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iWhen the University of Michigan celebrates its 
Bicentennial year in 2017-2018, the Duderstadts will also 
be completing our 50th year at the University, surpassing 
all other Michigan presidents in the number of years of 
service to the University (including Presidents Angell 
and Ruthven). Furthermore, 35 of these years have been 
spent as members of the Michigan faculty community, 
including two decades after the presidency, yet another 
first for former presidents.
Over our half-century as members of the University 
community, we have had the opportunity to serve the 
University of Michigan in almost every faculty role. We 
began our service when Jim was recruited as a young 
faculty member in the Department of Nuclear Science 
and Engineering while Anne joined and later assumed 
leadership of the Faculty Women’s Club (while earning 
her graduate degree). Next we were recruited into a 
sequence of University leadership roles that were very 
much two-person jobs: Dean and “Deanette”, Provost 
and “Provostess”, and President and First Lady of 
the University. After returning to the faculty and 
the University family in the late 1990s, we have both 
continued to work in a variety of roles for the University, 
creating new academic programs, launching dozens of 
projects to capture and illustrate its remarkable history 
through the use of rapidly evolving technologies, and 
working hard to advance the interests of the University 
through both roles and projects at the national and 
international level. Furthermore we have had the 
experience of being Michigan parents when both of our 
daughters earned their graduate degrees (a PhD and 
MD) at the University.
Hence we have had a front row seat in both observing 
and experiencing many of the events and changes that 
have occurred during this half-century of the University 
of Michigan and the Ann Arbor community, and 
also within the context of the extraordinary changes 
characterizing our state, the nation, and the world. 
Hence it occurred to us that it might be interesting 
to share this unusual perspective of what has changed 
and what has stayed the same, the ups and downs, and 
what our University has gained and what it has lost 
over these many years. In fact, by charting the course of 
the University over the past half-century, perhaps we 
might be able to suggest some of the most important 
characteristics, principles, and values that could guide 
Michigan as it enters its third century in 2017.
Of course, over such an extended period, most 
characteristics of the University tend to fluctuate rather 
than exhibit a secular trend (except for the downward 
path of state support). For example, when we first 
arrived in Ann Arbor in the 1960s, the campus was alive 
with student activism and protest concerning important 
social issues such as civil rights, the Vietnam War, and 
the draft. President Fleming’s wise leadership and the 
shifting priorities of society calmed the campus during 
the 1970s, but activism flared up once again in the 1980s 
and 1990s on both old issues (the lack of University 
progress in achieving racial diversity) and new (the 
creation of a campus police department). The late 
1990s and early 21st century were again a time of calm, 
but both student and faculty activism have flared up 
once again during the 2010s over the administration’s 
awkward efforts to impose a corporate style of 
centralized management onto a highly decentralized 
academic institution. The cyclic nature of many of these 
issues is important to recognize, since what is up today 
is likely to be down tomorrow, and vice versa.
There is also considerable variation in how one 
would measure the changing nature of various 
university activities. Some of these can be easily 
quantified, at least if one can pry the data out of the 
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bureaucratic complexity of a $7 billion/year enterprise. 
For example, it is straightforward to demonstrate the 
University’s rise and fall in racial diversity over this 
period. African American student enrollments rose 
from 4% during the 1960s up to over 9% in the 1990s 
due to the Michigan Mandate effort, only to collapse 
back to the 4% range over the past 15 years due both 
to state policy (a constitutional ban on affirmative 
action) and the lack of a strategic commitment to social 
diversity and inclusion.
However it requires a more subjective assessment to 
determine how many other characteristics have fared. 
For example, the Michigan saga as a pathfinder was 
in high gear during the 1960s, challenging the flaws 
of our society through student organizations such as 
the Students for a Democratic Society and academic 
activities such as Teach-ins. However the 1970s were a 
relatively placid time, without great impact on broader 
society. Michigan resumed its leadership role in the 
1980s and 1990s, changing the world yet again through 
its role in building and managing the Internet and 
then developing the paradigm of massive digitization 
of scholarly materials. However this was followed by 
yet another inactive decade as the University focused 
on internal issues such as enrollment growth, cost-
containment, and private fund-raising, while shifting 
both attention and priorities from resource-strained 
academic activities to the opportunities presented by 
prosperous auxiliary activities (e.g., hospitals, housing, 
and football).
To identify and analyze such trends requires not 
only a breadth of experience across the University, 
but also immersion in its activities over a considerable 
period of time. Since both happen to characterize our 
many years at Michigan, we have set out to provide 
just such a perspective as the University approaches its 
200th birthday in 2017. 
There are several important caveats we need to stress 
at the outset of this book.  First our effort to chart the 
course of the University of Michigan over the past five 
decades is a highly personal one, based on experiences 
we have had, how we understood them, and, in limited 
instances, how we attempted to deal with what we 
found. Put another way, this is certainly not intended 
as either a comprehensive history of the University (a 
la Peckham’s The Making of the University of Michigan), 
or a data-driven analysis of the University at different 
points in its history (a la the Michigan Almanac). 
A second caveat: This is an attempt to utilize the 
perspective gained through highly personal experiences 
to chart the course of the University of Michigan over 
its past half-century. Although we have concluded each 
chapter with several suggestions–some obvious, some 
on the radical fringe–about paths one might explore 
for Michigan’s future, the University’s third century 
will be shaped and led by new generations of faculty, 
students, staff, and leaders.
Finally, we have sprinkled throughout occasional 
observations and stories of a more humorous nature, 
accompanied from time to time with a few “zingers”, 
both to reawaken the reader and to avoid any 
interpretation that this book is intended as an accurate 
history of the past half-century of the University of 
Michigan. Instead it is simply the perspective of two 
loyal members of the University community who have 
regarded serving the University of Michigan as our 
highest calling to public service.
   James and Anne Duderstadt
   Ann Arbor, Michigan
   2016
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1In December of 1968, the Duderstadts moved from 
Southern California to Ann Arbor, Michigan, following 
four years in sunny (rather, smoggy) Pasadena, Jim’s 
graduate education, Anne’s job as a department 
manager, and the birth of our two daughters, Susan and 
Kathy.   It was a hot, sunny day in Pasadena–a Santa 
Ana condition, in fact–when we loaded our furniture 
moving van and took a taxi to LAX to fly to Detroit. We 
packed up our kids, who had never even seen snow, 
much less Michigan, and flew to Detroit, arriving in 
subzero cold and heavy snow. 
 We checked into the Ann Arbor Holiday Inn and 
awaited the arrival of our furniture–and our VW, which 
was also on the moving van–before we could move into 
our bare apartment in Northwood IV married student 
housing on the University’s North Campus. Here we 
would note that during the 1960s, few of the new young 
faculty families could afford to purchase a house, so the 
University kindly allowed us to rent an apartment in 
married student housing until we earned enough to 
purchase our own home.
Christmas was approaching. Michigan Bell was on 
strike, so we had no telephone, no house, no friends, 
and little money. No wonder we felt rather alone in this 
strange, cold place, so different from the house we had 
been living in in Pasadena, surrounded by avocado 
trees and adjacent to the Caltech Campus.
Yet Ann Arbor during the 1960s was a very exciting 
place, with the University in a building boom that 
was rapidly changing the campus, student activism 
at fever pitch, and the arrival of a new football coach 
(Bo Schembechler)–ironically arriving the same week 
we did–kindling a new spirit of optimism about the 
Wolverines.
Hence, perhaps the best place to begin this narrative 
concerning our perspective of the past half-century 
of the University of Michigan is to describe our first 
impressions of the institution, its campus, and the Ann 
Arbor community.
The University of Michigan 1950s
The University of Michigan had long been regarded 
as one of the leading public universities in the nation, 
both in terms of the quality of its academic programs 
and the scale of its activities. For much of its early 
history it had been the largest university in the nation, 
both in terms of enrollment and the scale of its campus 
(and its football stadium, of course). Its medical center 
was similarly renown for the quality of its clinical 
care, its scale, and the medical research of its faculty. 
Following WWII, the federal commitment to funding 
campus-based research transformed the University 
into one of the world’s leading research universities, 
with particularly strong programs in the social sciences, 
engineering, and the professions. Of note were major 
national research centers such as the Institute for 
Social Research, the Willow Run Laboratories, and 
the Michigan Memorial Phoenix Project, the nation’s 
first university effort to develop peaceful applications 
of atomic energy. In fact, it was the latter effort that 
attracted us to Michigan, since the University had 
the world’s leading programs in nuclear science 
and engineering, Jim’s particular interests following 
graduation from Caltech with a PhD in engineering 
science and physics.
As described in more detail in Appendix A, the 
University’s unusual degree of autonomy provided 
by the state constitution and its early establishment in 
1817 as a territorial university some two decades before 
Michigan attained statehood gave it a broader character 
as both a national and international institution, in 
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2contrast to those public universities created much later 
by the states in response to the Morrill (Land-Grant) 
Act. Although state support was sufficient to sustain 
both the quality and growth of the institution during 
the first two decades following WWII, by the time we 
arrived in the late 1960s there were already early signs 
that this was beginning to deteriorate. Fortunately, 
the University had launched a successful fund-raising 
campaign during the 1960s (the first among public 
universities), and optimism was high that growth 
would continue, even if state support were to fluctuate.
The strong support of the Regents during the post-
war decades, coupled with the strong leadership of 
President Harlan Hatcher and key deans such as Roger 
Heyns, William Haber, G. G. Brown, and Thomas 
Francis, along with unusually able administrators 
such as Wilbur Pierpont, had built both the quality 
and capacity of the University to the point where it 
rivaled not only leading public universities such as the 
University of California at Berkeley but also private 
universities such as Harvard, Yale, and MIT. Yet there 
were new challenges to the campus that required 
new leadership, and the year before we arrived, 
the Regents had selected a new president, Robben 
Fleming, from the chancellorship of the University of 
Wisconsin Madison, who had the skills to address both 
the activism developing on college campuses and the 
new challenges presented by the state and the federal 
government. President Fleming and his wife Sally were 
to become both our mentors and friends as we later 
followed them into leadership roles ourselves.
The Michigan Campus, Circa 1960s
When we first arrived in Ann Arbor, in 1968, the 
Central Campus of the University looked much as 
it does today, with the major Albert Kahn buildings 
already several decades old (including the great Hill 
Auditorium). Both the towering Hatcher Library and 
the Mondrian-designed Administration building had 
recently opened, although the most majestic new 
building on the Central Campus was the new Dental 
School, rumored to be the most expensive building in 
the University’s history. 
The Medical Campus included not only a 
bewildering complex of clinical buildings surrounding 
the “Old Main” University Hospital, but several blocks 
to the west was St. Joseph’s Mercy Hospital, a clinical 
facility comparable in both size and activity to the 
University’s medical campus.
Further to the North and across the Huron River 
was the University’s North Campus, still largely a 
vacant area of rolling hills and forests, inhabited only 
by research facilities such as the Phoenix Memorial 
Laboratory, the Cooley Electronics Laboratory, several 
engineering research buildings, and Jim’s Department 
of Nuclear Science and Engineering (because of the 
use of the Ford Nuclear Reactor and other nuclear 
research laboratories on the North Campus). There had 
been some recent efforts to begin to populate the new 
campus, including the Eero Saarinen designed School 
of Music and the tower of the Institute of Science and 
Technology, but in the 1960s the North Campus had 
few students or instructional activities. 
There was a long-standing promise to move the entire 
College of Engineering (and perhaps as well the School 
of Education) out to the campus, but these remained 
only dreams, although the College encouraged its 
faculty members to purchase homes near the North 
Campus. We ignored this advice, primarily since we 
could not afford the housing in the northern Ann Arbor 
subdivisions. We eventually ended up purchasing 
a home on the south side of Ann Arbor, close to the 
public schools.
The South Campus was dominated by Michigan 
Stadium and the new Crisler Arena, nicknamed “the 
House that Cazzie built” because of the Michigan 
basketball team’s 1960’s success led by its star, Cazzie 
Russell. The great size of Michigan Stadium, even then 
one of the largest stadiums in the nation, was hidden 
by its location in an excavated bowl with only a small 
pressbox and entrance tunnels visible from ground 
level, until one walked into the massive stadium itself.
The rapid growth of the campus began to slow in 
the late 1960s, both because of the weakening of state 
appropriations, but even more so because of action by 
the State Legislature to allocate all monies for planning 
and constructing university buildings through the 
state controller, including planning and letting 
contracts. Unfortunately this conflicted directly with 
the University of Michigan’s constitutional autonomy, 
and the institution wisely refused to put this at risk by 
3The University of Michigan Central Campus in the 1960s
accepting state-funded projects with this restriction for 
the next decade. Although the constraint eventually 
was withdrawn, by that time the impact of the energy 
crisis on the state’s economy, coupled with the growing 
pressure of the Japanese automobile industry on Detroit, 
triggered the beginning of a more permanent erosion of 
state support that would continue for decades to come. 
Academic Activities
The 1960s were a time of unusual experimentation 
for the University. A Residential College for 
undergraduates was launched in the East Quad 
Residence Halls (although the original plan called for 
a new set of residence halls along Fuller Road between 
Center and North Campus). The Pilot Program, the 
Inteflex program (a joint-B.S./M.D. program), and the 
Honors programs were other examples of important 
academic innovations in student living-learning 
environments
With the Cold War following closely on the heals 
of WWII, it was natural that the engineering and 
physical science programs of the University would 
continue to be heavily involved in defense research, 
including the efforts of the Willow Run Laboratories 
(Project Wolverine) in remote sensing, Aerospace 
Engineering’s involvement in guided missile and 
space flight technology (including astronaut training), 
and Computer Science and Engineering, with the 
co-development with IBM of the first time-sharing 
system (MTS). The University launched the world’s 
first university program in the peaceful uses of atomic 
energy with the Michigan Memorial Phoenix Project as 
its WWII memorial to the University’s war casualties. 
The Phoenix Project began to contribute major scientific 
breakthroughs such as Donald Glaser’s development 
of the bubble chamber for high-energy physics and 
William Beierwaltes’s use of I-131 to launch the field 
of nuclear medicine. The social sciences also rapidly 
gained strength and national leadership with the Survey 
Research Center, the Institute for Social Research, and 
the Center for Research on Learning and Teaching. In 
4Our daughters provide a tour of the University, circa 1969, including our VW, Northwood Housing, the Central 
Campus “dinosaur museum”, the “cube”, Jim’s North Campus lab, ..and their future home (20 years later).
5fact, by the 1960s, 21 of the University’s departments 
were ranked in the top 10, a number exceeded only by 
Harvard, Yale, and UC-Berkeley.
As it has often been, the University’s academic 
priorities were heavily influenced by national rather 
than state needs. There was a strong emphasis on 
science and engineering associated with the defense 
needs of the nation in the Cold War years along with the 
space program. Similarly, the latter years of the 1960s 
were characterized by the priorities of the Great Society, 
with major investments in programs in education, 
social sciences, and public health. Although the energy 
crisis of the 1970s shocked the national economy, there 
were already signs that the aging baby boomers where 
shifting national priorities toward health care, perhaps 
best illustrated on the UM campus by the investment 
in the new Dental School complex and the massive 
Replacement Hospital Project. The weakening of the 
Michigan economy brought economic competitiveness 
onto the table with major investments in Engineering 
(including the move to the North Campus) and 
Business Administration. Although the “dot-com” 
explosion during the 1990s and the end of the Cold 
War suggested that a “peace dividend “ would boost 
investment once again in technology, instead an aging 
population continued to place health care and hence 
biomedical research as the nation’s highest priority, at 
least in terms of investment in higher education, with 
strong growth across all of the health sciences.
The Protest Generation
In the early 1960s a new generation of students, 
largely pampered by “the Greatest Generation” of their 
parents, who had not only saved the nation in WWII but 
invested heavily in their children’s future, had arrived 
on campus with a new spirit of activism. While much 
of their agenda was concerned with significant national 
issues such as civil rights and the Vietnam War, they 
were also intent with challenging the establishment. 
The Free Speech Movement at UC-Berkeley spawned 
student rebellion against not only the student policies 
of American universities, but also challenged the 
full spectrum of student traditions such as in loco 
parentis, student disciplinary policies, fraternities and 
sororities, and other traditional aspects of student life. 
Demonstrating their new freedoms, they dropped out 
and turned on, embracing the drug culture and hippie 
movement of Haight-Ashbury on many campuses. The 
youth culture of the 1960s were anti-establishment, anti-
war, anti-elitism, anti-materialism, and were instead for 
free love, free sex, and free pot! Michigan not only was 
a part of this new student culture, but the University’s 
students actually led it with more radical groups such 
as the Students for Democratic Society and the Port 
Huron Manifesto. 
The “protest generation” of students not only 
pushed the universities out of student lives, but in 
many ways the new spirit of rebellion and rejection of 
tradition severed much of the University from its past. 
Students refused to attend not only commencements 
but even athletic events–although they would use these 
for highly visible protest movements from time to time. 
Old traditions such as the J-Hop, freshman hazing, 
class plays, and other long-standing student activities 
disappeared. Even the Greeks were on hard times and 
had to take in boarders, dropping from 12% to 5 % of 
the student body.
Students took to the streets to protest national 
causes such as the war in Vietnam, energized in part by 
the threat of the draft for most male college students by 
the late 1960s. A particularly volatile issue concerned 
Michigan’s low minority enrollments, triggering the 
formation of the Black Action Movement that demanded 
commitment to achieving 10% black enrollment by the 
early 1970s, and using both sit-ins and University-wide 
strikes to push their agenda. 
Our memories of the University and Ann Arbor 
of the late 1960s are filled with images that are more 
amusing that threatening today: The liberation of South 
University as a “free love” zone. The John Lennon 
concert to free John Sinclair, jailed for smoking pot. 
Hacking a Ford car to death on the Diag to demonstrate 
the damage cars do to the environment. A counter-
culture version of a University Homecoming parade. A 
rock concert in an Ann Arbor park by the rock group, 
the MC-5, “kicking out the jams”. Candidates of the 
Rainbow People’s Party running for City Council. 
Of course, all was not fun and peaceful 
demonstrations. University buildings were taken over. 
The Black Action Movement threatened the University 
with several strikes against classes. Fortunately, the 
6University’s president, Robben Fleming, was an 
experienced labor negotiator and understood how 
to keep such demonstrations from boiling over into 
violence and personal injury. He skillfully kept the 
agenda of a few radical agitators from provoking larger 
crowds into serious disruption of the campus. In fact, 
President Fleming succeeded in earning the respect of 
both the University community and those who were 
challenging its policies and commitments. He was 
clearly the right leader for these difficult times.
 
The Faculty Family
Fortunately, within a few weeks after our arrival, 
Anne encountered the first signs of the strong social 
network that had developed within the University 
through the wives of faculty members. She was 
contacted by the leaders of the Newcomers Section 
of the Faculty Women’s Club and invited both to join 
and to meet other new arrivals at a series of social get-
togethers for the over 700 new faculty wives joining the 
University that year. 
Here it is important to stress just how important such 
faculty organizations were to new faculty families. The 
University is a very diverse and complex organization, 
broken up into smaller social groups usually aligned 
with academic departments or work areas. One can 
image the differences among academic units such as 
Law, Medicine, Engineering, and LS&A, or among the 
diverse departments and programs in each of these 
It was a time for protest...even during the Homecoming parade. 
Even our daughters joined in with friend to protest a protest!
Students led the battle against “isms”!Rallies on the Diag against the Viet Nam War
7units. While most of these academic departments made 
some effort to welcome and orient their new faculty 
members, their families were generally ignored.
In contrast, the Faculty Women’s Club spanned the 
entire university, hosting an unusually broad set of 
activities and interest groups both for faculty wives and 
more broadly their families. In fact, since being launched 
by President Burton’s wife, Nina Burton, in the 1920s, it 
had become the primary social organization for pulling 
together faculty members and their families across the 
University. While many of the women in the Faculty 
Women’s Club would remain active throughout their 
lives (including many of the wives of senior university 
leaders such as presidents and deans), the FWC 
Newcomers group played a particularly important role 
both in welcoming new arrivals to the University and 
providing them with opportunities to become engaged 
in its broad range of activities, both as members and as 
families. 
Although there were many other opportunities 
for faculty to come together, such as family events 
(school programs, summer activities), cultural events 
(performing arts), or “cosmic athletic events” (UM 
football and basketball), these usually appealed to 
particular interests or periods in family life (e.g., 
school-age children). It was also a time when academic 
programs such as departments and research institutes 
hosted frequent events to pull together faculty members 
and their families to create a sense of community.
The City of Ann Arbor
Part of our attraction to the University of Michigan 
was the city of Ann Arbor itself. We remember an 
observation made by Robben Fleming during the 1970s 
when he suggested that the three universities that were 
the most difficult to raid for faculty were: i) Harvard, 
because of its tradition and reputation, ii) Indiana 
University, because of the strange role Bloomington 
plays in symbolizing the best of the state’s culture, and 
iii) Ann Arbor, in large measure because of the quality 
of life characterizing our community.
Esquire magazine once called cities such as Ann 
Arbor as “academic womb” communities, a small city 
whose culture is dominated by a great university. After 
a few years at Michigan, one might be tempted to go 
to another institution, but it would be difficult indeed 
to leave the “academic womb” of communities such as 
Madison, Chapel Hill, Champaign-Urbana, or Berkeley. 
These are cities with a vast array of world-class cultural 
opportunities, intellectual excitement, and (at least 
until recently priced beyond most of our citizens) big-
time college sports and all within a few minutes drive, 
if you can find the parking. 
Ann Arbor is an exciting, cosmopolitan, richly 
diverse, and wonderful place to live and work. Not 
to say that there are not some drawbacks: the crowds 
during football game days, the amount of property 
taken off the tax roles by the University, occasional 
Back in those days, Michigan football was a “community event”, with $2 tickets 
for children and a special day to honor the State’s high school bands.
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student rowdy behavior, and, of course, never enough 
parking. Yet the presence of one of the nation’s largest 
universities in the relatively small city of Ann Arbor 
provided an unusual array of world-class community 
events, affordable, easily attended, and important for 
pulling together a diverse communities of students, 
faculty, staff, and townspeople. 
Of course, the premier activity in the fall was 
Michigan football. Although the team was good, 
Michigan Stadium was so large that it was rarely 
sold out during the 1960s (except for Ohio State and 
Michigan State), typically averaging 80,000 fans. Hence 
it was both easy and affordable for groups of faculty 
couples and even families to arrange to sit together 
(children’s tickets were only $2), so that the games 
became an important social event. In fact, in an effort 
to build attendance, each fall the University would 
invite dozens of high school bands to participate in the 
halftime performance, and invite all of the Boy Scouts 
in the area to serve as ushers for a game. This social 
role of Michigan football provided a very important 
opportunity for gathering the diverse town-gown 
community together in a common activity (either 
to cheer on Michigan Wolverines or the Michigan 
Marching Band, depending on one’s proclivities). 
The second world-class activity involved the 
University Musical Society, which attracted many of the 
world’s leading symphonies and musical performers 
to Hill Auditorium, again priced attractively enough 
that this became a community event ($15 to $30 for a 
season ticket to the entire Choral Union Series). The 
highlight of each year was the May Festival, four nights 
of performances by the Philadelphia Orchestra led by 
Eugene Ormandy, which capped off the academic year 
with guest performers such as Vladimir Horowitz and 
Van Cliburn. 
Of course there are many other more relaxed 
memories of Ann Arbor and the University from those 
early days. The Pretzel Bell and Village Bell restaurants 
were still the places where students would celebrate 
reaching their 21st birthdays and “drinking age”. New 
hangouts such the Gandy Dancer and the Whiffletree 
became popular eating establishments. And who could 
ever forget Bimbos, with peanut shells on the floor and 
a great Dixieland band or the Blind Pig with a more 
progressive taste in avant guarde music.
Charting a Course to the Future
Both the University of Michigan and the City of Ann 
Arbor in the 1960s provide several benchmarks, in the 
energy, excitement, and impact of these communities, 
against which we might measure the subsequent 
evolution of the University over the next half-century. 
Ann Arbor was still very much a small town, but with 
extraordinary cultural resources. The University was 
highly regarded as one of the great universities of 
the world. And University students and faculty were 
unusually active, engaged, and influential in addressing 
some of the importance challenges of this era, although 
their energy and concerns frequently challenged the 
authority and patience of University leadership and 
governance.
Today a rapidly changing world demands new 
commitments from leading universities such as 
Michigan–a new level of knowledge, skills, and abilities 
on the part of its students, research of both basic and 
applied nature to address the future challenges facing 
our world, and deep engagement with our society, 
deploying the unique assets of great public research 
universities to address their needs and concerns. 
Perhaps these should frame the discussion of the future 
of the University of Michigan as it approaches its third 
century. It certainly provides the context for considering 
the evolution of the University of Michigan, its ups and 
its downs, over the past half century.
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Appendix
Some Timelines of the Past 50 Years
National and World Events
1950 McCarthy
1950 Korean War
1955 Salk Vaccine
1957 Little Rock School Desegregation
1958 National Defense Education Act
1958 Integrated Circuit
1961 Bay of Pigs
1961 Vietnam War
1962 Cuban Missile Crisis
1962 SDS
1963 MLK March
1963 JFK Assassination
1965 Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society speech
1965 Voting Rights Act
1965 Medicaid and Medicare
1965 Higher Education Act
1967 Detroit Riots
1968 Tet Offensive
1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
1969 Neal Armstrong on Moon
1969 Woodstock
1970 Kent State
1970 Earth Day
1970 EPA
1972 Nixon to China
1972 Watergate
1972 Apollo 17
1973 Roe vs. Wade
1973 OPEC Oil Crisis
1974 Nixon resigns; Ford becomes president
1975 Bill Gates founds Microsoft
1977 First personal computer (Commodore)
1979 Three Mile Island nuclear accident
1979 Chrysler loan guarantees
1981 Reagan becomes president
1986 Gramm-Rudman
1987 Berlin: Tear down this wall
1989 End of Cold War
1990 Gulf War
1991 USSR dissolved
1992 Major weather events begin
1998 Lewinsky scandal
1999 Y2 Bug
2001 Bush Tax Cuts
2001 Patriot Act
2002 No Child Left Behind Act
2002 Department of Homeland Security
2002 Invasion of Iraq
2004 Hurricane Katrina
2008 Great Recession
2009 Barack Obama
2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
2010 Deepwater Horizon Spill
2011 Dodd Frank Bill
2012 Fragmentation of political collaboration
National Higher Education
1950s
Massification
NSF-NIH-DOD created
Cold War-Sputnik
National Defense Education Act
1960s
Formation of state university systems
California Master Plan
Publics overtake privates as national priority
Research universities begin to appear
R&D focus on defense and space
Protest generation (Free Speech, SDS)
Racial unrest, civil rights
 
1970s
Baby boomer student surge
Pell Grants signal federal involvement
Mansfield Amendment changes fellowships into RAs
Affirmative action
Cal Prop 13 signals decline of priority of K-12
1980s
Baby boom ceases, HS graduate dip
Federal grants replaced by loans
Private wealth swamps publics
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Research priorities: Cold War ends, guns to pills
Bayh-Dole Act and tech transfer
USN&WR launch rankings game
1990s
For profits appear
Internet and Dot-Com bubble
Prop 209 challenge to affirmative action
Tidal Wave 2 on horizon with baby boomer kids
2000s
State funding collapses (-35%)
Immigration surge
Social networking (Facebook, Twitter,…)
Open knowledge: OCW, Google, Wikipedia…
No Child Left Behind…worry about K-12
2010s
States no longer support research universities
Both privates and publics approach tuition ceilings
Faculty retirement challenges
China passes US both in economy and HE
New technologies (MOOCs, big data, analytics)
U Michigan Timeline
1950s
UMAA doubles in size (GI Bill)
Willow Run defense research (Project Michigan)
Defense and space research
Strong state support for operations and facilities
North Campus expansion
Strength in the quantitative sciences
 
1960s
UM Expansion as a “system”: UM Flint, UM Dear-
born, North Campus
Survey Research Center, Institute for Social Research
Student protests, SDS
Black Action Movement (Detroit riots)
In loco parentis ends
Some academic innovation: RC, Pilot, Inteflex, etc.
Shift from UG focus to professional school focus
State constitutional convention extends UM’s consisti-
tutal autonomy to all state universities
1970s
Robben Fleming calms the storm
Labor takes over Regents; major unionization of UM
Expansion of state higher education as community 
colleges become 4-year institutons
Spinoff of Willow Run (and classified research)
Early preparation for anticipated financial storm 
by Provost Harold Shapiro (e.g., Budget Priorities 
Committee)
 
1980s
Automobile industry collapses (Japan competition)
State support collapses (drops 30% over 2 years)
State support of facilities ceases (never restored)
Shapiro Three-Point plan: costs down, tuition up, 
fund-raising up
“Smaller but better” strategy --> focus on excellence
Massive growth in Medical Center: RHP, CMHC, …
Research incentives drives UM R&D $ to #1 in nation
UM joins with IBM to create Internet
 
1990s
VP Womack establishes central “bank” increasing UM 
reserves from $200 M to a $2.5 B endowment during  
decentralization strategy: RCM, TQM, placing power 
with deans
$1.4 billion campaign, endowment up x10, R&D $ 
doubles
Diversity becomes priority: Michigan Mandate, 
Agenda for Women, Gay rights leading to highest UM 
diversity in history (9.4% AA, doubling AA faculty)
Innovation: Media Union, JSTOR, School of 
Information
Renewal of most academic facilities
Focus on Leadership, Vision, Transformation
Duderstadt --> Bollinger (“back to the future”)
2000s
Replace tuition increases with enrollment increases
Preoccupation with whims: Royal Shakespeare 
Theater, Life Sciences Institution, Michigan Stadium 
“halo”
Resources flat (no fund-raising, no tuition increases)
State support drops another 50%
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Enrollment increases begin; diversity begins to drop
2003 Supreme Court case; diversity continues to drop, 
erasing all the gains of the 1990s and dropping 
below levels of the 1960s
Attempts to recentralize by weakening deans through 
external appointments
Major fund-raising $3.3 B fund-raising campaign
Expansion of PR efforts (“global” communications, 
branding, Athletic Director Brand-on)
2010s
State support continues to deteriorate
Huge enrollment growth (+10,000 students, +25%, 
most out-of-state)
Tuition revenue increases to $1.2 B, R&D up to $1.3 B, 
Endowment: $10 B
Shift to part-time faculty for UG instruction
University priorities shift from academic to auxiliary 
(hospitals, housing, athletics
Loss of community
Loss of public purpose (a university for “the common 
man” becomes a university for “the 1%”
Efforts to re-centralize (“shared services”)
Athletics out of control (sold to the highest bidder)
Modest academic innovation (mostly “me-too-isms”)
2020 and beyond
Third Century Goals:
Reflection: Restore the Michigan Saga
Renaissance: Stress creativity, innovation
Enlightment: Provide the light of knowledge and 
learning to the world
“A more perfect union”: Restore UM as a learning 
community!  
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Throughout its history, the University of Michigan 
has been one of the nation’s largest universities, 
vying with the largest private universities such as 
Harvard and Columbia during the 19th and early 20th 
centuries, and then holding this position of national 
leadership until the emergence of the statewide public 
university systems (e.g., the University of California 
and the University of Texas) in the post-WWII years. 
Perhaps this addiction to growth was best explained 
by Michigan President Marion Leroy Burton during 
the 1920s, when he concluded “A state university must 
accept happily the conclusion that it is destined to be 
large. If its state grows and prosper, it will naturally 
reflect those conditions.” (Peckham, 1963)
During our early years at Michigan, we really did 
not sense the immense size of the University except 
on Saturday afternoons in the fall. After several years 
living in Pasadena and the Los Angeles metroplex, 
Ann Arbor seemed quite small–indeed, even quaint. 
But the scale of the University became more apparent 
with the amount of construction that began to appear 
on the University campus in the early 1980s with the 
Replacement Hospital Project and then on the North 
Campus with the construction of the new Engineering 
facilities. Throughout the late 1980s and 1990s, the 
University campuses continued to be dotted with new 
construction, stimulating the suggestion that perhaps 
Michigan should trade its wolverine mascot for the 
crane (the construction crane, that is).
By the mid-1990s in the roles of dean, provost, and 
president, we had accumulated considerable experience 
with all of the University’s campuses: Central Campus, 
North Campus, Medical Campus, Athletic Campus, and 
to some extent even the Flint and Dearborn Campuses. 
In these roles we became aware of the growth of the 
University in other areas such as sponsored research 
activity (a national leader), the rapid expansion of the 
University health system (growing larger than the 
University itself), and, fortunately, the endowment 
created by our financial teams, led by Farris Womack, 
which grew from $200 M to $2.5 B during the 1990s. 
Such growth in resources was fortunate, since state 
support continued to decline during the 1980s and 
1990s and then even more rapidly after 2000, dropping 
to less than 8% of the academic budget and 4% of the 
total budget of the Ann Arbor campus by 2015. 
In contrast to the growth in facilities and endowment, 
the enrollments of the University remained stable at 
roughly 35,000 students during the 1980s and 1990s. 
However enrollments began to grow rapidly in the 
2000s with the decision of a new administration to attract 
more out-of-state students capable of paying much 
higher tuition (e.g., $40,000/y compared to $14,000/y 
for instate students). The addition of another 10,000 
students to the University’s Ann Arbor campus, while 
compensating for the loss of state support, seriously 
strained both the faculty and physical capacity of the 
University, raising serious questions about whether 
this unbridled growth had changed the fundamental 
character of the institution.
Growth of the University
It can be argued that it was in the Midwest, in frontier 
towns such as Ann Arbor and Madison, that true 
universities first appeared in America. By augmenting 
the traditional mission of educating the young with 
faculty scholarship and public service to society, the 
emerging public state universities created a uniquely 
American university capable of responding to the 
needs of a rapidly changing nation in the 19th Century 
and that still dominates higher education today. 
Chapter 2
Growth
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The University of Michigan campus (1855, Cropsey)
The University of Michigan campus (1910, Rummell)
The University of Michigan campus (1930)
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The University of Michigan campus (1970)
The University of Michigan campus (2000)
The University of Michigan campus (2010)
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The University of Michigan was established in 1817 
in the village of Detroit by an act of the Northwest 
Territorial government and financed through the sale 
of Indian lands granted by the United States Congress. 
However it was only after the State of Michigan entered 
the Union in 1837 that a new plan was adopted to focus 
the University on higher education, establishing it as 
a “state” university after the Prussian system, with 
programs in literature, science and arts; medicine; 
and law–the first three academic departments of the 
new university. The new Michigan State Legislature 
authorized funds to purchase a campus for the 
University, and an enterprising group of citizens from 
Ann Arbor offered a 40 acre site in their community, 
now known as the University’s Central Campus. 
(Actually, the group first wanted to attract the state 
capital, but that went to Lansing. Then they considered 
going after the state prison before finally offering the 
site for a university.)
Campus Growth
The Ann Arbor campus expanded rapidly through 
the latter 19th and into the 20th century, as shown by the 
sequence of campus illustrations, broadening beyond 
the confines of the original 40 acres and then expanding 
northward toward the Huron River to accommodate 
the expansion of the University hospital and related 
medical facilities. 
Although growth was relatively modest during 
the early 20th Century through the Depression years, 
following WWII the returning veterans doubled 
enrollments, followed by the baby boom of the 1960s 
and 1970s that doubled the size again. To accommodate 
anticipated further growth, the Regents acquired 
farm property north of the city of Ann Arbor for both 
academic programs and student residences. During 
the 1950s the University began to build new laboratory 
facilities and student apartments on its North Campus. 
There were even plans to build additional student 
residence halls along the Huron River between the 
Central Campus and the North Campus with estimates 
of future enrollments ranging as high as 100,000 
students. 
In the post WWII years, the federal government 
adopted policies that funded much of the nation’s 
basic research on university campuses, thereby 
transforming leading institutions such as Michigan 
into research universities, and expanding their public 
purpose to include contributions to the security, public 
health, and prosperity of the nation in addition to 
their responsibilities to their states. The University’s 
commitment to serve the needs of the state also continued 
to expand with the growth of clinical care facilities by 
the University Medical Center, the creation of extension 
services to provide instruction throughout the state 
through instructional television, strong collaboration 
with Michigan industry, and, of course, providing high 
quality educational opportunities at the undergraduate, 
graduate, and professional level for Michigan citizens. 
Hence the expanding missions of the University in 
teaching, research, and service (particularly in the 
Medical Center) have led to continued growth of the 
institution in all its characteristics–people, facilities, 
budget, and impact–over the past half century, despite 
the decline in state support.
The history of the growth of the University from its 
move to Ann Arbor to the late 1960s when we arrived 
in Ann Arbor is shown in a detailed map developed 
by Myron Mortenson of the UM Plant Department 
(and known as “Mort’s Map” and available at: http://
umhistory.dc.umich.edu/mort/). The dramatic growth 
since that time can be seen by detailed 3D maps of the 
Central, Medical, and North Campuses in Chapter 9.
Enrollment Growth
Although University enrollments stabilized at 
9,000 during the Depression years of the 1930s, they 
exploded following World War II, as the returning 
veterans supported by the G.I. Bill arrived on campus, 
taking enrollments to over 20,000 by 1950 (of whom 
11,000 were veterans). The enrollments on the Ann 
Arbor campus declined following the post WWII 
surge, slipping back to 17,000 in 1956. However they 
began to grow again during the 1960s as both faculties 
and campuses expanded rapidly to accommodate the 
children of the post-war families (the “baby boomers”) 
reaching college age in the 1960s, swelling the University 
to 22,000 in 1960 and 30,000 in 1970. Federal research 
funding increased dramatically. National priorities 
such as the Cold War and the space program and the 
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social priorities of the Great Society fueled dramatic 
growth in graduate education and professional schools 
such as education, social work, and public health.
In 1956 the Flint Board of Education asked UM 
to establish a Flint branch of an upper-class college 
coupled to Flint Community College, while the Ford 
family presented the Fairlane estate along with a 
$6.5M gift to encourage a similar upper-class college 
in Dearborn. The assumption was that these upper-
class colleges would be discontinued as the post War 
II enrollments subsided, and both programs began to 
flounder in the late 1960s, stagnating with enrollments 
of less than 2,000. However once launched, universities 
campuses are rarely abandoned, and with the help of 
the Mott and Ford Foundations and a state commitment 
of appropriations, the Regents approved upgrading 
these upper-class colleges into viable 4-year campuses, 
UM-Flint and UM-Dearborn. 
During the 1960s and 1970s there were similar 
examples of “mission creep” throughout Michigan as 
the community colleges at Grand Valley and Saginaw 
Valley successfully convinced the State Legislature 
to allow them to evolve into 4-year “universities”. 
Several of the state’s undergraduate colleges began to 
add graduate programs, thereby creating increasing 
pressure for additional state support. Wayne State 
University joined Michigan and Michigan State as a 
“constitutional” university in 1956. This growth and 
competition of public colleges and universities in the 
state would soon put pressure on the traditionally 
strong state support of the University of Michigan.
Enrollments on the Ann Arbor campus stabilized 
at 35,000 during the 1980s and 1990s. However, in an 
effort to counter the decline in state appropriations 
by admitting more out-of-state students paying 
high tuition, in 1998 the University began to increase 
enrollments once again. By 2014, enrollments had 
reached 44,000, a 25% increase from the 1980s and 
1990s. While this generated a very significant increase 
in tuition revenue (rising to $1.2 billion per year and 
far exceeding the University’s state support), it not 
only strained facilities but also dramatically increased 
instructional loads on the existing faculty, which had 
to be augmented by large increases in non-tenure 
track and part-time instructors, particularly at the 
undergraduate level.
UM Enrollment Growth from 1841 to 2013
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Faculty and Staff Growth
With a relatively stable enrollment during the 
1980s and 1990s, there was little growth in the size 
of the faculty, particularly since the rapid growth in 
enrollment of baby-boomer children during the 1960s 
had stimulated significant faculty hiring at that time. 
Furthermore, the decline in state funding during the 
1980s and 1990s also limited staff growth, at least in 
numbers.
Yet in recent years there has been significant 
change in the faculty and staff population. Rather 
than accommodating the rapid growth in enrollments 
during the past two decades (from 34,500 to 44,000 
students) with comparable growth in the permanent 
faculty, the University chose instead to rapidly increase 
the number of part-time lecturers and non-tenure track 
faculty, now providing over 50% of the instruction at 
the undergraduate level. 
Furthermore, while the staffing has been relatively 
constant across most of the University, there has been a 
very significant growth in the number of administrative 
staff, particularly in areas such as fund-raising, 
public relations, and university marketing. While 
this has been most evident at the level of the central 
administration, many schools and colleges also have 
seen very significant growth in staff size. For example, 
the administration of the College of Engineering, which 
had only 30 staff in the 1980s, now has over 240 staff 
members reporting to the deans and department chairs, 
many of whom are compensated at levels significantly 
higher than the core faculty of the College.
Ann Arbor Growth
The City of Ann Arbor grew with the University 
of Michigan’s enrollment, in part because over 30,000 
of its employees live among the 117,000 population of 
the city (including 12,000 from the Medical Center). To 
this one must add the 44,000 students, only one-third 
of whom live in University housing. The surge both in 
enrollments and in the relative wealth of students has 
driven an apartment boom in the city, as evidenced by 
the larger number of high rise buildings dotting the 
city center. Indeed, when we first arrived in Ann Arbor 
during the late 1960s, there were only three buildings 
above 10 stories in height. Today hardly a year goes by 
without several new high-rise buildings proposed by 
real estate developers with the purpose of housing the 
growing number of affluent students. 
While the actual population of the city appears to 
be growing gradually, the urbanization of the city in 
terms of new construction and traffic flow driven by the 
University seems quite pronounced.
Michigan Today: “The Biggest in the Land”!
Today the University of Michigan’s Ann Arbor 
campus has become one of the largest in the nation, 
while not in terms of enrollment (44,000 students), but 
rather in budget ($7.1 B/y), research activity ($1.3 B/y), 
campus facilities (36 million net-square-feet)...and, of 
course, Michigan Stadium (110,000). It is instructive to 
consider each of these measures in more detail:
Growth of student high-rise apartments in Ann Arbor.Another demonstration of enrollment growth.
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UM Total Budget (including hospitals) UM Academic Budget (without hospitals)
Financial Resources
Today the University of Michigan leads the nation 
in the size of the budget for its Ann Arbor campus ($7 
B for FY2015) and its academic (non-hospital) activities 
($2.8 B).
Of course, while these characteristics are impressive, 
so too are the challenges facing the University. Over the 
past several decades, state support of the University 
has dropped to less than 8% of its academic budget. 
Fortunately, the University managed to dramatically 
increase its endowment during the past two decades 
(from $200 million to $10 billion), so that the endowment 
now generates more support for the University than 
the state appropriation ($450 M/y vs $300 M/y). 
Nevertheless, the sustainability of adequate support 
to maintain the quality of research and teaching for 
a public university of this scale with state support 
declining to less than 4% of the total University budget 
is a matter of great concern.
As a consequence of the dramatic growth in student 
enrollments, research activity, clinical care, campus 
construction, and budgets over the past two decades, 
today the University has reached an extraordinary scale. 
With a total budget now exceeding $7 billion/year, a 
campus continuing to expand both with new buildings 
and the acquisition of the 200 acre site and facilities of 
the adjacent Pfizer Global Research Laboratories, and 
a research budget now in excess of $1.32 billion/year, 
one could well claim that the Ann Arbor campus of the 
University of Michigan has become the largest, most 
comprehensive, and most complex university campus 
in the world. In fact, the population of 65,362 students, 
faculty, and staff on the Michigan campus is comparable 
to the population of 117,000 for its host city, Ann Arbor 
(which is nearly exceeded on Saturday afternoons by 
Growth in UM research expenditures General Fund (core academic) Budget Components
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the attendance at Michigan Stadium!)
Enrollment
Of particular note here has been the growth in 
student enrollments, from 34,500 in the 1990s to almost 
44,000 today, a 25% growth occurring mostly at the 
undergraduate level with a particular emphasis on 
out-of-state students paying private tuition levels 
capable of increasing tuition revenue to compensate 
for the loss of state support. Yet this growth has also 
changed the character of the University, shifting 
somewhat the balance between graduate/professional 
education to undergraduate education, demanding a 
significant increase in the number of non-tenure track 
lecturers (who now provide over 50% of undergraduate 
instruction), driving a major expansion of student 
housing (on the part of both the University and 
private developers), and threatening to overload other 
academic infrastructure such as libraries, study space, 
course availability, and computer access. Teaching 
loads, as measured by students per full-time faculty 
member, are now the highest in the University’s history. 
It is also clear that the demand of affluent students for 
high quality living environments is distorting even the 
character of Ann Arbor as it becomes dotted with high-
rise apartment buildings.
Unfortunately, the rapid increase in the number 
of out-of-state students capable of paying private 
tuition levels has also seriously distorted the economic 
diversity of the student body. As the University has 
become increasingly dependent on the high tuition paid 
by out-of-state students from affluent backgrounds, it 
has seen a decline in the percentage of low income and 
UMAA Population in 2015
under represented minority students enrolling in the 
University. Michigan’s long-stated public purpose of 
“providing an uncommon education for the common 
man” has become at serious risk. The increasing 
number of students from wealthy families (recruiting 
for their tuition revenue) has not only shifted the 
income diversity of the University (with the percentage 
of low-income Pell Grant students dropping below 
12%, the lowest among major public universities), 
but also attracted many students who distort the 
student culture with a “paying for the party” attitude.
(Armstrong, 2012)
Campus
Campus Facilities
36 M nsf of buildings and core infrastructure
601 buildings, 2,125 classrooms and labs
900 study rooms, and 6,300 labs
7 miles of utility tunnels
150 miles of fiber optic cables
137,200 networked desktop computers
660 elevators and escalators
25 miles or roads
4.7 M sf of sidewalks, steps, and plazas
280 acres of parking lots and decks
16,100 trees and 13 M sf of turf
The University of Michigan campus has continued to 
evolve over the past 15 years, despite the disappearance 
of state support for major capital facilities. New 
buildings have appeared across the campus–Weill Hall, 
the Ross School of Business Administration, North 
Quad, the Law School expansion, the gigantic Mott 
Pediatrics Hospital, and of course, the “new” Michigan 
Stadium. The two major complexes designed by 
architect Robert Stern, Weill Hall (for the Ford School) 
and North Quad, provided elegant entrances to the 
Central Campus. While Venturi’s Life Sciences complex 
was actually a somewhat smaller version of buildings 
he designed for Yale and UCLA, the biomedical research 
complex on Huron and Observatory was important for 
the continued expansion of research activity in the life 
sciences, as was the acquisition of the former Pfizer 
Global Research campus for the site of North Campus 
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Research Center. Furthermore the massive biological 
sciences facilities for LS&A programs launched in 2014 
will further expand these part of the campus.
Of course, much of this growth was highly 
opportunistic. Low interest rates and the University’s 
high credit rating enabled it to launch a massive 
series of renovations of student residence halls ($650 
million), felt to be necessary not only to house growing 
enrollments but also attracting high quality (and high 
tuition paying) students. The addition of skyboxes and 
club facilities coupled with aggressive increases in ticket 
prices (now among the highest in the nation) brought in 
the additional revenue to enable growth in facilities (and 
compensation) for Michigan athletics. The University 
Medical Center continued its rapid expansion with a 
Cardiovascular Center, a major expansion of the East 
Medical Campus, and the massive new Mott Pediatrics 
Hospital, along with planned expansion of the Medical 
School. In addition there was further capital facilities 
growth fueled by philanthropy including a $150 million 
expansion of the Ross Business School, a $100 million 
gift for expansion of the Athletic Campus, and a $110 
million gift toward a $180 million project to build a 
graduate residence hall.
Of course, with the disappearance of state funding 
of university buildings during the 1990s, campus 
growth has depended increasingly on alternative 
funding mechanisms characterized not only by greater 
risk but in some cases controversy. For example, the 
financing of the construction of new research facilities 
as additions in the schools of Medicine, Public Health, 
and Engineering have become heavily dependent 
upon sponsored research support. As such, they have 
faced the risk of declining federal research budgets, 
such as that which occurred in 2010 with the budget 
sequestration actions of a conservative Congress.
Furthermore, while private giving stimulated 
further campus construction, donors tended to give to 
their own priorities rather than the University’s needs 
(e.g., the Munger graduate residence that was roundly 
panned by graduate students for its “dormitory-
like character”). Furthermore such projects require 
substantial University contributions because of the 
nature of the gift (e.g., through pledges and bequests 
that led to present worth values that fell far short of 
the proclaimed size of the gift) and the requirement 
of further cost sharing by the University for both the 
construction of the facility and its eventual operation. 
Here the lesson overlooked was that large donors 
usually give money for what they want rather than what 
universities need, hence all too frequently imposing 
sizeable additional university expenses for resources 
only peripheral to academic priorities.  In retrospect, it 
quickly became clear that the University had failed to 
adequately look many of these gift horses in the mouth, 
resulting in considerable additional expenses.
There were also more general concerns. Most of 
the recent campus growth (75%), at least in terms of 
investment, occurred in auxiliary units (i.e., clinical 
activities, housing, athletics) and were funded by 
auxiliary revenue streams, albeit with debt secured 
by student fee revenues. Those buildings responding 
to academic needs have generally depended upon 
anticipated federal research support (e.g., Public Health 
Annex) or private funding (Ross Business School, Weill 
Hall). This raised a serious question as to just how, in the 
absence of state support, the University could meet the 
future capital facilities needs of those academic units 
that had no donors or other external revenue sources 
(e.g., federal R&D).
Of course, with such growth came both risk and 
controversy. The large scale of the new Mott Pediatrics 
Hospital ($750 million) quickly drove the budget of the 
University Hospitals into the red, with operating losses 
in excess of $200 million per year. The aggressive ticket 
pricing program of the Athletics Department, with 
ticket prices (including “seat licenses”) averaging $230 
per game in Michigan Stadium, drove many long-time 
faculty, staff, and townspeople season ticket-holders 
away, while student ticket prices (at $290 per season, 
the highest in the nation) and policies (open seating 
requiring queuing hours before game-time) quickly 
eroded student attendance.
Limits to Growth?
In recent years faculty surveys suggest growing 
concerns about whether the current financial strategy 
of the University is capable of sustaining both the 
quality and the public purpose of the institution. 
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An aerial photograph of the University of Michigan campus (2014)
The University’s Central Campus (2014)
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The University’s Medical Campus (2014)
The University’s North Campus (2014)
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While private support–and particularly endowment–
is also important, frequently these funds are heavily 
constrained by donor intent and frequently unavailable 
to meet the highest priorities of the University. While 
research expenditures have continued to grow, 
maintaining the University’s position as the nation’s 
leader by this measure, the fact that over 30% of 
UM research expenditures are now provided from 
University funds such as tuition revenue and clinical 
fees suggest that plugging the hole in eroding federal 
sponsorship of research with University funds may also 
be distorting institutional priorities. Yet it is also clear 
that the financial dependence on such growth creates a 
dependence that makes it hard to reverse.
The rapid growth in student enrollments coupled 
with the unbridled expansion of auxiliary activities 
(hospitals, housing, and athletics) has triggered concern 
that the University is on a determined path toward 
become big, bigger, and biggest at the expense of both 
quality of its academic programs and the quality of life 
both on campus and beyond. Comparisons with the size 
of the highest rated public research universities (UC-
Berkeley at 35,000, UC-Virginia at 21,000, and UNC-
Chapel Hill at 30,000) and private universities (Harvard 
at 21,000, Stanford at 23,000, and Yale at 12,000) does 
indeed suggest that as the size of Michigan swells to 
45,000 or greater, it will begin to count among its peers 
larger campuses such as MSU, OSU, and U Texas rather 
than the elite public and private institutions that have 
sustained a commitment to focus resources to achieve 
excellence rather than disperse them to drive scale. 
A related scale issue concerns the relative balance 
between undergraduate and graduate/professional 
enrollments. Leading private universities (Harvard, 
Stanford) typically have a majority of graduate and 
professional students. Michigan’s balance today is 65% 
undergraduate and 35% graduate/professional.), a 
significant shift from its peers. 
A similar phase transition may occur when a 
university becomes sufficiently large to not only be 
ungovernable but also unleadable. In anticipation of 
such management challenges in the early 1980s, the 
University of Michigan began a decade-long effort to 
decentralize both authority and responsibility to the 
level of its academic and auxiliary operating units, with 
the deans and directors assuming the role of distributed 
management responsibility for both revenue generation 
and expenditure controls. This system, known more 
generally as “responsibility center management”, has 
allowed the University not only to adapt and maintain 
academic priorities during the 1980s and 1990s as 
it became larger, but its loosely coupled adaptive 
system structure has enabled it to withstand stresses 
that might cripple smaller institutions. Of course, this 
decentralization places a high premium on the selection 
of outstanding deans and directors
Unfortunately as the University entered a new 
century, a new trend to recruit deans and senior 
administrators from universities with more centralized 
cultures has stimulated efforts to recentralize the 
institution, while leading to major growth in both the 
numbers and compensation of administrators. It also 
resulted in efforts to apply corporate management 
styles, complete with the demands to centralize and 
standardize services, bonus-based compensation 
systems, and excessive investment in corporate-like 
functions (e.g., marketing, branding, advertising, and 
other forms of “institutional advancement”). Such 
attempts to recentralize the institution’s management 
have encountered strong faculty opposition because of 
the threat of damage to the core academic mission by 
such a corporate-style central administration.
Beyond these signals of possible problems, a more 
careful assessment suggests that Michigan is clearly 
facing many of the challenges currently experienced by 
the rest of higher education, e.g., the unsustainability 
of its traditional sources of financial support, the 
increasing competition for the best students and 
faculty, and mission creep that dilutes the priority 
given to the academic core of the university. Cracks are 
beginning to appear in our façade of confidence. There 
is a growing fear we may be whistling through the 
graveyard, ignoring serious issues and concerns that 
could threaten our most fundamental goals of quality, 
public purpose, leadership, and even our institutional 
saga as a pathfinder for American higher education.
During the first serious encounter with the decline 
in state appropriations in the early 1980s, President 
Harold Shapiro once suggested that in facing financial 
pressures, the University should consider a strategy 
of becoming “smaller but better”. Although seriously 
misinterpreted by many in the campus community 
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at the time, since there was the fear of program 
discontinuance in the face of budget exigency, the 
intended meaning was that the institution’s size should 
be adjusted to sustain or even enhance its quality. Yet 
during the 1980s the University continued to grow, just 
as it does today. 
While growth brings opportunities (and pride), it 
also brings challenges such as financing and managing 
such a gigantic complex. While overwhelming size 
commands respect, we have many disturbing examples 
of how size and complexity can lead to disaster, e.g., the 
dinosaurs and General Motors. On a more positive note, 
we also have some excellent examples of organizations 
that have managed to transform themselves to achieve 
agility and innovation despite their immense scale, e.g., 
IBM and China! Growth demands serious thought be 
given to how one organizes and manages such scale.
The Road Ahead
It is critical that the University develop a more 
strategic approach to growth. One of the problems with 
a loosely coupled adaptive ecosystem is how to control 
growth, e.g., to prevent explosive growth in some 
components at the expense of others or even the entire 
organism. A key is communication among components 
and across the institution. When such communication 
is artificially limited or distorted (whether intentional 
or not), instabilities can set in.
Hence it is important to use a multiplicity of 
networks both to monitor growth and subject it to 
assessments of its relationship to University priorities 
such as quality, financial sustainability, and impact. 
Bigger is not always better!
Here an excellent example is enrollment growth. 
Although this allows the University to serve more 
students, the dramatic growth over the past two 
decades (over 10,000 students) was clearly driven 
not by a desire to broaden the University’s impact 
but rather to increase tuition revenue to compensate, 
in part, for the loss of state support. However in the 
process enrollment growth has clearly overloaded 
both faculty and facilities resources, shifting much of 
instruction to the use of part-time or non-tenure-track 
faculty and driving the priorities for capital facilities. 
It has also driven a major private construction boom 
of  high-cost apartment complexes designed for the 
expanding student population. And it has clearly had 
a negative impact on student behavior.
Hence any strategy for enrollment growth must 
take into account the impact on faculty, staff, facilities, 
campus infrastructucture, and the city of Ann Arbor, 
itself, in addition to priorities such as quality and 
mission. The desire for additional tuition revenue 
through enrollment growth should also consider other 
options such as year-round operation, distance learning 
(e.g., MOOCs and MOORs), and other forms of Internet-
based academic organizations such as collaboratories 
and virtual organizations.
Finally, careful consideration should be given to 
strategic issues of institutional balance and priorities. 
While the relative scale of different academic programs 
such as schools and colleges is an important issue for 
University leadership and governance, perhaps even 
more so is the balance among academic and auxiliary 
activities. For example, auxiliary activities such as 
clinical services, student housing, and intercollegiate 
athletics have increased in scale (by any measure–
financial, personnel, visibility) at rates considerably 
larger than those characterizing the core academic 
activities of the University. While such auxiliary 
activities certainly are responding to demand, they also 
have been benefiting from lucrative markets that are 
relatively price insensitive, thereby fueling substantial 
growth.
Here the University needs to address in a more 
strategic fashion whether it is appropriate for an 
academic institution to be responsibile for a health 
system comparable in size to the academic institution 
itself (e.g., $3.5 billion/year compared to $3.1 billion/
year) or an intercollegiate athletic program that has 
clearly evolved into a $150 million/year commercial 
enterprise rather than a student activity, with an 
alarming tendency to exploit student academic 
opportunities and health to generate coaching salaries 
at truly obscene levels.
Perhaps the time is approaching for a serious 
consideration of exploring a different organizational 
structures (e.g., a holding company) to govern and 
manage such rapidly growing auxiliary enterprises 
so different in character to the academic core of the 
University. 
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Tables on University Size
The World’s Largest Campus
Facilities (36 million nsf)
Budget ($7.1 billion per year)
Research volume ($1.32 billion per year)
Federal research ($800 million per year)
Medical center (2 million patient visits per year)
Alumni (560,000)
Michigan Stadium (114,000)
UMAA Budget
State support: $300 M
Fed support: $905 M
Foundation Support: $220 M
Tuition Revenue: $916 M
Gifts for Op: $128 M
Endowment: $10 B;  Payout: $340 M/y
UM Hospitals: $2.9 B
Other Aux: $341 M
$7.1 B Total; $3.1 B Academic 
Quality and Breadth
Offers all academic and professional disciplines
Most programs are ranked in the top 10 nationally
Particular strengths
Social sciences (anthropology, psychology)
Biomedical sciences
Engineering (nuclear, aerospace, industrial)
Professional schools (law, business, medicine, music, 
public health, social work, information)
The Physical Plant
36 M nsf of buildings and core infrastructure
601 buildings, 2,125 clasrooms and labs
900 study rooms, and 6,300 labs
7 miles of utility tunnels
150 miles of fiber optic cables
137,200 networked desktop coputers
660 elevators and escalators
25 miles or roads
4.7 M sf of sidewalks, steps, and plazas
280 acres of parking lots and decks
16,100 trees and 13 M sf of turf
2014 Rankings
National Universities
USN&WR: 29th all (4rd public)
World QS: 23th (1st public)
London Times: 19th
Shanghai Jiao Tong: 22th
Research
1st nationally in total research ($1.3 B/y)
1st nationally  in federally sponsored research
Doctorate production
2nd in PhDs (841 in 2011)
Enrollments
13th total (43,426)
7th international students (6,100)
1st alumni (560,000)
Financial
1st in total budget ($7.1  billion)
7th in endowment ($10 billion)
21st in annual private giving
Last in state appropriations (only 4% of total budget)
Ann Arbor
2nd in intellectual life (USN&WR)
2nd in economic vitality (Forbes
Diversity
Enrollments (2015)
African American: 4.4% UG, 5.3% grad
Asian American: 13.6% UG, 11.9% grad
European American: 65% UG, 48 % grad
Hispanic American: 4.9% UG, 6.6% grad
International: 5.7% UG, 30.9% grad
Gender: Women: 47%, Men: 53%
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The University of Michigan clearly qualifies 
for inclusion in the small group of institutions that 
have shaped American higher education. Although 
premature for a frontier state, Tappan’s vision for the 
University of Michigan in the 1850s and 1860s provided 
the first American model of a modern university, 
adapting the European model of rigorous seminars and 
advanced scholarship based on the tradition of high 
intellectual standards in the arts and sciences. Michigan 
was also among the first universities to develop strong 
professional schools (the Medical School, for example, 
had established its distinction even before the Civil 
War). From its founding, the University of Michigan 
has always been identified with the most progressive 
forces in American higher education. 
Michigan has long defined the model of the large, 
comprehensive, public research university, with a 
serious commitment to scholarship and service. It has 
been distinguished by unusual breadth, a rich diversity 
of academic disciplines and professional schools, social 
and cultural activities, and intellectual pluralism. This 
unrelenting commitment to academic excellence, broad 
student access, and public service continues today. In 
virtually all national and international surveys, the 
university’s programs rank among the very best, with 
most of its schools, colleges, and departments ranking 
in quality among the top ten nationally and with 
several regarded as the leading programs in the nation. 
The late Clark Kerr, the president of the University of 
California, once referred to the University of Michigan 
as “the mother of state universities,” noting it was 
the first to prove that a high-quality education could 
be delivered at a publicly funded institution of higher 
learning. (Kerr, 1963)
Although most new arrivals to the campus sense 
that the University of Michigan is a large public 
university with unusually strong quality, they would 
not necessarily conclude that this was a place where the 
practice was to attempt to change the world. Of course, 
from time to time a newcomer arrives with the hope of 
harnessing this gigantic academic beast to do just that! 
In fact, we came to Michigan with just that objective, 
since in our areas of interest, the University was then 
(and remains today) a world leader.
A Tradition of Leadership 
through Pathfinding and Trailblazing
Beyond academic excellence and unusually broad 
educational opportunities, one more element of the 
Michigan character seems particularly appropriate 
during these times of challenge and change in higher 
education. It is certainly true that the vast wealth of 
several of the nation’s elite private universities–e.g., 
Harvard, Yale, Princeton, and Stanford–also allows 
them to focus investments in particular academic areas 
far beyond anything that Michigan or almost any other 
university in the nation can achieve. They are capable of 
attracting faculty and students of extraordinary quality 
and supporting them with vast resources. 
Yet Michigan has one asset that these universities are 
rarely able to match: its unique combination of quality, 
breadth, and scale. This enables Michigan to take risks 
far beyond anything that could be matched by a private 
university. Indeed, because of their relatively modest 
size, most elite private universities tend to take a rather 
conservative approach to academic programs and 
appointments, since a mistake could seriously damage 
a small academic unit. In contrast, Michigan’s vast size 
and breadth allows it to experiment and innovate on 
a scale far beyond that tolerated by most institutions, 
as evidenced by its long history of leadership in higher 
Chapter 3
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education. It can easily recover from any failures it 
encounters on its journeys along high-risk paths. 
This ability to take risks, to experiment and 
innovate, to explore various new directions in teaching, 
research, and service, defines Michigan’s unique role in 
American higher education. In fact, beyond academic 
leadership, from time to time the University actually 
does something that changes the world! For example, 
it was the first university to own and operate its own 
hospital, thereby combining the medical research 
conducted by its faculty with the clinical care offered 
by its hospitals. It introduced the new discipline of 
aeronautical engineering within a decade after the 
Wright Brothers’ flight and nuclear engineering only 
a few years after the Manhattan project. In the 1950s 
Michigan conducted the clinical trials to verify the 
success of the Salk Vaccine. Astronauts trained at the 
University led NASA missions to the moon in the 1960s. 
And in the 1980s, Michigan joined with IBM and MCI 
to build and manage the Internet, a role it continued to 
play into the 1990s. 
Put another way, throughout its history, both 
the University of Michigan–through, of course, its 
students, faculty, staff, and alumni–does BIG Things! In 
fact, every once in awhile, it does something that truly 
changes the world! Some of these achievements are 
listed in the appendix to this chapter.
In fact, one might well make the case that in an era 
of great change in society, Michigan’s most important 
role has been that of a pathfinder and a trailblazer, 
building on its tradition of leadership and relying 
on its unusual combination of quality, capacity, and 
breadth, to reinvent the university, again and again, 
for new times, new needs, and new worlds. (For more 
background on this character of the Michigan “saga”, 
we have provided a brief historical background in the 
Appendix.)
Whether in academic innovation (e.g., the 
quantitative social sciences), social responsiveness 
(e.g., its early admission of women, minorities, and 
international students), or its willingness to challenge 
the status quo (e.g., teach-ins, Earth Day, and the 
Michigan Mandate), Michigan’s history reveals this 
pathfinding and trailblazing character time and time 
again. When Michigan won the 2003 Supreme Court 
case concerning the use of race in college admissions, 
the general reaction of other colleges and universities 
was “Well, that’s what we expect of Michigan. They 
carry the water for us on these issues.” When Michigan, 
together with IBM and MCI, built NSFnet during the 
1980s and then expanded it into the Internet, this again 
was the type of leadership the nation expected from the 
university.
However, continuing with the frontier analogy, while 
Michigan has a long history of success as a pathfinder, 
trailblazer, and occasional pioneer, it has usually 
stumbled as a settler, that is, in attempting to follow 
the paths blazed by others. All too often this leads to 
complacency and even stagnation at an institution like 
Michigan. The University almost never makes progress 
by simply trying to catch up with others.
Michigan travelers in Europe and Asia usually 
encounter great interest in what is happening in Ann 
Arbor, in part because universities around the world see 
the University of Michigan as a possible model for their 
own future. Certainly they respect—indeed, envy—
distinguished private universities, such as Harvard 
and Stanford. But as public institutions themselves, 
they realize that they will never be able to amass the 
wealth of these elite private institutions. Instead, they 
see Michigan as the model of an innovative university, 
straddling the characteristics of leading public and 
private universities.
Time and time again colleagues mention the 
“Michigan model” or the “Michigan mystique.” 
Of course, people mean many different things by 
these phrases: the university’s unusually strong and 
successful commitment to diversity; its hybrid funding 
model combining the best of both public and private 
universities; its strong autonomy from government 
interference; or perhaps the unusual combination of 
quality, breadth, and capacity that gives Michigan the 
capacity to be innovative, to take risks. Of course, all 
these multiple perspectives illustrate particular facets 
of what it means to be “the leaders and best.”
It is instructive to trace the University’s success in 
fulfilling this heritage as a pathfinder over the past 
half-century, since there have been periods of strong 
leadership as a pathfinder, and other times when the 
University has taken a more conservative approach to 
its teaching, research, and service activities. We need to 
understand better just what has led to these bursts of 
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unusual creativity and impact, as well as the forces that 
sometimes cause Michigan to take a more conservative 
path that tends to follow rather than lead.
1950s and 1960s
The 1950s were a time of rapid growth of the 
University with the returning veterans supported 
by the G.I. Bill and the rapid increase of federally 
sponsored research associated with the science policies 
developed by Vannevar Bush (i.e., his report Science, the 
Endless Frontier) and new federal science agencies such 
as the National Science Foundation and the National 
Institutes of Health. The University of Michigan rapidly 
evolved into not only one of the world’s leading research 
universities, but also one of its most innovative. 
For example, a leading team of social scientists 
from the Department of Agriculture relocated to the 
University to build the Survey Research Center and 
later the Institute for Social Research, which was later 
to become the nation’s leading center for quantitative 
social science research.
The presence of one of the nation’s first aeronautical 
engineering programs and graduates such as Kelly 
Johnson, the leading engineer for Lockheed (and 
creator of the Lockheed Skunkworks for advanced 
aircraft design), enabled Michigan to rapidly became a 
leader in rocket and missile technology, later becoming 
NASA’s leading research university and a leader 
in astronaut training. Many astronauts attending 
Michigan played major leadership roles in the nation’s 
space program, including the entire crew of Apollo 15 
(that, appropriately enough, took a car to the moon)
The wartime effort in remote sensing and 
radar through Project Michigan at the Willow Run 
Laboratories led to the development of the ruby maser 
and holography. This later led to developments in 
advanced radar and stealth technology. In the 1960s 
this expertise in remote sensing was extended to 
surveillance satellite technology.
The University’s School of Public Health conducted 
the clinical trials that established the efficacy of the 
Salk Vaccine for preventing polio, appropriate since 
Jonas Salk had spent his early career at Michigan. 
Furthermore, the Medical school developed the 
treatments for diseases such as sickle cell anemia. 
And following WWII, the University established 
through the Michigan Memorial Phoenix Project, the 
first university research efforts addressing the peaceful 
uses of atomic energy.  Interestingly enough, it was 
a student committee of WWII veterans that pressed 
the Regents to commemorate the memory of those 
students, faculty, staff, and alumni who had given their 
lives to the nation in the war effort by attempting to 
develop a research institute, using the symbolism of the 
Phoenix bird rising from the ashes, with the mission 
of transforming the nuclear weapons technology that 
had ended the war into peaceful applications. The 
University launched its first major fund-raising effort 
to raise $6.5 for the Phoenix Laboratory, and the Ford 
Motor Company contributed $1 million to build one 
of the first nuclear reactors on a university campus. 
Not only was this one of the first effort in the peaceful 
uses of atomic energy in the world, but the work of its 
scientists soon enabled discoveries such as the bubble 
chamber for physics detection (Don Glaser) and the 
use of I-131 to establish the field of nuclear medicine 
(William Beierwaltes). 
The leadership of the University during the decades 
immediately following WWII was truly stunning:
1st program in computer science and engineering
1st program in nuclear science and engineering
1st program in nuclear medicine
1st program in atmospheric science
1st courses in thermonuclear fusion
Development of time-sharing computing
Development of quantitative social sciences
Development of laser holography
Development of synthetic aperture radar
Development of medical endoscopy
Clinical trials for Salk vaccine
Highway Safety Research Institute
The Center for Research on Learning, the first 
research center on teaching in higher education.
The Kresge Hearing Research Institute, the first 
research institute on hearing and deafness
The Center for Education of Women (CEW), the first 
center focused on enabling the continuing education of 
women
Michigan led in many other ways during these 
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Kennedy’s Peace Corps speech at MichiganAnnouncing the success of the Salk polio vaccine
The world’s first academic programs in atomic energy Apollo 15, the All-Michigan mission to the moon
Michigan is one of the few universities capable of changing the world.
Joining with IBM to build the Internet Creating the world’s largest digital library
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years. The University had long attracted an activist 
student body and faculty that have driven not only 
much of the agenda of the University, but beyond 
that, have frequently become the social conscience of 
the nation on important issues. While occasionally 
disruptive, if well intentioned, such activism has had a 
very positive effect in raising issues of great importance: 
e.g., the Vietnam War in the 1960s, the environmental 
movement in the 1970s, and social justice and the plight 
of underrepresented minority communities through 
the latter half of the 20th century. 
We noted in Chapter 1 that the 1960s was such a 
period of campus activism and protests at the University 
of Michigan, with important social causes such as 
the international development (i.e., Kennedy’s 1960 
speech announcing the concept of the Peace Corps), 
the Vietnam war (i.e., the Teach-Ins of 1965), civil rights 
and racial diversity (i.e., the Black Action Movement 
of 1969), and environmental issues (i.e., Earth Day in 
1972). To be sure, these were issues of great importance, 
and the voices of Michigan students and faculty were 
important both to the institution and to the nation. 
The 1970s and 1980s
After the spectacular leadership of the University 
during the 1950s and 1960s, as it became what many 
regarded as the leading public research university in the 
nation, it was only natural that this momentum would be 
hard to sustain during the 1970s. To be sure, the decade 
started off with the work of atmospheric scientists 
Ralph Cicerone and James Anderson who discovered 
that CFCs were causing the ozone hole opening up 
every year over the Antarctic and threatening global 
sustainability. Beyond this important discovery, this led 
to the first global agreement to implement measures to 
protect the planet.
The University played a major role in the effort to 
build the Merit Computer Network, led by computer 
engineer Eric Aupperle, which connected the state’s 
public research universities. The technology used in 
building this network and the experience gained by 
engineers at UM, MSU, and WSU would later position 
Michigan to play a major role in building the Internet 
during the 1980s.
Just as with the announcement of the Peace Corps 
in the 1960s, the University played a major role in the 
establishment of Earth Day and the announcement of 
Americorps during the 1970s. 
And high on the agenda was the planning for a new 
adult general hospital, which would require strong 
University leadership and creative financing.
In summary, however, the 1970s were a rather quiet 
period, with both the erosion of state appropriations, 
a state policy that hindered the construction of state 
funded buildings at the University, and the energy 
crisis triggered by the Arab Oil Embargo largely 
preoccupying the University.
The 1980s brought a new round of leadership 
activities, as the University, led by President Harold 
Shapiro, reconfigured itself to adapt to declining state 
support, making hard decisions to become “smaller 
but better”, launching new fund-raising efforts, and 
implementing new policies that provided strong 
incentives to faculty members to attract sponsored 
research grants. Of most importance was the stress that 
both President Shapiro and Provost Billy Frye placed 
on academic excellence that positioned the University 
for the 1980s and beyond. 
Shapiro understood the longer term implications of 
weakening state support (dropping from 65% to less 
than 30% of the academic budget during his tenure). 
He moved in the 1980s to put in place a series of 
major financial measures to sustain the quality and 
capacity of the University. First a more conservative 
financial management and investment strategy was 
implemented, making tough decisions to set priorities, 
focusing resources to achieve excellence, and beginning 
a major decentralization of authority and responsibility 
for resource decisions that was better aligned with both 
revenue generation and cost containment. As the state 
subsidy of the costs of educational programs declined, 
it was necessary to compensate with major increases 
in tuition, highly differentiated between Michigan 
resident and out-of-state students. Finally, aggressive 
fund-raising efforts were launched with campaigns 
raising over $300 million during the 1980s. 
The decade of the 1980s began with the final 
commitment to build the new Replacement Hospital 
Project, a $300 million effort jointly funded by state 
government and the University, which anchored a 
medical center that would become a national leader in 
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clinical care and research.
The University was successful in recruiting a new 
chief information officer, Douglas van Houweling, who 
led an effort in which the Merit Computer Network 
joined with IBM and MCI to submit a successful 
proposal to build NSFnet, the first of the major national 
networks to link together scientists. The effort was so 
successful that other federal agencies broadened the 
Michigan effort to include their own networks, creating 
a national “Internetwork”, managed by the University 
and IBM, that later would be renamed the Internet. 
The University continued to manage the new national 
resource until 1993 when commercial traffic grew to the 
point where it needed to be spun off to private industry. 
However van Houweling followed quickly to create 
Internet2, a consortium of universities that built and 
managed a new ultra-high-speed network for scientific 
research.
Led by Richard Phillips and Daniel Atkins, the UM 
College of Engineering built one of the world’s most 
sophisticated campus network, the Computer Aided 
Engineering Network (CAEN), in partnership with 
IBM, Apple, and other computer manufacturers.
The University also attracted Gerard Morou to build 
and direct the Center for Ultra-Fast Optics, containing 
several of the world’s most powerful lasers.
The School of Public Health, led by faculty member 
Ken Warner, played a major role in addressing the 
health implications of tobacco and stimulating new 
federal regulation of smoking.
1990s
The University continued a series of strategic 
transformations to prepare it for leadership in a new 
century. The challenges to this vision of leadership were 
great. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, state support 
of the University had deteriorated to the point where 
it provided less than 20% of the University’s resource 
base. The Ann Arbor campus, ranking as the nation’s 
largest with over 26 million square feet of space, was in 
desperate need of extensive renovation or replacement 
of inadequate facilities. Although the fund-raising 
efforts of the 1980s had been impressive, the University 
still lagged far behind most of its peers, with an 
endowment of only $200 M, clearly inadequate for the 
size and scope of the institution. There were an array 
of other concerns, including the representation and role 
of women and minorities in the University community, 
campus safety, and student rights and responsibilities. 
So, too, the relationships between the University and 
its various external constituencies–state government, 
federal government, the Ann Arbor community, the 
media, and the public-at-large–needed strengthening. 
And all of these challenges would have to be met while 
addressing an unusually broad and deep turnover
The new leadership team formed in the late 1980s 
continued to embrace the strategy that Harold Shapiro 
had developed to address the erosion of state support 
during the 1970s and 1980s. Aggressive efforts were 
taken to actively manage the University’s endowment, 
increasing it from a modest $200 million during the 
1980s to over $2.5 billion by the late 1990s. Michigan 
launched the largest fund-raising campaign in the 
history of public higher education, raising over $1.4 
billion (comparable in constant dollars to the $3 and $4 
billion campaigns of recent years). The focus on cost-
containment and total quality management continued 
in all parts of the University. 
But there was one more key step in the strategy. 
Beginning with Harold Shapiro and intensified by 
the administration during the 1990s, steps were taken 
to radically decentralize the University, transferring 
control of resources and accountability for the 
expenditures to the deans and directors of academic 
units. In part this was in recognition of the fact that as 
state support declined, the academic units themselves 
would become the source of most University resources, 
through student tuition revenue, sponsored research 
grants, and private fund-raising. Since the deans and 
directors understood best the operations and resource 
needs of their units, it seemed appropriate to give them 
both control of the resources they were generating 
and hold them accountable for their wisdom of their 
expenditures.
This transformation of the management structure of 
the University during the 1980s and 1990s into a loosely 
coupled adaptive ecosystem was carefully crafted 
to create an institution with the powerful capacity to 
continually adapt to the rapid and profound changes 
likely to occur in the world it would face in future 
years. While not well understood by many, including 
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the University administrations of the early 2000s, it 
would be key in sustaining the quality of the University 
during difficult times by responding rapidly to address 
new challenges and opportunities. 
Leadership initiatives continued into the 1990s, with 
the discovery of the gene for cystic fibrosis and the early 
development of human gene therapy led by Francis 
Collins, James Wilson, and William Kelley. The School 
of Public Health developed a Flumist nasal vaccine for 
flu virus (Hunein “John” Maassab).
With the support of the Mellon Foundation and the 
National Science Foundation, the University launched 
through the JSTOR project important leadership efforts 
in the massive digitization and provision of access to 
scholarly materials and data.
Through the leadership of Daniel Atkins, the 
University transformed its library science program into 
the nation’s first School of Information, creating a new 
discipline in the use of knowledge. Associated with the 
effort was the construction of a bold new facility on 
the University’s North Campus, the Media Union that 
provided a collaborative environment supported by 
state-of-the-art technology, which brought together the 
Schools of Engineering, Architecture, Art, and Music to 
merge their creative activities.
The University continued its leadership in the 
level of its research activities, surpassing in research 
expenditures all other universities, both public and 
private. In this sense, Michigan had become the leading 
research university in the world.
There was also leadership on other fronts, with 
important policy efforts such as the Michigan Mandate, 
that doubled the presence of underrepresented 
minorities among the University’s students, faculty, 
and leadership; the Michigan Agenda for Women, 
that broke through the glass ceiling constraining the 
progress of women in leadership roles; and broadened 
University policies to include the rights of gay and 
lesbian students and staff.
Achieving the goals of excellence and leadership 
while facing the financial challenges of declining state 
support required more than simply determination 
and dedication. It required a major strategic planning 
process through which the University community at 
large could ask the most important, although difficult, 
questions: What kind of an institution was the University 
of Michigan?  What kind of an institution did we wish to 
become? What were our values and goals, our priorities 
and objectives? Working first with small groups of 
faculty, students, and administrators, the University 
tackled these fundamental issues and then propagated 
this dialog to involve larger and larger elements of 
the University community. These discussions rapidly 
converged on the themes of excellence and leadership 
as foundations for the planning effort.  These themes 
were woven together in the earliest attempt to define 
an appropriate mission and vision for the University. 
Rather than viewing the quality, breadth, and scale 
of the University as competing objectives–or possibly 
even as constraints on what it could accomplish within a 
world of limited resources–instead these characteristics, 
when linked together creatively, could provide an 
unusual opportunity. By building leadership in an 
environment that demands commitment to all three 
characteristics, with a particular stress on academic 
excellence, it can distinguish the University from other 
institutions that tend to focus on only one of these 
factors.
However, perhaps the most important contribution 
of these years was the recognition that to serve a 
rapidly changing world, the University itself would 
have to change dramatically. As its strategies shifted 
from building a great 20th Century university to 
transforming Michigan into a leadership role in 
defining a 21st Century institution, a series of key 
The 1990s Vision: Quality and Leadership
38
initiatives were launched that were intended as seeds 
for a university of the future. Certainly highly visible 
efforts such as the Michigan Mandate and financial 
restructuring were components of this effort. However, 
beyond these were a series of visionary experiments 
such as the Media Union, the School of Information, the 
Institute of Humanities, the Global Change Institute, 
and the Office of Academic Outreach—all of which 
were designed to explore new paradigms for higher 
education. 
The strategy designed for this leadership vision was 
successful by any measure. As a consequence of this 
decade-long effort, by the late-1990s the University of 
Michigan had become a better, stronger, more diverse, 
and more exciting institution. Hence as the 21st Century 
arrived, it was clear that the University of Michigan 
had not only become one of the leading universities in 
America, but that it was challenged by only a handful 
of distinguished private and public universities in the 
world in the quality, breadth, capacity, and impact of its 
many programs and activities. This progress was not 
serendipitous. It resulted from a carefully designed and 
executed strategy, created and sustained by remarkable 
teams of faculty, students, and staff throughout the 
University.
2000s
While the University of Michigan continued to 
provide strong leadership for higher education along 
with occasional path-breaking efforts, most of the 
accomplishments during the first decade of the new 
century had antecedents from earlier eras. For example, 
Paul Courant and John Price-Wilkins led the effort to 
build the world’s largest digital library, the HathiTrust, 
providing links to over 15 million digitized volumes 
from 80 major university libraries. In a sense, this 
initiative has become a contemporary version of the 
great Library of Alexandria, except that its goal is to open 
up as many volumes as possible for full public access 
(currently over 4 million). The seeds for this effort were 
planted at Michigan during the 1990s the University’s 
management of the JSTOR Project to provide broad 
electronic access to publications in the social sciences 
and NSF grants to develop the technology for digital 
libraries. This latter project later stimulated the work 
of a former Michigan computer science student, Larry 
Page, who with Stanford colleague, Serge Brin, founded 
Google, which launched its own digital books project at 
Michigan in 2004.
Similarly, John Greden, the long-standing chair 
of the UM Department of Psychiatry, pulled together 
his colleagues to found the nation’s first National 
Depression Center at Michigan in 2002, a model that 
he would later use to build a national network of such 
centers for both research and clinical care in mental 
illness.
The University launched several major efforts in 
the areas of technology transfer, creating several new 
programs in entrepreneurial activities, hiring new 
staff experienced in high-tech startups, and launching 
instructional efforts (including a new effort that 
promises to provide courses in entrepreneurism for 
every student). There was a major effort to develop 
new models of instruction that augment the usual 
classroom paradigms with broader experiences 
(such as public service, team building, and project-
Leadership achievements of the 1990s
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based learning) and technologies (such as MOOCs 
participation through established organizations such as 
Coursera and launching new efforts such as Unizen). 
But, again while substantial investments of resources 
and faculty effort have occurred, the University would 
not yet be characterized as a leader in such instructional 
paradigms.
There were other attempts at University leadership 
in the 2000s that missed the mark. For example, the 
University spent $3 million a year to attract the Royal 
Shakespeare Theatre to Ann Arbor, but after several 
years this week-long visit was discontinued. A leading 
architect, Robert Venturi, was named as the new master 
planner for the University, but his first project, adding a 
“halo” about Michigan Stadium to celebrate the circus 
nature of college football with 10 foot high words of 
the “Hail to the Victors” fight song was a particularly 
embarrassing failure, infuriating Michigan fans. His 
firm later was given the architectural design work for 
the new Life Sciences Institute, but this yielded only a 
smaller copy of similar Venturi-designed biomedical 
research facilities at Yale and UCLA. In fact, even the 
Life Sciences Institute itself, designed to attract Nobel 
Laureate quality faculty to Michigan and funded with 
$200 million from UM Hospital reserves, was only 
marginally successful, staffed during its early years 
with postdocs and faculty from the discontinued Pfizer 
research center in Ann Arbor.
Unfortunately, the University lost its leadership in 
other important areas. Despite the willingness of the U.S. 
Department of Energy to provide sustained funding, 
the leadership of the University insisted on shutting 
down the Ford Nuclear Reactor, one of the nation’s 
most valuable campus-based resources for nuclear 
research. The decision to rapidly expand enrollments of 
wealthy students paying out-of-state tuition decimated 
the economic diversity of the institution. And long-
standing traditions such as the Big Ten Conference 
and the community aspects of Michigan athletics have 
been eroded by the greed of conference commissioners, 
athletic directors, and coaches seeking ever higher 
revenues and, of course, salaries. 
To be sure, the University managed to sustain its 
reputation and academic quality in the face of losing 
another 50% of its state support during the first 
decade of the new century.  But this was in part due 
to earlier fundamental steps taken in the 1980s and 
1990s, including decentralizing financial authority 
and accountability to deans and directors, stressing 
more aggressive investments of University resources 
including endowment, and placing a premium on the 
appointment of strong academic leadership that was 
intentionally biased toward internal appointments to 
those who understood and were capable of sustaining 
the Michigan character.
There were also new concerns that the University 
may have walked out on a limb with efforts such as 
expanding enrollments by 25% to generate more tuition 
revenue, but also overloading instructional faculty and 
facilities and sacrificing much of the economic diversity 
of our students; making massive investments in debt-
financed auxiliary enterprises such as the Mott Children’s 
Hospital, student residence halls, and intercollegiate 
athletics (particularly Michigan Stadium and a new 
complex for olympic sports), and rapidly expanding 
staffing in both unit and central administration areas 
only marginally related to its academic mission such as 
marketing and communications. Only time will tell.
Lessons Learned
So how might we explain the unusual level of 
innovation and University leadership during the 1980s 
and 1990s and the relative absence of such efforts in 
the 1970s and 2000s? In part this has to do with the 
ability of the institution to build on its long history as a 
pathfinder. It is this very unique history that defines not 
only the character and strengths of the University but 
also how it functions. Michigan’s character as leader 
through its pathfinding and trailblazing required it 
to build spires of excellence in key fields, rather than 
trying to achieve a uniform level of lesser quality across 
all of its activities. Only by attempting to be the best 
in these fields can we develop in our students, faculty, 
and staff the necessary intensity and commitment 
to excellence. Furthermore, only by competing with 
the best can Michigan establish appropriate levels of 
expectation and achievement. 
The University culture has traditionally operated by 
placing very large bets in high-risk ventures involving 
our very best people at the grass roots level. Few 
of these have been top-down from the University’s 
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leadership but rather from the willingness to work hard 
to prospect, identify, and support major opportunities 
among its faculty, students, and staff.  
A particular warning flag should be raised about 
the use of initiatives at the presidential or executive 
officer level to lead or steer the university, since 
Michigan throughout its history has been very much 
a bottom-up driven institution. It is not just that most 
top-down initiatives are soon rejected by the Michigan 
grassroots culture and fade away into obscurity, but 
more important, the true creativity, wisdom, and drive 
flourishes best at the grass-roots level with outstanding 
faculty members, students, and staff rather than 
administrators. 
One might point to the limited success of the 
presidential initiatives launched during the past two 
decades such as the repertory theater planned to be 
originally sited next to the Power Center, the Venturi-
Scott-Brown master plan for the campus, the brief (and 
expensive) tenure of the Royal Shakespeare Theatre 
group, the “Halo” design of Michigan Stadium, and 
even the Life Sciences Institute. Some sank beneath the 
waves, some were ridiculed into oblivion, and some 
have been bailed out and still float (at considerable 
expense), but none was a dramatic success. 
Furthermore, efforts to climb on the bandwagon 
by launching high visibility efforts in areas prospected 
by other institutions such as “sustainability”, 
“entrepreneurship”, and interdisciplinary research 
again do not align well with Michigan’s strength as a 
pathfinder.  Contrast these with initiatives such as the 
Institute for Social Research, NSFnet (later to become 
the Internet), the Molecular Medicine Institute (a 
precursor to the Human Genome Project), the School 
of Information, and the Digital Library Project (leading 
eventually to the PageRank algorithm, Google, and the 
HathiTrust). In the past the University has achieved 
institutional leadership by placing very large bets 
on high risk ventures involving our very best people 
where we have established strengths. 
The deans and department chairs are the key 
players in such pathfinding ventures. They are the ones 
who understand best both the quality of their faculty 
and the unusual nature of the Michigan culture. Hence 
throughout the history of the University, the deans have 
been given extraordinary authority, accompanied by 
responsibility, in providing the leadership necessary to 
build and sustain outstanding programs. Fortunately, 
this has long been recognized by most in the central 
administration, including the president, provost, and 
other Executive Officer, and supported and sustained 
by the Board of Regents.  
Yet here the experience of the past five decades 
provides a warning. The University gets into trouble 
when it loses contact with its past. An example was 
the disruption of the 1960s, which decoupled UM from 
its history and traditions and led essentially to a lost 
decade of the 1970s, which was later reenergized by 
Shapiro and then reconnected with UM’s history by the 
subsequent administration in the 1990s. 
Equally important has been a long University 
tradition of making certain that the University’s 
distributed academic leadership is well balanced 
between long-time members of the University faculty 
who understand the unique Michigan culture of 
pathfinding and innovation and those newcomers to 
the University who may not understand its culture 
initially but bring in new ideas and insights. Such a 
balance is able to preserve the University’s long role as 
a pathfinder, not a follower. Of particular importance 
is the appointment of a series of powerful deans with 
long experiences at Michigan.
Fortunately, institutions characterized by the 
longevity, scale, and impact of major research 
universities such as Michigan are analogous to large 
ocean liners in their resistance to attempts to make 
rapid steering adjustments. As Peter Steiner, one of 
the most prominent of LS&A deans serving under 
Harold Shapiro, once observed when referring to 
administrative micromanagement, “This too shall 
pass…” There is ample evidence that most attempts 
to redirect the University away from its heritage, its 
institutional saga as a pathfinder, tend to bounce off 
without making much of a dent, although they can lead 
for a time to only marginal progress, as they did during 
the “lost” decades of the 1970s and the 2000s…
42
The Road Ahead
Spires of Excellence
Michigan’s character as leader through its 
pathfinding and trailblazing requires it to build “spires 
of excellence” in key fields, rather than trying to settle 
for a uniform level of simply good quality across all 
of its activities. Only by attempting to be the very best 
in these fields can we develop in our students, faculty, 
and staff the necessary intensity and commitment to 
excellence. Furthermore, only by competing with the 
best can it establish appropriate levels of expectation 
and achievement.
It must be stressed here that it should not be the 
University’s goal to build a few isolated spires of 
excellence in the manner of smaller private universities. 
Rather, it should seek to achieve within each of its 
academic units–its schools, departments, centers, and 
institutes–a number of spires of focused excellence. 
In other words, the general level of quality in each 
of our academic units can be achieved through the 
development of a series of sharply focused peaks 
of excellence within the units. Thus, even for those 
programs where the University is unable to provide the 
resources to be national leaders, it aspires to achieve 
some peaks of extraordinary excellence through the 
focusing of resources. It is determined to make every 
effort to avoid mediocrity, but constrained resources 
suggest that it will inevitably have some areas that 
were very good as opposed to excellent.
The theme of pathfinding leadership influences 
the focus of emphasis within Michigan’s traditional 
endeavors of education, scholarship, and service. For 
example, it requires that the University become even 
more committed to the concept of a liberal education 
for its students. The development of leaders among its 
students demands challenging intellectual experiences, 
both in formal instruction and in the extracurricular 
environment. 
In order to develop leaders among its faculties, 
at least some fraction of its scholarship needs to be 
devoted to venturesome intellectual activities at the 
cutting edge of inquiry. Some of the University’s 
faculty should be encouraged to work in seminal, cross-
disciplinary areas where extraordinary insight and 
intellectual breadth can lead to the creation of entirely 
new fields of knowledge.
The University continues to have important service 
roles. Leadership requires that such activities be justified 
as important experiences for its students and faculty, as 
models to be propagated to other institutions, and as 
sources of important questions for basic investigation. 
The Link Between Quality, Breadth, and Scale
The quality of the University of Michigan academic 
programs is the most fundamental determinant of its 
ability to develop and maintain leadership. However, 
a comprehensive and diverse array of intellectual, 
social, and cultural experiences is also important for 
its leadership role in higher education. And, the scale 
of our programs not only contributes to the richness 
and quality of the University (e.g., the size and quality 
of central resources such as libraries, computing 
networks, and athletic facilities), but it also determines 
its potential impact on society.
Rather than viewing the quality, breadth, and scale 
of the University as competing objectives–or possibly 
even as constraints on what it can accomplish within a 
world of limited resources–instead these characteristics, 
when linked together creatively, can provide an unusual 
opportunity. By building leadership in an environment 
that demands commitment to all three characteristics, 
with a particular stress on academic excellence, it can 
distinguish the University from other institutions that 
tend to focus on only one of these factors.
For example, highly selective private institutions 
sometimes sacrifice breadth and size in an effort 
to achieve absolute excellence in a small number 
of fields. This results in institutions highly focused 
in an intellectual sense, which while certainly 
capable of conducting distinguished academic 
programs, are nevertheless unable to provide the 
rich array of opportunities and diverse experiences 
of “multiversities” such as Michigan. At the other 
end of the spectrum, the University can also set itself 
apart from many other large, comprehensive public 
universities by the degree to which it chooses to focus 
its resources on academic quality.
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UM Does Big Things!
Ways in which the University of Michigan 
has changed the world
(1817) Catholepistimead or University of Michigania 
(in Detroit with Michigan Territorial Land Grant)
(1837) University moves to Ann Arbor; Michigan 
achieves statehood.
(1845) Alpha Epsilon chapter of Chi Psi Fraternity: first 
fraternity house in the nation.
(1850s) First effort to build true university in America 
similar to those emerging in Europe (von Humboldt), 
secular in character with a balance between teaching 
and research, as evidenced by the construction of the 
Detroit Observatory, the third largest observatory in 
the world (Tappan)
 (1856) First university building designed and equipped 
solely as a chemical laboratory
(1859) First university to introduce moot courts in law 
curriculum
(1860s) First university to own and operate its own 
hospital
(1868) Alumnus Joseph Beal Steere, naturalist, explorer, 
educator; set off in 1870 on a five-year exploration 
around the world, particularly on the Amazon River 
and later in the Philippines, where he discovered 
many previously unknown species of flora and fauna
(1869) Alumnus Charles F. Brush earned recognition as 
the “Father of the Arc Electric Lighting Industry” for 
his many inventions
(1870s) Created secondary school system (Henry 
Frieze)
(1870) The first large university to admit women.
(1871) Introduced the seminar method of teaching
(1873) Alumnus John Harvey Kellogg developed and 
advocated the eating of a dry breakfast cereal, from 
which came the flaked cereal product that led his 
brother to found the famed Kellogg cereal brand in 
1906
(1870s-1890s) Developed and taught the first courses 
in new disciplines such as bacteriology, forestry, 
meteorology, sociology, modern history, journalism, 
and American literature, modern languages, 
pharmacy, speech, forest administration, sanitary 
science, science and art of teaching
(1880s) One of a handful of early leaders in the reform 
of U.S. medical education
(1880s) Leadership in introducing new disciplines of 
engineering: naval architecture, marine engineering 
(1881), aeronautical engineering (1916), automotive 
engineering (1913), transportation engineering (1922)
(1893) Alumna Alice Hamilton , a specialist in lead 
poisoning and industrial diseases, was known as 
the “Mother of Industrial Health.” Her work led to a 
state law requiring medical examinations and various 
safety procedures in the workplace
(1900) Moses Gomberg, U-M professor of chemistry, 
discovered organic free radicals
1900s: Microbiology: development of culture 
techniques for parasites and spirochetes (Frederick 
George Novy)
(1905) Built the first naval architecture towing tank and 
model basin.
(1915) First degrees in public health (together with 
Harvard)
(1915) Alumni E. C. Sullivan and H. W. Hess, invented 
in 1915 several new forms of glass, including Pyrex, 
“Daylight Glass” and chemical-resistant glassware, 
which helped relieve shortage of German-made 
glassware during Word War I
(1919) The first student union (the Michigan Union)
(1924) Development of iodized salt to wipe out endemic 
goiter (David Cowie)
(1929) First courses in data processing
(1920s and 1930s) Summer physics conferences on 
quantum mechanics
(1930s) Development of electrocardiogram or EKG 
(Frank N. Wilson)
(1931) Created the first Alumni University
(1934) First Bureau of Industrial Relations
(1939) Development of plan for voluntary health 
insurance (Nathan Sinai)
(1940s) William Dow led Allied scientists in the design 
and construction of a 125-ton jamming device used to 
disable German and Japanese radar systems.
(1944) Development of influenza vaccine for U.S. Army 
(Thomas Francis, Jr.)
(1945) Bureau of Public Health Economics established 
in UM School of Public Health as primary source of 
archival information on medical care
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(1940s) Alumnus Kelly Johnson, working for Lockheed, 
he established the legendary Lockheed Skunk Works 
and created the P-38, the F-104, the U-2 and the SR-71 
Blackbird during a remarkable 40-year career.
(1940s) James V. Neal discovery that defective genes 
cause sickle cell anemia
(1947) Own and operate a large commercial airport 
(Willow Run Airport)
(1950s) First university program in peaceful uses of 
atomic energy (Phoenix Project)
(1950s) First degree program in nuclear science and 
engineering
(1950s) Developed first major programs in quantitative 
social sciences (Survey Research Center)
(1958) Built and operated the largest nuclear reactor on 
college campus (1 MW Ford Nuclear Reactor)
(1960s) Lawrence Klein develops econometric models 
(Nobel Prize)
(1950s) William Beierwaltes develops the use of I-131 in 
nuclear medicine using UM’s Ford Nuclear Reactor
(1950s and 1960s) Developed the first university-based 
programs in rocketry and guided missile technology 
for the Air Force
(1960s) Became a major astronaut training center
(1960s) The Apollo 15 mission had an all Michigan crew 
(and a car) on the moon
( 1950s) Developed first degree program in computer 
engineering
(1953) Jonas Salk, research associate and fellow in the 
U-M School of Public Health from 1940-44, developed 
in 1953 the polio vaccine.
(1954) Donald Glaser, developed in 1954 the world’s 
first liquid bubble chamber to study high-energy 
subatomic particles and won the Nobel Prize in 
physics for his invention in 1960
(1955) Clinical trials for Salk vaccine for polio (Thomas 
Francis)
(1957) Chihiro Kikuchi, professor of nuclear 
engineering, developed in 1957 the ruby maser, 
a device for amplifying electrical impulses by 
stimulated emission of radiation
(1957) Alumnus John Sheehan, pioneered in 1957 
development of synthetic penicillin, the life-
saving antibiotic discovered in 1928 and developed 
ampicillin, a semi-synthetic penicillin taken orally.
(1958) Faculty member C. Wilbur Peters and Lawrence 
E. Curtis developed in 1958 a fiberoptic technique 
leading to medical endoscopy technology.
(1959) First program in engineering meteorology and 
later atmospheric science
(1960) First program in computer and communications 
science
(1964) Alumnus Jerome Horwitz, an organic chemist 
at Michigan Cancer Foundation, synthesized in 1964 
the drug AZT, which is used to fight AIDS.
 (1960s, 1980s) Peace Corps and later Americorps an-
nounced at UM
(1960s) Developed time-sharing computing (MTS with 
IBM)
(1960) First courses in thermonuclear fusion for AEC
(1962s) Developed laser holography (Emmett Leith and 
Juris Urpatnieks)
(1962) Center for Research on Learning and Teaching is 
first research center on university teaching.
(1963) First university research institute on hearing and 
deafness (Kresge Hearing Research Institute)
(1964) Center for Education of Women (CEW), the first 
center focused on enabling the continuing education 
of women (Jean Campbell and Louise Cain)
(1960s-1970s) Willow Run Labs development of satel-
lite remote sensing
(1968) Alumnus Marshall Nirenberg shared the 1968 
Nobel Prize in medicine and physiology for cracking 
the genetic code
(1968) John G. Wagner, professor of pharmacy, began 
to develop pharmacokinetics, a field that uses math-
ematical models to study the body’s metabolism of 
drugs, and to determine safe dosage levels
(1969) Richard C. Schneider, professor of neurosurgery, 
co-patented a football helmet with an inflatable inner 
lining that is designed to reduce head injuries
(1970s) MERIT Computer Network (Eric Aupperle)
(1970s) Discovery that CFCs cause Ozone Hole (Ralph 
Cicerone)
(1972) Founding of the nation’s first Anxiety Disorders 
Program (George Curtis)
(1976) Alumnus Samuel C. C. Ting shared the 1976 No-
bel Prize in physics for co-discovering a subatomic 
structure called the J particle
(1982) Discovery that Venus seas were lost to green-
house gases (Thomas Donahue)
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(1980s) Computer-Aided Engineering Network (Rich-
ard Phillips, Daniel Atkins)
(1985) Key Study and Senate testimony on health im-
plications of tobacco (Kenneth Warner); Tobacco Re-
search Network established in 1999
(1985) Alumnus Richard Smalley , along with two other 
scientists, won 1996 Nobel Prize in chemistry for the 
1985 discovery of a form of the carbon element in the 
faceted shape of a soccer ball called fullerene
(1986) Alumnus Stanley Cohen was co-winner of the 
1986 Nobel Prize in medicine for discovering growth 
factors (proteins regulating cell growth) in human 
and animal tissue.
(1987) Development of high-power chirped-pulsed la-
sers (Gerard Mourou)
(1987) Douglas Richstone, professor of astronomy, dis-
covered in 1987 evidence for massive black holes in 
the Andromeda Galaxy and its satellite galaxy M32
(1988) Art Rich and James Van House develop positron 
microscope
(1980s) NSFnet and the Internet (with IBM and MCI) 
(Doug Van Houweling, Eric Aupperle)
(1980s) Development of Photoshop and software for 
digital photography (Tom and John Knoll)
(1990) Donabedian Paradigm statistical model for 
ranking hospitals and health care facilities (Avedis 
Donabedian)
(1990s) Francis Collins identifies gene for cystic fibrosis 
and neurofibromatisis
(1990s) Developed JSTOR project for the Mellon Foun-
dation (Randy Frank, Daniel Atkins)
(1990s) NSF Digital Library Project
(1990s) First School of Information (and informatics 
program) (Dan Atkins)
(1996) Created the Media Union (aka Duderstadt Cen-
ter) to explore paradigms for the future of higher 
education.
(1997) Developed technology for operating research 
nuclear reators on low-enrichment (non-weapons-
grade) uranium to secure nonproliferation (John Lee)
(1998) Mark Burns headed 1998 multidisciplinary team 
that created miniature “laboratory on a chip” for the 
analysis of DNA samples
(1999) Alumnis Tony Fadell creates the iPod (and sub-
sequent mobile devices such as the iPhone).
(2003) FDA approves FluMist nasal flu vaccine 
developed at the School of Public Health (Hunein 
“John” Maassab)
(2000s) Alumnus Larry Page creates Google, the na-
tion’s leading search engine
(2004) UM Libraries as leader in Google Book project
(2006) Created first University National Depression 
Center (John Greden) 
(2008) Created and managed the HathiTrust (world’s 
largest digital library)
(2010s) Involvement of SPH on Genome Wide Associa-
tion Studies identifying key (druggable) targets for 
widespread and orphan disease (Goncalo Abecasis 
and Mike Boehnke)
(2010s) SPH and UM Cancer work on understanding 
responses to chemotherapies.
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There is an old saying, particularly among college 
presidents, that the academic programs of the 
contemporary university are, in reality, a very fragile 
enterprise, precariously balanced between the football 
stadium on one end of the campus and the university 
medical center on the other. From our experience with 
the Michigan presidency, we can certainly attest to the 
dangers presented by these two “auxiliary” activities, 
since while misdeeds in the Athletics Department are 
usually sprayed across the front page, above the fold, of 
the newspapers, the mismanagement of the university 
hospital can sink the institution financially.
Yet the core missions of the university, its teaching 
and its research, are the responsibility of its academic 
programs. They determine not only the quality but 
moreover the reputation of the institution. Hence, it is 
important that we understand how these have evolved 
over the past several decades if we are to understand 
both the current status and the future challenges and 
opportunities faced by the University of Michigan.
The University of Michigan, Inc.
The late University of California President Clark 
Kerr once coined the term “multiversity” to describe 
today’s comprehensive university, a loosely coupled 
adaptive system that mutates and evolves with ever-
greater complexity to respond to the ever-greater 
knowledge needs and opportunities posed by society. 
One can certainly understand this viewpoint when 
considering the current organization of the University 
of Michigan. In fact, one might depict U of M, Inc., 
as essentially a holding company of knowledge-
intensive services. This would include the traditional 
components of a university: undergraduate colleges, 
graduate programs, and professional schools, all 
clustered about an intellectual core of faculty masters 
and advanced student scholars (in medieval terms, a 
universitas magistrorum et scholarium). But it also includes 
an array of auxiliary enterprises, largely operated on 
a self-financing basis, including sponsored research 
institutes, laboratories, and projects; clinical activities 
such as hospitals and health systems; student housing 
and services; and, of course, public entertainment 
venues such as intercollegiate athletics. Furthermore, a 
major university such as Michigan is always launching 
new ventures such as international programs, not-for-
profit knowledge services such as digital libraries, and 
possibly even activities that draw on the “brand name” 
of the university to establish new institutions through 
Chapter 4
Academic Programs
An academic institution delicately balanced between the football stadium 
on one end of the campus and the University hospital on the other end.
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franchising or mergers and acquisition.
Yet, even as the university continues to grow and 
diversify as it evolves, one must always remember 
that at its core are its academic programs. The usual 
Copernican view of the solar system of the university 
would place the liberal arts college and its core academic 
disciplines as the sun, the four inner planets as the most 
powerful professional schools—Medicine, Engineering, 
Law, and Business—and then a series of elliptical orbits 
for the remaining professional schools, depending 
upon their quality and priority within a particular 
institution. (Actually, some universities have evolved 
almost into a binary star system in which the medical 
center has assumed a size and financial importance 
almost comparable to that of the rest of the university. 
Some of our liberal arts colleagues suggest that a more 
appropriate astronomical metaphor would be that of the 
university as a star orbiting about a gigantic black hole 
created by the gravitational collapse of the University 
Hospital and the Athletic Department).
However it is useful to consider a somewhat 
different model: At the center of the university solar 
system would be the University Library and the 
Graduate School (posed strategically on either end 
of Ingalls Mall running through the core our Central 
Campus). This, of course, is the contemporary remnant 
of the medieval university, the Universitas Magistrorum 
et Scholarium, the union of scholars and masters both 
mastering and extending knowledge. Then the nearest 
four planets, where one at least has a chance of finding 
life, would be the liberal arts...the humanities, the 
arts, the natural sciences, and most recently the social 
sciences. Still farther out are the gas giants, the four large 
professional schools: medicine, law, engineering, and 
business. Finally, there are a range of other planet-like 
disciplines…some very similar to the liberal arts (e.g., 
the performing and visual arts), some that behave like 
comets (e.g., public policy, information sciences), and 
some that appear to be remnants of ancient university 
activities (e.g., Kinesiology as the remnant of Physical 
Education).
One might also describe the academic programs 
of the university in terms of the flow of students, 
first entering the university as undergraduates at the 
lower division (freshman, sophomore) level with 
the primary early objectives of socializing young 
adults, providing foundational learning, and enabling 
students to sample an array of disciplines for possible 
majors. Although lower division programs comprise a 
primary mission of community colleges and four-year 
liberal arts colleges, most public research universities 
today assign both instruction and student counseling 
to non-tenure track faculty (lecturers and instructors) 
and professional staff, with only occasional student 
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interaction with senior faculty in survey courses. There 
is a much greater involvement of senior faculty with 
undergraduate education at the upper division level, 
where students select to concentrate in an academic 
discipline and begin to prepare either for careers or 
further study at the graduate or professional level.
In fact, many students at leading research 
universities such as Michigan will continue their 
studies in professional schools at the graduate level in 
fields such as law, medicine, business administration, 
or education. These studies generally lead to graduate 
professional degrees at the masters level (MBA, M.Arch, 
MAT) or doctorate level (M.D., LL.D.).
A select few undergraduates will choose instead 
to enter the graduate programs of the university to 
prepare for careers in research or as college faculty. 
These graduate programs of the university are the 
closest analog to the structure of ancient universities 
since learning and scholarship occurs through unions 
or communities of masters (the faculty) and scholars 
(the students) leading to graduate degrees such as the 
M.S. or M.A. and the Ph.D. In fact, in many fields such 
as the physical and biomedical sciences, even further 
education at the postdoctoral level has become the 
norm for students wishing to enter the academy.
From a more fundamental perspective, these 
graduate programs (and their associated graduate 
schools in many universities), along with knowledge 
resources such as the university libraries, comprise 
the true academic core of the research university. They 
determine the intellectual vitality and reputation of the 
university and its various undergraduate and graduate 
programs. At Michigan, this academic core also has an 
important physical presence on the university campus, 
with the Rackham School of Graduate Studies and 
the University Library at either ends of the Ingalls 
Mall, about which are distributed not only the various 
schools and colleges but as well key cultural resources 
for the performing arts (e.g., Hill Auditorium and 
the Power Center) and museums (e.g., Museum of 
Art, Kelsey Museum, Ruthven Museum of Natural 
Sciences). Moving beyond this academic core, one 
finds first the University’s many professional schools 
(e.g., Law, Business Administration, Education, Social 
Work, Public Policy), then moving still further those 
professional schools associated with major research 
and clinical activities (e.g., the health sciences and 
the University Hospital, the North Campus with the 
creative disciplines such as Art, Music, Architecture, 
and Engineering) and finally to the many research 
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institutes and laboratories scattered about Ann Arbor. 
Many American research universities have a similar 
structure, with a clearly identifiable academic core 
surrounded by an array of schools, colleges, cultural 
institutions, and research activities.
The quality of the University of Michigan academic 
programs is the most fundamental determinant 
of its ability both to serve and to lead. However, a 
comprehensive and diverse array of intellectual, 
social, and cultural experiences is also important for 
its leadership role in higher education. And, the scale 
of our programs not only contributes to the richness 
and quality of the University (e.g., the size and quality 
of central resources such as libraries, computing 
networks, and athletic facilities), but it also determines 
its potential impact on society.
Rather than viewing the quality, breadth, and scale 
of the University as competing objectives–or possibly 
even as constraints on what it can accomplish within a 
world of limited resources–instead these characteristics, 
when linked together creatively, can provide an unusual 
opportunity. By building leadership in an environment 
that demands commitment to all three characteristics, 
with a particular stress on academic excellence, it can 
distinguish the University from other institutions that 
tend to focus on only one of these factors.
1960s -1970s
Much of the evolution of the University’s academic 
programs during the 1950s and 1960s was driven by 
enrollment growth, first the impact of returning WWII 
veterans funded by the GI Bill, and then a decade later, 
the post-WWII baby boom. Academic programs were 
challenged to expand their faculties and facilities to 
handle this enormous influx of new students. It was 
fortunate that the nation was willing to invest heavily 
both in higher education and research to enable this 
rapid growth of the campuses, particularly among 
public universities.
State support was strong, and there were sufficient 
resources for significant academic experimentation at 
the University with the Inteflex program, a joint and 
compressed B.S./M.D. program; the Pilot Program, a 
living-learning program based on writing and the arts; 
the Residential College, a major living-learning effort 
located in East Quad and patterned after the colleges 
at Yale and Oxbridge; and the Honors Program, an 
interdisciplinary major for outstanding students. 
In the early 1960s, enrollment pressures motivated 
the Regents to consider opening the University for year-
round operation, based on a “trimester” calendar with 
shortened four-month terms. Unfortunately, although 
a trial effort was a success, the University was never 
able to persuade Lansing to provide the necessary 
appropriations for spring-summer instruction, and the 
plan was abandoned, although, interestingly enough, 
the “trimester calendar” continued, only with the 
trimesters renamed “semesters” with little spring-
summer enrollment. This four-month term calendar 
not only remains today at the University, but it has been 
adopted by many other universities with shortened 
semesters.
While Michigan’s undergraduate programs in 
LS&A and Engineering grew rapidly during this 
period, there were also changes in the relative priorities 
among its professional schools and colleges, as shifting 
public priorities were reflected in the ebb and flow 
of University activities. During the 1950s, American 
priorities remained national defense (the Cold War) 
and getting the economy back on stable peacetime 
growth, stimulating the campuses to place high priority 
on building engineering and the physical sciences.
These priorities shifted to social themes during 
the 1960s, with emphasis on the social sciences and 
professional schools such as Education, Social Work, 
and Law. The 1970s saw major emphasis on the health 
sciences, with major investments in Medicine, Dentistry, 
Nursing, Public Health, and Pharmacy–culminating in 
the commitment to a major new University Hospital in 
1978. As both the state and the nation became concerned 
with issues such as economic competitiveness and 
industrial productivity in the early 1980s, the University 
once again shifted priorities to focus on Engineering 
and Business Administration.
Michigan entered the 1960s with 21 of its departments 
rated in the top 10, exceeded only by Harvard, 
UC-Berkeley, and Yale. But with the emergence of 
disruptive student activism and then later the erosion 
of state support, the University had other priorities 
during the latter years of the 1960s and the 1970s, and 
the innovation in academic programs languished. The 
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erosion of state support, particularly for new buildings, 
coupled with the pressures of the energy crisis, restricted 
opportunities that required major additional resources. 
Engineering remained largely trapped in old buildings 
on the Central Campus, with any opportunity to build 
new facilities on the North Campus only a pipe-dream. 
Medicine anxiously awaited a new adult general 
hospital accompanied by modern research facilities, 
but again while planning proceeded, the absence of 
adequate funding constrained academic programs.
In summary, the 1970s were largely a status quo time 
for the academic programs, just as they were for other 
characteristics such as major initiatives and institutional 
leadership. Yet although surveys suggested that the 
stature of most of the University’s academic programs 
was maintained throughout these years in its traditional 
areas of strength, the social and  behavioral sciences, 
warning signs did appear in some areas such as the 
physical science and medicine. It was clear that without 
improvement of existing facilities and strong initiatives 
at faculty hiring in the next decade, the stature of the 
University would clearly diminish.
1980s
The University faced even greater financial 
challenges during the 1980s as the weakening of 
the American automobile industry in the face of 
competition from Japan led to serious erosion in state 
support that would continue to decline throughout 
the decade. With the loss of over one-third of its 
state support during the first years of his presidency, 
Harold Shapiro realized it was necessary to adapt 
the University to a future of declining state support. 
While it was clear that a major cost-cutting effort 
was necessary to bring expenditures into line with 
resources, Shapiro recognized that a far more strategic 
approach would be necessary to sustain the quality of 
the institution. To this end, Shapiro created a University-
wide Budget Priorities Committee comprised of faculty 
and academic leaders (deans and executive officers) 
reporting to the provost to determine both University 
priorities and targets for possible cuts. Although most 
budget reductions were in administrative areas, several 
academic units (Art, Education, Natural Resources) 
were proposed for major budget reductions or possible 
even program discontinuance. Here the “holy trinity” 
of quality, centrality, and cost were used to make these 
determinations.
While Shapiro and his provost, Billy Frye, were 
successful in adapting the University to reduced state 
support through cost reductions, increased tuition 
rates, and fund-raising, they did so with their intense 
and unrelenting commitment to academic excellence. 
Indeed, it is no exaggeration to state that during 
Harold Shapiro’s tenure as provost and president, 
the University intensified its commitment to serious 
academic excellence and developed a determination to 
compete with the finest universities in America for the 
very best faculty, students, and programs. 
While the quality of the various academic 
programs of the University is determined by many 
factors such as resource commitments and capital 
facilities, there is nothing more critical to the quality 
of faculty and the standards applied in promotion 
and tenure. As provost and then president, Shapiro 
personally reviewed carefully each faculty casebook 
for promotion and tenure and frequently challenged 
academic units if he believed these cases fell short of 
the University’s aspiration for excellence. To be sure, 
this was challenging in an institution of Michigan’s 
unusually broad intellectual span, ranging from the 
liberal arts to professional schools such as medicine 
and law to the performing and visual arts. By working 
closely with senior colleagues with experience in many 
of these areas, including in particular John D’Arms, a 
classicist who was then Dean of the Graduate School, 
and George Zuidema, Executive Vice President of the 
Medical Center, he was able to raise the bar for faculty 
promotion. This effort required not only thoughtful 
review but also considerable courage, such as when 
tenure was denied for the first time to a junior faculty 
member in the Law School, challenging their long 
standing contention that since every faculty member 
they hired was outstanding, all should be promoted.
The commitment set by Shapiro was continued by 
his successors, drawing on the assessment of colleagues 
to help review each case and frequently challenging 
academic programs when the case seemed insufficient 
for positive action. The basic philosophy was rarely to 
deny directly a promotion or tenure recommendation, 
but instead to return the casebook with the explanation 
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that more was needed to make a strong case. On one 
occasion over 50% of the recommendations from the 
Medical School were returned without approval, 
noting that they all looked like they had been prepared 
from the same word-processor template (they had). 
The philosophy was summarized in a communication 
to the school’s dean and executive committee: “Put 
yourself in our shoes for a moment. In the course of 
a year we are asked to evaluate and rule on hundreds 
of appointments for all conceivable academic and 
professional appointments. This year we received 
70 tenure recommendations from your school. 
The decision to offer tenure is the most important 
decision we make in this university. It is also our most 
important responsibility, since these decisions affect 
the institution for decades to come. The burden must 
be on the unit to demonstrate that the candidate has 
the degree of excellence, of achievement, necessary to 
merit tenure. You have not done so on many of these 
recommendations, and until that case has been made, 
we are unable to support tenure for these individuals.”
1990s
By the late 1980s it had become apparent that 
the College of Literature, Science, and Arts and, in 
particular, its undergraduate programs, had suffered 
the most from the erosion of public support and the 
shifting priorities of the University. In part this was 
due to the shear size of LS&A. Whenever budget cuts 
were necessary, LS&A had to take a major cut since it 
had the largest share of resources. But, in part, this was 
also due to the trend in most large public universities 
in the post-war years to stress professional education–
Business, Law, Engineering, and Medicine–rather than 
undergraduate education.
Hence, during the 1990s it was important to set 
firm priorities on restoring core support for both 
LS&A and improving the quality of undergraduate 
education. During the early years this was done both 
through the provision of additional operating funds as 
well as special initiatives which benefited LS&A, e.g., 
the priority given to rebuilding the natural sciences, 
additional funding designed to improve the quality 
of first year undergraduate education, and special 
salary programs for outstanding faculty. However, 
in later years, the University went beyond this to 
launch an ambitious program to renovate or rebuild 
all of the buildings housing LS&A programs, which 
had deteriorated during the 1970s and 1980s as the 
University had addressed other capital priorities such 
as the Hospital. In the decade from 1985 to 1996, the 
University invested more than $350 million in capital 
facilities for LS&A, essentially rebuilding the entire 
Central Campus area.
During the 1990s the focus on improving the 
quality of the undergraduate experience was also a 
clear priority. The Undergraduate Initiative Fund was 
created to provide over $1 million per year of grants to 
projects aimed at improving undergraduate education. 
The common thread throughout these initiatives was 
grassroots involvement. By seeking proposals, ideas, 
and participation in defining programs from faculty, 
students, and staff, the University sought to invest 
resources in a way that would motivate our most creative 
people to become involved and to become committed. 
The first awards in this program created an interesting 
portfolio of new initiatives. A new series of core 
curriculum courses in the liberal arts was developed. 
Instruction in science and mathematics for the first two 
undergraduate years underwent major revisions. New 
initiatives to better integrate the arts such as theater, 
dance, and music into the undergraduate curriculum. 
The University funded pedagogical needs such as 
teaching assistant training and took substantive action 
to improve counseling and sensitivity to pluralism 
in the University. It also funded a number of student 
proposals, ranging from undergraduate colloquia to 
faculty fellow programs in the residence halls, to on-
line counseling and information services on our campus 
computer network, to an alternative career center. A 
series of named professorships, the Thurnau Professors, 
were established to honor faculty with extraordinary 
achievements in undergraduate education. 
Similar steps were taken to improve undergraduate 
education in other schools including Engineering, 
Music, Art, Nursing, and Business Administration, 
including major new facilities such as the Angell-
Haven Center and the Media Union on the North 
Campus to provide undergraduates with state-of-the-
art computing resources. A series of renovations and 
new construction projects were launched to improve 
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the quality of instructional space on campus, including 
renovation of the Undergraduate Library.  As part 
of this effort, $500,000 per year base budget line was 
committed to renovate over time every classroom on 
the Central Campus. 
Similar efforts were launched to improve the quality 
of graduate and professional education. The School 
of Medicine completely restructured the medical 
curriculum to provide students early on with clinical 
experience. Business Administration redesigned its 
MBA program to stress teamwork and community 
service. Engineering introduced new professional 
degrees at the masters and doctorate level to respond to 
the needs of industry for practice-oriented professionals. 
The School of Dentistry underwent a particularly 
profound restructuring of its educational, research, 
and service programs. The Institute for Public Policy 
Studies was restructured into a new School of Public 
Policy. The School of Library Science evolved into a 
new School of Information, developing entirely new 
academic programs in the management of knowledge 
resources.
International education was also given high priority. 
Following planning efforts of the 1980s, a series 
of steps were taken to broaden and coordinate the 
University’s international activities. Michigan joined 
its Big Ten colleagues as a member of the Midwestern 
University Consortium for International Activities 
(MUCIA), the leading university organization for 
international development. The University created a 
new International Institute to coordinate international 
programs. It continued to expand its relationship with 
academic institutions abroad, with particular emphasis 
on Asia and Europe. Of particular note were the 
distance learning efforts of the Business School, which 
used computer and telecommunications technology, 
along with corporate partnerships, to establish overseas 
campuses in Hong Kong, Seoul, Paris, and London.
National rankings of the various academic and 
professional programs continued their upward climb. 
By the mid-1990s, Michigan had achieved rankings 
across the full range of undergraduate, graduate, and 
professional programs that were matched in academic 
quality by only a handful of peer institutions–notably 
Harvard, Stanford, and the University of California. 
During the 1990s, the University of Michigan completed 
the ascension in academic quality launched years earlier 
by Harold Shapiro. Its quality and impact across all 
academic disciplines and professional programs ranked 
it not only among the most distinguished universities 
in the world but tied with the University of California 
Berkeley as the nation’s leading public university.
2000s – 2010s
While Michigan’s deans continued to play key roles 
in the fortunes of the academic programs of schools 
and colleges as the new century commenced, their 
power began to be challenged by a new University 
administration.  Major projects such as the renovation 
of Hill Auditorium and a Master Plan for the 
University’s North Campus were halted and replaced 
by new presidential initiatives such as the Life Sciences 
Institute, funded from $200 million from UM Hospital 
reserves, that would compete with the needs of the 
biological sciences, which continued to struggle with 
inadequate space in the shadow of the new Institute 
designed by Robert Venturi. 
Ironically, however, one such presidential initiative 
inadvertently had a very positive impact on the North 
Campus academic programs. The new administration 
diverted a $10 million gift originally intended for LS&A 
by alumnus Charles Walgreen to fund a new repertory 
theater proposed for a Central Campus location adjacent 
to the Power Center. This site was soon determined to 
be inappropriate, as was the original intent of using the 
new theater for a professional repertory company rather 
than for student-related performances. Eventually the 
School of Music was able to persuade a subsequent 
administration both to repurpose the complex for its 
academic programs in theater and relocate it to a central 
location on the North Campus, adjacent to the Media 
Union (aka Duderstadt Center) with its sound stages 
and recording studios. This new location and purpose 
for the Walgreen Center (and its experimental theater, 
named after Arthur Miller) fit in well with the other 
creative disciplines evolving on the North Campus in 
Art and Design, Architecture, and Engineering.
There was further expansion of research space, 
with the acquisition of the Pfizer global research center 
(although the University fumbled an offer from Pfizer to 
provide this large complex as a gift and later had to pay 
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$105 million for the property). Engineering also missed 
the opportunity to acquire the Industrial Technology 
Institute, a research facility built for robotics research 
during the 1980s, and instead allowed the University 
Hospitals to acquire it for the storage of Hospital 
records (ironically placed in the high-bay laboratories 
originally designed for automated manufacturing 
research).
Although the University managed to maintain its 
rankings in various international “league tables”, a 
more definitive analysis of the change in the US News 
& World Report graduate rankings for UM programs 
suggests there was some erosion in many programs 
over the past decade. In fact, many of the University 
concerns arising over the past decade trace their origin 
to the changing culture of the university as it became 
larger, more extended, more complex, and less driven 
by academic priorities. 
New Challenges to Academic Priorities
Although the academic activities of the University 
remain key to its reputation and impact, the attention 
of recent University administrations and Regents 
has increasingly been focused on nonacademic 
opportunities. During the first decades of the new 
century there has been a growing faculty concern that 
the rapid growth of the Michigan’s auxiliary activities 
(hospitals, housing, and athletics), now comprising 
almost 50% of the University’s budget, has driven an 
increased focus on these activities by the leadership and 
governance of the institution to the neglect of academic 
programs. 
This was certainly the case in areas such as the 
University’s investment in capital facilities–e.g., 
the new $750 million pediatrics hospital, the $650 
million investment in renovation of residence halls, 
and the $500 million additions to Michigan Stadium 
and the Crisler Center–in comparison to the modest 
investments in the academic core limited to the $150 
M Business school complex, a $100 M Law addition, 
a $50 million building for Nursing, and a limited 
investment in LS&A facilities. To be sure, the auxiliary 
units operate in markets that are relatively insensitive 
to pricing compared to the tuition constraints and 
limited public support of academic units. But there is 
growing concern that this rapid growth is also driven 
by unusually aggressive leadership of auxiliary units as 
well as the priority given by the University’s leadership 
and governance.
There is also the related issue as to whether the 
aggressive growth of the auxiliary units actually 
competes with and draws resources away from the 
academic core. To be sure, the strong influence of the 
clinical units in the Medical Center on fund raising is 
understandable and usually beneficial to the Medical 
School. However the aggressive fund-raising of the 
Athletics Department through devices such as skyboxes 
and seat taxes clearly draws away private giving that in 
the past has benefited academic units. So too, the recent 
aggressive fundraising activities of the University 
Musical Society is almost certainly at the expense of 
the School of Music, particularly as UMS has expanded 
its programs beyond musical performance to include 
theater and dance. While there is disagreement about 
how damaging this has been to academic priorities, it 
is certainly appropriate to raise the policy issue of the 
priority given auxiliary unit fund-raising activities 
relative to that given academic units.
This concern about academic priorities applies not 
only to resource allocation but also to the attention of 
governance (the Regents), leadership (the Executive 
Officers), and management (central administration 
functions such as development and communications). 
Too many universities have seen the quality of their 
academic programs deteriorate through the distraction 
of important but clearly secondary activities such as 
fund-raising (e.g., donor cultivation and influence), the 
management of billion-dollar enterprises such as health 
systems, the public visibility of intercollegiate athletics, 
and the misguided efforts to force upon universities 
many of the inappropriate practices of business and 
commerce (e.g., “shared services”).
While much of this is driven both by the differing 
financial opportunities and challenges facing academic, 
auxiliary, and administrative activities, it is also due 
to an erosion of the academic voice in University 
leadership. For example, there has been a decided 
shift away from long tradition of appointing senior 
administrators (including the Executive Officers of the 
University) with significant faculty experience. During 
the 1980s and 1990s, the majority of the Executive 
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Officers had sufficient academic backgrounds to merit 
faculty appointments. In recent years, however, only the 
president, provost, and vice-president for research have 
had backgrounds that merit academic appointments.
So, too, the long-standing practice of achieving 
a balance between the appointment of internal and 
external candidates for senior leadership positions 
such as deans in an effort to balance both the continuity 
provided by long-standing University employees with 
new viewpoints from outside seems to have been 
abandoned, with a decided preference toward external 
candidates in recent years. During the 1970s through 
the 1990s, the majority of the deans came from internal 
appointments of outstanding faculty. In recent years 
there has been a very significant preference for external 
candidates, now comprising over two-thirds of the 
deans and the majority of the executive officers.
But perhaps the most worrisome trend has been 
the weakening of the voice and influence of the 
University’s deans and faculty executive committees 
in recent years. The University of Michigan has long 
been known as a “deans’ university”, in which the 
authority and responsibility of deans as academic 
leaders is unusually strong, working closely with 
elected executive committees generally populated 
with many of the University’s most outstanding 
faculty members. Deans are the key academic leaders 
most responsible for the priority, quality, and integrity 
of the University’s academic programs. They select 
department chairs, recruit and evaluate faculty, seek 
resources for their school both within the university 
(arguing for their share of university resources) and 
beyond the campus (through private fundraising or 
research grantsmanship). As the key line officers for the 
faculty of the university, they have rather considerable 
authority that usually aligns well with their great 
responsibilities. Good things happen in the University’s 
academic programs because of good deans, at least over 
the long term–and vice-versa, of course. 
Yet, despite this dispersal of power, Michigan is also 
an institution where team building and cooperation 
is greatly valued. Deans come together quite easily as 
teams, particularly if encouraged by the provost and 
president, and willingly work together on university-
wide priorities. Although technically the deans report 
to the provost, the wise provost will join the deans’ 
team as a member and captain rather than as its coach–
and certainly not as its owner!
Since the influence of faculty governance at the 
University is primarily concentrated in powerful 
elected faculty executive committees at the school, 
college, and department level rather than with a 
University-wide faculty senate, the deans also have 
primary responsibility for making certain that academic 
priorities dominate the attention of the University 
administration and governing board. To weaken the 
USN&WR Rankings of UM Graduate Programs (Courtesy of F. Ulaby)
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access and influence of the deans relative to both the 
Executive Officers and Regents of the University is 
tantamount to weakening the academic priorities of the 
institution.
The Road Ahead
So, how does one sustain the quality and 
leadership of academic programs in an unusually 
large and complex institution such as the University 
of Michigan that is continually challenged to balance 
rapidly changing challenges, responsibilities, and 
opportunities? For example, highly selective private 
institutions sometimes sacrifice breadth and size in 
an effort to achieve absolute excellence in a small 
number of fields. This results in institutions highly 
focused in an intellectual sense, which while certainly 
capable of conducting distinguished academic 
programs, are nevertheless unable to provide the 
rich array of opportunities and diverse experiences 
of “multiversities” such as Michigan. At the other 
end of the spectrum, the University can also set itself 
apart from many other large, comprehensive public 
universities by the degree to which it chooses to focus 
its resources on academic quality. As the diagram above 
suggests, not only the reputation but also the impact of 
the University is driven by its deep commitment to the 
priority given the quality of its academic activities.
Once again we must stress the importance of 
understanding the history of the University, the nature 
of our past achievements of academic quality and 
leadership, and our unique institutional culture. The 
University’s unusual combination of quality, breadth, 
spirit, and scale not only allow it but actually compel it 
to provide leadership for higher education through risk 
taking, path finding, and trail blazing. To this leadership 
character, one must add the importance of recognizing 
that the true source of Michigan’s excellence and 
leadership rests with the quality, spirit, and innovation 
of its people–its faculty, students, and staff–and 
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decidedly not with its administrative leadership or 
governance. It thrives as a loosely coupled, adaptive 
organization, drawing its strength, innovation, and 
vision from the grass roots, from the faculty, students, 
and staff who embrace deep commitments to academic 
priorities.
Of course, this character is quite unusual in higher 
education (although certainly present in several 
other great universities such as Harvard, Caltech, 
and Stanford). While clearly ingrained in the culture 
of the institution and shaping the perspective and 
achievements of its people, it can be a threatening 
characteristic to those new to the University–
particularly to those recruited into leadership positions 
as deans or executive officers or elected to serve on the 
University’s Board of Regents. Hence the challenge is 
both to make certain that the selection of University 
leadership at all levels is balanced among insiders both 
knowledgeable and committed to the unique history 
and culture of the University, and those recruited from 
outside into leadership positions adequately informed 
and committed to sustaining this culture and its 
academic priorities.
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Despite what the faculty, administrators, alumni, 
and football fans may think, students are the most 
important participants on a university campus. 
Yet there is as much diversity in this community–
rather communities–as in higher education itself, 
distinguished by degree programs (undergraduate, 
graduate, professional, postdoctoral), academic majors 
(from Art to Zoology), extracurricular interests (sports, 
politics, parties, etc.), sociodemographics, and so on. 
Hence it is useful to begin first by considering the 
general characteristics of the University student body 
over the past fifty years.
As we have noted earlier in Chapter 2, for much 
of its history, the University’s enrollment was among 
the largest in the nation. Although growth was slow 
and relatively stable during most of its early history, 
enrollments expanded rapidly following WWII with 
the GI Bill and returning veterans. A second wave of 
enrollment increases occurred with the baby boomers, 
the children of the “greatest generation”, who swelled 
college enrollments in the 1960s and 1970s. But in sharp 
contrast to their parents, these comprised the protest 
generation, challenging not only the values of their 
parents, but of the university more generally. In the 
1960s students wanted to change the world. Parties were 
out (except for street efforts like the MC5). Fraternities 
and sororities almost disappeared. To be sure, many of 
their causes such as civil rights and war protests were 
just, but their rejection of “the establishment” not only 
challenged many of the traditions of higher education 
but severed the long-standing relationship of the 
University of Michigan with its past. 
After a lull between generations, a second surge in 
enrollments began in the late 1980s with “tidal wave 
II”, the children of the boomers, who were more career 
focused, regarding their education as a stepping stone 
to employment and prosperity. After modest increases, 
enrollments stabilized once again throughout the 
1990s. Although there was a brief period of student 
activism during the late 1980s and early 1990s, student 
interest began to shift to preparing for an increasingly 
competitive job market, with majors such as business 
administration rising to the top of the list in student 
interest. 
But there was another important change during 
the past two decades. Throughout much of the last 
half of the 20th Century, the University had attracted 
a broad spectrum of students, many from low-income 
families in the cities, factories, and farms, and as the 
first college students in their families. They came to 
Michigan, determined to work hard to take advantage 
of its opportunities, and striving for leadership roles in 
society. This character was reflected in their work ethic, 
whether working to pay their way through college or 
to achieve academic competence in tough majors like 
medicine and engineering; in their competitiveness, 
whether in the classroom, on the field, or later in life; 
and in their activism, challenging the flaws in our 
society and proposing new paths to the future, and 
in their competitiveness. The majority of Michigan 
students were indeed “the common man” seeking “an 
uncommon education”, in Angell’s words, to become 
the “leaders and best”.
Yet in the late 1990s and continuing today, 
many public universities began to increase their 
undergraduate enrollments dramatically, with a strong 
bias given to out-of-state students capable of paying 
much higher tuition in an effort to compensate for 
the loss of state support. Since most of these students 
came from families (or nations such as China) capable 
of paying the high costs of private universities, the 
socioeconomic mix of students began to shift toward 
Chapter 5
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higher incomes, leaving behind those from low-income 
backgrounds and underrepresented minorities. This 
has raised the great concern that the shift toward high 
income students to compensate for weakening state 
support threatened to erode the public purpose of 
universities such as Michigan, committed in early eras 
to providing “an uncommon education for the common 
man.”
1950s
The growth of the University following WWII 
surged with the returning veterans to over 20,000, then 
stabilized and slipped back briefly to 17,000 students 
in the mid-1950s, then began to grow again, reaching 
22,180 students in 1960. The veterans added maturity 
to the student body as they returned from war seriously 
committed to their education. In fact, many senior 
faculty remember these times as the most intellectually 
exciting of their careers, challenged as they were by the 
maturity and commitment of the returning veterans. 
However eventually as the veterans graduated, the 
campus student body once again returned to the 
behavior of the young.
President Hatcher provided strong leadership 
during this period of growth, although he did run 
into some student problems. During his first year, 
he ran into fraternity discrimination again, and like 
Ruthven, vetoed a requirement to ban such behavior. 
Students from South Quad and West Quad raided the 
women’s dorms on the Hill–the first panty raids–and 
then gathered outside the President’s House to display 
their trophies. However, President Hatcher, always the 
patrician, greeted them with the advice “Men, it is late 
and time to go to bed.” At which point they returned 
to their dorms. The UM took great flak in the media, 
however, “Why was such horseplay permitted when 
other young men were dying in Korea?” It is ironic 
that the episode occurred at the very time that certain 
faculty members and student leaders were lamenting 
“student apathy”. But change was beginning to occur 
in the student body as the 1960s approached. 
1960s-1970s
The 1960s produced one of the most distinctive 
youth culture in collegiate history: anti-elitist, anti-
establishment, and rejecting the materialism of its 
The rapid growth in enrollments following WWII and then once again in the past decade.
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parents. Old traditions such as the J-Hop, freshman 
hazing, class plays, and such disappeared. Fraternities 
and sororities faced hard times and had to take in 
boarders, dropping from 12% to 4.7% of the student 
body.
Of course Michigan had long attracted an activist 
student body, as evidenced by the well-known 
observation in the 1880s in Harper’s Weekly that referred 
to one of Michigan’s most interesting characteristics as 
“the liberal spirit through which it conducts education”. 
But during the 1960s student activism was more 
strident. The University was pushed out of students’ 
lives, the Code of Nonacademic Conduct disappeared 
(and was not reinstituted until 1992), and in loco parentis 
was forever banned from the Michigan campus.
By 1966 the students’ insistence on control over their 
personal lives, including draft status and antiwar protest 
activity, collided with House Un-American Activities 
Commission request to the Hatcher administration for 
cooperation in investigating war protestors and the 
concerns of the Selective Service Bureau. The Students 
for a Democratic Society were particularly active. The 
Hatcher administration banned sit-ins in November, 
1966 stirring enormous opposition from the Student 
Government Council. 1,500 students held a one-hour 
sit-in at the Administration (LSA) Building. This protest 
effort intensified when the Johnson administration 
ended student deferments. Draft card burnings at 
rallies began, and some students began to leave the 
country to escape the draft. The Diag became the center 
of activity for SDS and other groups.
Ann Arbor adopted its $5 pot law and established 
the annual Hash Bash celebration each May 1. John 
Sinclair and the Trans-Love Energies Tribe and Rainbow 
People’s Party took over two large houses on Hill Street 
for communes. Drugs were an accepted part of campus 
life, at least by most students, with 90% using alcohol 
and 50% trying marijuana at least once. Co-ed dorms 
appeared, with only the Betsy Barbour, Newbury, 
Stockwell, and Martha Cook residences remaining 
restricted to women in 1970. Ironically, however, 
fraternity discrimination continued.
The Regents turned to Robben Fleming for leadership 
during these turbulent times, Fleming brought skills 
that seemed tailor made for the challenges of the 1960s. 
He was Chancellor of the University of Wisconsin, a 
peer institution, but he had also been a labor mediator, 
directing the Institute of Labor Relations at both 
Illinois and Wisconsin. With great patience, tact, and 
an understanding of the art of negotiations, Fleming 
would maintain the confidence of the University 
community through a difficult decade.
At an antiwar rally in Hill Auditorium in 1969, 
Fleming expressed the view that the war was a “colossal 
mistake”. Following a UM football game the next day, 
12,000 students marched from the Diag to Michigan 
Stadium to protest. On October 15, 1969, a rally was 
held in Michigan Stadium, encouraged by the Faculty 
Senate, and 20,000 showed up.
In March 1969, the Jesse James Gang, the militant 
wing of the SDS, attempted to provoke a confrontation 
by locking themselves in the room with a military 
The 1960s were a time of student protest. John Sinclair and the Rainbow People’s Party
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recruiter. Fleming just let them wear themselves out. 
Later, anti-ROTC militants took over North Hall, 
and again Fleming asked the police to just guard the 
building for safety and leave the back door unlocked. 
Eventually the students wore out once again and left.
Fleming did get caught in one incident: the battle 
over a student-operated bookstore. The Regents would 
not allow the students to control the store, and the 
Radical Caucus of SDS took over the LSA building. 
Concern about the security of faculty offices and 
student files, Fleming sought a restraining order. At 
4:00 a.m., state and local policy forcibly evacuated the 
building, arresting 107 people. The arrests let students 
know there were some things that went too far. 
Yet another volatile issue concerned minority issues. 
Low Black enrollment had been a growing concern. The 
snail’s pace of progress led to the organization of the 
Black Action Movement, dedicated to assisting minority 
students and opening the University’s traditionally 
white campus to wider minority participation. Unable 
to secure from the Regents the financial guarantees to 
meet its goal, BAM called for a campus-wide strike in 
March 1970. They sought a number of guarantees for 
financial aid, support services, support for the Center 
for African American Studies, and an increase in Black 
enrollment from 3% to 10%.
Fleming was under pressure to call in the National 
Guard. But he persuaded the Regents to bear with 
the unpleasantness, arguing that avoiding potential 
tragedy “calls for enduring a certain amount of 
damage, or intimidation, harassment and insult, in 
return for a more rational and sane means of dealing 
with the problem”. Eight days after it began, the strike 
was settled, and the University gave approval to the 
essential BAM demands, including agreeing to work 
toward a goal of 10% Black enrollment by 1973.
While campus activism and protests during the 
1960s irritated many, it should be acknowledged that 
these were frequently the mechanisms the campus 
used to address important social causes such as the 
international development (i.e., Kennedy’s 1960 
speech announcing the concept of the peace corps), the 
Vietnam war (i.e., the Teach-Ins of 1965), civil rights 
and racial diversity (i.e., the Black Action Movement 
of 1969), and environmental issues (i.e., Earth Day in 
1972). To be sure, these were issues of great importance, 
and the voices of Michigan students and faculty were 
important both to the institution and to the nation. 
The nation’s first Earth Day conference, sponsored by 
a campus group, was held on March 12-15, 1970. To 
attract media attention, a 1959 Ford sedan was “hacked 
to death” on the Diag.
Yet there is an ebb and flow to student activism, just 
as there is to broader political life, determined by social 
issues of the times–e.g., an unpopular war, the draft, 
an economic downturn, the lack of jobs for graduating 
students–and by the quality of student leadership, since 
pulling together such movements requires some talent. 
During the 1970s the energy crisis and a weakening 
economy put jobs on the front burner for most students. 
There were occasional flare-ups over important issues 
such as racial tolerance or gay rights, but there were 
Calling for a commitment to diversity and inclusion. Students disrupting a Regents meeting.
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President Fleming was a calming influence.
also cosmic concerns such as establishing Ann Arbor as 
a nuclear-weapons-free zone that have long since been 
forgotten.
1980s
During the 1980s, the number of high school 
graduates in Michigan dropped by over 25%, as the post-
war baby boom subsided. Although this led to a decline 
in the number of Michigan applicants to the University, 
increases in the number of out-of-state applicants more 
than offset this decline to the point where almost 20,000 
students were applying for the 5,000 positions in the 
freshman class. While some of this increase in out-state 
application activity was no doubt due to the ease of 
filing multiple applications with personal computers, it 
was also due to the fact that Michigan had become a “hot 
school”, a popular choice to students across the country 
because of its unusual combination of academic quality, 
attractive social life, excitement (athletics, politics, arts), 
and name recognition. 
As the mood of the nation shifted away from 
confrontation and dissent in the 1980s, so, too, did 
the majority of Michigan’s student body become 
more conservative and detached from the agendas 
of various special interest groups. As a result, those 
remaining activist elements of the student body 
became increasingly focused on narrow special interest 
agendas, even as the silent majority of students became 
more passive and focused instead on personal issues 
such as grades, social life, athletics...and job prospects! 
This was reflected in student government, in which only 
the more activist–indeed, radical–students would care 
passionately enough about particular issues to expend 
the energy to run for elected office. It was also reflected, 
unfortunately, in the attitude of administrators and 
faculty toward such student activism, treating it with 
benign neglect until it burst into flames that required 
a fire drill. This tradition of activism, while a source of 
great energy and excitement, also had some drawbacks–
particularly when the issues and agendas were not 
sufficiently compelling. 
Student activism returned once again in the late 
1980s, but the issues were common to those of most 
other campuses–e.g., military research on campus, gay 
rights, and racism–and could be viewed as resurgence 
of unsettled issues from the 1960s. Perhaps the most 
interesting event strategically was the Regents decision 
to divest only 90% of South African holdings in response 
to a law drafted by State Legislature Representative 
Perry Bullard prohibiting colleges from investing in 
South Africa because of its apartheid government. 
Although the University agreed in principle with 
challenging apartheid, it first sued the state to protect 
its constitutional autonomy, and after it eventually 
won in 1988, it divested the rest of its holdings. (This 
willingness to sue the state from time to time–or at least 
threaten suit–was a regular occurrence over the years, 
necessary to protect the constitutional autonomy of the 
University.)
Smashing a car to celebrate Earth Day.
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1990s
Although the University had been worried about 
the impact of the demographic slide following the baby 
boom, in fact, student quality continued to improve 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s, with each class 
possessing academic credentials even stronger than 
the previous class. But student energy and activism 
remained, in part encouraged by the large number of 
staff in the student services area who had been members 
of the 60s generation and who harbored as much 
distrust and disrespect for “the establishment” as did 
the more activist students themselves. Indeed, it was 
not uncommon to find that many staff, themselves, were 
pot-stirring among the activist students, encouraging 
them to protest on various special interest agendas.
Key in changing a Michigan student culture, 
stagnating between those still trapped in the 1960s and 
those who had rejected student activism as irrelevant 
to their personal concerns, was the appointment 
of Maureen Hartford as Vice President for Student 
Affairs. Hartford came with extensive experience at 
other universities. But, more significant, she came with 
a deep respect, concern, and love for students that was 
immediately obvious to those on the search committee 
that recommended her appointment. During her first 
week on campus, she checked into the South Quad 
residence hall to spend several nights with students 
to learn more about their lives. She rapidly gained the 
respect of even the most activist students. Over time, 
she managed to stimulate a similar degree of respect 
for student concerns within the administration and the 
faculty. Within a few months it was clear that a true sea 
change had occurred in the student culture, and there 
was a rapid growth of interest in student government 
among our very academically strongest students.
But despite the mutual respect and affection 
between Hartford and the student body, she faced 
several particular challenges in which her reputation 
for toughness–with an earlier nickname of “Attila, 
the Hen”–would prove valuable. When she arrived 
on campus, Michigan had one additional issue that 
would have seemed almost absurd on other college 
campuses: the absence of any policy for student 
discipline and campus safety. One of the hangovers of 
the volatile days of the 1970s had been the elimination 
of a code of student conduct. The elimination of this 
policy in 1974 had been intended only as a temporary 
lapse pending the development and adoption of a new 
code. But student government was given veto power 
over the process, and it had consistently exercised this 
veto to prevent the development or adoption of a new 
disciplinary policy. As a result, the University had 
gone for almost 15 years without any of the student 
disciplinary policies characterizing every other college 
or university in the nation. The only option available 
for student disciplinary action was to utilize an obscure 
Regents Bylaw that gave the president the authority to 
intervene personally to handle each incident.  Although 
the University knew it was at some risk in the absence 
of such a student code–and, indeed, out of compliance 
with federal laws that required such policies to govern 
areas such as substance abuse–each time an effort was 
made to develop a code, activist students blocked it.
There was yet another issue of great concern to 
many students–but also providing opportunities for 
protest to others who resented any authority: campus 
safety. For most of the University’s history, Ann Arbor 
was a rather simple and safe residential community. But 
as Southeastern Michigan evolved in the post-war era 
to “metroplex” with intricate freeway networks linking 
Detroit and its suburbs, Ann Arbor acquired more 
of an urban character, with all of the safety concerns 
plaguing any large city. While many aspects of campus 
safety could be addressed through straightforward and 
noncontroversial actions, such as improving lighting or 
security locks on residence hall entrances, there was one 
Vice-President Maureen Hartford
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issue unique to the University that proved to be more 
volatile: the absence of a campus police force. Unlike 
every other large university in America, the University 
had never developed its own campus police and instead 
relied on community police and sheriff deputies. This 
had caused some difficulties in the activist days of 
the 1960s, when the Washtenaw Country sheriff had 
adopted a highly confrontational approach to student 
unrest. Throughout the 1980s it became more and more 
evident that local law enforcement authorities simply 
would never regard the University as their top priority. 
Their responsiveness to campus crime and other safety 
concerns was increasingly intermittent and unreliable. 
Furthermore, most other universities had found that the 
training and sensitivity required by police dealing with 
students was far more likely to be present in a campus-
based police organization than in any community 
police force.
The issues of both the code of student conduct 
and a campus police came to a focus in 1992 when 
a University task force on campus safety strongly 
recommended that both be established. Although 
surveys indicated that most students supported both 
steps, a number of student groups–including student 
government–rapidly put together a coalition to protest 
“No cops, no codes, no guns”. As the University took 
formal action to establish the campus police, a series 
of protests occurred, including one on a particularly 
warm day in December in which students camped out 
on the lawn of the President’s House to “bury student 
rights”!
But, like most protests resisting efforts to bring the 
University in line with the rest of higher education, these 
rapidly faded as the campus police was established and 
not only demonstrated that they could reduce crime on 
campus, but further that they were far more sensitive 
to student needs and concerns than the local Ann Arbor 
police. Several years later students again protested–this 
time to urge more campus police in preference to the 
use of community police.
A series of actions were taken to improve campus 
safety, beyond the formation of a campus police 
organization. Major investments were made to improve 
campus lighting and landscaping. Special programs 
were launched such as the Sexual Assault Prevention 
and Awareness Center, the Night Owl transportation 
service, a Safewalk escort service in which students 
served as nighttime security escorts, and the Task 
Force on Violence Against Women. Broad programs 
were undertaken to address the concerns of substance 
abuse on campus, with particular attention focused on 
alcohol consumption. The University also addressed 
the hazards of smoking by making most of the campus 
a smoke-free zone, including all public spaces (even 
Michigan Stadium!) It developed programs to help 
members of the campus community stop smoking.
Greek life also changed significantly during the 
1990s. Since the 1960s, the University had generally 
kept an arm’s length distance from fraternities and 
sororities, even though over 6,000 undergraduates 
each year chose them as their residential community. 
This reluctance to become involved grew, in part, 
Protesting the president Cartooning the president
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from the University’s concern about liability for the 
institution should it become too closely linked with 
Greek life. This attitude of benign neglect changed in 
the late 1980s, when the University–and the Ann Arbor 
community–became increasingly concerned about a 
series of fraternity incidents involving drinking and 
sexual harassment. The administration concluded that 
it had a major responsibility, to both its students and 
the Ann Arbor community, to become more involved 
with the Greeks.
To this end, it was decided that the president 
should call a special meeting with the leaders of all 
of the university’s fraternities to address the growing 
concerns about their destructive behavior. The key 
message was to remind the students of Michigan’s 
heritage of leadership and challenge them to strengthen 
their capacity to discipline renegade members through 
organizations such as the Interfraterrnity Council. 
Although beginning with a strong challenge for self-
discipline, it was also stated quite clearly that the 
university would act with whatever force necessary 
to protect the student body and the surrounding 
community. More precisely, it was suggested that if their 
disruptive behavior continued, the president would 
come down on fraternities “like a ton of bricks.” The 
ultimate threat was to deprive misbehaving fraternities 
of access to intramural sports, which was important for 
their visibility in recruiting new pledges. 
Fraternity leaders picked up this challenge, and 
a new spirit of responsible behavior and discipline 
began to appear. Policies were adopted forbidding 
drinking during rush along with strong sanctions for 
entertaining minors from the Ann Arbor community in 
the houses. The university took further steps by hiring 
a staff member to serve as liaison with the Greeks. 
This is not to suggest that misbehavior in Greek life 
vanished from the campus. Indeed, several fraternities 
suffered from such a pattern of poor behavior that 
their national organizations agreed to withdraw their 
charter, and they were removed from campus. But 
in general, the nature of Greek life became one of far 
greater responsibility and self-discipline.
2000s
The University of Michigan experienced major 
changes in the size, character, and culture of its student 
body as the century came to an end. In part because 
many of the concerns of students had been addressed 
and also because a challenging job market focused 
student attention on careers, student activism began to 
subside during the 1990s. But something else happened 
that changed the character of the student body more 
dramatically. In an effort to compensate for declining 
state support, in the late 1990s, the University began 
to rapidly increase enrollments, placing a premium on 
out-of-state students capable of paying private tuition 
levels. Enrollments were increased from 35,000 in the 
late 1990s to over 44,000 in 2015, an increase of 25%. 
Since many of these students came from affluent families 
capable of paying $60,000 per year or more for tuition, 
room and board, they frequently arrived on campus 
Fraternity behavior became increasingly out of control.
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with more interest in the social aspects of university 
life than a rigorous academic experience. By the first 
decade of the new century, student protests had largely 
been replaced by student parties and athletics (at least 
if the increasing popularity of fraternities and sororities 
are any evidence of student priorities). The University 
became increasingly dependent on rich students who 
came here as much for fun as for learning.
Although entering student quality remained strong, 
at least as measured by high school grade point averages 
and scores on standardized entrance examinations such 
as the SAT and ACT, both the University’s selectivity in 
admissions and yield rates lagged considerable behind 
those of many peer public and private universities. For 
example, in 2011 the University admitted 60% of instate 
applications, with a yield rate of 70%, while out-of-state 
selectivity was 40%, with a yield rate of 25%. 
Although the growth in applications for admission 
from students continued to grow (largely because of the 
ease of application with the Common Application now 
used for most undergraduate programs), Michigan 
still competed very aggressively to attract high income 
students, since it was still regarded as a “safety” or 
backup school for most-out-of-state students. The 
University invested heavily ($650 million) to provide 
high quality residence experiences (complete with sushi 
bars and entertainment centers–“beer and circuses” in 
Roman terms), through infusing its athletic contests 
with “the wow factor”, and turned lose its advertising 
power to push the Michigan brand to such students.
With these students have come numerous 
challenges. Although the University had managed 
to tame fraternity excesses in the 1990s, the deluge of 
affluent students seeking fun rather than scholarship 
have ignited problems in Greek life once again, with 
excessive drinking, sexual assaults, and horrendous 
public behavior (e.g., the trashing of ski resorts during 
MLK weekend in 2015). Surveys find that today’s 
students spend roughly half the time on their studies as 
earlier generations (e.g., typically 10-12 hours outside 
of class compared to 20-30 hours characterizing college 
students in the 1960s-1980s). While some of this can be 
blamed on student motivation, the faculty must also 
accept some of the blame for not assigning sufficient 
work!
In recent years there has been a growing concern, 
particularly on the part of the faculty, that as the 
University has become larger, more extended, and 
more complex, it has become less guided by academic 
priorities. Earlier the concern was raised about the 
erosion of the University of Michigan’s long-standing 
public purpose of providing “an uncommon education 
for the common man”. Clearly its leadership in 
providing exceptional educational opportunities to low 
income and underrepresented minority students has 
already declined as its state support has eroded. 
But more seriously, the priority that the 
University has placed upon high-income students 
has been reflected in the drop of both students from 
impoverished backgrounds (e.g., Pell Grant recipients) 
and underrepresented minority students. In effect, it has 
shifted its public purpose to “providing an uncommon 
Soaring applications for admission Soaring average incomes for out-of-state applicants
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education for the uncommonly rich”. But there are other 
signs of an increasing imbalance in the priority given 
to wealth, e.g., responding to the whims of generous 
donors, the private boxes and clubs characterizing 
Michigan athletics, wealthy students who attend 
Michigan “paying for the party,” all activities, ironically, 
subsidized in part by the “common man” through 
the generous tax treatment of the payments for these 
premium services. (Armstrong, 2012)
A related concern is the current process universities 
with highly selective student admissions processes use 
to make admissions decisions. In 2010 most American 
colleges and universities with selective admissions 
process agreed to use a Common Application for 
admissions, in which students were required to 
complete a common application form and references to 
each of the institutions under consideration (augmented 
by a small number of specific elements for the most 
selective institutions). This enabled students to apply 
for admission to many institutions with essentially the 
same form, subject only to paying the small fee to each 
institution for admissions application processing. As a 
result, the number of applications received by selective 
institutions soared, with many students applying to 5 
to 10 institutions in an effort to optimize their options 
for college attendance.  With thousands of more 
applications, the selectivity of admissions at leading 
institutions such as the Ivy League dropped rapidly, 
below 10% in several cases. 
Of course, since selectivity was used as an important 
indicator by college ratings schemes such as U.S. News 
& World Report, every effort was made to increase 
selectivity still further by marketing institutions to 
larger numbers of applicants, whether qualified or 
not. Yet enormous increase in applications triggered 
by the Common Application overloaded admissions 
offices and led unfortunately to the over dependence 
on quantitative measures such as grade point averages, 
SAT scores, and Advanced Placement courses as the 
first pass in the selection process in an effort to reduce 
the burdens on staff. 
This was particularly serious for the University of 
Michigan, since it was regarded as a “safety” school, a 
backup application for students whose first choice was 
an Ivy League class institution with very low acceptance 
rates. The number of applications to UM soared to 
52,000 and beyond, forcing the use of quantitative 
measures (GPA, SAT, AP) as initial criteria to reduce the 
remaining application inventory to manageable size for 
more subjective consideration.
Yet many of those with high quantitative scores 
came from affluent families that could afford special 
training programs for test taking and had access to 
strong secondary schools with ample AP offerings. 
Students from lower income families or secondary 
schools with limited resources were handicapped by 
the dependence on quantitative data forced by the 
Common Application, and hence eliminated early 
in the competition for admission. Unfortunately, the 
current admission process demanded by the Common 
Application process discriminates against the very type 
of student that Michigan really wants to enroll, i.e., “the 
common man with uncommon dreams”!
In 2015 the University joined a new group of 
80 selective universities, the Coalition for Access, 
Affordability, and Success, which will adopt a new 
approach to admissions, working with students 
at an early ninth grade stage to build portfolios of 
achievements, and providing institutions with more 
flexibility in modifying applications to address their 
particular interests and characteristics. It is too early to 
assess the impact of the new approach, but it should be 
vastly preferable to the Common Application.
 In summary, there is growing evidence that external 
factors including the dramatic decline in state support, 
the state’s implementation of a ban on affirmative 
action, and the biases built into current admissions 
processes have put the University’s public purpose 
at some risk. And to be fair, the University has spent 
heavily on providing financial aid packages that meet 
full cost of attendance to admitted students from 
Michigan. But this has been a formidable challenge 
in a state that provides the lowest level of need-based 
financial aid in the nation. Indeed, the degree to which 
the State of Michigan–and many other states–have 
turned their backs on the support of public education 
requires a more urgent warning, particularly to those of 
us in the “me” generation.
On a more positive note, the massive effort over the 
past several years to renovate all of the University’s 
student housing while adding new facilities such as 
North Quad and the Munger Graduate Residence Hall 
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For most students, the ultimate goal today is commencement!
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is highly comendable. These facilities are the living-
learning environments for roughly one-third of the 
student body, and their quality is of major strategic 
importance to the university (even if the presence of 
food stations and sushi bars in the renovated dorms 
does suggest an effort to attract wealthy students as a 
part of this strategy...)
The Road Ahead
Over the past 15 years enrollments have grown 
25% to almost 44,000 students. However essentially 
all of this growth has been at the undergraduate 
level, while graduate and professional enrollment has 
stayed relatively constant. This major shift in student 
composition deserves serious strategic effort, since 
it has strained the faculty and facilities resources that 
support our graduate and professional programs.
It has also been noted while the emphasis on 
attracting more out-of-state students capable of paying 
$60,000 for tuition, room and board has generated very 
substantial new resources, it has also shifted somewhat 
the student culture, away from the historic mission of 
“providing an uncommon education for the common 
man” and instead attracting more students from wealthy 
backgrounds, many of whom selected Michigan as a 
“safety school” backup to Ivy League applications or 
have chosen Michigan for its extracurricular life (i.e., 
have come “paying for the party”). While this shift in 
the student culture will be considered more specifically 
in Chapter 20 concerned with the public purpose of 
the University, it also is important to state here the 
concern about the low enrollments of students from 
low-income backgrounds. Much of Michigan’s impact 
in the past came from students from working class 
families from the state’s farms and factories who saw 
attending the University as a great opportunity to do 
something important with their lives, provided they 
worked hard enough. To serve more of these students, 
once the backbone of its student body, the University 
must restructure its admissions policies, financial aid, 
and outreach.
The University needs to throttle back Michigan’s 
reputation as a party school (with big-time college 
sports) and instead rebrand itself as an institution 
determined to demand the student academic effort 
required for leadership roles later in life. More 
specifically, the University must insist that its faculty 
challenge its students through demanding academic 
programs. Here it might set a goal of demanding 
that through course assignments, students spend a 
minimum of two hours of effort for every one hour of 
class time, a metric used at leading universities through 
much of the last century. It also needs to provide more 
opportunities for student engagement with faculty 
in research, service, and professional activities. Here 
technology might help, since social networking has 
largely decoupled such engagement and interactions 
from space and time constraints.
It is also important for the University to provide its 
varsity athletes, roughly 1,000 in number, with similar 
academic experiences similar to other students. It must 
resist the tendency of coaches to dominate the lives 
of their athletes, demanding 40 hours or more a week 
of training and competition, and in some cases, even 
dictating their academic majors (e.g., the Bachelor of 
General Studies offered by LS&A). While the Athletics 
Department has built and staffed high quality learning 
facilities, these also tend to isolate athletes from other 
students (ironically, when these facilities were approved 
by the Regents, it was agreed that they would also be 
open to all students).
Although in loco parentis disappeared decades ago, 
the University has learned that it simply cannot ignore 
the behavior of students beyond the classroom. While 
most communities of young people experience the 
challenges of excessive alcohol consumption, drugs, 
and sexual misconduct and assault, large university 
communities are particularly vulnerable to these, 
as evidenced by Michigan’s “leadership” in various 
national polls attempting to rate institutions as “party 
schools” or tragically, “sexual assault and misconduct”. 
While the University has taken major steps toward 
addressing these concerns, the very scale and diversity 
of its many student communities will likely require 
new approaches.
Here particular attention must be given to “Greek 
life” on campus, since the unusually large number of 
students belonging to unregulated fraternities leads to 
a serious issue of adequate controls, as evidenced by the 
frequent instances of serious misbehavior and, indeed, 
even criminal conduct by fraternity members. While 
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there is always a danger to the University in exposing 
itself to liability in becoming too engaged with these 
organizations, their damage to the University has been 
and remains today simply too great to ignore. While 
it is unrealistic to ban fraternities entirely as some 
institutions have done, the University should reinforce 
demands for appropriate behavior with strong penalties 
for misconduct, both for students as well as for the 
fraternities as organizations.
On a more positive note, Michigan’s long history 
of student activism, while occasionally challenging 
to the University’s leadership and governance, is 
something of great pride because of its social impact. 
Michigan must not only tolerate such student activities, 
including occasional disruption of University activities, 
but actually encourage it and remain attentive and 
responsive to student issues. Here, particular concern 
should be given to maintaining the University’s long 
tradition of “truth and light”, by throttling back efforts 
to manage information flow throughout the institution 
so that bad news is disguised and good news is 
marketed heavily. Students deserve the truth, the whole 
truth, and nothing but the truth from the institution 
responsible for their education.
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The principal academic resource of a university is 
its faculty. The quality and commitment of the faculty 
determine the excellence of the academic programs 
of a university, the quality of its student body, the 
excellence of its teaching and scholarship, its capacity 
to serve broader society through public service, and the 
resources it is able to attract from public and private 
sources.
The inauguration address of 1988 of Michigan’s 12th 
president began with the statement: “It is sometimes 
said that great universities are run by their faculties, for 
their faculties. Clearly the quality of our institutions is 
determined by the quality of our faculty–by their talents, 
their commitments, and their actions.” (However this 
statement was quickly followed with the caveat: “I 
must hasten to add here that they are also run for their 
students and their society as well!”) 
Actually this faculty-centric statement reflected well 
our perspectives, shaped by decades of toiling in the 
faculty vineyards at Michigan, teaching, conducting 
research, advising students, hustling research grants, 
and serving on faculty committee after committee 
after committee. Both of us had served in numerous 
leadership roles with university faculty and community 
groups that played essential roles in the support of the 
University’s faculty.
This empathy for faculty life evolved personal 
experience, understanding well the stresses of the 
promotion and tenure decisions, the relative poverty 
of junior faculty, and the frustrations of faculty politics. 
From this background, we understood clearly our 
obligation to serve the faculty of the university in 
various leadership roles–first as dean, then as provost, 
and as president. Yet even in these leadership roles, 
we continued to view ourselves as first and foremost 
members of the university’s faculty community, on 
temporary assignment to administrative positions, a 
role we returned to after completing our leadership 
roles. We both have continued to work in many roles 
and on many agendas, both on the campus and in the 
community, as well as at the national and global level, 
to serve the University as best we could, always loyal 
and always dedicated to the faculty family. 
1960s and 1970s
When we arrived in Ann Arbor, the Department of 
Nuclear Science and Engineering was the only academic 
program located entirely on the North Campus, spread 
out across several buildings, including the Phoenix 
Memorial Laboratory where most of our research 
laboratories and the Ford Nuclear Reactor were located. 
Furthermore, since this department offered only 
graduate degrees, all of its instruction, research, and 
students were also on that campus. In fact, its faculty 
and students probably had more interaction with other 
nuclear programs at MIT, Wisconsin, UC Berkeley, and 
Caltech than they did with other faculty members at 
Michigan. This isolation actually created a very close 
bond between faculty, graduate students, staff, and 
their families, working together, learning together, 
discovering together, and even playing together (all-
night poker games, basketball, baseball, whatever).
Yet largely through involvement as both a member 
and a leader of the Faculty Women’s Club, we began 
to develop relationships with faculty in other parts of 
the University. This would lead eventually to a role in 
faculty governance and teach us about some important 
characteristics of the Michigan faculty: 
First, the unusual intellectual breadth of academic 
programs–schools and colleges, departments, research 
institutes and projects, etc.–provided evidence of 
Chapter 6
Faculty
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just how low the barriers among disciplines were 
at Michigan and how easy it was to launch new 
interdisciplinary programs. For example, it was easy 
for engineering faculty to form relationships with 
mathematics and physics that would eventually lead 
to more formal programs such as applied mathematics 
and applied physics.
Second, although there was a University-wide 
faculty governance body, the Senate Assembly, in 
reality was rather weak. It served primarily as an 
advisory body on University-wide issues rather than 
faculty senates at many other univesities that were 
given executive authority (e.g., U Wisconsin and U 
California). Instead, at Michigan the true faculty power 
rested in the hands of elected executive committees at 
the level of schools, colleges, and departments. These 
influenced faculty appointments and promotions, 
budgets and instructional assignments, and even 
occasionally the selection of deans and chairs. And 
their elected participants were frequently some of the 
University’s most distinguished faculty members.
Third, since the University was scattered about the 
small city of Ann Arbor, which was only of comparable 
size to the University itself (and actually smaller than 
the University on football weekends), one was likely to 
encounter other faculty members as neighbors, school 
parent-teacher organizations, restaurants, swim and 
tennis clubs, …just about everywhere. Hence one’s 
social life with other faculty members naturally evolved 
far beyond one’s academic department.
Fourth, although still in a relatively early stage, at the 
time, the decentralization of the University associated 
with the dispersion of power to the level of deans, 
directors, and chairs, was already well underway. 
Hence, the President, Executive Officers, and Regents 
of the University were far removed from the personal 
experience of most faculty members, except for the 
occasional article in the Michigan Daily or the Ann 
Arbor News, where one was more likely to read about 
Bo Schembechler than President Fleming or the Board 
of Regents. At the highest level, the administration and 
the governing board were largely out of sight and out 
of mind in faculty concerns. The most visible influence 
over faculty experiences and academic programs 
came from neither the central administration nor the 
governing board, but rather it was due to an invisible 
network of senior faculty members, distinguished 
in achievement, who had spent the majority of their 
careers at Michigan.
To be sure, those with influence and distinction 
were sometimes not the most visible and rarely the best 
compensated of Michigan faculty members. The latter 
were usually from the Medical School, as evidenced 
by the new cars that appeared each July in the parking 
lots of the city’s tennis clubs shortly after the spring 
distribution of clinical income. Yet those with true 
influence over their colleagues and even at times the 
President and Regents, were” lifelong” members of 
the Michigan faculty who had committed their careers 
to the University, University leaders such as Bill 
McKeachie, Donald Katz, Angus Campbell, John Knott, 
Carl Cohen, and many, many others.
Our first “faculty home”: the Department of Nuclear Science and Engineering: 1970 to 2012
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Of course many faculty members joined students 
during the 1960s to push for social justice, civil rights, 
and an end to the war in Vietnam. At times they were 
even sympathetic to student disruptive tactics such 
as classroom strikes or protests at Michigan Stadium. 
Fortunately the wise leadership of President Fleming 
recognized the importance of pervasive academic 
freedom, as long as academic values and the academic 
process were not put at risk. Tolerance was preferred 
to confrontation, and by the 1970s the flames of protest 
and activism had begun to smolder. The faculty largely 
returned to their classrooms, laboratories, and studios 
with their students, and Michigan turned instead to 
new challenges such as adjusting to the decline in state 
support and launching mammoth projects such as the 
new Adult General Hospital. 
1980s
As state support began to decline more rapidly, with 
the loss of roughly one-third of state appropriations 
during the early years of the 1980s, there was increasing 
pressure on faculty to generate the research grants 
necessary to support their activities–and, indeed, part 
of their salaries and the support for their students.
At a university like Michigan, this can amount 
to an expectation that each faculty member will 
generate hundreds of thousands of research dollars 
per year, a heavy burden for those who also carry 
significant instructional, administrative, and service 
responsibilities. For example, imagine the plight of the 
young faculty member in Medicine: responsible for 
teaching medical students and residents; providing 
sufficient clinical revenue to support not only his 
or her salary but also the overhead of the medical 
center; securing sufficient research grants to support 
laboratories, graduate students, and postdoctoral 
fellows; exploiting opportunities for technology 
transfer and business start-ups; and building the 
scholarly momentum and reputation to achieve tenure. 
Imagine as well the conflict that inevitably arises among 
responsibilities to students, patients, scholarship, and 
professional colleagues. Not an easy life!
As a consequence, research universities such 
as Michigan began to develop a freewheeling 
entrepreneurial spirit, perhaps best captured by the 
words of one university president, “Faculty at our 
university can do anything they wish–provided they 
can attract the money to support what they want to do.” 
In fact, one might view the contemporary university as 
a loose federation of faculty entrepreneurs, who drive 
the evolution of the university to fulfill their individual 
goals. In a sense, the research university has become a 
highly adaptable knowledge conglomerate because of 
the interests and efforts of our faculty. An increasing 
share of externally provided resources flow directly to 
faculty entrepreneurs as research grants and contracts 
from the federal government, corporations, and private 
foundations. These research programs act as quasi-
independent revenue centers with very considerable 
influence, frequently at odds with more formal faculty 
governance structures such as faculty senates. The 
result is a transactional culture, in which everything is 
up for negotiation–let’s make a deal, writ large! 
The faculty members of research universities are 
well aware that their careers–their compensation, 
promotion, and tenure–are determined primarily 
by their research productivity as measured by 
publications and grantsmanship, since these contribute 
most directly to scholarly reputation and hence market 
value. This reward climate helps to tip the scales 
away from undergraduate teaching, public service, 
and institutional loyalty, especially when quantitative 
measures of research productivity or grantsmanship 
replace more balanced judgments on the quality of 
research and professional work. 
Since the academic promotion ladder is relatively 
short, consisting essentially of the three levels of 
assistant professor, associate professor, and professor, 
the faculty reward culture can become one-dimensional, 
based primarily upon salary. Although faculty honors 
and awards are common in higher education, including 
endowed professorial chairs, many faculty members 
tend to measure their relative worth in terms of salary. 
Many public universities are required by freedom-
of-information laws to publish faculty salaries. Even 
in private universities, one’s salary can usually be 
compared with those of others either through the 
informal grapevine or by testing the marketplace by 
exploring offers from other institutions. Hence the 
faculty reward structure creates a highly competitive 
environment that extends beyond a single institution 
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into a national or even global marketplace for the very 
best faculty talent.
These pressures began to drive noticeable shift in 
faculty priorities during the last decades of the 20th 
century. The strong commitment that had been made by 
earlier faculty to lifelong careers serving the University 
began to erode with an increasingly competitive 
marketplace for faculty, particularly those who could 
generate external funding for their research. Faculty 
members quickly learned that the best path to increased 
compensation and promotion–and for some, leadership 
positions–was to play the marketplace, moving from 
institution to institution in an effort to build a rewarding 
career. Those who chose to stay behind and commit a 
career to a single institution became a declining breed.
Deans quickly learned about the faculty marketplace, 
since in these roles, much of their time was spent 
attempting to counter offers that would lure Michigan 
best faculty elsewhere, while enticing top-notch faculty 
members into leaving their current institution and 
migrating to Michigan. In fact, deans and department 
chairs were increasingly evaluated by the scalps they 
raided from competing institutions. During the 1980s 
and 1990s it was customary to keep tabs on Michigan’s 
success in this competition through what was called 
the annual “ebb and flow” charts of who the University 
attracted and who it lost in each program.
1990s
The growing pressures on faculty to generate the 
resources necessary to support their activities became 
even more intense during the 1990s. Since faculty 
compensation policies have major impact on recruiting, 
rewarding, and retaining top talent, this received 
increasing attention by the University leadership.  A 
new faculty compensation policy was developed by 
the Executive Officer team and deans that aimed at 
achieving an optimum balance among criteria such as 
merit, market, and equity. Its key features, principles, 
and goals could be stated as:
The average compensation for full professors at 
Michigan should be set at the top of public 
universities. 
However, the best faculty members at Michigan 
should be compensated at levels comparable to 
those of the best public and private universities.
The average compensation for assistant professors 
and associate professors should be set at the 
highest among public and private universities 
in the nation, since Michigan’s tradition is to 
develop faculty from within rather than recruit 
at senior ranks through raids, and hence we 
needed to recruit the very best junior faculty.
Deans and directors should be compensated at 
levels comparable to the best public and private 
universities. 
Annual salary increases should be based entirely 
upon merit (i.e., no cost-of-living increase), 
occasionally adjusted by market or equity 
considerations.
It was clear that it was the President’s responsibility 
to attract the resources necessary to support such a 
policy and to make an effective case to the Regents, 
the State Legislature, and the public as to why such 
compensation was vital to the university’s quality. The 
success of this aggressive strategy was demonstrated 
by the fact that by the early 1990s Michigan’s faculty 
salaries had passed UC-Berkeley to become first among 
all public universities, and at the assistant and associate 
professor level, salary levels rose to first in the nation, 
ahead of all public and private peers. 
Of course faculty members learn quickly that the 
best way to increase compensation and rise through 
the ranks is to periodically test their market value by 
exploring positions in other institutions. Although 
many professors would prefer to remain at a single 
institution throughout their career, the strong market-
determined character of faculty compensation may 
force them to jump from institution to institution at 
various stages in their career. And here once again the 
influence of the president became important.
University presidents are usually not involved 
in routine faculty recruiting, since in the typical 
university, hundreds of searches are underway at any 
particular time. However, on occasion the president 
would be brought into the search process to lure a 
major faculty superstar to the campus. The president 
also occasionally played a similar role in attempting to 
persuade a distinguished faculty member to remain in 
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the face of an attractive offer from another institution. 
Since so many of these efforts were in competition 
with West Coast universities, prior to a meeting with 
the faculty member, picture books on the San Francisco 
earthquake or other West Coast calamities (e.g., freeway 
traffic) were carefully placed on the coffee table in the 
President’s office. There was also direct involvement as 
President in recruiting senior minority faculty, in part 
because of the hands-on involvement in the Michigan 
Mandate, the strategic effort to increase the university’s 
commitment to diversity.
However, perhaps the president’s most significant 
impact on faculty recruiting was through particular 
policy initiatives. Much of the momentum of academic 
institutions is driven by a few truly exceptional, 
visionary, and exciting appointments that set the pace 
for academic programs. Hence the University created a 
“target of opportunity” program intended to strongly 
encourage academic units to recruit such candidates. 
Usually faculty searches are heavily constrained by 
programmatic requirements, e.g., to search for an 
historian in Southeast Asian studies or a physicist in 
superstring theory. For this reason, the administrative 
team would set aside special funds intended to fund 
appointments for truly exceptional candidates, 
regardless of area of expertise. The academic units were 
challenged to identify such hiring opportunities and 
then bring us proposals for funding their positions. 
If these looked promising, the administration would 
commit from central resources the base and startup 
funding necessary to recruit these individuals. The 
target of opportunity was later extended to the 
recruiting of outstanding minority faculty with great 
success.
Of course such singular scholars are not always the 
easiest people to accommodate. Some are demanding 
prima donnas, requiring high maintenance by deans, 
provosts, and even presidents. It was the president’s 
role to stroke these folks, sometimes assisting deans 
in meeting their needs and demands, at other times 
simply reassuring them that the university was honored 
to have them on our faculty and strongly supported 
their work. Yet it was their passion for their work, their 
unrelenting commitment to achievement, and their 
exceptionally high standards that accompanied their 
great talent, which set the pace for their students, their 
Average Assistant Professor Salary (1994)
Average Full Professor Salary (1994)
Average Associate Professor Salary (1994)
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In our roles in the positions of provost and president, we set a high priority
 on community building events for faculty members and their guests.
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colleagues, and the university.
There was one final element of faculty policy that was 
considered during the 1990s, although both sensitive 
and challenging: “the third rail” of tenure! Certainly the 
most controversial, complex, and misunderstood issue 
related to the faculty in higher education, at least in the 
minds of the public, is tenure. In theory, tenure is the 
key mechanism for protecting academic freedom and 
for defending faculty members against political attack 
both within and outside the university. In practice, it 
has become something quite different: job security, 
protecting both outstanding and incompetent faculty 
alike, not only from political intrusion but also from 
a host of other performance issues that could lead to 
dismissal in many other walks of life. And, of course, 
it is this presumed guarantee of job security that so 
infuriates many members of the public, some of whom 
have felt the sting of corporate downsizing or job 
competition. 
Most university faculty members believe that tenure 
is a valuable and important practice in the core academic 
disciplines of the university, where independent 
teaching and scholarship require some protection 
from criticism and controversy. This privilege should 
also enable tenured faculty members to accept greater 
responsibility for the interests of the university rather 
than focusing solely on personal objectives. But even 
within the academy, many are beginning to question 
the appropriateness of current tenure practices. The 
abolition of mandatory retirement policies is leading 
to an aging faculty cohort, insulated from rigorous 
performance accountability by tenure, and this is 
depriving young scholars of faculty opportunities. 
Increasingly, the academy itself is acknowledging that 
both the concept and practice of tenure—particularly 
when interpreted as guaranteed lifetime employment—
needs to be reevaluated. 
Yet only the most foolhardy would attempt to do 
this within a single institution, since the marketplace 
for the best faculty is highly competitive. Hence any 
challenge to the status quo of tenure must be mounted 
by a coalition of institutions. To this end, during the 
1990s the President’s Council of the Big Ten Conference 
(which is actually as much an academic organization 
of 12 institutions–including the University of Chicago–
as it is an athletic conference) invited the provosts 
and chairs of the faculty senates of its universities to 
a daylong conference to discuss tenure and the faculty 
contract. Needless to say, one workshop does not a 
sustained movement make, but the discussion did 
suggest that the faculties of at least this set of research 
universities are more open to considering change than 
one might expect.
2000
As the University of Michigan entered a new 
century, faculty quality was increasingly challenged 
by the institution’s struggle to retain top faculty in 
the face of increasing instructional loads, eroding 
compensation levels, and aggressive offers from 
competing institutions. There were growing concerns 
that the combination of heavier instructional loads 
driven by increasing enrollment in larger academic 
units (LS&A and Engineering) and faculty salaries, 
which were beginning to lag those of well-endowed 
private universities, wete making both the recruiting 
and retention of high quality faculty more difficult. 
More specifically over the period 2004 to 2011, the 
University lost 40% of faculty receiving offers from 
other institutions, including 55 to Harvard, 54 to UC 
Berkeley, 46 to Stanford, and 37 to Chicago, and 24 to 
Columbia. Of course, it had always been a challenge to 
compete with peer private institutions, particularly at 
a time when the gap between faculty salaries at public 
and private universities have grown to over 20%. But 
perhaps even more serious during this period were the 
growing losses to public universities, such as 33 to U 
Texas, 28 to U North Carolina, 25 to Maryland and 23 
to Ohio State. Viewed from the perspective of many of 
our peers, Michigan was becoming a major supplier of 
many of their very best faculty members, and the loss 
to this University was immense.
Of particular concern was the evidence of a 
disturbing loss of many of our most talented junior 
faculty members. During the 15 years from 2000 to 2015, 
the University lost over 600 young faculty members 
to peer institutions. Of particular concern here is the 
loss of hundreds of recently tenured junior faculty, 
including many of the University’s most outstanding 
women and minority faculty member, just as they are 
moving into the most productive part of their career. 
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Several of the University’s schools and colleges (e.g., 
LS&A) had effective programs for successful mentoring 
of junior faculty members to the tenure stage. In fact, 
Michigan has long had a strong reputation for building 
an outstanding faculty through the recruiting and 
development of young talent, in contrast to many 
private institutions, which tend to recruit faculty at 
more senior levels after they have achieved tenure and 
established reputations elsewhere. For Michigan to have 
its young faculty members recruited away just as they 
have successfully achieved promotion and tenure not 
only raises the perception that the institution is serving 
as a “farm club” for other institutions, but furthermore 
raises a serious question about its continued capacity 
to build and retain its senior faculty through faculty 
development.
Unfortunately, the recent expansion in University 
enrollments, increasing by over 25% to 44,000 students, 
has had a significant impact both on the character of the 
University’s academic programs and the nature of the 
Ann Arbor community. Since tenure-track faculty size 
has increased only modestly in those units undergoing 
major expansion (e.g., LS&A and Engineering), this 
has shifted lower division instruction toward an 
increasing dependence on part-time or nontenure-
track faculty, who now provide over 50% of lower 
division undergraduate instruction. Teaching loads, as 
measured by students per full-time faculty member, are 
the highest in the University’s history.
`On the other side of the ledger, the University 
launched an ambitious cost reduction effort during 
the past decade, aiming to trim roughly 1.5% to 2.0% 
each year off the base budget. Although some of these 
savings has come from more efficient management of 
energy and supply acquisition, and administration, 
much of the recent savings have come largely out of 
faculty-staff benefits for health care, retirement, and 
salary programs–and budget cuts imposed on academic 
and administrative units. Hence serious concerns have 
arisen that further cuts in benefits and support could 
cripple UM’s efforts to attract and retain outstanding 
faculty and staff.
The University has compounded this top-down 
approach to cost containment by entering expensive 
contracts with external consultants (e.g., Accenture) 
that have attempted to impose corporate practices 
(e.g., centralizing all service activities) that have not 
only demoralized staff and enraged faculty, but have 
also been found to generate minimal savings of less 
than 0.1% of the University’s budget (e.g., “penny wise 
but pound foolish”). To date administrative efforts 
have largely ignored the unprecedented expansions in 
administrative staffing and cost of growing peripheral 
activities such as public relations, marketing, and 
“institutional advancement” as well as the unusually 
high levels of compensation of senior administrators, 
now approaching extreme levels and questionable 
practices (e.g., hidden bonuses and deferred 
compensation) more appropriate for the corporate 
setting than higher education.
The Challenges Facing Today’s UM Faculty
Market Concerns
Most of the faculty trends of the past decade have 
continued to intensify. The marketplace has become 
even more intense as faculty have become even more 
nomadic, now remaining less than a decade at each 
way station on their route to a professorial chair or 
administrative position. New elements have been 
added to the package of negotiations, including not 
only promotion, salary increases, startup funding, 
perhaps an endowed chair, but now dual-career family 
placement, more generous sabbatical leave options, etc. 
The competition among institutions has become every 
more intense.
It is important to note that faculty members of today 
Faculty hires and departures
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actually work in several overlapping communities, 
e.g., their university, their discipline, their research 
communities, their teaching communities...all 
characterized by similar commitments, quality, rewards, 
reputation, etc. In contrast to years past when faculty 
members committed careers to a single institution 
(or disciplines), today faculty members are not only 
institutional nomads but also disciplinary nomads. 
They respond to a multiplicity of markets, pressures, 
and incentives, many of which are simply not under the 
control of the university.
The highly competitive nature of higher education in 
America, where universities compete aggressively for 
the best faculty members, the best students, resources 
from public and private sources, athletic supremacy, and 
reputation, has created an environment that demands 
achievement. However, while competition within the 
higher education marketplace can drive quality, if not 
always efficiency, it has an important downside. When 
serious imbalances arise in available funding, policy 
restrictions, and political constraints, such competition 
can deteriorate into a damaging relationship that not 
only erodes institutional quality and capacity, but 
also more seriously threatens the national interest. 
It can create an intensely Darwinian winner-take-
all ecosystem in which the strongest and wealthiest 
institutions become predators, raiding the best faculty 
and students of the less generously supported and 
more constrained public universities and manipulating 
federal research and financial policies to sustain a 
system in which the rich get richer and the poor get 
devoured.
This ruthless and frequently predatory competition 
poses a particularly serious challenge to the nation’s 
public research universities. These institutions now 
find themselves caught with declining state support 
and the predatory wealthy private universities 
competing for the best students, faculty, and support. 
Of course, most private universities have also struggled 
through the recent recession, though for some elite 
campuses this is the first time in decades they have 
experienced any bumps in their financial roads. Yet 
their endowments and private giving will recover 
rapidly with a recovering economy, and their predatory 
behavior upon public higher education for top faculty 
and students will resume once again.
Faculty Incentives
The analysis of faculty attrition during the past 
15 years finds that the loss of Michigan has been 
unusually high among junior faculty, and particularly 
among women and minorities. Although some of this is 
due to the long-standing process of tenure evaluation, 
the number of young faculty with distinguished 
records that leave the University for appointments at 
peer institutions (e.g., Harvard, MIT, Yale, Stanford, 
University of California) is cause for concern.
Of course, part of this may be due to the challenges 
of finding suitable opportunities for two-career families, 
since the small size of the Ann Arbor community and 
the weak economy of southeastern Michigan simply 
Academic Workforce (2014) Research Workforce (2014)
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cannot provide the job markets characterizing major 
metropolitan areas such as Boston or San Francisco. 
So, too, the large instructional loads driven by the 
University’s dramatic increases in enrollments 
discourage many faculty members, particularly at the 
junior level.
But it also must be recognized that despite rhetoric 
to the contrary, faculty salaries simply have not been 
a priority of the University administration in recent 
years. Recent comparative analyses of faculty and 
administrator salaries with peer public institutions 
indicate that as of 2014, the average salary of full 
professors at Michigan has not only fallen 30% below 
those of private universities but also ranks only at 
the level of 16th among the 18th public and private 
institutions consided at its peers. In sharp contrast 
the compensation of senior administrators (Executive 
Officers, deans, and senior financial administrators) 
are 30% to 40% higher than all other peer public 
universities–and 40% to 50% higher when undisclosed 
bonuses are included (a topic to be discussed later 
in this report). The impact on faculty morale of 
excessive compensation of senior administrators and 
administrative staff has been considerable.
To be sure, the University has been under significant 
financial pressures during the past two decades with the 
decline of state support and the recession of 2008. Yet it 
has chosen to respond to these challenges by restraining 
faculty and staff salaries and reducing benefits rather 
than addressing the excessive compensation of the 
central administration. Indeed, during this period 
expenditures for administrative support have been 
increasing at an average annual rate that is 2 to 3 
times the increases in expenditures for instruction, the 
primary measue of faculty salaries and benefits. (Ulsoy, 
2012)
While much of this is driven both by the differing 
financial opportunities and challenges facing academic, 
auxiliary, and administrative activities, it is also due to an 
erosion of the academic voice in University leadership. 
For example, there has been a decided shift away from 
the long tradition of appointing senior administrators 
(including the Executive Officers of the University) 
with significant faculty experience. So, too, the long-
standing practice of achieving a balance between the 
appointment of internal and external candidates for 
senior leadership positions such as deans in an effort to 
balance both the continuity provided by long-standing 
University employees with new viewpoints from 
outside seems to have been abandoned, with a decided 
UMAA Faculty compensation over the past decade
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preference toward external candidates in recent years.
The Faculty Marketplace
Academic leaders spend much of their time either 
attempting to recruit outstanding faculty members to 
their institution or fending off raids on their faculty by 
other institutions. Although there have been attempts 
in the past to impose certain rules of behavior on faculty 
recruiting–for example, through informal agreements 
that institutions will refrain from recruiting faculty just 
prior to the start of a new academic year or avoid using 
the promise of reduced teaching load to lure a research 
star—in reality, it is a no-holds-barred and quite ruthless 
competition. The wealthier and more prestigious the 
institution, the more aggressively it plays the game. 
There is an insidious nature to this intensely 
competitive market for faculty talent. First, such 
recruiting efforts are a major factor in driving up the 
costs of a college education. The competition for faculty 
superstars can be intense and become VERY expensive. 
Whether it is the size of an offer put together to lure a 
star faculty member away, or the counteroffer the home 
university puts on the table to retain the individual, both 
can seriously distort the broader faculty compensation 
patterns. Furthermore, such offers usually go far 
beyond simply salary and can involve a considerable 
dowry including laboratory space, research support, 
graduate and research assistant support, and, yes, 
sometimes even a reduced teaching load. 
Not only does such an effort tax the available 
resources of a university, but the recruitment package 
may seriously distort the existing faculty reward 
structure and lead to the loss of key faculty who may 
feel jilted by the offer to their new colleague. Even 
more serious are those instances in which an up-and-
aspiring university recruits a big-name faculty member 
past his or her prime–an “extinct volcano.” While the 
reputations of these individuals may add luster to the 
institution, their excessive compensation and declining 
productivity can discourage more junior faculty and 
actually harm program quality over the long term.
But beyond this, several of the wealthiest private 
universities play a particularly damaging role within 
higher education by preferring to build their faculties 
through raids on other institutions rather than 
developing them through the ranks from within. Their 
vast endowments allow them to make offers to faculty 
members that simply cannot be matched by public 
universities. When challenged about their predatory 
faculty raids on public universities, the elite private 
institutions generally respond by suggesting a trickle-
down theory. Such free-market competition, they argue, 
enhances the quality of all faculties. “If you don’t let 
these market forces work, institutions and people can 
stagnate.” Yet in reality, this philosophy promotes the 
fundamental premise that the very best faculty members 
should be at the wealthiest institutions. Such predatory 
Compounded UM salary increases over 2005-2014 
(excluding President compensation)
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behavior can decimate the quality of programs in other 
universities by raiding their best faculty, who have 
been nurtured and developed at considerable expense. 
Even unsuccessful attempts to raid faculty can result in 
a serious distortion of resource allocation in the target 
institution as they desperately attempt to retain their 
best faculty stars. 
The Erosion of Faculty Influence
Looking back over the past 50 years, it is clear that 
the career trajectories of the faculty have changed 
significantly. No longer do young faculty expect to 
pursue their career at a single institution but anticipate 
more of a nomadic path moving from institution to 
institution in order to rise up the promotion ladder. Yet 
even more seriously, the opportunities for establishing 
an academic career are dwindling, with non-tenure 
track appointments as post-doctoral scholars, lecturers, 
and adjunct faculty now providing the majority of lower 
division instruction, a feature driven by the efforts of 
universities to cut costs and improve productivity with 
a more flexible faculty workforce. As a consequence, 
today less than 25% of the instructional faculty is 
comprised of tenured professors.
Adopting corporate approaches to university 
management and leadership, coupled with the nomadic 
life it imposes upon today’s faculty members, has also 
seriously damaged faculty loyalty to institutions. Here, 
Michigan provides a disturbing example of the impact 
of the increasingly “corporate” nature of large research 
university, with an increasing fraction of its central 
administration comprised of staff with little if any 
experience in higher education, and decision making 
largely detached from academic considerations (e.g., 
the efforts to recentralize resource control, weakening 
the power of deans and directors, launching new 
initiatives from the central administration rather 
than harvesting them from faculty and students, and 
imposing upon faculty and academic programs a 
corporate bureaucracy that is orthogonal to the spirit of 
academic freedom and creativity).
Noted scholar Cathy Davidson puts it well: “The 
distress in higher education today, our adjunct crisis, 
our overstuffed lecture halls, and our crushing faculty 
workloads, is a product of 50 years of neoliberalism, 
both the actual defunding of public higher education 
by state legislatures and the magical thinking that 
corporate administrators can run universities more 
cost-effectively than faculty members. They don’t. 
The major push to “corporatize” higher education has 
coincided with a rise, not a decrease, in costs. The greedy, 
corporate brutality of far too many contemporary 
universities is reminiscent of medieval monasteries of 
old. Let’s call it “turf and serf”: real-estate land grabs, 
exploitation of faculty labor, and the burdening of 
students with crushing debt.” (Davidson, 2013)
Little wonder than many of Michigan’s most 
accomplished and distinguished faculty members 
have largely stepped back from efforts to influence the 
future of the University through service in a faculty 
governance role with little power or through initiatives 
that are usually ignored or overwhelmed by the public 
relations efforts of the central administration. In a very 
real sense, perhaps one of the greatest challenges to 
the University of Michigan today, as it is to other great 
public research universities, is to find a way to empower 
once again those faculty members whose contributions 
in teaching, scholarship, and service have been the key 
factor in establishing and sustaining the reputation of 
the University. 
But perhaps most important has been the weakening 
of the voice and influence of the University’s deans in 
recent years. The University of Michigan has long been 
known as a “deans’ university”, in which the authority 
and responsibility of deans as academic leaders is 
unusually strong. Deans are the key academic leaders 
most responsible for the priority, quality, and integrity 
of the University’s academic programs. They select 
department chairs, recruit and evaluate faculty, seek 
resources for their school both within the university 
(arguing for their share of university resources) and 
beyond the campus (through private fundraising or 
research grantsmanship). As the key line officers for the 
faculty of the university, they have rather considerable 
authority that usually aligns well with their great 
responsibilities. Good things happen in the University’s 
academic programs because of good deans, at least over 
the long term–and vice-versa, of course. 
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The Impacted Wisdom Group
During the mid-1990s, federal age discrimination 
laws eliminated the long-standing practice of 
mandatory retirement for university faculty. There was 
initial concern that this would lead to an “impacted 
wisdom group” of aging faculty retaining their 
appointments well past conventional retirement ages of 
65 to 70, thereby preventing the opening of positions for 
new junior faculty. However the impact of the relative 
prosperity of the 1990s on faculty defined contribution 
retirement programs (e.g., TIAA-CREF) enabled many 
faculty members to continue to retire in the 60s with 
incomes comparable to their faculty salaries. Hence the 
elimination of mandatory retirement practices had little 
impact.
This situation changed with the 2008-2009 “Great 
Recession” that significantly dented retirement program 
accumulations, with losses in the 30% to 40% range. 
Although these accumulations have recovered in more 
recent years, the impact of the recession on confidence 
has not. Today a faculty member in reasonable health at 
age 65 has a 50%-50% probably of living until age 90, a 
period during which further major economic declines 
are likely to occur. Hence there is strong incentive for 
senior faculty members to continue to work as long 
as their health and their interests in their academic 
activities remain strong. In fact, recent surveys indicate 
that most faculty view the downside of retirement as the 
loss of the intellectual, cultural, and social benefits of 
being an active part of the academic community rather 
than financial concerns. Hence once again the concern 
that if retirements slow, positions for new faculty will 
similarly disappear.
Yet universities have also learned that the penalties 
for age discrimination can be very severe. Deans and 
department chairs are cautioned to be extremely careful 
in discussing retirement plans with faculty, since any 
attempt to push a faculty member into retirement is 
likely to result in expensive litigation. Today research 
universities are finding that each retirement has 
become a process of negotiation, with options such as 
phased retirement over several years, some continued 
engagement of emeritus faculty members, and other 
benefits such as access to libraries, retired faculty 
clubs, and possible partial appointments as “emeritus-
in-service” for limited teaching and administration 
assignments. No longer is it sufficient to simply 
schedule a meeting for retiring faculty with a university 
financial consultant, who then takes away their parking 
pass and e-mail account and shows them the door. 
Instead the approach should be to provide ways that 
faculty members can retain the intellectual, cultural, 
and social links that have been important parts of their 
lives and instead offer them an active role during their 
post-retirement. Put another way, senior faculty should 
be viewed as an important academic resource for the 
University rather than an aging challenge. For example, 
in Chapter 8 concerning the financial challenges facing 
the University of Michigan, we make a strong case for 
the wisdom of moving to a true year-round calendar that 
would be achieved through activating the May through 
August part of the calendar. This would be enabled 
not only by student demand (50,000 applications a 
year!), a modern physical plant (air-conditioned), and 
a calendar that is already divided into four-month 
long “trimesters” (although we call them “semesters”). 
Estimated additional tuition revenue would be $300 
M to $400 M, while the financial impact on students 
choosing full-year enrollment allowing the completion 
of a baccalaureate degree in 2 to 2.5 years would not 
only be from reduced living costs but even more from 
getting into the work force with a college degree two 
years early!
But where would the instructional workforce come 
from, with current faculty members using the summer 
months for research projects or scholarly writing? From 
retired faculty members!!! Many of our senior faculty 
members are our most competent teachers, well known 
to students! While probably not interested in full time 
roles, they do love spending summers in Ann Arbor, 
and most would relish the opportunity to become re-
engaged with students. Hence this untapped resource 
could actually be key to the University of Michigan’s 
financial sustainability…
The Road Ahead
Ebbs and Flows Analysis
While department chairs and deans spend much 
of their time recruiting new faculty (and persuading 
85
their best faculty not to leave), this amount of faculty 
effort is difficult to assess at the University level. To 
be sure, a provost is usually sensitive to the “wins” 
and “losses” of a school or college when evaluating 
deans, but the broader University and its faculty are 
usually not aware of how the institution is doing in this 
competition for faculty. To this end, it might be useful 
to adopt a practice of the 1990s by creating each spring 
an “Ebb and Flows” chart identifying new faculty hires 
and losses at the department level, including where the 
gains came from and where the losses went. This would 
be analogous to a “business dashboard” exercise in the 
corporate world.
Essential Singularities
While the general faculty quality of a university 
across all departments, schools, and colleges is of 
great importance, determining the strength of its 
teaching and research, the visibility of the institution is 
frequently determined by truly exceptional individuals, 
so-called “essential singularities”, whose intellectual 
impact is immense. At a large pubic university such as 
Michigan, these exceptional faculty members usually 
are first discovered as young hires, before their work 
has reached the attention of competing institutions. 
However once their work becomes visible, they are 
aggressively recruited by many other institutions, 
particularly leading private institutions such as the Ivy 
League, MIT, or Stanford, who can focus great resources 
to recruit them away from Michigan. 
The University should think very strategically 
about how to provide a supportive environment for 
their unusual brilliance (not the easiest challenge in a 
community of outstanding scholars) and move them 
rapidly through the ranks in an effort to hold them to 
Michigan. Fortunately, we have been able to do this 
for many of our most outstanding junior faculty, but it 
remains a challenge of great difficulty and importance. 
However we might consider the approach taken 
by several other universities (e.g., UC Berkeley, the 
Canadian research universities) and create endowed 
chairs for exceptional junior faculty that would 
transition into senior endowed chairs subject to their 
continued achievements. 
At the highest level, the University might consider 
the creation of professorial chairs with institution-wide 
appointments, such as the University Professors at the 
University of California or the Institute Professors at 
MIT. These provide exceptional faculty members with 
appointments in all academic units (and campuses 
in the case of Michigan), funded centrally by the 
institution, so that they have maximum flexibility for 
their research and teaching interests.
National Leadership
The national leadership of the University of Michigan 
is due almost entirely to the national leadership and 
influence achieved by members of its faculty in several 
areas:
Intellectual Leadership: e.g., stimulating, defining, 
and leading a particular field
Teaching Leadership: e.g., developing new 
pedagogy or reshaping a field through textbooks
Leadership in practice or application of knowledge: 
e.g., leading in a field of practice such as law or medicine 
or building a company through technology transfer
Academic leadership: e.g., achieving recognition as 
a department chair, dean, or university president
There are many paths to such leadership 
achievements, e.g., through research and scholarship, 
entrepreneurial activities, pedagogical development 
(e.g., award winning textbooks that dominate a field, 
intellectual leadership (e.g., election to a National 
Academy), and broader academic leadership (as chairs, 
deans, executive officers, and university presidents). 
However all of these paths to consequential leadership 
require not only talent, effort, and persistence, but they 
also require a supportive environment in the University 
and influence beyond its campus.
Hence the University not only needs to better 
encourage and recognize the national leadership 
of its faculty members, but it also needs to create an 
environment that supports such efforts, identifies and 
promotes opportunities, and remove barriers to such 
activities beyond the campus. 
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Emeritus Faculty
As we have noted, the disappearance of mandatory 
retirement age and the vulnerability of defined 
contribution retirement plans in a fluctuating economy 
have had a major impact on faculty retirement planning. 
But surveys have indicated that even more today, many 
senior faculty seek some level of continued engagement 
with their University following retirement, since their 
intellectual, cultural, and social lives have been shaped 
by these institutions.
We have suggested  one possible contribution they 
might make should the University decide to move 
to year-round activity, since many emeritus faculty 
are not only among our best-known faculty through 
their earlier contributions (e.g., textbooks known to 
incoming students). Many universities have developed 
specific policies to encourage the engagement of senior 
faculty in productive roles, such as emeritus-in-service 
appointments providing them with the opportunity 
to continue teaching, research, and service at reduced 
appoint levels.
Yet beyond the desire to recapture faculty positions 
for new younger faculty from retiring faculty members 
within the current environment of limited funding, it 
is important to recognize that many emeritus remain 
among the University’s most distinguished, dedicated, 
and capable teachers and scholars. Hence the senior 
retired faculty cadre should be viewed as an important 
asset of the University from a strategic viewpoint.
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Appendix to Chapter 6
A Word about Faculty Compensation
The reputation of a university is determined 
primarily by the quality of its faculty. One cannot 
emphasize strongly enough just how competitive the 
current faculty recruiting (and retention) environment 
has become, and how intense the pressure has become 
on department chairs, deans, and executive officers to 
maintain faculty quality.
Some of the challenges faced by leading public 
research universitie includes:
The competition among the leading research uni-
versities has become what economists would 
characterize as a “winner-take-all” market. A 
great faculty enhances institutional reputa-
tion,…which enhances the ability to attract 
more great faculty and resources,…which 
enhances the institutional reputation relative to 
its competitors,… and so on, until only Harvard 
and Stanford remain standing. Put another way, 
the rich get richer, and the poor get devoured.
The impact of the booming equity market of the 
1990s on the endowments of private universities, 
coupled with the meltdown of state economies 
during the early 1990s and then again during 
the past few years, has opened up a 20% gap 
in faculty salaries between the leading private 
and public universities–the largest gap in three 
decades.
This is aggravated by the predatory behavior of 
several of the private universities, which tend to 
build their faculty through lateral appointments 
of established faculty members (i.e., raiding 
other institutions) rather than developing them 
through the junior ranks from within. Here, at the 
top of the food chain is Tyrannosaurus Harvard; 
but several of the other Ivies (Princeton, Yale, 
Columbia) are almost as bad, tending to feed on 
the public research universities, weakened by 
state budget cuts and ponderously constrained 
by public regulations (e.g., sunshine laws).
The large public research universities face a 
particular challenge, since to fend off a raid by 
a rich private university, they may have to make 
a counter-offer that destabilizes other faculty 
members, stimulating them to look elsewhere 
to determine their own market value. Faculty 
retention during a period of limited resources 
can create a culture in which faculty come to 
believe that the only way to get a good raise or 
promotion is to demonstrate their worth on the 
open market, putting them in play for raids.
What might department chairs, deans, provosts, 
and others suggest to address these challenges? 
1. While adequate compensation is important in 
faculty recruiting, the real keys are:
• The presence of world-class colleagues
• Outstanding students
• Great facilities
• Workload and service responsibilities that allow 
time for scholarship
• And a “dowry” to help them get their research up 
and going (which can run into the millions of 
dollars in the laboratory sciences)
An institution rarely attracts or loses an outstanding 
faculty member because of salary. Rather these other 
factors are where the key negotiations occur.
2. Furthermore, since many top faculty members 
make more from outside activities than from their 
faculty salary, policies governing academic leaves, 
consulting, intellectual property, and technology 
transfer can become important.
3. Global market comparisons of faculty 
compensation can be very deceptive. The marketplace 
tends to function at the microscopic level of individual 
faculty, specific academic areas, and faculty roles 
rather than at the macroscopic level of institutions. 
The recruitment of a world-class musician is totally 
different than that characterizing a laboratory-based 
nanotechnologist or first-amendment scholar. This 
market differentiation is rarely captured by faculty 
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compensation market studies at the institution level. 
So much for the faculty. What about senior academic 
leadership, at the level of deans, executive officers, 
chancellors, and presidents? While executive search 
consultants love to stress the importance of competitive 
compensation (after all, that is how many of them set 
their fees), one should be very skeptical of just how 
important compensation is at this level. Instead, 
• Believe it or not, most senior academic leaders are 
rarely lured by the dollars. To be sure, a competitive 
salary is viewed by some candidates as a measure of 
how much you want them. But it is rarely the deciding 
factor.
• Far more important is the challenge, opportunity, 
and prestige of building a top-ranked academic 
program.
• Many candidates are seeking new opportunities 
because they have been blocked by the narrowing 
pyramid of the academic hierarchy in their own 
institution.
• Some are after wealth and fame, but NOT from 
the university, but rather from outside their academic 
appointment through corporate boards, national 
commissions, or other opportunities.
• Some actually view academic leadership as 
a “higher calling”, with emotional rewards and 
satisfaction that simply cannot be quantified in terms 
of compensation.
• In fact, some actually have acquired a sense of 
loyalty to a university and view such assignments as a 
duty of service.
If you think this sounds crazy, just look at the list of 
institutions with the highest executive salaries. Usually 
these are places you have to pay people to go, not at the 
very best institutions!
One more caution here. While it is the case that some 
public universities use their fund-raising foundations 
to supplement the salaries of senior leadership, this is 
usually provided as a payment for their development 
responsibilities. It is quite another matter entirely 
to solicit private support specifically to bring senior 
leadership salaries up to market levels. Not only does 
such a practice run into optics problems (remember, 
we are now in the post-Abramoff era), but it can start 
a public university down a very slippery slope where 
institutional integrity could be compromised by conflict 
of interest.
In summary, then, the incredible pressure on 
department chairs, deans, provosts, and chancellors 
to recruit and retain outstanding faculty in such a 
hypercompetitive marketplace, coupled with the 
challenge of recruiting top-notch senior leadership, 
demand adequate resources and flexibility, but within 
guidelines that are:
carefully crafted,
transparent, 
well-understood, 
broadly accepted, and 
rigorously observed and implemented.
So what are the minimum essential requirements 
of modern faculty compensation programs? Of course, 
these are highly dependent on institution traditions, 
values, and character and hence are difficult to 
generalize.
Perhaps the best approach is to just tell you how we 
tried to set compensation at Michigan (since we have 
encountered and learned from most of the mistakes 
experienced by other public research universities).
The Faculty Compensation Strategy in the 1990s
The University of Michigan faculty and senior 
leadership compensation system was very simple, 
highly flexible, and entirely determined by the 
marketplace:
Market driven: Each department chair or dean was 
given the flexibility (within budget constraints) to adjust 
salaries to meet the marketplace characterizing each 
faculty member as an individual. All compensation 
was merit- and market-based, with no cost-of-living or 
other across-the-board adjustments.
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Simplicity: Compensation is kept as simple and 
transparent as possible, avoiding deferred, incentive, 
and one-time compensation actions as much as 
possible, and utilizing a standard TIAA-CREF defined 
contribution retirement program (5% employee, 10% 
university). 
Accountability: All academic administrators must 
be prepared to backup their compensation decisions 
with evidence of merit-, market-, and/or equity 
considerations (including outside offers).
Transparency and Optics: All compensation was 
fully disclosed, including the release of all employee 
compensation by name and appointment (“What 
you see is what they got…”). Furthermore, all 
compensation agreements and decisions were made 
with an assumption of eventual public scrutiny. (Chairs 
and deans were warned to imagine that any decision 
they make will eventually appear on the front page of 
the Detroit Free Press.)
Other Factors: Although chairs and deans have 
considerable flexibility in negotiating other elements of 
the package necessary to attract or retain faculty (e.g., 
moving, housing, laboratory space, research assistance, 
teaching and administrative loads), these packages were 
shaped by standard practice guidelines and monitored 
at the level of the provost. The same was true for early 
retirement or severance negotiations.
As an example of guiding compensation philosophy, 
during the 1990s the following goals were set and 
achieved:
1. The average compensation for full professors 
at the University of Michigan was set at the top of all 
public universities. 
2. However, the best faculty members at Michigan 
were compensated at levels comparable to those faculty 
members of comparable quality in similar fields at the 
best public and private universities.
3. The average compensation for assistant 
professors and associate professors was set to be the 
highest among public and private universities in the 
nation, since Michigan’s tradition was to develop 
faculty from within rather than recruit at senior ranks 
through raids, and hence we needed to make certain we 
were recruiting the very best junior faculty.
4. Deans and academic executive officers were 
compensated at levels comparable to the best public 
and private universities. 
We used annual department-by-department surveys 
of faculty recruiting and retention experience (a so-
called “ebb and flow” analysis) to monitor the success 
of the program.
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Students and faculty members tend to take the 
staff of a university pretty much for granted. While 
they understand these are the people who keep the 
trains running on time, who provide them with the 
environment they need for teaching and research, 
most view staff as only the supporting cast for the real 
stars, the faculty. When staff members come to mind 
at all, it is usually as a source of complaints, e.g., not 
fast enough to respond to request, too much regulation, 
too many coffee breaks, etc. To many faculty members, 
service units such as the Plant Department, Purchasing, 
and Internal Audit are sometimes viewed as the enemy.
Yet, with each step up the ladder of academic 
administration, we came to appreciate more just 
how critical the staff was to both the functioning 
and the continuity of the university. Throughout 
the university, whether at the level of secretaries, 
custodians, groundskeepers or the rarified heights of 
senior administrators for finance, hospital operations, 
or facilities construction and management, it became 
clear to us that the quality of the university’s staff, 
coupled with their commitment and dedication, was 
actually just as important as the faculty in making 
Michigan the remarkable institution it has become. In 
some ways, even more so, since unlike many faculty 
members, who view their first responsibilities to their 
discipline or perhaps their careers, most staff members 
are true professionals, deeply committed to the welfare 
of the university as their highest priority, with many 
dedicating their entire careers to the institution. 
The University of Michigan has been fortunate 
over its history in recruiting and retaining perhaps the 
most outstanding collection of staff members in higher 
education. In part this is due to the scale and complexity 
of the institution, which demand extraordinary 
competence. The knowledge, skill, and experience 
necessary to work with cutting edge technologies 
(e.g., the University’s nanotechnology laboratories, 
performance venues such as Hill Auditorium, complex 
surgical procedures, and one of the most sophisticated 
IT environments in the world) attract outstanding talent. 
So too does the need for craftsmen of extraordinary skills 
(e.g., preservation of ancient documents and artifacts, 
design of performance venues, cutting-edge software 
development, and handling of hazardous materials). 
The supervision and management of the facilities, 
equipment, and financial operations characterizing the 
multiplicity of sophisticated environments necessary 
for cutting edge instruction, research, and service also 
require highly skilled staff. As The Michigan Daily once 
put it, “While the legend is that the President spins the 
Cube to start the day, it is the staff who truly make the 
University move.”
One of the important reasons that the University 
is able to attract such outstanding staff is because our 
highly decentralized structure provides them with the 
freedom not only to perform their roles with minimal 
bureaucracy, but it also enables them to express their 
creativity in ways that frequently has impact far beyond 
the campus. For example, it was the great strength of 
the University’s staff in networking, developed during 
the 1960s and 1970s for a statewide network connecting 
its universities, who developed the technology of the 
Internet. It has been staff who developed the modern 
surgical techniques and equipment that provide life-
saving procedures to patients. The staff in finance 
managed the financial operations and integrity of a $7 
billion/year institution, comparable in size to a Fortune 
500 corporation, yet far more complex in the array of 
its many activities. And, in all such roles, these staff 
Chapter 7
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members play roles of great importance in teaching 
our students the skills and crafts critical both to their 
profession and achieving their educational objectives.
Finally, it is important to understand the importance 
of the role that staff members play in sustaining the 
momentum of the University and passing on from one 
generation to the next the corporate history critical to 
the institution’s success. Students pass through for 
only the brief period of their studies. Faculty members 
are increasingly nomads, moving from university 
to university as the opportunity arises. But many of 
our staff members dedicate their entire careers to this 
University.  
This was impressed upon us twice each year, when 
the president would host a banquet to honor staff with 
long-term service–20, 30, even 40 years. In a very real 
sense, it is frequently the staff who provide through 
their many years of service the continuity of both 
the culture of the university and its commitment to 
excellence. Put another way, it is the staff, as much as 
the students, faculty, or alumni, who perpetuate the 
institutional saga of the university. 
1960s and 1970s
From the earliest days of the University, the quality 
of its staff stood out. In the 1950s and 1960s, Wilbur 
Pierpont was the Vice President and Chief Financial 
Officer (VPCFO) with a parallel appointment as 
Professor of Business Administration. In the late 1940s 
and early 1950s, it was Bill Pierpont who developed the 
concept and then negotiated the property acquisition 
that created the North Campus (and has been honored 
by the naming of the Pierpont Commons on that 
campus). When Alexander Ruthven developed health 
problems late in his tenure as Michigan President, it 
was Bill Pierpont who acted behind the scenes to keep 
the University on course. He recruited an outstanding 
team that served Harlan Hatcher, Robben Fleming, and 
later Harold Shapiro. His two successors as VPCFO, 
James Brinkerhoff and Farris Womack, also had wide 
responsibilities as well as faculty roles in the School 
of Business Administration and School of Education. 
Pierpont’s predecessor, Robert Briggs, also later served 
as a Regent of the University, again providing evidence 
of the quality of the staff.
1980s
Our first experience working with staff members 
occurred while Dean of Engineering in the early 1980s. 
The College’s Business Manager, Harold Harger, played 
a role very similar to that played by Bill Pierpont by 
providing both shrewd management of the assets of the 
College as well as helping to train a very young team 
of deans (including Chuck Vest, Dan Atkins, and Scott 
Fogler). Harger was a member of an important network 
of highly experienced business managers, scattered 
across the University who worked closely with deans 
and directors, who were, for the most part, faculty 
members with little experience with management 
issues. Although these business managers reported 
directly to their respect deans and had leadership 
responsibilities for the financial staff of their school, 
they also were part of a network of such senior staff that 
had a dotted line relationship with the VPCFO. Hence, 
if there were any problems within an academic unit, an 
alert would immediately be passed along to the VPCFO 
and hence the Executive Officers. 
In fact, this network of experienced senior business 
managers was really the key to the decentralization 
of the University, since working arm-in-arm with the 
deans, they provided strong, experienced leadership 
with capability in both academic and financial matters. 
Their wisdom and integrity enabled the University to 
develop a remarkable capability to thrive even in the 
face of the most serious challenges, such as the loss of 
most of its state support.
It was also the case that the technology-intensive 
nature of engineering required a large number of highly 
skilled staff to build and operate critical equipment and 
facilities (e.g., think nuclear reactors). Because of their 
unique competence, such technical staff and faculty 
worked side-by-side in laboratories in a spirit of strong 
mutual respect. The same was true for secretarial and 
administrative staff who kept the ship moving ahead 
while chairs and deans worried about policy rather 
than operational matters. Indeed, the first advice we 
usually gave new faculty members was to quickly 
befriend the department secretaries, since they ran the 
University. (This was a lesson that we also learned in 
roles as provost and university president!)
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Many of the staff who worked with us in the presidency
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1990s
During the late 1980s the University recruited a new 
and highly experienced VPCFO, Farris Womack, who 
had served in that role both at the University of Arkansas 
and the University of North Carolina and was highly 
regarded as one of the most outstanding university 
financial officers in the nation. He was wise and 
experienced enough to immediately recognize the very 
considerable talent he had inherited in his organization 
and kept firmly in place, including not only one of the 
nations top financial teams (led by Chandler Matthews, 
Norman Herbert, Bill Krumm, Carl Smith, Bob Monart) 
and campus facility teams (Paul Spradlin, Fred Mayer, 
Russ Reister, Tom Schlauff, and many others), but as 
well outstanding technological capability (Doug Van 
Houweling, Dan Atkins, Randy Frank). 
The achievements of this group were stunning. For 
example, Womack began by creating a central “bank” 
for the various units of the University, which allowed 
them to invest reserves as “funds functioning as 
endowment”. Through wise leadership, augmented by 
a stellar group of financial advisors, Womack was able 
to increase the modest endowment of the University 
from $200 million to over $2.5 billion during his years 
at Michigan. Joining with Gil Whitaker as Provost, 
they were able to implement total quality management 
methods across the University that eventually raised 
the University’s credit rating to the highest level of 
AAa, the first for a public university.
Yet there was another important role played by 
Womack and his predecessors in the role of VPCFO. 
Since most university presidents come to their role 
from backgrounds as faculty, they have relatively 
little experience in understanding and mastering 
the roles of university leadership. To be sure, most 
have been in other leadership positions, as deans or 
vice presidents. But the scale and complexity of a 
university such as Michigan, with a budget of $7 billion 
comparable to a Fortune 500 corporation, but with an 
array of activities far more diverse and complex, can 
be challenging indeed, particularly when presidential 
leadership requires so many skills, e.g., management, 
finance, politics, external relations, and fund-raiser 
extraordinaire. Hence at Michigan and most of its peers 
there is an unspoken additional role of the experienced 
chief financial officer: educating a new president on how 
to preside. This was the role that Bill Pierpont played 
with Harlan Hatcher, Jim Brinkerhoff with Robben 
Fleming and Harold Shapiro, and Farris Womack with 
our leadership team.
The word “team” is a very important word to use 
in describing the staff. Beyond their skill, competence, 
and dedication to the University, there was also a 
remarkable spirit of teamwork among staff members. 
The Executive Officer leadership team worked with 
staff not so much as supervisors but rather as colleagues, 
and in time we began to view our presidential roles as 
more akin to those of staff than faculty, in the sense 
that our first obligation was always to the welfare of 
the University rather than to our academic discipline or 
professional career.
While intensely loyal to the University, staff also 
require pastoral care from the president, particularly 
during difficult times such as budget cuts–sometimes 
involving layoffs–or campus unrest. It was important 
for the president and other senior officers to give 
the highest priority to events that demonstrated the 
importance of staff to the university and our strong 
support for their efforts. Whenever launching a major 
strategic effort, such as the Michigan Mandate or the 
Michigan Agenda for women, we would meet with 
numerous staff groups throughout the university to 
explain the effort and seek their advice and counsel. We 
made it a point to attend or host staff receptions, for 
example, to honor a retiring staff member or celebrate 
an important achievement. And, while we understood 
the central role of faculty in determining the quality 
of academic programs, we felt it was important that 
the president always be seen, in word and in deed, 
as committed to the welfare of the entire university 
community–students, faculty, and staff–in a balanced 
sense.
2000s
Unfortunately the University’s leadership network 
of experienced staff, working together with deans 
and directors while maintaining the strong financial 
integrity, came to a screeching halt with the arrival 
of a new administration in the late 1990s. When 
Farris Womack decided to return to North Carolina, 
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the new president named a young staff member 
from New York’s Metropolitan Museum of Art as 
Womack’s successor.  The resulting lack of financial 
and management experience triggered a stampede of 
departures of many of Michigan’s most long-serving 
and valuable senior staff members, unfortunately to 
be replaced with successors not only unfamiliar with 
past University traditions and practices, but with 
limited understanding of their responsibilities in an 
institution of the University’s scale and complexity. For 
example, in an effort to appease the faculty faced with 
an inadequate salary program, the new administration 
announced that since the faculty was more important 
than the staff, their salaries would be frozen so that 
any available funds could be used for a modest faculty 
salary program, both demoralizing and angering the 
staff. Although the new administration would last only 
four years, the damage that was done both through 
attrition and lack of respect for staff would last for well 
over a decade.
With the arrival of a new and more experienced 
administration, the disruption of staff activities began to 
subside, although morale remained low. With an agenda 
that was primarily focused on external activities, e.g., 
expanding the University medical center, fund-raising, 
and intercollegiate athletics, most attention was focused 
on recruiting new staff for the central administration. 
This resulted in a widening gap between the salaries 
of faculty and staff and the compensation (including 
bonuses and deferred compensation) of the central 
administration. The Regents were largely unaware of 
the damage that was being done to faculty and staff 
morale through this preferential compensation policy.
Although the overall staffing of the University 
increased only modestly during the past decade, 
there was a major shift of staffing away from core 
activities such as academic support and infrastructure 
maintenance and into externally focused activities such 
as development, marketing, and communications. 
Hundreds of new staff were added with little 
understanding or experience with academic institutions, 
a sharp contrast with earlier University practice. For 
example, the University launched a massive effort in 
“institutional advancement”, in areas such as fund-
raising, “branding” (read advertising), and social 
networking (e.g., webmasters, tweeters), and “global 
communications” (which largely became a “Pravda-
like” function hiding bad news and promoting the 
administration). By 2015 there were over 600 staff 
members in marketing and communications alone, in 
addition to another 500 in fund-raising.
This massive increase in staff members  engaged i 
“institutional advancement” occurred not only in the 
central administration, but also at the level of schools 
and colleges. For example, the College of Engineering, 
listed 240 staff reporting to the Dean (compared to less 
than 30 people two decades earlier) in a host of new areas 
such as Entrepreneurship, Communication, Marketing, 
Web Development, and Industrial relations, although 
few in areas related to the core educational and research 
mission of the College.  One of the consequences of this 
enormous staff was the burdens plance on the dean 
by staff issues at the expense of academic leadership, 
a situation faced by many other deans as their 
development and communications staff demanded 
more and more of their personal time for fund-raising 
and marketing rather than leadership. Again, the 
disappearance of the network of experienced business 
officers in academic units with dotted reporting lines to 
the chief financial officer removed the opportunity to 
identify and correct such excessive staffing.
Today’s Concerns
Erosion of Appreciation for the Role of Staff
While great universities are known for their capacity 
to attract outstanding faculty and students, they 
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require equally talented staff to support and sustain 
the environment necessary for high quality education, 
research, and service. At Michigan there is little doubt 
that many of our very best people are those among our 
staff, with extraordinary skills and deep commitment 
to the University. 
Most faculty members realize the importance of 
staff, since they not only depend upon their talents, 
but they usually work side-by-side with staff in their 
teaching and research activities. Furthermore, many 
of our staff members are intimately involved with 
students, teaching them the subtle skills of the craft in 
the laboratory, the performance studio, or the medical 
procedure suites. This appreciation of the role of the 
staff is certainly present to those who both depend 
upon and work with them.
Yet in the same way that an increasingly corporate 
approach to University management and decision-
making now threatens academic priorities, it also puts 
talented staff at great risk, as evidenced by the degree 
to which cost-saving ventures such as administrative 
shared services and reduction in benefits all too 
frequently have their most negative impact on the staff.
The Shared Services Fiasco
Perhaps the best example of the increasingly 
cavalier treatment of the staff is the recent effort 
by the central administration to implement a plan 
developed by Accenture consultants (and executed 
by two former Accenture employees who had become 
senior Michigan financial officers) to transfer several 
hundred long-service administrative staff from 
academic units into an off-campus “shared services” 
facility. Another Accenture team of consultants 
proceeded with an attempt to “rationalize” IT services 
by requiring common desktop computing equipment 
(“MIWorkspace”) and operating software, much to 
the chagrin of academic units dependent upon unique 
hardware and software demanded by their instructional 
and research programs.
The retention of such external consultants (at great 
expense) to apply corporate management methods 
to an academic institution, had a devastating impact 
on faculty and staff morale as resources and staff 
critical to research and teaching were withdrawn from 
academic units, and efforts were made to force the 
use of commodity equipment of inferior performance. 
Ironically, it was finally revealed that such heavy-
handed projects would not achieve significant savings, 
both because of the costs of the Accenture consultants 
and the negative impact on University operations.
More generally it should have been apparent that 
the effort to centralize (or “rationalize”) administrative 
responsibilities that may work quite well in some areas 
of corporate management could turn into a disaster if it 
pulls the University’s best staff away from the academic 
units where the real innovation is driven by the 
interests of faculty and students working closely with 
outstanding staff with extraordinary skills. Similarly, 
to impose on the University’s academic programs an 
enterprise-level of shared services unable to respond 
rapidly to the unique needs and technologies required 
for cutting-edge learning and discovery would cripple 
Many staff have unique talents and skills that
make them valuable teachers to students
Highly skilled staff are essential to the 
complex laboratories of the University
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the University’s leadership as a research university. In 
2014 a petition was circulated in which the majority of 
Michigan faculty opposed the efforts of the University 
administration to impose a shared services plan on 
academic units revealed the faculty concern about such 
corporate approaches, a reaction seen in other peer 
institutions. Over 1,100 signatures (representing over 
50% of the faculty in the affected units) condemned the 
effort.
The impact on many leading faculty members of 
the shared services program has been serious, since it 
has taken away valuable and loyal staff who have long 
provided direct support not only for their oncampus 
teaching and research activities, but also for their 
ability to attract resources from outside (including 
the roughly $1 billion faculty members raise each 
year from external research sponsors). To impose an 
ill-conceived corporate strategy estimate to save less 
than $5 million per year (most of which will be used 
to pay off the Accenture consultants and necessary 
building renovations) that puts at risk a substantial 
share ($1.3 billion per year) of the University’s budget 
is an extreme example of University leadership that has 
become “penny wise and pound foolish”.
But of equal concern is the degree to which this 
undermined the treatment of valuable and loyal staff 
members. As one faculty member put it, “Instead of 
seeing employees as part of an organization, staff are 
now being perceived as interchangeable parts on an 
almost factory model.”
Another long-standing faculty member put it even 
more bluntly, “This used to be a University I could be 
proud of in the way we handled our staff. Today, it isn’t. 
The way shared services was handled revealed a side of 
a University I would not want to be proud of; I’m not 
even sure I’d want to be part of!” Or, as another faculty 
member put it, “The pain stems not only from losing 
a colleague, whose office will no longer bustle with 
students and faculty wandering in and out, but also 
from the broken trust between staff and the University’s 
leadership.”
The shared services plan also damaged the trust 
in institutional leadership by the faculty, who were 
shocked not only by the withdrawal of some of their 
most important staff, but by the cavalier way that the 
University leadership launched this effort in secrecy 
and seemed determined to proceed with it. Fortunately, 
with the departure of the key administrative staff 
responsible for launching the effort and the appointment 
of a new president in 2014, there was an opportunity to 
reconsider such disruptive initiatives and their impact 
on the culture and character of the University.
Salary Inequities and Compensation Policies
There is ample documentation of the erosion in 
University staff compensation and benefits relative to 
peer institutions over the past two decades, similar to 
the erosion in faculty compensation. In sharp contrast 
has been the significant growth in compensation of 
senior adminstrators (executive officers and deans) 
and central administration staff who enjoy salaries far 
above those of the faculty. This inequity is compounded 
by the recent disclosure of a confidential system of 
bonuses and deferred compensation that has elevated 
administrative salaries to levels that now rank among 
the highest in higher education.
Beyond the lack of disclosure of such additional 
compensation, it has also become clear that such 
bonus compensation fails to meet the rigor demanded 
of similar practices in business and industry such as 
public disclosure of bonus compensation formulae 
The increases in average salaries for various groups
over the decade from 2004 to 2013.
The undisclosed salary supplements for admnistration
over the decade from 2004 to 2013
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that determine awards. Such an undisclosed and 
inadequately constrained compensation system for 
selected administrators has badly damaged both morale 
and confidence in university leadership by faculty and 
staff.
The Road Ahead
Thoughout the history of the University it has 
been apparent that whether at the level of secretaries, 
custodians, or groundskeepers or the rarified heights of 
senior administrators for finance, hospital operations, 
or facilities construction and management, the quality 
of the university’s staff, coupled with their commitment 
and dedication, was comparable to that of the faculty 
in making Michigan the remarkable institution it has 
become. In some ways, it has been even more so, since 
unlike many faculty members, who view their first 
responsibilities as to their discipline or perhaps their 
careers, most staff members are true professionals, 
deeply committed to the welfare of the university as 
their highest priority, many dedicating their entire 
careers to the institution. Most staff members serve the 
university far longer than the faculty, who tend to be 
lured away by the marketplace.
It is from this stragetic perspective of the value of 
our staff that several suggestions seem appropriate:
It is important that the University develop 
and implement employee development programs 
comparable in scale and quality to most Fortune 500 
corporations. While it is certainly true that many staff 
members develop unique skills of great value to the 
University, this should not be used as an excuse to 
lock them in place. Instead, they should be provided 
with the opportunity to develop new skills and explore 
new employment roles. The current University policy 
of allowing staff to take courses while employed is 
important to such career advancement.
Because of the scale, diverse, and unusually highly 
decentralized organization of the University, it is natural 
that considerable duplication can arise. For example, 
schools and colleges clearly duplicate many of the 
development and communications roles of the central 
administration. Clearly there is a need to achieve a 
better balance between central and unit staffing in many 
areas, since such redundancy represents considerable 
cost escalation. However in this ongoing effort, it is 
very important to identify where staff can have the most 
impact, rather than simply gathering them together 
where they can be centrally managed. Here the damage 
done by the University’s shared services program 
provides an excellence example of what should be 
avoided, since relocating valued staff from the units, 
where they were important for attracting and managing 
the $1.3 billion/year attracted for research projects by 
faculty in these units, to a central off-campus facility to 
save a relatively small amount (estimated at $5 million/
year) is a classic example of mismanagement, robbing 
Peter to pay Paul, and penny-wise but pound-foolish!
The importance of the role of experienced financial 
managers in each of the many academic units, where 
most deans and chairs come from the ranks of faculty 
rather inexperienced in such management and 
financial roles. The EVPCFO should not only maintain 
a network of contacts with these managers at the unit 
level, capable of providing assistance or warnings 
when necessary, but should also be involved to some 
degree in both the appointment and evaluation of these 
staff. As noted earlier, it is this informal network of 
experienced management staff in the units linking to 
the EVPCFO that is the key to the financial integrity of 
such a massive and highly decentralized institution.
Finally, although the unique roles of staff throughout 
such a large, diverse, and highly decentralized 
organization should be respected, there needs to be a 
thorough review of salary practices to achieve equity 
across the institution. There are too many examples of 
inexperienced management providing inappropriate 
compensation through the undisclosed use of bonuses 
and other forms of one-time compensation, particularly 
at the central administration level. While making the 
total compensation of all employees of the University 
openly available for comparison, it is also appropriate 
to implement an ongoing compensation review to 
ascertain inequities that may arise across the university 
for similar staff roles. In particular, the University 
should adopt compensation policies consistent with 
best practices in the corporate sector for bonus and 
deferred compensation.
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The story of the financial support of the University 
of Michigan over the past five decades is one of a 
continued decline in state support, which in turn has 
forced the University to become ever more dependent 
on student tuition, federal support of research, private 
giving, the building of significant endowment asets 
through wise investments, and the capacity of its 
auxiliary activities such as hospitals, student housing, 
and athletics to tap price-insensitive markets. When we 
first arrived at Michigan in the late 1960s, Michigan was 
clearly a state-supported institution with over 70% of 
the funding for our academic programs coming from 
state appropriations. However, over the next several 
decades, state support would be withdrawn year after 
year, so that Michigan was forced to make transitions 
from a “state-supported” to a “state-assisted” to a 
“state-related”, and to a “state-located” institution, 
with less than 10% of our academic budget provided 
by the state. In fact, since today the activities of the 
University span not only the nation but have become 
worldwide, Michigan has become only a “state-titled” 
institution (e.g., the University of Michigan).
Despite this loss of state support, the University 
remains very much a public university, shaped as such 
throughout history and reflected in our characteristics 
(scale, breadth, and social engagement). But today 95% 
of the publics the University serves and the publics that 
support it are no longer located in our state. Our support 
comes almost entirely from students and their parents 
paying tuition, from the federal government providing 
grants for research and student financial aid, from 
alumni, friends, foundations, and industry providing 
private support, and from the wise investment of 
University assets such as its endowment.
The story of this forced evolution from a state-
supported institution to one that became largely 
“privately supported, although still publicly 
committed” (in the words of former UM Provost and 
Cornell President, Frank Rhodes) is important not 
only for the University’s historical record but also as 
a model for most of the other flagship public research 
universities in this nation, which are now experiencing 
the same erosion in state support.
First, however, it is useful to provide some 
background in university financing.
Financing the University: A Brief Tutorial
Like other enterprises in our society, the operation 
of a university requires the generation of adequate 
resources to cover the costs of activities. This is a 
complex task for academic institutions, both because of 
the wide array of their activities and the great diversity 
of the constituencies they serve. The not-for-profit 
culture of the university, whether public or private, 
requires a different approach to the development of 
a business plan than one would find in business or 
commerce.
Universities usually begin with the assumption that 
all of their current activities are both worthwhile and 
necessary. They first seek to identify the resources that 
can fund these activities. Beyond that, since there is 
always an array of worthwhile proposals for expanding 
ongoing activities or for launching new activities, the 
university always seeks additional resources. The 
possibility of reallocating resources away from ongoing 
activities to fund new endeavors has only recently been 
seriously considered. Strategies from the business world 
aimed at cutting costs and increasing productivity are 
relatively new to our institutions.
Chapter 8
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Most universities depend upon the following 
revenue sources:
• Tuition and fees paid by students
• State appropriations
• Federal grants and contracts
• Gifts and endowment income
• Auxiliary activities (such as hospitals, residence 
halls, and athletics)
Strategies for the expenditure side of the ledger 
include:
• Cost containment
• Strategic resource management
• Innovation through substitution
• Total quality management
• Re-engineering systems
• Selective growth strategies
• Restructuring the organization
The availability and attractiveness of each of these 
options varies greatly and depend upon the nature of 
the institution and the environment of which it is a part. 
Financial strategies also vary significantly with the 
particular circumstances faced by the institution. For 
many public institutions, more heavily dependent upon 
state appropriations, an appropriate strategy might be 
to build the political influence necessary to protect or 
enhance state support. Small private institutions with 
modest endowments depend heavily upon tuition and 
fees, and issues such as enrollments and tuition pricing 
and discounting play a key role in financial strategies. 
Small, highly focused research universities such as 
MIT and Caltech are heavily dependent upon federal 
research support and, needless to say, seek to influence 
federal research policies as part of their financial 
strategy.
The wise and efficient deployment of resources is as 
important as the effort to generate sufficient revenue 
when it comes to compensating for eroding public 
support. Understanding how to better use available 
resources to perform the many different missions of 
the contemporary university is key. Yet this can be a 
difficult task. Today’s university is like a conglomerate, 
with many different business lines: education 
(undergraduate, graduate, professional), basic and 
applied research, health care, economic development, 
entertainment (intercollegiate athletics), international 
development, etc. Each of these activities is supported 
by an array of resources: tuition and fees, state 
appropriation, federal grants and contracts, federal 
financial aid, private giving, and auxiliary revenues. 
Part of the challenge is to understand the cross-flows, 
e.g., cross-subsidies, among these various activities.
Adapting to the Loss of State Support
Interestingly enough, both the university’s early 
growth and its success in building an unusually broad 
array of world-class programs have had relatively 
little to do with the generosity of state support. For the 
first half-century following its founding in 1817, the 
University of Michigan was supported entirely from its 
federal land grant endowment and the fees derived from 
students. During these early years, state government 
both mismanaged and then misappropriated the 
funds from the Congressional land grants intended to 
support the University. The University did not receive 
direct state appropriations until 1867, and for most of 
its history, state support has actually been quite modest 
relative to many other states. Although there were 
periods during which state support matched those 
for other public universities, these were followed by 
long periods of deteriorating state support (e.g. the 
Depression years of the 1930s and then the recessions 
of the 1970s, 1980s, and 2000s.)
1950s-1960s
In the early decades following World War II, the 
substantial investments by the federal government 
in higher education as a public good essential for 
prosperity, public health, and national security were 
echoed at the state level for public universities. During 
this period, public institutions treated state and local 
governments as their primary revenue source, with 
tuition playing a relatively modest role. Even at private 
universities, the strong growth in federal research 
expenditures and student financial aid programs led to 
very significant increases in public support.
During the 1950s state appropriations to the 
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University of Michigan for both operations and 
facilities were generous, doubling from $15 M in 1951 
to $30 M in 1957, with an additional $26 M for capital 
facilities. However there were occasional bumps in 
this road, including payless paydays on the campuses 
in 1959 and frozen state appropriations in the early 
1960s, when UM fell to 17th place in salaries among 
universities while teaching loads increased rapidly. 
However this quickly turned around with significant 
growth resuming in the mid-1960s, although the efforts 
of state government to take over direct control of all 
campus construction in direct conflict with Regental 
authority led to a moratorium in state-funded campus 
construction during the late 1960s and much of the 
1970s. 
The UM Sesquicentennial fundraising campaign 
raised $55 M for new academic programs, fellowships, 
and buildings “to insure the vital margin” between state 
support for operations and the University’s capacity to 
achieve excellence.
1970s
During the 1970s, the impact of the OPEC oil 
embargo and the emergence of strong competition 
from the Japanese auto industry weakened state tax 
revenues. The emergence of new universities such as 
Grand Valley State University and Saginaw Valley 
State University put more pressure on the state’s higher 
education budget. In the short run, it probably did 
not help the University’s financial position that the 
Regents twice sued the state for interfering with the 
powers of the Regents. In the long run, however, such 
challenges were vital for maintaining the autonomy of 
the University.
Unionization further complicated things. In 1968 
there were two small unions: by 1974 the University 
was bargaining with numerous newly organized union 
locals, and strikes became a familiar routine in campus 
life. In 1971 the Intern-Resident Association unionized, 
followed in the same year by the Teaching Fellows 
Association who formed the Graduate Employees 
Organization (the Regents chose not to contest either, 
dominated as they were by newly elected Democrats).
The impetus for unionization was also caused 
by an unrelated and successful court challenge to 
the University’s interpretation of instate residency. 
Anticipating a substantial loss of out of state tuition 
(although less than 1,000 were ultimately reclassified), 
the University eliminated the instate fee privilege or 
tuition waiver for graduate student teaching assistants.
Although the University of Michigan and the state 
shared in the support of the Replacement Hospital 
Project in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the drain of 
this mammoth project on the state funds once again 
severely limited state support for capital facilities for 
academic programs.
By the late 1970s, it was increasingly clear that the 
erosion of state support for higher education was a 
secular trend in Michigan that was likely to continue 
into the 2000s as the state’s economy, based on low 
skill manufacturing, continued to decline. Indeed, over 
this three-decade period, state appropriations dropped 
from 70 percent of the University’s operating budget 
in the 1960s to less than 10% in the mid-1990s. Further, 
as the state’s tax revenue dropped below the national 
average, and other social needs such as K-12 education 
and prisons passed higher education as priorities, it was 
clear that further decline in state support was inevitable 
for the foreseeable future. 
1980s
Although never a leader in state support of higher 
education, by 1975 the state slipped to 19th and by 1980 
it would drop to 35th and was still falling. By the 1980s 
Michigan’s state support was no longer strong enough 
to support even the instructional component of the 
University. Federal funding also continued to weaken 
in the 1980s as society turned its attention to mounting 
social and economic priorities.
With the accumulation of cutbacks, demands, and 
pressures leading to relentless financial contraction, it 
was clear that the academic quality of the institution 
would become seriously affected unless long-range 
planning was given a high priority. Hence it was 
fortunate in 1977 for the University to name as provost 
Harold Shapiro, an economist who had served as chair 
of the Budget Priorities Committee. It was even more 
fortunate when he accepted the position of President of 
the University in 1980.
If there was any hope that the state’s financial 
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condition and support might improve, it was quickly 
dashed within a few months after Shapiro took office. 
By the early 1980s the state had entered a deep recession, 
with appropriations to the University of Michigan 
dropping by over 30%. Executive order cuts began 
to roll out of the Governor’s office (since Governor 
Milliken was totally opposed to any new taxes). 
Coming as it did on the heels of the cuts and austerity 
measures adopted in the 1970s, the budget crisis of 
the early 1980s presented the UM with an intractable 
problem of increasing proportions. Michigan’s growth 
rate for support of higher education dropped to 49th in 
the nation over the decade.
Although the erosion of state support slowed 
by the late 1980s, it never fully recovered, and it 
would continue a secular erosion for the next two 
decades, declining from 70% of the core support of the 
University’s academic programs in the 1960s to less than 
10% by 2010. In fact, by 2000, Michigan would drop to 
the bottom 10% of the states in its funding for higher 
education. The classic model of the public university no 
longer conformed to reality. When Shapiro took over, 
state support was 60% of the General Fund and 20% of 
the total budget. By the time he stepped down it had 
dropped to 50% of the General fund and 15% of the 
budget (and during the 1990s it dropped further to 30% 
of the General Fund and 10% of the budget).
Fortunately, the UM had a president in Harold 
Shapiro who understood that this burden of inadequate 
state support was likely permanent, and he assembled 
a team of experienced administrators capable of 
addressing it. He moved rapidly to put in place a series 
of major financial measures to sustain the quality and 
capacity of the University.
There were three key components to the Shapiro 
strategy: First, a major restructuring of both the culture 
and the financial management of the University by 
i) decentralizing authority for revenue generation 
and responsibility for expenditures, ii) stressing the 
importance of focusing resources to achieve excellence, 
iii) implementing conservative financial management 
of resources, and iv) during tough times, making tough 
decisions to set priorities.
Second, “right-sizing” tuition while maintaining the 
UM’s long commitment of meeting the full financial 
need of all Michigan resident students. As the state 
subsidy of the costs of educational programs declined, 
it was necessary to compensate with major increases 
in tuition, highly differentiated between Michigan 
resident and out-of-state students. Between 1977-
78 and 1987-88,  tuition increased fourfold, raising 
annual tuition revenues from about $50 million to 
over $200 million. Students were also assessed for 
improvements  in services that specifically benefited 
them, including the renovations of  the Michigan Union 
and computer support. They were clearly being asked 
to pay for a greater percentage of their education since 
their state subsidy was disappearing.  However, the 
increase in tuition was offset almost completely by 
inflation and  declining state support. Students were 
being asked to pick up the portion of the bill the State 
was no longer willing to pay.
Third, an aggressive fund-raising effort was 
launched (including an $180 million campaign in the 
early 1980s). Shapiro hired Jon Cosovich, the major gifts 
officer at Stanford, to lead the new development efforts, 
who in turn began to work with the deans to develop 
more aggressive fund-raising strategies.
While these steps were important, even more so was 
Shapiro’s belief that the key to Michigan’s successful 
adaptation to a rapidly changing era, while sustaining 
its quality, would involve a profound decentralization 
of authority over resources and personnel to the lowest 
level where resources are generated and costs are 
incurred. As state support declined during the 1970s 
and 1980s, Harold Shapiro embraced this philosophy of 
decentralization to the level of deans and directors. An 
open market strategy evolved where deans were given 
the freedom as customers to decide for themselves 
where centralized services were more efficient and 
cost-effective than using outside vendors (e.g., facilities 
maintenance, communications services, etc.)
By the 1990s, more than 90% of the resources 
supporting the institution were attracted by individual 
units rather than the central administration. To 
be sure, the Executive Officers and Regents of the 
University had final authority, but this was generally 
exercised with considerable restraint to allow deans, 
directors, and department chairs significant authority. 
This realignment of both resource control and cost 
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responsibility to the lowest levels of the organization 
where they occurred most naturally was key to 
the ability of the University to adapt to the very 
considerable financial pressures it would face by the late 
20th Century. Michigan’s long tradition of institutional 
autonomy positioned it well for such decentralization, 
a philosophy that was eventually adopted by many 
other public universities facing serious erosion of state 
support.
During the Shapiro administration, the provost and 
chief financial officer formed the team that worked 
together to refine the cost-containment activities, 
launching a major total quality management effort in the 
University Hospitals that, together with the completion 
of the new Adult General Hospital, was to position 
it as the most financially successful medical center in 
the nation during the 1990s. Major efforts to improve 
both the environment and incentives for sponsored 
research, coupled with an aggressive federal relations 
effort in Washington, stimulated rapid growth in the 
University’s research grant activity. During the next 
several years Michigan moved to national leadership in 
its success in attracting research grants. 
Although undergraduate education did not appear 
as prominently on the list of priorities as some felt 
it  should, this was by design, not neglect. In times of 
financial crisis and  dwindling public support, Shapiro 
turned first to the elements of higher  education 
that society was willing to fund and stressed the one 
measure of  higher education that Michigan had 
long championed and that most people  seemed to 
understand—its academic reputation. A university that 
was  recognized as a leader among its peers and that 
had financial strength and  independence was one that 
could then afford and seek excellence in  education.
The years of austerity, of reallocation, and of 
diversifying the University’s support base, years that 
extended back into the Fleming presidency, began to 
pay off as Shapiro prepared to leave for the presidency 
of Princeton.  The University not only met this challenge 
of declining state support, but it actually thrived during 
this transition period by intensifying the three-tiered 
strategy developed during the Shapiro years: effective 
cost containment, wise management of resources, and 
aggressive development of alternative revenue sources. 
1990s
Although there was modest recovery in state 
support during the 1990s, it was essential to continue 
the strategy developed by Harold Shapiro stressing 
cost-containment and efficiency, adjusting tuition levels 
to reflect the loss of the subsidy through declining state 
appropriations, and to develop alternative sources of 
support through sponsored research and private fund 
raising.
Following the recommendations of a major task force 
on costs chaired by Business Administration Dean Gil 
Whitaker, the University implemented an institution-
wide total quality management program in the early 
1990s. This was patterned on the award-winning 
program in the University Hospitals. It empowered 
staff and faculty at all levels to seek ways to enhance 
the quality of their activities while constraining 
costs. In the mid-1990s, the University completed the 
decentralization of both resource and cost management 
to the unit level through a budgeting system known as 
responsibility center management, similar to that used 
in many private universities. In this system, units were 
allowed to retain all revenues. They were then assessed 
the costs associated with their activities, and taxed on 
all expenditures to support university-wide services 
such as safety. This system provided strong incentives 
for generating revenues and containing cost. It allowed 
local management controls at the unit level as key in 
more efficient operation.
As evidence of the effectiveness of these efforts, 
by the mid-1990s peer comparisons ranked the 
University’s administrative costs (as a percentage of 
total expenditures) third lowest among major research 
universities. Yet another sign of the efficient use of 
resources was the fact that while essentially all of the 
University’s programs were ranked among the top ten 
nationally in academic quality, the University ranked 
roughly 40th in terms of expenditures per student or 
faculty member. More specifically, it was able to provide 
an education of the quality of the most distinguished 
private institutions at typically one-third the cost! 
The second element of the 1990s strategy involved 
far more aggressive management of the assets of the 
University–its financial assets, its capital facilities, and, 
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of course, its most valuable assets, its people. VPCFO 
Farris Womack moved rapidly in the late 1980s to 
put into place a sophisticated program to manage 
the investments of the University. He built a strong 
internal investment management team augmented by 
knowledgeable external advisors, including several 
University alumni. Attention was focused on the 
management of the University’s financial reserves 
such as operating capital and short-term funds. By 
establishing the concept of a centralized bank, Womack 
was able to bring more than $1 billion of additional 
funds associated with the various operating units 
of the University under sophisticated investment 
management.
Particular attention was focused on the University 
endowment, which amounted to only $200 million in 
1988, small by peer standards and quite conservatively 
managed. Through Womack’s aggressive investment 
management, coupled with a highly successful 
fund-raising effort, the University was to increase 
its endowment to over $2.5 billion by 2000–a truly 
remarkable growth of ten-fold with an average annual 
rate of return of 23%. During this period, Michigan 
consistently ranked among the national leaders in 
endowment earnings. This remarkable achievement 
established the nucleus of what today amounts to the 
7th largest endowment in higher education, amounting 
to over $10 billion in 2015.
Womack’s team put into place a plan for eliminating 
the backlog of deferred maintenance, which had 
grown during the difficult budget period of the 1980s. 
Since state support for maintenance had effectively 
disappeared, the University put into place a special 
student fee that generated roughly $10 million per year 
to maintain its physical infrastructure, with a priority 
given to classroom space.
The University also put into place a modern 
program to manage and develop its human resources. 
It established a senior position of Executive Director 
of Human Resources which pulled together all of 
the reporting lines in the personnel and affirmative 
action areas. It also took steps to address a number 
of key staff concerns, such as staff development, high 
performance workplace policies, flexible staff benefits, 
and dependent care.
The University also took steps to more realistically 
price its services. One of the most difficult tasks from a 
political standpoint was to charge more realistic tuition 
levels for instate students. Although the University had 
long charged essentially private tuition levels to out-
of-state students, acknowledging a state policy which 
dictated that state tax dollars could be used only for 
the support of Michigan residents, instate tuition had 
been kept at only token levels throughout the 1960s and 
1970s. However, as state support declined, it became 
clear that the eroding “state subsidy” of the cost of 
education for Michigan residents no longer justified 
these low tuitions. Throughout the 1980s, the University 
began to raise instate tuitions to more realistic levels, 
although this frequently triggered political attacks 
from both state government and the media. By the mid-
1990s, student tuition revenue had been increased to 
over $400 million, far exceeding the University’s annual 
state appropriation of $290 million. Throughout this 
period of tuition restructuring, the University was able 
to increase the financial aid awarded students so that 
it could sustain its long-standing policy that no instate 
student should be denied a Michigan education for lack 
of economic means.
The financial strength of the University also 
benefited from the remarkable success of its faculty in 
attracting research grants and contracts from both the 
federal government and industry. As we noted earlier, 
the University rose to the position of national leadership 
by this measure of research activity, and by 1996 its 
sponsored research support was over $500 million per 
year–again substantially larger than state support.
The third resource stream of the University involved 
charges for auxiliary services it provided to the public, 
namely those activities such as clinical patient care and 
UM Endowment Ranking in 2015
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continuing education that generated revenues beyond 
those of the academic programs. Key in this effort was 
the remarkable success of the University Hospitals and 
related Medical Service Plans, which were generating 
almost $1 billion of revenue by the mid-1990s. Indeed, it 
was the revenue associated with these clinical activities 
that supported much of the remarkable growth of the 
Medical School. So, too, other auxiliary enterprises 
such as the Executive Management Education program 
of the Business School, the Housing Division, and the 
Department of Athletics also saw very considerable 
success during this period. 
The University had been one of the first public 
universities to recognize the importance of private 
fund-raising, with the 55M campaign of the 1960s 
and the $180 million campaign of the 1980s. However, 
as the prospects for state support became dimmer, 
it became clear that private support would extend 
beyond providing simply the margin of excellence for 
the University’s academic programs and increasingly 
provide their base operating funds as well. Early in the 
1990s a very aggressive goal was set to build private 
support, as measured by the combination of gifts 
received and income distributed from endowment, to 
a level comparable to state support by the year 2000.
To this end, the University launched the largest 
fund-raising campaign in the history of public 
higher education by setting as a goal the raising of 
$1 billion by mid-1997. A sophisticated University-
wide development effort was built and hundreds of 
volunteers were recruited across the nation. This fund-
raising effort was extraordinarily successful. By 1996 
the University had already gone well past its $1 billion 
goal, a year ahead of schedule, and would eventually 
exceed $1.4 billion. Annual gifts had grown from $60 
million per year in 1988 to over $180 million per year 
in 1996. And, total annual private support, including 
endowment income exceeded $220 M per year, well 
ahead of schedule to surpass the state appropriation of 
$290 M per year by the end of the decade.
This combined strategy of effective cost containment, 
sophisticated asset management, and alternative 
resource development provided the University with 
extraordinary financial strength, despite the continuing 
deterioration of state support. As one measure of this 
financial integrity, in 1996 the University became the 
first public university in history to earn Wall Street’s 
top credit rating of AAa, placing it on par with the 
wealthiest private universities. It would be this 
unusually high credit rating that would allow the 
University to borrow at minimum interest rates the 
resources to sustain further campus facility expansion 
and renovation despite the fact that the state support 
would continue to decline to one of the lowest levels in 
the nation (dropping to 47th among the states by 2010). 
Yet even as the University became predominantly 
supported by private resources (tuition and gifts) and 
federal grants (for research and student financial aid), it 
was able to sustain its strong commitment to serve the 
needs of the state. 
2000s
As it usually happens, the transition to a new 
administration also resulted in a hard right turn (or 
perhaps “wrong turn” is more accurate) in financial 
strategy. The fund-raising campaign of the 1990s was 
brought to a conclusion in 1997 with a final total of $1.41 
billion, which, while impressive, would have crossed 
the $2 billion mark had it been continued to 2000. The 
few capital construction projects launched by the new 
administration, such as the Life Sciences Institute, were 
funded by tapping existing assets such as those from 
University Hospital reserve funds rather than raising 
new funds. Efforts to contain costs or improve efficiency 
were largely terminated. And rather than fight the 
annual battle with Regents over increasing tuition to 
compensate for the loss of the subsidy provided by 
declining state support, the administration embarked 
on an alternative course by low-balling instate tuition 
and instead relying on major enrollment increases 
to generate new revenue by giving priority to the 
admission of out-of-state students capable of paying 
tuition at private levels. 
Fortunately the tenure of this administration was 
brief, and during the brief interregnum before yet 
another administration, B. Joseph White, Dean of the 
School of Business Administration as Interim President, 
moved rapidly to appoint a new provost, Paul Courant, 
and VPCFO, Timothy Slottow. Working with this team, 
White resumed the major effort at cost reduction. 
However the appetite for the new revenues 
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generated through the high tuition paid out-of-state 
students continued to be overwhelming, and when a 
new permanent administration was installed in 2002, 
enrollment growth was resumed as a key element of 
financial strategy. This would continue for the next 
decade, leading to a massive 25% enrollment growth 
of almost 10,000 students. Since this was accompanied 
by only modest growth in the number of tenure-track 
faculty (although major growth in the use of lecturers 
and part-time instructors), there was an associated 
productivity gain, at least as measured by students per 
faculty member (FYES/FTE). However instructional 
loads increased rapidly in the two units with large 
undergraduate enrollments, LS&A and Engineering, 
badly overloading both faculty instructional capacity 
and facilities.
The highest priority of the new administration was 
the launch of major private fund-raising efforts, the first 
during the mid-2000s, achieving $3.3 billion in funds 
and pledges, and the second launched in 2010 with the 
goal of $4 billion. While impressive in magnitude, once 
again these efforts also resulted in new costs associated 
with priorities of donors rather than the institution 
itself (e.g., the additional costs associated with an 
expansion of the Business School, the Athletic Campus, 
and residence halls).
Under continued pressure to demonstrate cost 
savings, the new administration first turned to the most 
obvious source: reducing faculty and staff compensation 
expenses by increasing cost sharing requirements for 
medical plans, reducing retirement benefits, and, of 
course, limiting salary increases (for all job families 
with the exception of senior administrators, which 
continued to escalate rapidly). Ironically, in contrast to 
earlier efforts to increase productivity, the new priorities 
of the University–fundraising, marketing, and public 
relations–experienced massive staffing increases. 
However the highly decentralized structure 
associated with responsibility center management still 
left control of 90% of University resources with the 
deans and directors, who were held responsible for 
both revenue generation and cost decisions. Hence the 
University administration moved rapidly to attempt 
to induce major cost-savings at the unit level through 
taxes on expenditures, although at the early stage deans 
and directors were given discretion in how this would 
occur. 
The chart above reveals clearly the University 
financial strategy during these years as expenditures 
for institutional support, academic support, and 
A careful tracking of expenditures over the past decade indicates that the 
largest growth was in administrative staffing rather than instruction (i.e., faculty salaries). 
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student services (meaning the central administration) 
increased at 2 to 3 times the rate for instruction (which 
primarily reflects faculty salaries and benefits). Perhaps 
as evidence of the rapidly changing culture, several of 
the deans chose to respond by reducing faculty and 
staff support, while increasing the number of staff 
serving their needs for fund-raising, marketing, and 
public relations–just as the central administration.In 
fact, over the decade, thenumber of staff engaged in 
“institutional advancement” activities, increased to 
almost 1,100, with 500 involved in development (fund-
raising) and over 600 in communications (marketing, 
public relations, and publications), with many of these 
staff added within the central administration.
 As pressures for cost containment and efficiency 
increased, the central administration attempted to 
“recentralize” certain commodity services such as 
accounting, research grant management, and even 
computer services, much to the chagrin of the academic 
units that were heavily dependent on this support. 
With the arrival of a former partner from Accenture 
as a senior member of the University financial staff, it 
was not surprising that his former company would be 
given major contracts to implement new programs in 
“shared services” and “IT rationalization”, with little 
effort to either seek input or even provide advance 
information about these efforts or to justify their cost-
benefit advantages, which turned out were modest if 
not even negative in some cases. Not surprising, this 
ill-considered action caused an explosion of faculty 
and student activism to block its implementation, who 
voted overwhelming in a campus-wide petition to scrap 
the plan. This however was ignored by the executive 
officers, and the shared service program was put into 
place over the objections of academic units.
One other rather disturbing feature of the 
University’s financial strategy over the past decade: the 
degree to which the auxiliary units of the University, 
the University Health System, Student Housing, and 
Intercollegiate Athletics, were largely absolved from 
the draconian cost-containment and staffing policies 
imposed on the academic units. In fact, the auxiliary 
units enjoyed very considerable growth in finances, 
facilities, and pricing even as the academic units were 
tightly constrained. Why did the auxiliaries so dominate 
University priorities when it was clear that it was 
the academic units that provided the reputation and 
fulfilled the fundamental missions of the University? 
That was a question that was frequently asked by the 
faculty of the University, without a response from its 
leadership.
Today’s Financial Challenges
Today much of American higher education is still 
recovering from the impact of the Great Recession of 
2008 and 2009. State support on a per student basis has 
continued to drop by over 30% over the past decade 
to the lowest levels in three decades. Faculty and staff 
layoffs and furloughs are still common. 
Yet in the 2000s and beyond the University of 
Michigan appeared to be enjoying a period of relative 
peace, prosperity, and growth. In contrast to much 
of the rest of higher education, Michigan appears to 
be financially secure, having completed a $3.3 billion 
fundraising campaign several years ago and launching 
a new effort with a goal of $4 billion by 2018. It touts a 
series of efforts to reduce costs and improve productivity 
in its business activities to keep its top Aa1 credit rating 
intact. Student applications and enrollments continue 
to grow, as do research expenditures, exceeding $1.3 
billion per year. The spirit of the campus seems upbeat, 
confident, and secure. Or at least so we are told. 
Yet, below the surface there are growing concerns 
about whether the University has a realistic and 
sustainable financial model as the University prepares 
to enter its third century. As state support declined over 
the past five decades, the University of Michigan has 
found itself a predominantly “privately-supported” 
public university, in the sense that roughly 95% of 
its revenues came from non-state sources such as 
student tuition, clinical fees, research grants, private 
gifts and endowment earnings that are determined by 
competitive markets (as shown in charts detailing the 
2014 financials of the University).
While the University’s state appropriation today 
at $300 million (UMAA) is still very important, state 
support has fallen behind all of the University’s 
other patrons including students (tuition), the federal 
government (research grants and student financial 
aid), and private contributors (gifts and endowment 
income). This erosion in state support is demonstrated 
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convincingly by charts showing the elements of the 
General Fund (academic) budget as well as an estimate 
of the loss in state support over the past decade (the so-
called “jaws” diagram).
A more detailed discussion of the current strategy 
for compensating for the loss of state support and 
financing the University is provided below:
1) Enrollment Increases: These charts make it 
apparent that the University has been able to adjust 
revenues to compensate for the loss of state support 
largely by increasing enrollments (by 25% or 10,000 
students), increasing student tuition (particularly for 
non-resident students, now in excess of $45,000/year), 
and shifting the student mix of instate to out-of-state 
students. Yet here there are worries about the future. 
While once the state appropriation was viewed as 
providing the tuition discount provided instate students, 
this is clearly no longer the case. A very rough estimate 
of the annual cost of education at Michigan (across all 
undergraduate and graduate/professional programs) 
would range between $25,000 to $30,000 per student, a 
cost similar to other leading public universities such as 
UC Berkeley, U Wisconsin, and U Virginia. State support 
of the roughly 27,000 instate students enrolling in the 
University averages out roughly to $7,000, which when 
combined with instate tuition still falls roughly $10,000 
short of the actual cost. Hence it seems clear that the 
higher tuition charged out-of-state students ($45,000 
and up) generates a sufficient surplus over actual costs 
to partially subside instate students and financial aid. 
Put another way, the high tuitions charged to out-of-
state students are covering the cost (subsidizing the 
education) of Michigan resident students. While this 
may strike some as robbing Peter to pay Paul, it is 
perhaps better to frame it as a Robin Hood approach to 
university financing since weathy out-of-state students 
are being asked to subsidize the education of low-
income instate students.
However there are several serious concerns about 
this strategy. First, while the loss of state support has 
largely been compensated for with nonresident tuition, 
this has approached a ceiling. Today the current out-
of-state undergraduate tuition of $45,000 has caught 
up with leading private universities such as Harvard 
and Stanford. Furthermore although there are strong 
financial pressures to continue to grow enrollment, 
while holding permanent faculty lines relatively 
constant, the increasing instructional load in UM’s 
large undergraduate colleges, LS&A and Engineering, 
are already becoming unbearable for many faculty 
members, particular those with research grants.
Finally, as we have noted earlier, this strategy 
of increasing the enrollment of students capable of 
paying essentially private tuitions has distorted both 
the economic distribution of the student body as well 
as the culture of the University. This has also placed 
the public purpose of the University in jeopardy, since 
it is in part responsible for the major decline in the 
number of low income and underrepresented minority 
students. However here one should properly also place 
the blame on state higher education policies that place 
The “Jaws” diagram showing the erosion in
state support compared to the CPI
General contribution of state support to
the UMAA General Fund budget
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Michigan at the bottom of the states in the level of need-
based financial aid it provides to resident students.
2) Sponsored Research: If the University is successful 
in sustaining the quality of its faculty, it should remain 
among the national leaders in the level of sponsored 
research expenditures. However, as we noted early, 
since roughly 30% ($380 million in 2014) of research 
expenditures are provided by the University itself 
both to cover inadequate indirect cost recovery and 
cost sharing, this high level of research activity also 
imposes additional costs on the University that must 
be addressed by revenue from other activities such 
as student tuition and patient fees (unless, of course, 
research sponsors such as the federal government can 
be persuaded to cover more of the indirect costs of the 
research they procure).
3) Fund Raising: Clearly private support has been 
essential to the welfare of the University. As state 
support for major capital facilities disappeared in the 
1990s, this provided a critical source of funding for 
new buildings. It has also been critical for ongoing 
operations, bringing in roughly $100 M/y to $150 
M/y for this purpose. Private gifts also provide much 
of the funding for the University’s essential student 
financial aid programs. But its most critical impact is 
building an endowment whose growth can then be 
managed to provide significant ongoing support for 
academic programs for the long term. The ability of 
the University to build its endowment through fund-
raising campaigns and effective asset management has 
been impressive, resulting in endowment growth to $10 
billion in 2015 after recovering from the 2008 recession. 
However several caveats are important here: 
Although the UM completed a successful $3.3 
billion fund-raising campaign in the 2000s and has 
recently launched a $4 billion fund-raising campaign 
associated with the Bicentennial, these largely provide 
only marginal resources within a $7 billion per year 
budget–and could well result in launching new 
initiatives demanded by donors that dilute academic 
programs even further. Furthermore, in recent years 
Michigan has been able to achieve only an average 
annual fund-raising activity (currently ranked 20th), 
lagging not only leading privates but several publics 
as well (Wisconsin, Indiana, Texas, U California, etc.) 
While it is understandable that a very large university 
like Michigan would not attract the deep loyalty and 
commitment of Ivy League institutions, it also does not 
seem to be attracting the support characterizing several 
other large public institutions. The most successful 
fund-raising is by clinical units, understandable 
because of the personal impact they have on donors. 
Perhaps the problem is that there are just not enough 
exciting things happening on campus to attract the 
interest of donors. 
It is also important to recognize that most large 
gifts for capital facilities fail to cover either the full 
construction or operating costs of the building, requiring 
substantial additional University expenditures. This is 
a particularly serious issue for those naming gifts (i.e., 
An optimistic extrapolation of the General Fund
over the next decade (Hanlon)
State Appropriations per student
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“the edifice complex”) for facilities that are not among 
the University’s highest priorities. Furthermore, most 
of the University’s endowment is for specified purposes 
(including those funds associated with hospital 
reserves) and not available for general support. 
As we noted, while the University’s current 
development and marketing staffing is several times 
that of the 1990s, it has failed to achieve any real growth 
in annual giving, ranking below many other public and 
private universities. In a similar sense, although the 
total goals of the major campaigns appear large ($3.3 
B and 4.0 B), when adjusted for inflation, these are 
comparable in scale to the $1.4 B campaign  of the 1990s 
and furthermore are dependent upon major gifts that 
require substantial additional University investment 
in low priority activities (e.g., the Munger graduate 
resident hall and the expansion of the Athletics campus).
4) Endowment: Although Michigan’s endowment 
appears impressive, its impact is limited by the size of 
the University. As a rule of thumb, the wealthiest private 
institutions achieve endowments capable of sustaining 
their institutions only when their endowments reach 
a level of $1 million per student (since this generates 
sufficient payout at 4.5% to 5% to cover tuition levels). 
With the rapid growth in Michigan’s enrollment, its 
endowment support for academic purposes (paying 
out 4.5% of the total endowment each year) amounts to 
only $230,000 per student. Hence while impressive, the 
University’s endowment falls far short of that required 
to provide independence from state support with our 
current enrollment.
Two comparisons illustrate the relative importance 
of endowments vs. student tuition:
Percent of academic budget from endowments
 Harvard: 35%
 Stanford: 20%
 Michigan: 10%
Percent of academic budget from tuition
 Harvard: 10%
 Stanford: 17%
 Michigan: 36%
It is also important to observe that most of the growth 
of Michigan’s endowment is coming from investment 
income rather than additional gift contributions.
5) Cost Containment: On the other side of the 
ledger, the University has launched an ambitious cost 
reduction effort during the past decade, with the goal 
of trimming roughly 1.5% to 2.0% each year of annual 
expenditures. While this has resulted in part from more 
efficient management of energy and supply acquisition 
and administration, many of these savings have been 
achieved by taxing the expenditures of academic 
units to leverage reductions in their budgets and by 
increasing employee and retiree contributions to staff 
benefits. Both approaches put academic quality at risk. 
It is clear that efforts to enhance efficiency, productivity, 
and cost containment must be broadened to include 
both academic units and revenue-generating activities 
such as development and marketing.
Gifts to the University Endowment Growth
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the ceilings experienced by private universities, 
suggests that this option may be limited.
8) Cost Containment: Much of the highly touted 
recent “savings” of the University have come largely 
out of faculty-staff benefits, cutting health care, 
retirement benefits, and salary programs. Furthermore 
faculty and staff compensation have been modest, 
dropping 20% below several of its private university 
peers and lagging behind even other leading public 
universities. Hence there is a serious concern that 
further cuts in benefits would cripple UM’s efforts 
to attract outstanding faculty and staff. Instead, it is 
becoming clear that the University must simply assess 
more carefully those areas where most staff growth 
has occurred (e.g., communications and development). 
Furthermore the Regents must demand more rigorous 
and defensible compensation policies for senior 
administrators comparable to peer institutions.  
9) Securing the University’s “Public Purpose”: As we 
will discuss later in Chapter 20, the loss of state support 
coupled with the enrollment of large numbers of out-of-
state students paying high tuition has seriously eroded 
Michigan’s public purpose. The fraction of low-income 
and first-generation college students has dropped below 
that of most public universities and even several leading 
private universities, leading to UM’s characterization as 
“an engine of inequality”. Furthermore, the fraction of 
underrepresented students enrolling in the University 
has also dropped significantly from its peak in 1996. 
Growth in research expenditures (inflation adjusted)
Furthermore, the massive expansion of the 
staffing in areas such as communications (600) and 
development (500), coupled with the dramatic increase 
in compensation of senior administrators and staff in 
the central administration, raise serious concerns about 
the viability of the current cost containment strategy.
There are several longer-term concerns that should 
be kept in mind about future options for strengthening 
the University’s financial situation
6) State Support: Since much of the State of 
Michigan’s tax revenue base has been eliminated by 
the tax policies of recent conservative Republican 
administrations, it is unlikely that there will be 
significant restoration of state appropriations for higher 
education for many years. Michigan is likely to continue 
to rank in the lowest quartile of the states in its support 
of its public universities. Since the population of college 
age students in Michigan is projected to drop by 20% 
over the next decade, it is likely that state support will 
at best track inflation and will not increase sufficiently 
to cover the funding cuts of the past two decades.
7) Enrollment Growth: Although there will likely be 
strong pressures to continue to grow enrollment while 
holding tenure-track faculty size constant, the concerns 
about the negative impact on academic quality of 
further enrollment growth, the pressure on faculty 
retention driven by increasing instructional load, and 
the fact that out-of-state tuition rates are approaching 
Endowment returns over past decade
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In fact, the percentage enrollment of African American 
students has dropped from 9.5% in 1996 to 4.3%, the 
lowest level since the 1960s.
There seems to have been a shift in University 
priorities from a fundamental public purpose of 
“providing an uncommon education for the common 
man” to selling our services to the highest bidder–in 
fact, to the “top 1%. Clearly this would characterize 
those out-of-state students whose parents could afford 
$60,000 per year to attend Michigan. But it also applies 
to those who can afford access to many other University 
activities, e.g., an average price of $230 per game for 
football tickets (except for students, who still pay $50 
per game for standing in long lines for open seating…
the highest student pricing in the nation). 
11) Competition among Academic vs Auxiliary 
Units: There is increasing concern about the very 
significant growth in the auxiliary units of the 
University, which operate in relatively price-insensitive 
markets with few Regent constraints such as those 
imposed on tuition. Yet this unbridled growth has 
serious implications for academic units. For example, 
the University’s debt capacity is determined by tuition 
revenue rather than auxiliary revenues, thereby raising 
the concern that to some degree auxiliary facilities 
growth could well constrain academic opportunities. 
More serious is the aggressive growth in the fund-
raising activities of auxiliary units that are now going 
after prospects and fund-raising opportunities in 
competition with academic units. An early example of 
this was the degree to which the University Musical 
Society has managed to capture most of the private 
gifts that in earlier times would have funded the Music 
School. Most recently, the Athletics Department has 
been rapidly expanding development staff and set 
a campaign goal of $350 million, comparable to and 
likely competitive with LS&A. Again this clearly raises 
the relative priority given to academic and auxiliary 
units by the leadership of the University.
In summary, the University’s current financial 
model looks increasingly unsustainable: Its academic 
programs are largely sustained by high tuition from 
out-of-state students, which is approaching both 
enrollment and tuition ceilings. Fund-raising seems 
increasingly suspect, achieving modest results even 
with excessive staffing, poorly aligned with university 
priorities, and insufficient to have the major impact 
characterizing private universities. Although the 
University faculty remains highly successful in 
attracting sponsored research support, roughly 30% 
of the $1.3 billion of annual research expenditures is 
currently provided by the University itself. While the 
University had taken advantage of low interest rates 
to enable massive investments in auxiliary enterprises 
($650 million of resident hall renovations, $2 billion of 
medical center expansions, and $750 million in new or 
renovated athletic facilities), the capability of longer 
term revenues to support both the debt and operating 
costs of these facilities is questionable.
The Bottom Line
So how might we assess the financial state of 
the University over the past 50 years. To be sure, the 
University has survived in the face of losing over 50% 
of its state support, with its reputation largely intact. On 
the positive side, Michigan has managed to preserve 
most of its quality and its reputation even while losing 
over 80% of its state support. In fact, in the 1990s the 
National Academy ratings of academic quality ranked 
the University of Michigan 3rd in the nation (and world) 
behind only Stanford and the University of California 
Berkeley in the quality across the full spectrum of its 
graduate programs. 
But it could be argued that this was primarily 
because of decisions and actions taken during the 
three-decade period from the 1970s to through the 
1990s. Tuition was increased to more realistic levels 
reflecting the decline in state subsidy. Strong support 
and incentives were provided to encourage the faculty 
in obtaining external research support (with Michigan 
moving to 1st in the nation in research activity as a 
result). Authority and accountability for resources 
was decentralized to the level of deans and directors, 
where assets are acquired and costs are incurred. The 
effort was launched to more aggressively manage the 
University’s endowment increasing it by 10 fold to over 
$2.5 B. And a central “bank” was created by the VPCFO 
to manage University assets in a highly creative and 
effective manner.  Largely as a result of these actions, 
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the University was able to achieve in 1997 the top AAa 
credit rating and maintain this rating through the past 
decade and a half. 
In contrast, during from the late 1990s to the 2010s, 
a series of short term actions have been taken that may 
have walked the University out on a financial limb. 
The dramatic increase of 25% in student enrollments, 
designed to generate additional tuition particularly from 
out-of-state students, has both overloaded instructional 
capacity and seriously damaged the socioeconomic 
diversity of the student body. Furthermore, launching 
massive debt-financed capital facilities projects in 
auxiliary enterprises to take advantage of market-
insensitive pricing and low interest rates has not only 
incurred significant debt but encumbered much of the 
University’s borrowing capacity (determined primarily 
by student tuition and fee revenue rather than auxiliary 
revenues). 
Hence today there remain serious concerns about the 
University’s financial sustainability, since enrollments 
have now reached (or in some cases exceeded) 
instructional and facilities capacity. Nonresident tuition 
is approaching the ceiling experienced by the top private 
institutions, while instate tuition continues to be highly 
constrained by political factors. While endowment has 
continued to grow, endowment-per-student is at only 
one-tenth the level of leading private institutions.
During the past half-century, the auxiliary units 
(i.e., health system, student housing, and intercollegiate 
athletics) have thrived. UM’s AAa rating coupled with 
inelastic consumer markets experienced by auxiliary 
activities has allowed a massive investment in new 
facilities (e.g., the adult general hospital, the Mott 
Children’s hospital, and many other new clinical 
care and research facilities for the medical center; an 
investment of over $650 million in renovating and 
building new student residence halls; and comparable 
investments in Michigan Stadium and other athletic 
facilities). Yet this massive growth in auxiliaries has also 
raised a concern about the balance between auxiliary 
and academic priorities.
Perhaps most serious is the fact that the University 
has failed to sustain its public purpose. While it 
achieved significant progress in racial diversity during 
the 1990s, minority enrollments have since fallen back 
to the low levels of the 1960s. Largely because of the 
growth in the enrollment of high-income nonresident 
students coupled with the low level of state support 
(particularly in the absence of state-based financial aid 
programs), the University has lost much of its economic 
diversity. Indeed, some even question whether the 
University’s long-standing commitment to providing 
“an uncommon education for the common man” has 
now been replaced by efforts to attract and educate 
uncommonly rich students.
The Road Ahead
Clearly, in the face of the impact of aging populations 
and the global financial crisis on state and federal 
budgets and hence on support for higher education, 
the nation’s public research universities must intensify 
their efforts to increase efficiency and productivity in 
all of their activities. In particular, they should set bold 
goals for reducing the costs of their ongoing activities. 
Many companies have found that cost reductions 
and productivity enhancement of 25% or greater are 
possible with modern business practices such as lean 
production and total quality management. While 
universities have many differences from business 
corporations–for example, cost reductions do not 
drop to the bottom line of profits–there is likely a very 
considerable opportunity for process restructuring in 
both administrative and academic activities. 
Of course, in the face of deep cuts in state 
appropriations, most public research universities have 
already been engaged in intense cost-cutting efforts, 
particularly in non-academic areas such as financial 
management, procurement, energy conservation, 
competitive bidding of services, and eliminating 
unnecessary regulation and duplication. They have cut 
hundreds of millions of dollars of recurring costs from 
their budgets. But it is now time to consider bolder 
actions that require restructuring of academic activities 
as well.
First, let us provide a realistic assessment of financial 
opportunities for each source of support:
Restore state support? Not for years, if ever...
Raise tuition? Perhaps for instate, but outstate
 tuition is already at Harvard levels
Private fund raising? Questionable as a major
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 source relative to needs
Endowment: Absolutely, but it will grow henceforth
 primarily through wise financial management 
Federal support: Absolutely, both for financial aid
 and research support (subject to ICR)
Rather than distracting ourselves with penny-wise 
and pound-foolish actions such as “shared services” 
(that will undercut the staff support of our teaching 
and research) or IT “rationalization” (that will stifle the 
innovation and creativity in our academic units), while 
achieving only marginal savings (less than 1% on the 
average), we should consider “pound-wise and penny-
foolish” approaches that would have very major impact 
on the University. 
1. Re-establish the control of the Provost over 
budgets, expenditures, and financial discipline by 
recreating the Committee on Budget Administration 
and the Budget Priorities Committee, each chaired by 
or reporting to the Provost.
The massive increases in administrative staffing 
and expenditures both in administrative units such 
as Development and Communications and in Schools 
and Colleges (particularly Engineering and Business 
Administration) suggest both a lack of discipline and 
control of expenditures. From 1970 to 2000, the authority 
as chief budget officer of the Provost was sustained by 
the Executive Officers convened as the Committee on 
Budget Administration and chaired by the Provost and 
by the Budget Priorities Committee, a blue-ribbon body 
comprised of faculty, staff, deans, and executive officers 
reporting to the Provost. Note the Provost maintained 
control over all operating and capital expenditures 
through these mechanisms, a control and discipline 
authority that is clearly missing today.
However as we suggested in Chapter 7, the role of 
experienced financial managers in each of the many 
academic units is critical since most deans and chairs 
come from the ranks of faculty rather inexperienced 
in such management and financial roles. The EVPCFO 
should not only maintain a network of contacts with 
these managers at the unit level, capable of providing 
assistance or warnings when necessary, but should also 
be involved to some degree in both the appointment 
and evaluation of these staff. As noted later, it is this 
informal network of experienced management staff 
in the units linking to the EVPCFO that is the key to 
the financial integrity of such a massive and highly 
decentralized institution.
2. The Provost should implement a series of actions 
to establish greater discipline and cost containment.
For example, all capital projects that are either 
not fully funded (for BOTH capital expenditures and 
operating costs) or central to the academic programs of 
the University should be put on hold. Similarly, private 
gifts that either do not address significant University 
priorities (e.g., Munger Hall) or entail significant 
additional expenditures (expansion of Ross School 
of Business Administration) should be declined. It is 
absolutely essential that the Executive Officers contain 
those activities that convey a false impression of the 
University’s prosperity or compete with the academic 
core for resources. Here, the biggest threats are the 
unconstrained growth of the Athletics Department 
and the plush designs of renovated student housing 
(complete with sushi bars and exercise rooms). Any 
auxiliary or University-related activities that compete 
directly with academic units for private giving or 
University subsidy should be constrained. Finally, 
the salaries of senior administrators, including the 
President, should be clearly linked to faculty and staff 
salaries rather than simply market-driven (which is 
largely a fictitious rationale for compensating what 
are “public callings” similar to many government 
positions).
3. Moving to year-round operation
In the early 1960s the University switched to a 
trimester calendar of three 4-month terms to allow 
operating year-round at full capacity (with the spring-
summer term divided into two 2-month half terms). 
The students and faculty liked it, but the state never 
stepped up to add in the additional appropriation 
necessary to subsidize state resident students during the 
spring summer term. Hence year-round operation was 
abandoned. Yet, interestingly enough, the University 
kept the trimester calendar, except we now call each 
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trimester a “semester” and give faculty the month of 
May as “academic non instructional time”.
Since state support today provides only 8% of the 
support for the University’s activities, it is no longer 
a major factor in determining the University calendar. 
Hence it is logical for the University to consider 
the possibility of bringing the third spring-summer 
“semester” to full capacity. Furthermore today both 
our instructional facilities and residence halls are 
completely renovated to handle year-round operation 
(even in a future of global warming). At the current net 
tuition level of $1 billion for two terms, this would have 
the potential of generating an additional $400 million 
a year. Moveover, it would provide students flexibility 
in how they schedule their calendar. In fact, students 
entering with advanced placement credits could 
conceivably earn a bachelor’s degree in two years, 
thereby providing as well very considerable savings in 
the cost of their education (particularly through both 
living costs and additional employment opportunities).
Since our buildings and utilities are fixed costs, 
whether they get used or not, the primary concern would 
be instructional costs. Although most faculty use the 
spring-summer term for research, the University could 
rely on senior and/or emeritus faculty as the major 
teaching staff for the summer (perhaps negotiating a 
reduced salary). 
There are questions, of course. In our current 
calendar, the state appropriation provides (in theory) 
the discount between instate and nonresident tuition, 
amounting to roughly $150 million per term. Would 
we need to generate a similar subsidy to operate in the 
spring-summer term? Or would we attract a different 
student mix? How would we handle the balance 
between full-time Michigan students and students 
from other colleges taking a summer term at Michigan?
4. Tax auxiliary units to support the academic core
The auxiliary units of the University, i.e., hospitals, 
student housing, intercollegiate athletics, depend 
heavily on the reputation and capacity of the academic 
core of the institution. Furthermore the auxiliaries 
currently operate in a less price sensitive market and 
are less constrained by political issues than tuition (e.g., 
Regents).
Hence it seems perfectly appropriate to “tax” the 
expenditures of the auxiliary units to help support the 
academic core. A tax of 5% of expenditures = $150 M/y. 
Indeed, such a tax on expenditures might provide an 
additional brake on unnecessary spending, such as 
capital facilities expansion.
5. Lobby to restore state support to adequate levels
During the 1980s and 1990s the University 
successfully led a statewide coalition of public 
universities and their most influential alumni to make 
the case for state support (the so-called “treetops” 
strategy). During the past decade there has been little 
effort to build such a unified approach. It is clearly time 
to repeat the “treetops” strategy of the 1990s to restore 
state appropriations either to inflation-adjusted levels 
that would amount to an increase from 2015 level of 
$300 M to $468 M to match the inflation-adjusted level 
of 2002.
6. Join in the National Academy Agenda
Recently the National Academies of Science, 
Engineering, and Medicine have engaged in a major 
effort to restore the priority of research universities 
in America. If higher education is able to get traction 
on the ten actions requested of Congress, funding for 
the nation’s research universities would increase by 
roughly 25% ($70 billion/year) over the next decade.
Michigan’s share of this would be $1.5 B/y, or 
equivalent to a $30 B endowment.
Yet, while many of the nation’s research universities 
are actively engaged in this effort, Michigan has been 
conspicuously absent from the table. Perhaps it should 
get up off the bench and join in the effort
Other ideas
Spin off companies in which the University owns 
equity interests. (After all, isn’t that what Michigan 
Athletics has become?)
Apply peer comparisons to determine staffing levels 
appropriate for activities such as fund-raising and 
marketing (meaning Harvard, Stanford, U. Wisconsin, 
and U California).
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Conduct a thorough analysis of executive salaries 
(using compensation practices for corporate boards)
Learn to say “no” to the offer of gifts that run 
counter to University interests or require excessive UM 
cost-sharing (e.g., Munger Hall?)
And the list goes on and on and on…
A final observation...
Clearly, current financial models for most American 
research universities are unsustainable and must be 
restructured. Yet, while efficiency, streamlining, cost 
reductions, and productivity enhancement are all 
necessary, eventually stakeholders of American higher 
education must address the dramatic decline in research 
university support through investments from all 
sources–federal government (particularly for graduate 
education), states, private sector, and students (tuition). 
As any business executive knows all too well, relying 
entirely on cost-cutting and productivity enhancement 
without attention to top line revenue growth eventually 
leads to Chapter 11!
We will return to this issue in Chapter 19.
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While outstanding faculty, students, and staff 
are the key assets of a great university, the quality of 
facilities clearly influences the ability both to recruit 
outstanding people and to support their efforts to 
achieve excellence. As Winston Churchill once stated: 
“We shape our buildings. Thereafter, they shape us.” 
Maintaining and enhancing the quality of the campus, 
buildings, grounds, and other infrastructure is a major 
priority of the university, and it must be a responsibility 
of the president. In most cases, the need for facilities 
and other campus improvements bubble up from the 
various programs of the university, and then the deans 
and the president work together to acquire the resources 
necessary to support these projects. 
One of the more visible challenges faced by the 
University over the past half century arose from the 
burden of its aging physical plant. Our academic 
buildings, many fifty to one hundred years old, had 
served us well. Thousands of students had skipped up 
stairs, rushed down halls, and scooted out doors, on 
to other commitments, leaving behind scuffed walls, 
drafty windows, and heating and cooling systems of 
a by-gone era. These buildings desperately needed 
renovation to meet the educational needs of today and 
tomorrow. For example, modern research methods 
required more space than was allotted decades ago. 
Changing teaching styles demanded flexible classroom 
spaces that could accommodate small seminars and 
group projects as easily as large lectures.
Outside these buildings, many more lumens of light 
were needed to bathe campus landmarks and illuminate 
sidewalks and footpaths to create a safer environment 
for all members of the community. Behind the flora, 
miles of fiber optics were necessary to link libraries, 
research laboratories, and residence hall rooms to the 
information super highway. 
With the disappearance of federal support for 
higher education facilities during the 1980s, universities 
had been forced to depend primarily upon private 
support, student fees, or limited state support—for 
public universities—to rebuild their physical plants. 
The growth in the equity markets enabled some well-
endowed private universities to take important steps 
toward addressing these needs during the 1990s. 
But many other less affluent institutions, including 
Michigan, continued to struggle with inadequate 
facilities for their educational programs. 
Although the needs of academic units should take 
precedence in capital improvements, any visit to a 
university campus will soon reveal that much of the 
activity exists in auxiliary units, such as the medical 
center, student housing, and intercollegiate athletics 
because of their independent capacity to generate 
funding (e.g., patient fees, rents, ticket income, 
television revenue, or gifts).
 The majority of capital expansion at most research 
universities these days occurs in their medical centers, 
driven by the need for renovation or growth in clinical 
facilities, the desire for additional research space in the 
biomedical sciences, and the availability of substantial 
income from clinical activities. This is not surprising, 
considering that medical center budgets have typically 
increased at twice the rate of academic budgets 
throughout the past two decades (e.g., 10 percent per 
year for the medical center versus 5 percent per year for 
the rest of the university). The desire to increase clinical 
income drives the continual expansion of facilities, 
particularly in such lucrative areas as surgery and 
internal medicine, but also in satellite clinics designed 
to expand primary care activities that feed patients 
into university hospitals. Similarly, the extraordinary 
growth in federal support of biomedical research, now 
Chapter 9
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representing over 60 percent of all federal research and 
development on university campuses, has stimulated 
staggering investments in expensive new research 
facilities in the life sciences, such as molecular biology, 
genomics, proteomics, and biotechnology. There is 
a certain irony here: in contrast to pharmaceutical 
companies that tend to invest in “throwaway” 
research buildings because of the rapid obsolescence 
of research technology, universities prefer to hire 
expensive architects to design monumental facilities 
to last generations, even though these facilities will 
require several times their original capital costs for the 
renovations necessary to track technological changes.
In recent years, there also has been a comparable 
level of capital expansion in athletic facilities. The 
wacko culture characterizing intercollegiate athletics 
presumes that the team that spends the most—or builds 
the most—wins the most. Hence, there has been a costly 
arms race to invest hundreds of millions of dollars in 
expanding football stadiums and basketball pavilions, 
specialized training facilities, academic counseling 
centers, plush offices for the ever-expanding athletic 
staff, and even museums designed to impress recruits 
and fans alike with past athletic accomplishments. 
While much of this investment (e.g., in bigger and 
better training facilities or the most expensive artificial 
turf fields) is driven by competitive forces, some of the 
largest investments (e.g., skyboxes for wealthy fans and 
corporate clients, sophisticated television systems, or 
on-campus stores for marketing sports paraphernalia) 
have been made as a marketing device. Most athletic 
departments tend to borrow the funds to build such 
facilities, depending on future revenue from ticket 
sales, television contracts, or licensing to cover the debt, 
although most of these loans are actually secured with 
a university pledge of income from student fees. The 
debt load on several of the major athletic programs is 
considerable, ranging into the hundreds of millions of 
dollars for many institutions and requiring that new 
revenue be generated through clever and occasionally 
even coercive mechanisms, such as seat taxes and 
skyboxes for premium seating (ironically given a highly 
favorable, if somewhat perverse, tax treatment by the 
Internal Revenue Service as “charitable donations for 
educational purposes”).
Although the core activities of the university involve 
teaching and scholarship, capital investments in 
facilities for academic programs tends to lag far behind 
investments in auxiliary activities, such as medical 
care and intercollegiate athletics. In part, this has to do 
with constraints on the funding sources available for 
academic facilities (e.g., state appropriations, private 
gifts, or debt financing based on student fees). But it 
is also due to the relative autonomy of most auxiliary 
units, portraying (at least in myth, if not in reality) their 
financial independence from the rest of the university. 
Most universities tend to be far more parsimonious 
when spending funds on new classroom or library 
space than when investing in major expansion of the 
football stadium or university hospital. Such was true 
for Michigan, both during the 1970s and 1980s as state 
support collapsed and then again in the early 2000s as 
University priorities shifted from academic facilities to 
large investments in auxiliary activities (e.g., a large 
expansion in the medical center, student residence 
halls, and Michigan Stadium).
1960s - 1970s
During the late 1950s and early 1960s, growth of the 
University’s campus was dependent not only on student 
demand but on the availability of state appropriations 
to fund the necessary capital facilities. There was 
strong state support of both operations (amounting 
to roughly 80% of instructional costs) and new 
facilities, including the School of Music, Engineering 
laboratories, a cyclotron laboratory, and the Institute 
of Science and Technology on the North Campus, the 
Undergraduate Library, the Physics and Astronomy 
Building, and the giant Mary Markley residence hall on 
the Central Campus, and the new School of Dentistry, 
at $17 million, the largest state-funded building in the 
University’s history at that time ($140 million in today’s 
dollars).
Yet rapid growth of the campus began to slow in 
the late 1960s, both because of the weakening of state 
appropriations, but even more so because of action by 
the State Legislature to allocate all monies for planning 
and constructing university buildings through the state 
controller, including planning and letting contracts. The 
conflict of state control with the independent authority 
demanded by the University’s constitutional autonomy 
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blocked state funded construction for almost a decade.
By the mid-1970s the impact of the energy crisis on 
the state’s economy, coupled with the impact of the 
growing competitiveness of the Japanese automobile 
industry on Detroit, and later the shifting priorities 
of an aging population, signaled the beginning of a 
more permanent erosion of state support that would 
continue for several decades. Student fee revenue, 
federal research grants, and private gifts allowed 
limited construction of student residences such as 
Bursley Hall on the North Campus, research facilities 
such as the School of Public Health, and the Schools of 
Art and Architecture on the North Campus. 
 Although state appropriations for campus projects 
resumed during the 1970s, the increasing competition 
from other public colleges and universities competing 
for state fund and the impact of the Arab oil embargo 
and Japanese auto imports on state revenues kept state 
capital for UMAA academic facilities at marginal levels. 
By the early 1980s the state had entered a deep recession, 
with appropriations to the University of Michigan 
dropping by over 30%, requiring a major restructuring 
of the University’s financial strategy with deep budget 
cuts, program discontinuance, increasing tuition, and a 
major effort to build private support of the University. 
1980s
But there was yet another factor competing with the 
funding of academic buildings due to the University’s 
own priorities. By the 1970s it had become apparent 
that “Old Main”, the University Hospital built during 
the 1920s, was in desperate need of replacement. Yet the 
projected expense was formidable. President Fleming 
launched the planning effort for the Replacement 
Hospital Project, which he chaired to make certain it 
was a reasonable plan. Success was finally achieved in 
1979-1980 during the transition year when Allan Smith 
served as interim president and then followed with the 
leadership of Harold Shapiro, based upon a unique 
partnership in which both the State of Michigan and 
the University would each sell $180 million of bonds 
to finance the $360 million project. This was the largest 
state-funded project since the Mackinac Bridge. Indeed, 
the size of state funding required for the Replacement 
Hospital Project ($180 million) took a significant bite 
out of the state capital outlay dollars available for all of 
higher education in Michigan during the 1980s.
The massive project began in the early 1980s at a time 
when the State of Michigan was coping with a major 
national recession, which followed the usual pattern of 
state’s fortunes: “When the nation economy catches a 
cold, the state of Michigan catches pneumonia!” While 
the Replacement Hospital Project benefited from low 
construction costs during the recession, the construction 
on the rest of the campus was largely dormant with 
the exception of privately funded health care facilities 
such as the W. K. Kellogg Eye Center and the Taubman 
Health Care Center along with biomedical laboratory 
facilities funded through research grants, e.g., Medical 
Science Research Buildings I, II, and III, which together 
with the Replacement Hospital Project amounted to 
a $500 million investment in the University Medical 
Center during the Shapiro years.
At a much smaller, but nevertheless critical, level 
was the completion of the move of the College of 
Engineering to its North Campus site. Actually this 
provides an interesting example of how, even in the 
worst of economic times, a bit of pragmatic planning and 
good luck can lead to progress. In 1980,  Engineering 
found itself split with most instructional activities in 
the old Central Campus buildings of West Engineering 
and East Engineering, and most research activities in 
laboratories on the North Campus. The enrollment of 
the College had grown by over 35% during the 1970s, 
so there was a desperate need for more space. An 
overly optimistic fund-raising campaign conducted 
The  new Adult General Hospital
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in the 1970s raised sufficient funds for only the first 
phase of a grand plan for a three-building complex to 
accommodate the move of the College. When a new 
team of deans was appointed in the College in 1981, 
it quickly became apparent that they would have to 
cobble together a much more realistic plan based as 
much on trading space as new construction. 
Key to success was the tragic loss of the University’s 
oldest academic building, the Economics Building, 
when on Christmas Eve of 1982 a disgruntled graduate 
student set fire to it and burned it to the ground. The 
College immediately turned to Provost Billy Frye and 
offered him temporary space in its East Engineering 
building for the displaced Economics Department until 
it could be moved to Lorch Hall, if he could provide 
the funds to allow us to move part of the College into 
under-utilized space on the North Campus. Next the 
College persuaded Harold Shapiro to let the deans go to 
Lansing to lobby for a state-funded building that would 
complete our move. Although Shapiro was skeptical 
that in the state’s current economic condition we would 
be successful, he nevertheless agreed to let us go, albeit 
accompanied by one of the University’s most skillful 
state relations staff, Keith Molin. Sometimes miracles 
happen, as they did in this case when we managed 
to land the state-funded Electrical Engineering and 
Computer Science (EECS) Building and complete the 
move!
Hence by sacrificing a grand plan based on overly 
optimistic fund-raising goals of the 1970s and settling 
for reallocated facilities, the College was finally able to 
launch its move to the North Campus in 1983. 
This EECS Building would be the last state-funded 
building for many years to come, as state funding for 
higher education buildings would largely collapse. 
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the state had provided 
little support for campus facilities, aside from the 
commitment to rebuild the University Hospitals, which 
had diverted state dollars that would have otherwise 
been available for academic facilities to the support of 
patient care. Hence future academic facility needs of 
the University would have to be met through private 
gifts or debt-financing pledged against student tuition 
revenue.
1990s
Despite the lack of state support, the University 
of Michigan’s Ann Arbor campus continued to grow 
into one of the largest university campus in the nation, 
with almost 26 million square feet of space by 2000. Yet 
many of the most distinguished academic programs 
of the University were housed in ancient buildings, in 
bad need of repair, and totally inadequate for modern 
teaching and research. Heating systems were antiquated, 
windows drafty, and teaching and laboratory facilities 
were outdated. During the previous several decades, 
the campus environment had declined significantly. 
A two-decade long freeze on state funding for capital 
construction, coupled with the age and obsolescence 
of many of Michigan’s facilities, was having a serious 
impact on the quality of the University’s academic 
programs and the morale of faculty, students, and staff. 
Classrooms were dilapidated, laboratories were no 
longer adequate for state-of-the-art research, and major 
book and art collections faced serious risk. Even the 
appearance of the campus looked dismal, with trash 
littered everywhere, posters taped to any bare space, 
and chalked messages scribbled across the sidewalks 
and building walls. It was clear that many of the 
students and faculty had lost any sense of pride in the 
appearance of the campus, and they treated it like the 
slum it had become.
Yet, during the 1990s, several factors converged 
simultaneously to provide the University with a 
remarkable window of opportunity for rebuilding its 
campuses. First, falling interest rates, coupled with the 
University’s high credit rating, made it quite inexpensive 
to borrow money. Second, because of a weak economy, 
The Economics Building destroyed by fire in 1982
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there were few competing construction projects 
underway in the private sector, and hence construction 
costs were quite low. Third, the University’s success in 
auxiliary activities, including private support, clinical 
revenue, and continuing education fees, was beginning 
to generate substantial revenue. And, fourth, the 
University was able to convince Governor Engler to 
launch a major state capital facilities programs, with 
the understanding that the University would match the 
state effort through the use of its own funds.
But there was one final ingredient. The Executive 
Officers managed to convince the Regents that the 
University should debt-finance critically needed 
academic facilities using student fees. While this was 
a common device in private universities, Michigan 
had generally used student fees to finance only non-
instructional facilities such as Crisler Arena, depending 
instead on state funding for academic facilities. To 
make this step more politically palatable in the face of 
concerns about rapidly rising tuition, the administration 
developed a plan of shared sacrifice in which faculty 
and staff salaries were held level during the first year 
of the new fee. (This latter step earned some harsh 
criticism from faculty members, even though the lapse 
in salary increases was only temporary and more than 
made up through strong salary programs in later years.)
The Medical Center led the way with a series of new 
teaching, research, and clinical facilities that augmented 
the new Adult General Hospital. A new Child and 
Maternal Health Care Hospital replaced Mott and 
Women’s Hospitals. A high-rise Cancer and Geriatrics 
Center was constructed. A trio of sophisticated research 
laboratories, Medical Science Research Buildings I, II, 
and III came on line to keep the Medical School at the 
forefront of biomedical research, while also housing 
the Howard Hughes Medical Research Institute. As 
the Medical Center growth began to strain against the 
limits of its downtown Ann Arbor site, the University 
Hospitals acquired a large site northeast of Ann 
Arbor and began to develop its East Medical Campus 
to respond to the need for additional primary care 
facilities. It also developed new primary care facilities 
throughout southeastern Michigan, including a major 
concentration in the Briarwood area in south Ann 
Arbor.
The last remaining facilities needed to complete 
the North Campus were completed, including the 
FXB Building for aerospace engineering, the Lurie 
Engineering Center, and the Media Union, a remarkable 
digital library and multimedia center. Further, the 
eminent American architect–and University alumnus–
Charles Moore was commissioned to design a striking 
carillon, the Lurie Bell Tower, that rapidly became the 
symbol for the North Campus.
There was also extensive construction activity on 
the South Campus of the University, including the 
renovation or construction of most athletic facilities. 
Michigan Stadium was renovated, and a natural grass 
field was installed. In the process, the stadium floor 
was lowered so that an additional 3,000 seats could be 
added, thereby increasing the capacity of the stadium 
to 106,000. Other new or substantially renovated 
The key to rebuilding the campus: Farris Womack, VPCFO, who put together the financial plan, Paul Spradlin, 
who managed the vast complexity of the many projects, and University Architect Doug Hanna.
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Angell Hall-Haven Connector
Chemistry Building (Old)
Chemistry Building (Dow)
C. C. LittleKraus Building
Angell Computer ClusterAngell Hall Renovation
Shapiro Undergraduate Library
Randall Laboratory Addition
Central Campus New Buildings and Renovations during the 1990s
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Student Activities Heutwell Center
Michigan League
Lorch Hall
Ingalls Mall/Diag Re-construction
Health Service
East Engineering Building
Hill Auditorium Plan
School of Social Work
Business Administration Education
Margaret Bell Pool Addition
West Engineering Building
Business Executive Education
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North Campus Reflecting Pool
Lurie Bell Tower Lurie Engineering CenterMedia Union
Francois-Xavier Bagnoud Building
Electrical Eng & Computer ScienceHerbert H. Dow Building
North Campus New Buildings and Renovations during the 1990s
Maya Lin’s Wave Field
Francois-Xavier Bagnoud Building
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C. S. Mott Children’s Hospital
Women’s Hospital, 
Maternal & Child Health Care Center
Taubman Health Care Center
Medical Center Drive 
Parking Structure
Cancer CenterMedical Science Research I, II, III
East Medical Complex
Plymourh Road
Medical Campus new Bildings and Renovations during the 1990s
Detroit Observatory
University Hospital
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Weidenbach Administration Building
Tennis Center
Continuing Legal Education
Golf Course Improvements
Glenn E. Schembechler Hall
South Campus New Buildings and Renovations during the 1990s
Donald B. Canham Natatorium
Michigan Stadium (and turf)
William D. Revelli Band Rehearsal Hall
Donald B. Canham Natatorium
Michigan Stadium
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facilities included Canham Natatorium, Schembechler 
Hall, Keen Arena, Weidenbech Hall, Yost Arena, the 
Michigan Golf Course, the varsity track, and the 
new Michigan Tennis Complex. New facilities were 
provided to support business operations, including the 
Wolverine Tower and the Campus Safety Office.
Most encouraging of all was the great progress in 
addressing the critical needs of the Central Campus. The 
Undergraduate Library, appropriately referred to as the 
“ULGI”, was surrounded by an attractive shell, totally 
renovated, and dedicated as the Harold and Vivian 
Shapiro Library. The Physics Department benefited 
from a major new research laboratory promoted by it 
chair, Homer Neal. A major building was constructed 
between Angell and Haven Halls to serve the LS&A 
faculty. Total building renovations were accomplished 
for East Engineering, West Engineering, C. C. Little, 
Angell Hall, the LS&A Building, Frieze, Mason, and 
Haven Halls. And a marvelous new building was built 
for the School of Social Work.
This massive campus renaissance, eventually 
amounting to almost $2 billion of facilities construction 
and renovation, was made possible by a combination 
of state support for capital improvements; federal 
support of research facilities; private gifts and grants; 
the reallocation of internal UM funds including 
contributions from the University’s auxiliary units; 
and student fees. Its tremendous success was due 
to the vision, commitment, and hard work of a great 
many individuals at the University. Of particular note 
here was the incredible effort of VP Farris Womack in 
leading the effort to finance the projects, Paul Spradlin 
in directing the projects, and Jack Janveja, Tom Schlauff, 
and Fred Mayer in the design, management, and 
execution of the complex effort.
By the conclusion of this massive effort, essentially 
every building on Michigan’s three campuses had either 
been substantially renovated or replaced with modern, 
state-of-the-art facilities. The infrastructure necessary for 
modern research and teaching was installed, including 
extensive investments in networking the campuses and 
installing modern information technology systems. 
Furthermore, this massive construction effort provided 
an opportunity to significantly enhance the appearance 
of the University’s campuses with exciting new 
architecture and new landscaping. Finally, by taking 
advantage of modern technology, the University was 
able to design facilities to lower lifetime operational 
costs.
The University of Michigan had moved rapidly 
from an aging campus to a leader in the quality of 
environment it was able to provide for its academic 
program. It would enter the new century, confident 
of working from a firm foundation of cutting-edge 
teaching, research, and support facilities. By 1996, 
essentially all of the projects to rebuild the University 
of Michigan were either completed, underway, or 
funded. Over the next two years several dozen of these 
facilities projects would be completed and dedicated. 
During spring of 1996 the University had managed 
to obtain a commitment to provide an additional 
$137 million of state appropriation, including $79 
million for the Ann Arbor campus. This amount was 
sufficient to complete the renovation of the Central 
Campus, including the last key LS&A facilities: the 
LS&A Building, Haven Hall, Mason Hall, Frieze Hall, 
West Hall, and the Perry Building. Since this required 
a 20% University match, the University had developed 
a funding plan that would use University funds to 
renovate Hill Auditorium and the Rackham Building as 
the University’s contribution (in fact, $20 million was 
set aside for the Hill Auditorium project). Since Farris 
Womack had realized that construction costs were 
likely to increase rapidly with a prosperous economy, 
we arranged to have these projects fast-tracked with the 
intent to have them completed by late 1998.
The funding was in place, the plans had been 
completed, and the University was ready to proceed 
through the state capital construction process. 
Unfortunately, these important projects came to a halt 
in 1997 with the arrival of a new administration. 
2000s 
With a new administration in the late 1990 came 
a new campus master planning architect, Venturi-
Scott-Brown, led by noted architect Robert Venturi. 
Previously funded University projects were put on 
hold for several years to allow the development of a 
new master plan. Although the University eventually 
moved ahead with the Venturi-designed Life Sciences 
Institute (ironically a copy of an earlier Venturi design 
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of a larger biomedical sciences laboratory at Yale), 
there was little effort to resume the projects to renovate 
important Central Campus academic buildings. During 
this delay, the original construction estimates of $80 
million later soared to over $300 million because of 
the delay. The master plan for completing the North 
Campus met a similar fate. Although the University 
benefited greatly from the successful effort to rebuild 
the various campuses of the University during the 
1990s, this effort was halted even when most of its 
plans were close to completion.
Although there was an attempt to signal a strong 
interest in architecture by directing Venturi to decorate 
Michigan Stadium with a surrounding “halo”, 
proclaiming the Michigan fight song in 10 foot high 
letters (and angering fans so much that the Regents 
directed that it be quietly removed a year later), Venturi’s 
major effort was to design the key research facility in a 
new Life Science Institute, aimed at attracting Nobel-
quality biomedical researchers to the campus. Rather 
than seek new funding for this multi-building center, 
the administration instead simply funded it from UM 
Hospital reserves ($80 million). The biomedical research 
complex on Huron and Observatory (later named the 
Taubman Biomedical Laboratory) was important for 
the continued expansion of research activity in the life 
sciences, as was the acquisition of the former Pfizer 
Global Research campus for the site of North Campus 
Research Center.
A more strategic campus development effort was 
launched in the mid-2000s by the next administration, 
beginning with two major complexes designed by 
architect Robert Stern, Weill Hall (for the Ford School) 
and North Quad, which provided elegant entrances to 
the Central Campus. However when the late decision 
was made to add a 450 student residence hall tower to 
the North Quad complex, it not only delayed the project 
by a year but resulted in a construction cost per student 
comparable to a small house in Ann Arbor. Similarly 
a major expansion of the Business School (labeled 
“the flower pot” by its faculty) ended up costing five 
times ($150 M) the present worth value of a “naming” 
gift $30) and almost bankrupted the School–a painful 
lesson about the costs associated with gifts consisting 
of pledges rather than cash.
Of course, much of this growth was highly 
opportunistic. Low interest rates and the University’s 
high credit rating enabled the auxiliary units to 
launch a series of major projects. The University 
Medical Center continued its rapid expansion with 
a new Cardiovascular Center ($300 million), a major 
expansion of the East Medical Campus, and the 
massive new Mott Pediatrics Hospital ($750 million), 
along with planned expansion of the Medical School. 
A major series of renovations was launched for student 
residence halls ($650 million), felt to be necessary not 
only to house growing enrollments but also attracting 
high quality (and high tuition paying) students. The 
Athletics Department launched a $260 million project 
to add skyboxes and dining clubs to Michigan Stadium, 
funded from additional fees for season tickets (“seat 
licenses”) and increasing ticket prices for both fans 
and students alike to the highest in the nation. Similar 
premium seating (funded by major increases in ticket 
prices) was added to Crisler Arena (basketball) and Yost 
Arena (ice hockey). In addition there was further capital 
facilities growth fueled by philanthropy including a 
$150 million expansion of the Ross Business School, a 
$100 million gift for expansion of the Athletic Campus, 
and a $110 million gift toward a $180 million project 
to build a graduate residence hall, with a $261 million 
biological sciences building approved by the Regents in 
2014 (although funding was specified only as “internal 
sources”...meaning debt-financed).
Of course, with such growth came both risk and 
controversy. The financing of the construction of new 
research facilities heavily dependent upon sponsored 
research support such as the Public Health addition 
faced the risk of declining federal research budgets. The 
massive scale of the new Mott Pediatrics Hospital ($750 
million) quickly drove the budget of the University 
Hospitals into the red, with operating losses in excess 
of $200 million per year. The aggressive ticket pricing 
program of the Athletics Department, with ticket 
prices (including “seat licenses”) averaging $230 per 
game in Michigan Stadium, drove many long-time 
faculty, staff, and townspeople season ticket-holders 
away, while student ticket prices (at $305 per season, 
the highest in the nation) and policies (open seating 
requiring queuing hours before game-time) quickly 
eroded student attendance. And while private giving 
stimulated further campus construction, donors 
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The Venturi Halo comes down!The Venturi Halo goes up...
Venturi’s early design for a “circus look” halo for Michigan Stadium
Venturi’s UM Life Sciences Institute Venturi’s Yale Biomedical Research Laboratory
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Ross School of Business Administration Law School South Hall
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Hill Dining Hall East Quad Renovation
Michigan Stadium Chrisler Center
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tended to give to their own priorities rather than the 
University’s needs (e.g., the $140 M Munger graduate 
residence hall that was roundly panned by graduate 
students for its “dormitory-like character”). 
Many of the gift-funded facilities required substantial 
additional University contributions because of the 
nature of the gift (e.g., through pledges and bequests 
that led to present worth values that fell far short of 
the proclaimed size of the gift) and the requirement of 
further cost sharing by the University for the both the 
construction of the facility and its eventual operation. 
Here the lesson frequently overlooked was that large 
donors usually give money for what they want rather 
than what universities need, hence all too frequently 
incurring sizeable additional university expenses for 
resources only peripheral to academic priorities. It 
quickly became clear that the University had failed 
to adequately assess the true cost of these building, 
resulting in considerable additional expenses.
There were also more general concerns. Most of the 
campus growth (75%), at least in terms of investment 
($2.5 B), occurred in auxiliary units (i.e., clinical 
activities, housing, athletics) and were funded by 
auxiliary revenue streams, albeit with debt secured 
by student fee revenues. Those buildings responding 
to academic needs have generally depended upon 
anticipated federal research support (e.g., Public Health 
Annex) or private funding (Ross Business School, Weill 
Hall). This raised a serious question as to just how, in the 
absence of state support, the University could meet the 
future capital facilities needs of those academic units 
that had no donors or other external revenue sources 
(e.g., federal R&D). 
Furthermore, the debt of the University rose to 
School of Nursing Beyster Laboratory
Ross Addition to Business Administration Munger Graduate Resident Hall
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$1.835 billion with an additional estimate of interest 
charges over the borrowing period as $577 million.
The Road Ahead
While capital facilities (or bricks and mortar) 
are necessary and important assets for the teaching, 
research, and service activities of a university, they 
also have other characteristics that can pose risks. 
For example, they sometimes have a monumental 
character, symbolizing the history and tradition of an 
institution. Hence they provide an important objective 
for university leaders, from deans to presidents to 
trustees, to build something designed by a “big name 
architect” to symbolize the impact of their leadership. 
In a similar way, many donors have an edifice complex, 
with the intent to mark the campus with a major facility 
bearing their name. It is perhaps not surprising that 
these other objectives sometimes conflict with the actual 
need for the building or the serious consideration of its 
construction and long-term operating costs.
A brief walk across the campuses of most prominent 
American research universities will quickly spot 
these architectural gems (or just as frequently, white 
elephants), although the assessment of whether they 
are really needed by the institution or adequately 
financed requires further analysis. This is particularly 
the case with buildings financed in part through gifts 
from donors in return for naming rights. As a rule of 
thumb, most universities set the gift requirement for 
naming a building after a donor as at least 50% of its 
construction costs. But there are two caveats here. Since 
donors frequently pay off their pledge over time, the 
actual value of their gift is usually much less. The long-
term operating costs of a building today are estimated 
to be two to three times its construction costs. Hence, 
naming gifts for new construction typically walk the 
university out on a long limb of continued expenses 
many times the value of the gift itself. 
Here the lesson is that universities should think very 
carefully about the financial burden they are assuming 
by building an edifice for a donor. They should at least 
demand a gift in excess of 50% of the actual construction 
costs in constant dollars. They might even consider 
seeking an additional endowment to provide further 
support for the operations of the facility.
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The University of Michigan has long provided 
national leadership for higher education in the 
application of technology to teaching and research. 
Perhaps no area illustrates this more vividly than 
its leadership in the development and application 
of computers and, more broadly, information and 
communications technologies. Michigan has not 
only easily adapted to each transformation in these 
technologies, but it has led in the transitions of early 
mainframe computers to timesharing to networked 
computer workstations to the Internet and today’s 
global networks of data centers, search engines, big 
data, and open knowledge resources.
1950s and 1960s
During the post WWII era, Michigan was among 
the earliest universities to explore the use of the digital 
computers. Michigan faculty member Arthur Burkes 
participated in the development of the first electronic 
computer, ENIAC, and obtained a portion of this 
machine for display in the University’s Computer 
Science and Engineering Building. The University’s 
Willow Run Laboratories installed an early computer, 
MIDAC (Michigan Digital Automatic Computer) in 
1952, but the use of computers in teaching and research 
really began with a series of IBM mainframe computers, 
the IBM 650, 704, and 7040, installed on campus during 
the 1950s and 1960s. University faculty members 
including Bernard Galler, Donald Katz, James Wilkes, 
and Brice Carnahan led the efforts to apply these 
computers to both teaching and research, developing 
the first courses in computer programing and later 
new academic degree programs such as Computer and 
Communications Sciences (in LS&A) and Computer 
Science and Engineering (in Engineering). 
But more significantly, the University led in the 
development of the software for these computers, first 
developing the MAD (Michigan Algorithm Decoder) 
programming language in 1960 and then one of the 
first time-sharing operating systems, MTS (Michigan 
Terminal System), for building a University-wide 
network using the IBM 360/67 mainframe computer 
in 1966. The MTS system, operated by the University 
Computer Center directed by Robert Bartels, not only 
became the workhorse of the University’s teaching 
and research activities, but soon was adopted by many 
other universities. (Wilkes, 2014)
The University’s leadership in networking 
technology soon led to a statewide computer network, 
MERIT, (Michigan Education Research Information 
Triad), linking together the major universities in 
Michigan (initially UM, MSU, and WSU), which was to 
play a major role in creating the Internet in the 1980s.
1970s and 1980s
The University’s time-sharing system continued 
to evolve through the 1970s and 1980s, moving from 
IBM mainframes to more powerful Amdahl computers, 
and gaining a reputation as one of the nation’s leading 
computer environments for teaching and research. But 
the very success of the MTS system, its centralized 
structure, and its home-grown character, rapidly lost 
ground to the new generation of minicomputers such 
as Data Equipment Corporation’s VAX minicomputer 
systems for science and engineering applications. By 
the end of the 1970s, most engineering and science 
departments at top research universities had acquired 
their own VAX systems. Yet, Michigan remained not 
only moored to the increasingly aging mainframe-
based MTS system, but also to centrally administrated 
Chapter 10
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computer policies that prevented academic programs 
from breaking away and acquiring more advanced 
computing environments. In fact, every purchase of a 
computer had to be approved by a central committee at 
the University.
This was a topic of personal interest, since Jim’s 
own career had largely paralleled that of the digital 
computer. His particular area of research, nuclear 
energy systems (nuclear reactors, nuclear rockets, 
thermonuclear fusion), was not only heavily dependent 
upon state-of-the-art computing, but it had actually 
driven much of computer development. During the 
1960s and 1970s much of this research was accomplished 
using Atomic Energy Commission supercomputers at 
AEC laboratories such as Los Alamos and Livermore. 
Although the research made use of the very fastest 
computers in the world, several of our faculty members 
(including Dick Phillips and Bill Powers of Aerospace 
Engineering) stimulated interest in the use of the first 
microcomputers such as the TRS-80 and Apple II for 
instructional purposes. In fact, this led to one of the very 
first introductory computer courses on these systems in 
the late 1970s. From these experiences, it was clear that 
the College of Engineering simply had to break away 
from the University’s MTS system and build its own 
computing environment, more suited to its needs. We 
were convinced that the digital computer would rapidly 
evolve from simply a tool for scientific computation and 
information processing into an information technology 
infrastructure absolutely essential to all of our activities, 
from research to instruction to administration. Hence, 
to build a leading engineering college, it would have to 
become a leader in information technology. This view 
was shared by many members of the College.
Dan Atkins assumed the leadership for this effort, 
assisted by Dick Phillips, Lynn Conway and other 
From sliderules and calculators to Eniac to early IBM mainframes and finally to the Michigan Terminal System
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members of the faculty. They set a rather ambitious goal: 
To build the most sophisticated information technology 
environment of any engineering college in the nation, 
an environment that would continually push the limits 
of what could be delivered in terms of power, ease of 
use, and reliability to our students, faculty, and staff. 
The system was called CAEN, the Computer Aided 
Engineering Network, a name reflecting its functional 
architecture as a sophisticated information technology 
network integrating the College’s instruction, research, 
and administrative activities together with both 
oncampus users (students, faculty, staff) and offcampus 
participants (industry, government, alumni). More 
technically, CAEN was envisioned as a distributed 
intelligence, hierarchical computing system linking 
personal computer workstations, superminicomputers, 
mainframe computers, function-specific machines 
(CAD/CAM, simulation) and gateway machines to 
national networks and facilities such as supercomputer 
centers. The network was designed to support not 
only general scientific computing, but computer-aided 
instruction, administrative services, and access to 
technical and bibliographic databases. 
The College first had to fight a battle with the 
University administration to allow us to break away 
from the MTS system. Fortunately it was easy to 
convince Harold Shapiro and Bill Frye that they 
needed to encourage more diversity in computing, 
and in particular, allow some units to move far out on 
the curve of advanced computing as pathfinders for 
the rest of the University. Engineering and Business 
Administration were given the go-ahead to build their 
own environments (which would eventually lead to the 
disappearance of MTS, although it would take almost a 
decade).
The College of Engineering moved ahead with 
the transition from a mainframe time-sharing system 
to microcomputer/workstation networks by first 
providing every member of the faculty with a personal 
computer (a choice of either an IBM PC or an Apple II 
computer). Actually, there was an interesting wrinkle to 
this offer, since the College asked each faculty member 
also to take a second computer home, the rationale 
being the likelihood that their families would serve as 
an additional stimulus to become “computer literate”. 
Interestingly enough, this program had unexpected 
impact when the teenage sons of one faculty member 
became so adept at programming the Apple II 
computer brought home by their father, that they 
managed to develop commercially successful software 
for editing photographic images. You may have heard 
of the software…Adobe’s Photoshop! (Tom Knoll 
and John Knoll together developed this software that 
revolutionized the field of digital photography. John 
Knoll later became a leader in the field of computer 
animation at George Lucas’s Industrial Light and 
Magic and today is leader of CGI at the Walt Disney 
Company.)
The College next began to acquire several networked 
clusters of state-of-the-art computer workstations 
for research (Apollo, Sun, HP, Apple Lisas, Silicon 
Graphics). We faced a very major challenge in providing 
adequate computing resources for our students, since 
our large enrollments (6,000) would require a massive 
investment. To address this, we took two very important 
steps: We persuaded the University to allow us to 
charge students a special $100 per term computer user 
fee to help support their computing environment. This 
generated $1.5 million each year that we then could use 
to buy (or even debt-finance) computer equipment. We 
made absolutely certain that every penny of these fees 
(along with significant contributions from the College) 
went entirely to equip numerous student computing 
clusters that would be restricted solely for the use of 
students. To provide a vivid demonstration of just what 
the students were getting for their fees, we converted 
two large lecture rooms on the first floor of the Chrysler 
Center into a gigantic computer cluster, equipped with 
over 100 of the new Apple Lisa workstations. This was 
quite a sight—probably the largest collection of Apple 
Lisas that ever existed—and it really impressed the 
students. The College adopted the philosophy that these 
were the students’ computers, without any constraints 
on how they could use them. Similar computer clusters 
were later distributed across the University.
The second element of the plan for students involved 
developing a mechanism to help them purchase 
their own personal computers, since we realized that 
the University would never have sufficient assets to 
equip all enrolled students. The College explored the 
possibility of negotiating very deep discounts (60% 
or more off list price) with key vendors such as Apple 
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and IBM. They were quite willing to do this, but the 
principal hangup was with the University, nervous 
that the local computer stores might complain to 
the state legislature that we were undercutting their 
business. After considerable effort, we finally managed 
to convince Shapiro and Brinkerhoff that the leading 
universities would be achieving massive deployment 
of personal computers to students through such bulk 
discounts, and that Michigan would rapidly fall behind 
if we did not do the same. Since I suspected that the 
impact on local retailers would be very positive from 
the secondary hardware and software sales stimulated 
by the student program, the University negotiated a 
separate agreement with them to sell their wares when 
the students picked up their computers through the 
University. Since the first major deliveries occurred 
early in the fall, we began to call these events the 
Fall Computer Kickoff Sale. It was quite a hit with 
the students, particularly when new systems such as 
the Macintosh appeared. The number of University 
students acquiring their own computers began to 
increase rapidly, stimulating both the College and the 
University to install appropriate networking capability 
in the residence halls and University buildings.
The final step in bringing CAEN to the level of 
sophistication we had envisioned was made possible 
by a $2 million gift from General Motors that allowed 
us to acquire over 350 high-end computer workstations, 
connected with high speed networks, to serve the 
advanced needs of students and faculty. Our philosophy 
was simple: The College was determined to stay always 
at the cutting edge, but with a very strong service focus. 
It sought to remove all constraints on computing, with 
no limit whatsoever on student and faculty use. The 
College went with a multivendor environment, moving 
with whatever technology was most powerful. 
Needless to say, these were highly controversial 
issues in the early 1980s, particularly at the University 
of Michigan. But as a result, by the mid-1980s the 
University could boast one of the most sophisticated 
computing environments in the world, a fact of major 
importance to recruiting outstanding faculty and 
students.
But more important, the leadership and experience 
of the University, both in the development of 
distributed workstation networks and in the statewide 
MERIT network led directed by Eric Aupperle, coupled 
with the recruiting of Douglas van Houweling as 
chief information officer, led to an effort to join with 
IBM and MCI (a 1980s telecom company) to compete 
successfully for a grant to build a national network 
(NSFnet) that would link the nation’s scientists with 
the supercomputer centers of the National Science 
Foundation. The MERIT-IBM-MCI team was able to 
address the explosive use of this new network, growing 
at rates of 10% a month, both because of the Michigan 
experience and the decision to use the TCP-IP protocols 
developed by the Department of Defense Arpanet. 
Because of this success, the federal government 
supported the extension of the NSFnet scientific 
network to include other national networks, creating an 
“Internetwork”, which would be managed by Michigan 
and its partners until the early 1990s. Of course, this 
was the Internet, which the Michigan team led through 
a new organization, Advanced Network Technologies, 
until it was finally spun off to the commercial sector in 
1993.
1990s
The opening of the Media Union in 1996 was yet 
another significant and tangible commitment by the 
University of Michigan, in partnership with the State 
of Michigan, to provide all members of the University 
community access to some of the most sophisticated 
and transformational tools of the emerging digital 
revolution. Conceived as a model for “the university 
of the future”, the North Campus deans viewed the 
Media Union project as an effort to create a physical 
environment to meet the rapidly changing character 
of teaching and research for many years to come, in a 
sense of “…designing a building full of unknowns.” 
The University retained the architectural firm 
descended from the famous architect, Albert Kahn, 
who had designed much of the University campus in 
the early 20th century, as well as many of the leading 
buildings in Detroit. The design team of deans, faculty, 
and staff responsible for the program of the new facility 
envisioned it as more akin to the MIT Media Lab for 
students and faculty of the North Campus academic 
programs. It was designed as a high-tech collection 
of studios, laboratories, workshops, performance 
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venues and gathering and study space for students. Its 
original program statement in 1993 portrayed it as an 
Internet portal to the world (since the Internet was still 
rather new at that time). Although it was designed to 
provide space for the library collections of the College 
of Engineering and Schools of Art and Architecture, 
its function as a “traditional” book-based library was 
never a major part of the vision. Instead it was a place 
intended for collaboration and innovation in teaching 
and learning, a place where students, faculty, and staff 
could access a technology-rich environment, a place 
open to all “who dared to invent the future”.
More specifically, the resulting 250,000 square foot 
facility, looking like a modern version of the Temple 
of Karnak, contained over 500 advanced computer 
workstations for student use. It had thousands of 
network jacks and wireless hubs for students to connect 
their laptops to work throughout the building or in its 
surrounding plazas and gardens during the summer. 
The facility contained a 500,000 volume library for art, 
architecture, science, and engineering, but perhaps 
more significantly, it was the site of several of the 
nation’s major digital library projects (including the 
JSTOR project, the first of the national digital libraries). 
There was a sophisticated teleconferencing facility, 
design studios, visualization laboratories, and a 
major virtual reality complex. Since art, architecture, 
music, and theater students worked side-by-side with 
engineering students, the Media Union contained 
sophisticated recording studios and electronic music 
studios. It also had a state-of-the-art sound stage for 
digitizing performances, as well as numerous galleries 
for displaying the results of student creative efforts. To 
serve the unique needs of students and faculty in these 
areas, the Media Union was designed to open 24 hours 
a day, seven days a week, so that students have round-
the-clock access to its facilities.
Over the past two decades since it opened, this 
facility “full of unknowns” has become the home for 
a large and evolving collection of new information 
and communications technologies far beyond the 
resources that any one school or college could acquire 
and maintain. The Media Union’s collection of digital 
assets and resources requires constant renewal with 
the latest versions of software and hardware, and an 
expert team of professionals who enable U-M users 
to get up-to-speed and use them productively for 
innovative research and teaching. The Media Union 
rapidly became one of the most active learning spaces 
in the University, providing thousands of students with 
7x24 hour access to rich resources including libraries, 
advanced technology, workshops, performance 
venues, and high quality study and community 
gathering spaces. The center has evolved into an 
innovative center for discovery, learning, invention, 
innovation, demonstration, and deployment utilizing 
state-of-the-art technologies and facilities and assisted 
by expert staff. In a sense, it serves as a new form of 
public good, an innovation commons, where students 
and faculty would come to work together with expert 
staff mentors to develop the skills and tacit learning 
acquired through studios, workshops, performance 
venues, and advanced facilities such as simulation and 
immersive environments. The Media Union encourages 
experimentation, tinkering, invention, and even play as 
critical elements of innovation and creative design.
Rationalizing significant investments in cutting-
edge resources by enabling free access to a shared, 
expertly supported collection of assets has enabled a 
widespread culture of innovation in digital technologies 
at the U-M. Students and faculty are free both to 
envision and to lead, hands-on, change in disciplines 
being transformed by the digital revolution – from 
engineering, the performing and design arts, and 
medicine, to economics and government. 
In 2004, in keeping with a long-standing tradition 
of naming an appropriate building after each former 
president, the Media Union was renamed the James 
and Anne Duderstadt Center, or more commonly 
known to students simply as “the Dude”. Perhaps one 
student best captured the role of the center when asked 
to explain its purpose as: “The Dude is the place you go 
to make your dreams come true!”
The University also continued its leadership in 
advanced network technology. After spinning off 
University management of the Internet in 1993, Doug 
van Houweling launched a new initiative, Internet2, 
which created a consortium of research universities and 
companies to build and operate an advanced network 
for research purposes. The State of Michigan recognized 
the importance of this effort and invested $10 million to 
help it get up and running. For several years this effort 
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was managed by the University of Michigan, until after 
a change in UM leadership, the leadership role was 
passed along to Indiana University. 
During the 1990s the University seriously considered 
launching a “skunkworks” operation to explore and 
develop various paradigms for what a 21st Century 
university might become. Eventually, rather than 
building an independent research center, the University 
instead decided to take its smallest academic unit, the 
former School of Library Science, and put at its helm 
one of our most creative scientists, Dan Atkins, with 
the challenge of developing new academic programs 
in “knowledge management.” The result was the rapid 
evolution—indeed, revolution—of this unit into a new 
School of Information, the first such academic program 
in the nation.
This new school was committed to developing 
leaders for the information professions who would 
define, create, and operate facilities and services 
enabling users to create, access, and use information 
they need. It intended to lead the way in transforming 
education for the information professions through an 
innovative curriculum, drawing upon the strengths 
of librarianship, information and computer science, 
business, organizational development, communication, 
and systems engineering. Its activities ranged from 
digital libraries to knowledge networks to virtual 
educational structures. Although initially launched 
as graduate programs at the M.S. and Ph.D. level, the 
School of Information broaden in later years to also 
offer undergraduate degrees. 
In 1996 the University created a new institution, the 
Michigan Virtual Auto College, designed to explore the 
implications of digital technology for higher education. 
This was a collaborative effort among the University 
of Michigan, Michigan State University, the State of 
Michigan, the state’s other colleges and universities, 
and the automobile industry. It was formed as a 
private, not-for-profit, 501(c)3 corporation to broker 
technology-enhanced courses and training programs 
for the automobile industry, including the Big 3 and 
Tier 1, 2, and 3 providers.
MVAC served as an interface between higher 
education institutions, training providers, and the 
automotive industry. It worked to facilitate the 
transfer of credits between and among institutions to 
facilitate certificate and degree attainment for those 
participating in courses and training programs offered 
under its auspices. MVAC offered courses and training 
programs, ranging from the advanced post-graduate 
education in engineering, computer technology, and 
business administration to entry level instruction 
in communications, mathematics, and computers. 
Capitalization for MVAC was provided by members 
of the partnership: the State of Michigan ($5 million), 
the universities ($2 million), and the automobile 
industry ($5 million). However it was expected that 
the effort would rapidly become self-supporting, 
based on student fees. The schedule for the MVAC 
was an aggressive one, with formal incorporation in 
fall of 1996, delivery of the first array of pilot courses 
by February, 1997 and a full curriculum in place by 
Internet 2 and the Abilene Computer Network The Michigan Virtual University
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Fall of 1997. The MVAC paradigm was sufficiently 
successful that it broadened its curriculum into a full 
range of undergraduate curricula and was renamed the 
Michigan Virtual University in 1998, with participation 
by both public universities and community colleges 
throughout the state.
2000
University activities in the development of 
digital information and communications technology 
continued throughout the 2000s, although there were 
some minor setbacks. For example, the Internet2 
project, founded by Douglas van Houweling to develop 
a consortium of institutions to build the next generation 
of the Internet, received little support with the arrival 
of a new University of Michigan administration in 
the late 1990s. The University’s leadership role in this 
effort was assumed by Indiana University, and after 
further difficulties in receiving adequate support from 
Michigan, the headquarters of Internet2 was moved 
from Ann Arbor to Washington, DC.
On a more positive note, Daniel Atkins was asked to 
chair a major National Science Foundation blue ribbon 
commission on the future of cyberinfrastucture, the 
new term for the technology infrastructure provided 
by computer hardware, software, personnel, and 
policies. In a response to the recommendations of this 
study, the NSF invited Atkins to create a new Office of 
Cyberinfrastructure that managed the nation’s efforts 
in areas such as advanced scientific computer and 
software development. Atkins returned after several 
years to lead a similar effort to bring the University of 
Michigan to a leadership role in cyberinfrastructure 
development. Jim’s own role included chairing a 
major National Academies study of the impact of 
computing on research universities and then assuming 
the chairmanship of the NSF Advisory Committee on 
Cyberinfrastructure. 
Yet another major contribution of the University 
during the 2000s traces its antecedents to the 1990s 
when Michigan joined several other universities to 
examine the possibility of digital libraries for the 
National Science Foundation. Led by Randy Frank and 
Dan Atkins, the University already had the experience 
of building the JSTOR library of the Mellon Foundation 
for digital archiving and providing access to scholarly 
work in history and economics. Among the students 
working on NSF project was a young Michigan 
computer science student, Larry Page, who continued 
on to graduate school at Stanford (also part of the 
NSF digital library project), where he and Serge Brin 
developed the Page-Rank algorithm that was the key to 
the Google search engine. 
In 2004 Page returned to Michigan and offered to 
have Google digitize our entire library (all 8 million 
volumes), which would become the nucleus of a major 
book search service by Google, now up to over 22 
million volumes. Led by Paul Courant and John Price 
Wilkins, Michigan went beyond this to lead a group of 
universities and libraries (80 thus far) in pooling their 
digital collections to create the Hathi Trust (“Hathi” 
Google Books Hathi Trust
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means “elephant” in Hindu), adding over 400,000 
books a month to form the nucleus (already at 14 
million books, with 5 million of these already open for 
full online access) of what could become a 21st century 
analog to the ancient Library of Alexandria. While 
many copyright issues still need to be addressed, it is 
likely that these massive digitization efforts will be able 
to provide full text access to a significant fraction of 
the world’s written materials to scholars and students 
throughout the world within a decade. Michigan has 
also played an important role in opening up access to 
both scholarly publications and digital archives critical 
to the advancement of knowledge in an increasingly 
digital world.
Michigan has provided leadership in developing 
sophisticated course managements systems with its 
Sakai software, now serving as the learning system for 
several major universities and supporting the CTools 
system at the University. With this experience, the 
University was well positioned to participate in the 
emerging use of cyberinfrastructure on instruction 
through MOOCs (massively open online courses), first 
participation in the Coursera organization and later 
creating a new consortium, Unizen, for creating such 
online curriculum resources.
In the 2010s, Michigan joined with several other 
universities, national laboratories, and industry to 
create CASL, the first of the Department of Energy 
innovation hubs, a new research paradigm aimed at 
building government-university-industry partnerships 
to translate basic research into commercially valuable 
products. The $125 M CASL project (Consortium for 
Advanced Simulation of Light Water Reactors) goal 
was to use the world’s fastest supercomputers (so-
called exaflop technology, capable of 1018 arithmetic 
operations per second) to use fundamental physics 
to design the next generation of nuclear reactors. 
University faculty members William Martin and Tom 
Downer led the successful effort to development key 
elements of the key CASL product, the VERA virtual 
environment for reactor analysis. 
Most recently, in 2015 the University announced a 
major $100 million effort to build an interdisciplinary 
research effort in “big data”, involving the College of 
Engineering, the Medical School, the Institute for Social 
Research, and many other faculty across the University. 
A related project to couple data-intensive computing 
with supercomputing modeling and simulation was 
also launched with the assistance of the National 
Science Foundation.
Today’s Concerns
The primary missions of the University, its 
teaching, research, and service activities (or 
alternatively, its activities of learning, discovery, 
and engagement with society) are increasingly 
dependent on cyberinfrastructure, i.e., information and 
communications technology. The rapid advances in 
these technologies are not only reshaping but creating 
entirely new paradigms for research, education, and 
application not only in science and engineering but 
Angell Haven Computer Clusters Visualization stations
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in all of the academic and professional disciplines. It 
has been clear for sometime that to maintain world-
class academic programs, the University must also 
achieve leadership in the quality and relevance of the 
cyberinfrastructure it provides at the level of each of its 
highly diverse teaching and research programs.
This is particularly challenging since the features 
of information technology such as processing speed, 
memory, and bandwidth, have been increasing in power 
at rates of 100 to 1,000 fold per decade since WWII. This 
is one of the major reasons for the continued surprises 
we get from the emergence of new applications–the 
Internet, social networks, big data, machine learning–
appearing in unexpected ways at a hyper exponential 
pace. We have learned time and time again that it 
makes little sense to simply extrapolate the present 
into the future to predict or even understand the next 
“tech turn”. These are not only highly disruptive 
technologies, but they are highly unpredictable. Ten 
years ago nobody would have imagined Google, 
Facebook, Twitter, etc., and today, nobody really can 
predict what will be a dominant technology even five 
years ahead, much less ten! 
In 2013 the University of Michigan hosted a major 
conference concerning the impact of rapidly evolving 
cyberinftrastructure on the activities of discovery, 
innovation, and learning. The workshop convened an 
unusually broad spectrum of thought leaders from 
multiple disciplines and venues of research, technology 
development, and education to consider the changing 
nature of cyber- enabled learning and discovery in broad 
terms, spanning learning at all levels and institutions 
and discovery including research, development, 
innovation, invention, design, and creativity. 
The topics considered by the Michigan workshop 
considered the impact of powerful technologies such 
as always-on, ubiquitous connectivity (anywhere, 
anytime, everyone); social networking, crowd 
sourcing, collaborative learning and discovery, 
functionally complete cyberinfrastructures, emerging 
learning paradigms such as massively open online 
courses (MOOCs), cognitive tutors, gaming, immersive 
experiences; big data, data-intensive discovery, 
learning analytics, intelligent software agents: and 
possible surprises such as cognitive implants. Of 
particular concern were the impact of emerging 
technologies capable of transforming learning 
institutions (schools, colleges, workplace training, 
lifelong learning, open learning) and paradigms 
(from learning about, to learning to do, to learning to 
become). Similarly consideration was given to the way 
in research paradigms were likely to change (Pasteur’s 
Quadrant, citizen scientists, crowd sourcing, open 
knowledge). In particular, the workshop roundtable 
was challenged to suggest a framework for the conduct 
of research concerning the impact of possible emerging 
technologies on the conduct of scientific research, 
technological innovation, and STEM education. Of 
particular interest was the identification of possible 
advances in technology that could radically transform 
the existing paradigms for these activities.
Many participants stressed the importance of 
Daniel Atkins hosting NSF SessionUM hosted NSF meeting on cyberinfrastructure
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“craft”, of the contributions of truly talented staff 
who drive innovation in units where they are most 
competent. These people are attracted to universities 
such as Michigan to work in academic units with 
faculty and students where they are highly valued 
and have the freedom to do exciting work. In fact, its 
great strength and contribution to society arises from 
this very unusual diversity in ideas, experiences, 
and people. Again, this argues for an organic plan, 
essentially a diverse ecosystem that will continue to 
mutate and evolve in ways that we cannot anticipate. 
Just what purposes should drive IT strategy. To 
support the university mission? What mission? Of 
the University writ large? Of the academic units? Of 
generic language like teaching, research, and service…
or discovery, learning, and engagement…or “Change 
the world!”…or what?
What should be the focus on solutions that are easily 
created and replaced? Agility to be sure. But what 
about resilience? And maturity? What about “optimum 
redundancy”, so important to academic processes. For 
example, while Michigan formed a partnership with 
Google in 2012 at the enterprise level to Google, it soon 
learned that relations with companies with “startup” 
encountered difficulties in the support of “mission 
critical” applications such as university instruction. The 
University learned to be careful about becoming overly 
dependent on companies still embracing a “startup”, 
e.g., high-risk, culture.
Who should the University regard as priorities for 
IT services? Students? Faculty? Staff? Administrators? 
New learning paradigms such as blended education; 
experiential, personalized learning. Actually, all of 
these activities have been part of the university’s 
portfolio since the 19th century! Even the massive 
markets enabled by MOOCs is not really new. UM 
TV was teaching courses for credit with over 100,000 
students through live TV in the early 1950s. 
What is the appropriate strategy for enterprise-wide 
IT development? Most of the University’s IT Strategic 
Plan is aimed at providing a cyberinfrastructure 
environment on campus. But the anyplace-anytime 
character of today’s world leaves hanging the majority 
of the time spent working by our students, faculty, 
and staff, which is off campus in their homes, dorms, 
cars, wherever. Without a major plan for high-speed 
connectivity throughout the community, this is a very 
incomplete strategy. Most of the strategic investments 
associated with the NextGen infrastructure seem to 
be focused on-campus…WiFi networks, high capacity 
networks in data centers, labs, etc., use of clouds. But 
most of the time our people (faculty, students, staff) 
will be tethered to our resources through 4 MB/s cable 
or telcom carriers. Hence, without robust connectivity 
beyond the campus, these major investments will fall 
far short of our needs.
Where is the subject of institutional collaboration? 
Today our faculty work more with colleagues on the 
other side of the globe than across the hall; our students 
bring multi-institution study groups with them from 
their high school days…and Facebook, of course…most 
of our faculty are nomadic, moving from institution to 
institution every few years, just as our students will 
move on to other endeavors and institutions when 
they finish their studies. Again, more consideration 
needs to be given of life beyond the campus...and with 
institutions beyond our own.
Too much of the current focus is shaped by today’s 
technologies, not tomorrow’s. Cloud services, big 
data, analytics. Again, overdependence on commodity 
products, particularly to the degree we constrain the 
cyber environments of academic units through policies 
such as purchasing and shared services, will harm the 
loosely coupled adaptive culture of the university that 
is one of our greatest strengths. This is particularly 
dangerous if we become overly dependent on particular 
vendors because of top-down rather than bottom-up 
forces. The reality is (and always has been) that it has 
been our faculty, staff, and students who spot the next 
big trends in technology and then drive change upward 
through the institution. 
It is becoming increasingly clear that we are 
approaching an inflection point in the potential of 
rapidly evolving information and communications 
technology to transform how the scientific and 
engineering enterprise does knowledge work, the nature 
of the problems it undertakes, and the broadening of 
those able to participate in research activities.
Arden Bement, Director of the National Science 
Foundation stressed that , “We are entering a second 
revolution in information technology, one that may 
well usher in a new technological age that will dwarf, 
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in sheer transformational scope and power, anything 
we have yet experienced in the current information 
age”. (Bement, 2007) The implications of such rapidly 
evolving technology for the future of the discovery, 
innovation, and learning are of great importance to 
the prosperity, health, and security of our nation as it 
faces the challenge of an increasingly knowledge-and 
innovation-driven world. Such cyberinfrastructure will 
not only be increasingly important to higher education, 
but it will drive the evolution of the university as a 
knowledge institution.
The Road Ahead
Fortunately, the University of Michigan has been 
able to respond to such rapid technological change in 
the past–and, indeed, achieved leadership–because it 
has functioned as a loosely coupled adaptive system 
with many of our academic units given not only the 
freedom, but also the encouragement, to experiment and 
to try new things.  We have intentionally avoided the 
dangers of centralizing these activities, although every 
once in awhile someone tries to recentralize, e.g., riding 
the MTS mainframe model while the rest of the world 
was switching to minicomputers (PDPs and VAXs) and 
microcomputers, or overly constraining university-
wide IT with models appropriate for the business world 
but highly constraining, indeed disastrous, for research 
and teaching.  We must be very careful to learn from 
these past mistakes and not go down these roads again.
To be sure, the tension between centralization 
(whether MTS or “rationalization”) and decentralization 
(where cacophony leads to innovation) can be very 
threatening, particularly to those parts of the University 
that need to make the trains run on time (e.g., financial 
services, hospitals, etc.)  Fortunately, in the past, the 
wisdom of maintaining a loosely coupled adaptive 
system at the academic level finally bubbles up to the 
leadership of the institution, and academic units are set 
free once again.  An example here was when Harold 
Shapiro set Engineering and Business Administration 
free to develop networks of powerful workstations 
as the alternative to the MTS-Amdahl time-sharing 
system.  One of the results was CAEN, which rapidly 
evolved beyond MIT’s Athena and CMU’s Andrew 
systems to achieve leadership.
Some particular warnings here are appropriate. It 
is important not to attempt to standardize the campus 
cyberinfrastructure environment. The university in 
general–and Michigan in particular–is one of the most 
intellectual diverse organizations in the world.  In fact, 
its great strength and contribution to society arises 
from this very unusual diversity in ideas, experiences, 
and people.  Again, this argues for a much more organic 
plan, essentially a diverse ecosystem that will continue 
to mutate and evolve in ways that we cannot anticipate.
While dependence on commodity services, 
particularly those provided through the cloud, can be 
cost-effective, it can also become highly constraining 
for the creative enterprise that characterizes research 
universities. Overdependence on commodity products 
can become debilitating to the academic process, 
particularly to the degree we constrain the cyber 
environments of academic units through policies such 
as purchasing and shared services, that can harm the 
loosely coupled adaptive culture of the university that 
is one of our greatest strengths.  This is particularly 
dangerous if we become overly dependent on particular 
vendors because of top-down rather than bottom-up 
forces.  The reality is (and always has been) that it has 
been our faculty, staff, and students who spot the next 
big trends in technology and then drive change upward 
through the institution.  
To be sure, the University has important 
responsibilities that require mission critical computing. 
But it is at the level of academic units rather than the 
enterprise level where innovation and leadership must 
occur.  Why?  Because they are driven by learning and 
discovery, by experimentation, by tolerance for failure, 
and by extraordinarily talented faculty, students, and 
particularly, staff.  While sometimes duplicative and 
inefficient, it has made MIT, Carnegie Mellon, and 
Stanford leaders, as well as Michigan with CAEN and 
MERIT (i.e., NSFnet and then the Internet).
In a sense, it is amazing that the university has 
been able to readily adapt to these extraordinary 
transformations of its most fundamental activities, 
learning and scholarship, with its organization and 
structure largely intact. Here one might be inclined 
to observe that technological change tends to evolve 
much more rapidly than social change, suggesting 
that a social institution such as the university that 
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has lasted a millennium is unlikely to change on the 
timescales of tech turns, although social institutions 
such as corporations have learned the hard way 
that failure to keep pace can lead to extinction.  Yet, 
while social institutions may respond more slowly to 
technological change, when they do so, it is frequently 
with quite abrupt and unpredictable consequences, 
e.g., “punctuated evolution”. 
Admittedly, futurists have a habit of overestimating 
the impact of new technologies in the near term and 
underestimating them over the longer term.  There 
is a natural tendency to implicitly assume that the 
present will continue, just at an accelerated pace, and 
fail to anticipate the disruptive technologies and killer 
apps that turn predictions topsy-turvy.  Yet, we also 
know that far enough into the future, the exponential 
character of the evolution of Moore’s Law technologies 
such as info-, bio-, and nano- technology makes almost 
any scenario possible.
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The nature of the contemporary university and 
the forces that drive its evolution are complex and 
frequently misunderstood. The public still thinks of us 
in very traditional ways, with images of students sitting 
in large classrooms listening to faculty members lecture 
on subjects such as literature or history. The faculty 
thinks of Oxbridge—themselves as dons, and their 
students as serious scholars. The federal government 
sees another R&D contractor or health provider—a 
supplicant for the public purse. And armchair America 
sees the university on Saturday afternoon as yet another 
quasi-professional athletic franchise. The reality is far 
different—and far more complex. 
The classic and highly simplified triad of higher 
education, of teaching, research, and service, branches 
extensively. Once during a planning exercise at Michigan 
during the 1980s, we attempted to list the various 
activities of the university in the hopes that we might 
be able to red-pencil all but the most important of these 
activities—our “core competencies”—in our efforts 
to reallocate limited resources. Our brainstorming 
sessions led to a network of activities that went on 
for pages and pages. After identifying these multiple 
missions, we asked the planning group to cross off all 
but the most critical activities. Not surprisingly, we 
managed to cross out only a few of the items on the 
list. All of the other activities were felt to be essential by 
someone in the group. (And those we had marked out 
were later reinstated by several members, after further 
reflection.)
This branching network of multiple missions 
creates a very different image of the modern research 
university than that commonly perceived by students, 
faculty, or society: that of a very complex, international 
conglomerate of highly diverse businesses. To illustrate, 
Chapter 11
Organization
consider a simple organizational diagram of “business 
lines” of the University of Michigan, Inc.
The University of Michigan, with an annual budget 
of roughly $7 billion per year, and an additional $15 
billion of assets under active investment management, 
would rank roughly 350th on the Fortune 500 list. The 
University educates over 70,000 students on its several 
campuses at any given time. This would correspond to 
an educational business line with a budget of roughly 
$3.5 billion per year. The University is also a major 
federal R&D laboratory conducting over $1.3 billion 
a year of research, supported primarily from federal 
contracts and grants. Its health care system averages 
two million patent visits per year in its various hospitals, 
providing care to a population of two million, and 
characterized by a $3.0 billion budget. The university’s 
activities are truly international in scope, providing 
educational, research, and service activities throughout 
the world through both an array of partnerships 
with institutions abroad as well as through Internet 
services. Even its sports entertainment business line, 
the Michigan Wolverines, has scale more comparable to 
professional franchises with a budget of $150 million–
even larger since Michigan Stadium’s capacity of 
115,000 is the largest in the nation. Other characteristics 
of note include 36,000 employees, an endowment of $10 
billion, and over 36 million square feet of facilities.
The University of Michigan has become actively 
involved in providing a wide array of knowledge 
services, from degree programs offered in Shanghai, 
Hong Kong, Seoul, and Paris, to cyberspace-based 
products such as online continuing education and 
massively open online courses (MOOCs). In fact, 
Michigan played a leading role in building and 
managing the Internet in the 1980s and 1990s, and 
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today it is the world’s leader in capturing, curating, and 
archiving digital materials, as evidenced by its creation 
and management of the HathiTrust, the largest digital 
library in the world with over 14 million volumes.
The corporate organization chart shown above 
would compare in both scale and complexity with 
many major global corporations. And it is not unique 
to Michigan. Most of the major research universities 
in America are characterized by very similar 
organizational structures, indicative of their multiple 
missions and diverse array of constituencies. The 
contemporary university has become one of the most 
complex institutions in modern society. It is comprised 
of many activities, some non-profit, some publicly 
regulated, and some operating in intensely competitive 
marketplaces. It teaches students; conducts research 
for various clients; provides health care; engages in 
economic development; stimulates social change; and 
provides mass entertainment (athletics). It is far more 
complicated than any corporate structure, not only in 
missions but frequently also in extent, spanning the 
world in both activities and influence in both the public 
and private sectors.
1950s-1970s
As we have noted, the early years following WWII 
were a time of rapid growth for American colleges and 
universities, sustained by strong public support from 
both states and the federal government for expanding 
academic programs, building campuses, funding 
research, and supporting students. Fortunately, during 
the 1930s and 1940s, Michigan’s Alexander Ruthven 
had transformed the earlier “headmaster” character of 
University leadership into more of a corporate model, 
expanding the number of executive officers to handle 
the growing activities of the institution and utilizing 
Regents as a true board of directors. Of particular note 
here was the emergence of Wilbur Pierpont, a former 
faculty member in the Business School, as a wise and 
effective chief financial officer capable of guiding and 
financing the growth of the University throughout the 
1950s and 1960s. 
Hence when Harlan Hatcher arrived from Ohio 
State in 1952, there were relatively few changes that 
he needed to make in the organization, where most 
resource decisions were made at the executive office 
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and Regent level. Put in simplest terms, each year 
the University would drive its budget “truck” up to 
Lansing, fill it with generous state support, and then 
drive it back and distribute it among the deans and 
directors of the various academic program and auxiliary 
activities. To be sure, many of these units were led by 
powerful and visionary deans capable of building both 
the quality and size of their programs. But since most 
support came from state appropriations and research 
grants, they had relatively little control of their overall 
funding.
Robben Fleming inherited this organization when 
he arrived in the late 1960s, but already changes were 
appearing on the horizon. The growth of other public 
colleges and universities in the state–particularly 
Michigan State University–provided strong competition 
for state funding. State support of campus construction 
stalled with new government policies that threatened 
the University’s constitutional autonomy. And campus 
activism and occasional disruption weakened state 
priorities for the support of higher education. Hence 
Fleming acted early to reorganize his executive officer 
team, distributing more broadly both the responsibilities 
and accountability for controlling the resources of 
the University. Key in this was the creation of two 
powerful executive officer committees, the Committee 
on Budget Administration, chaired by the Provost and 
Vice President for Academic Affairs of the University, 
who assumed the role as both chief academic officer 
and chief budget officer of the University, and the Plant 
Extension Committee, chaired by the chief financial 
officer, who presided over the buildings, grounds, and 
construction projects of the campus. Again expressed in 
simplified terms, in this system the role of the president 
became that of generating the money to support the 
University, the provost had the power to determine how 
these dollars would be spent, and the chief financial 
officer had the responsibility to make certain the dollars 
would be spent the way the provost wanted them to be. 
This new system clearly made the provost at 
Michigan not only second-in-command to the president, 
but as both chief budget officer and chief academic 
officer, one of the most powerful such positions in the 
country. As Fleming once put it, “If you start out as a 
president with a VPAA and VPCFO who are superb 
people, you are about three-quarters of the way down 
the path of success, because these are your critical 
areas.” Fortunately during the Fleming years the role 
of provost was assumed by three individuals of truly 
extraordinary ability: Allen Smith, former Dean of the 
The University of Michigan’s Ann Arbor Campus (2014)
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Harlan Hatcher Robben Fleming Harold Shapiro
Allan Smith Frank Rhodes Billy Frye
Wilbur Pierpont James Brinkerhoff Farris Womack
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Law School; Frank Rhodes, former Dean of LS&A; and 
Harold Shapiro, former chair of Economics. Note that 
all would later assume critical university leadership 
roles, Smith as interim Michigan president, Rhodes 
as president of Cornell University, and Shapiro as 
president of both Michigan and Princeton. Similarly, 
Fleming’s two VPCFOs, first Wilbur Pierpoint and then 
James Brinkerhoff, were highly regarded as among the 
very best financial officers in the nation.
Interestingly enough, despite their power, the 
Michigan provosts of the 1970s not only appointed deans 
and directors of unusual ability, but they also began a 
gradual process of transferring more and more control 
over resources, appointments, and policy to them in 
their leadership roles of academic and administrative 
units. They realized that as the University continued 
to grow while becoming ever more complex, and the 
erosion of state support would require more diverse 
sources of revenues, most of which would be generated 
by the deans and their units (e.g., tuition revenue, 
research grants, and private gifts), the capacity of the 
executive to manage the institution through centralized 
authority was no longer advisable or even practical.
1980s-1990s
To set the framework for the further evolution of 
the organization of the University during the 1980s 
and 1990s, it is important to remember one of its most 
unusual and important characteristics: constitutional 
autonomy. Because the University had already been in 
existence for two decades before the State of Michigan 
entered the Union in 1837, and because of the frontier 
society’s deep distrust of politics and politicians, 
the new state’s early constitution in 1850 granted 
the university an unusual degree of autonomy as a 
“coordinate branch of state government”.  Michigan’s 
constitution delegated full powers over all university 
matters granted to the University’s governing board of 
regents, although surprisingly enough it did not state 
the purpose of the university. 
This constitutional autonomy, together with the fact 
that the university traces its origins to an act of Congress 
rather than a state legislature, has shaped an important 
feature of the university’s character. Throughout its 
history the university has regarded itself as much as a 
national university as a state university. Furthermore, 
Michigan’s constitutional autonomy, periodically 
reaffirmed through court tests and constitutional 
conventions, has enabled the university to have much 
more control over its own destiny than most other 
public universities. 
Hence, it should not be surprising that the various 
academic units of the University also evolved with a 
strong sense of autonomy over their academic objectives 
and decisions. To be sure, the Executive Officers and 
Regents of the University had final authority, but this 
was generally exercised with considerable restraint to 
allow deans, directors, and chairs significant authority.
This decentralization of authority and autonomy 
throughout the University became even more 
important as state support began to erode in the late 
1970s. By the 1990s, more than 90% of the resources 
supporting the institution were generated by the 
actions of individual units rather than by the central 
administration. Hence it was natural to cede even more 
authority over expenditures along with responsibility 
and accountability for costs incurred to the deans and 
directors of the University’s various units. An open 
market strategy evolved where deans and directors 
were given the freedom as customers to decide for 
themselves where centralized services were more 
efficient and cost-effective than using outside vendors 
(e.g., facilities maintenance, communications services, 
etc.)
This realignment of both resource control and cost 
responsibility to the lowest levels of the organization 
where they occurred most naturally was key to 
the ability of the University to adapt to the very 
considerable financial pressures it would face by the late 
20th Century. Michigan’s long tradition of institutional 
autonomy positioned it well for such decentralization, 
a philosophy that was eventually adopted by many 
other public universities facing serious erosion of state 
support.
Yet such decentralization has occasionally had a 
negative impact, particularly when it has allowed the 
auxiliary units of the University (e.g., those without 
public support) to effectively decouple from the 
institution. At Michigan there is some truth to the old 
saying that the academic core of the contemporary 
university is a quite fragile institution striving to survive 
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between the pressures exerted by the football stadium 
on one end of the campus and the university hospital 
on the other. But more serious is the issue of how one 
sustains the highest priority for the academic core of the 
university in an increasingly resource-driven (and for 
many academic units, resource-starved) environment 
constrained by “fund accounting”, in which it is 
increasingly difficult to provide cross-subsidies from 
one unit to another (and particularly from auxiliary 
units to academic units).
During the 1980s and 1990s, the University 
had evolved into a highly adaptable knowledge 
conglomerate. Put another way, Michigan’s 
organization culture had become a loosely coupled, 
adaptive ecosystem that evolved and excelled based on 
the extraordinary talents, dreams, and commitment of 
faculty, staff, and students. In particular, faculty members 
were provided with the freedom, the encouragement, 
and the incentives to move toward personal goals in 
highly flexible ways. One might even suggest that the 
University had become, in an organizational sense, an 
intellectual holding company of faculty entrepreneurs, 
who drove the evolution of the University to fulfill their 
individual goals. A transactional culture had emerged 
in which everything was up for negotiation–except 
for fundamental academic values. The university 
administration saw its role as managing the university 
as a highly decentralized federation. It had set some 
general ground rules and regulations, acted as an arbiter, 
raised money for the enterprise, and tried—with limited 
success—to keep activities roughly coordinated. In fact, 
university leaders viewed their role as less similar to 
that of a corporate manager and more akin to that of a 
conductor of an orchestra comprised of highly skilled 
and highly valuable knowledge professionals. 
2000s
Although Michigan’s high degree of decentralization 
of authority and responsibility had been key to its 
quality and capacity, allowing the University to 
enhance academic quality even while losing state 
support, this culture proved difficult for new university 
leaders and administrators to accept, coming as most 
did from other universities and experiences (including 
several from the business world). It was not surprising 
that beginning the late 1990s and continuing into the 
2010s, numerous efforts were launched to attempt 
to impose practices from the corporate sector to 
recentralize authority within the institution. For 
example, following the recommendation of business 
consultants, the University attempted to adopt a 
“shared services” organization, where key staff were 
pulled out of academic units and placed in central 
organizations to provide “commodity” services such as 
personnel, financial, and procuring activities. A similar 
approach was launched in the information technology 
area through a “rationalization” process that attempted 
to force the adoption of commodity technologies and 
extract key staff from the academic units to support 
University-wide services. 
Yet another approach to centralize power in the 
University involved imposing heavy taxes on the 
expenditures of the academic units to support central 
services, particularly burdensome at a time when both 
staffing and compensation in the central administration 
were increasing rapidly. 
Finally, and perhaps most damaging, the central 
administration launched a major effort to recruit an 
increasing number of external candidates for deans 
and executive officers (roughly 70% of administrative 
appointments during the decade of the 2000s came 
from outside the University) in an effort to dilute the 
long-standing Michigan culture of powerful deans that 
had been handed down through generations of internal 
appointments.
To be sure, the tension between centralization 
(e.g., to achieve efficiency) and decentralization 
(where cacophony leads to innovation) can be 
very threatening, particularly to those parts of the 
University that need to make sure that the trains run 
on time (e.g., financial services, hospitals, etc.) They 
prefer a coordinated approach at the enterprise level, 
a so-called “rationalization” of services that seeks to 
reduce redundancy with strong central control. Yet 
while this approach might work well in corporate 
settings, it began to damage the University by pulling 
some of the best staff away from the academic units 
where the real innovation is driven by the interests of 
faculty and students working closely with outstanding 
staff with extraordinary skills. Similarly, to impose 
on the University’s academic programs a central 
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administration unable to respond rapidly to the unique 
needs and technologies required for cutting-edge 
learning and discovery would threaten the University’s 
leadership as a pathfinder and trailblazer. In sharp 
contrast to business enterprises, technological diversity 
and redundancy is frequently a requirement for the 
conduct of world-class academic programs.
But there was one other important organizational 
characteristic that disappeared during the 2000s and 
2010s: the availability of open, accurate, pervasive, and 
accessible information throughout the entire University. 
After all, a university is the ultimate knowledge 
organization, and any attempt to hide, distort, or 
manipulate information can seriously damage its most 
fundamental activities of discovery, learning, and 
engagement.
To be sure, such an open form of communications 
can be alien to those from activities such as advertising, 
marketing, public relations, fund raising, and politics. 
Yet without complete access to accurate information–
both good news and bad news–universities are seriously 
hindered. Any attempt to sequester information, 
replacing truth with fiction, or attempting to propagate 
myths or distortions to further a particular agenda 
should be challenged and revealed as damaging to 
the academic process. This is particularly important 
in these times when the role of the traditional media 
supporting investigative journalism and openness has 
been challenged by the pervasive character of electronic 
media and social networking. 
The effort of the 2000s and beyond to launch a 
massive communications, public relations, marketing, 
and branding effort that emerged at Michigan with 
the goal of “institutional advancement” in reality 
represented an attempt to manipulate both internal 
and external opinions. It rapidly became not only 
an extraordinarily expensive endeavor, growing to 
over 600 staff by 2015, but it also engaged in highly 
inappropriate and damaging activities to the long-
standing traditions and quality of the University. While 
such media manipulation is common in the world of 
commerce or politics, it has no place on any university 
campus, since it corrupts the university’s fundamental 
goals of veritas et lux, e.g., “truth and light”.
However, from a more positive viewpoint, 
the inability of recent administrations to tame the 
decentralization of the University provides strong 
evidence that today the institution is so large and 
complex that as a loosely coupled adaptive ecosystem, 
it can no longer be managed through top-down 
directives. Like other complex biological systems, it 
has developed the capacity to reject “invasive species” 
that try to change its culture (or in other terms, its 
“institutional saga”). It is quite capable of defending 
itself against attacks both from the inside and outside.
For example, when a former corporate CEO 
attempted to transform the Michigan athletics program 
into a commercial entertainment business, he quickly 
encountered the long tradition of a highly decentralized 
but dedicated Michigan community that insisted upon 
traditional values, including not only longstanding 
and loyal fans, but also students and faculty. In a 
sense, the University responded by repelling this 
“invasive species” and terminating its leadership. 
There are numerous other examples when externally-
recruited leadership of academic programs, deans 
and department chairs, have attempted to acquire the 
power to radically challenge the Michigan grass-roots 
culture and have found themselves quickly repelled 
and rejected.
The Road Ahead
The trail-blazer character of the Michigan saga 
demands a risk-tolerant environment in which 
initiatives are encouraged at all levels among 
students, faculty, and staff. For example, the university 
intentionally distributes resources among a number of 
pots, so that entrepreneurial faculty with good ideas 
rarely have to accept “no” as an answer but instead can 
simply turn to another potential source of support.
The most important play in the Michigan playbook 
for entrepreneurs is the end-run, since the University 
culture not only tolerates but encourages faculty, 
students, and staff to bypass bureaucratic barriers. 
For example, it is quite common for faculty to bypass 
deans and appeal directly to the provost or president, 
just as many, including the deans–and occasionally 
even a coach or athletic director–will occasionally find 
opportunities to execute an end-run to the Regents, 
a relatively easy thing to do since half of them live in 
Ann Arbor. Once faculty, chairs, and deans learn the 
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Michigan culture, they quickly learn that the university 
also tolerates end-runs to state or federal government, 
e.g., the governor, legislature, congress, or federal 
agencies. To be sure, sometimes a senior administrator 
might growl at them–particularly the vice-president 
for government relations worried about coordinating 
university relations with the state, or a president 
worried about inappropriate influence on a Regent. 
Most Michigan presidents soon learn that since these 
end-runs are so ingrained in the culture of the university, 
they will happen quite naturally, and attempts to stifle 
them are likely to be not only ineffective but could 
discourage many of the most creative, loyal, and well-
intentioned people in the university. Hence it is far 
better to accept the end-run as a University tradition. 
It has been suggested that some Michigan presidents 
even quietly encouraged this practice, since they had 
used it quite effectively themselves during their earlier 
roles as faculty members and deans!
Perhaps because of this long tradition of 
decentralization–even anarchy–university-wide faculty 
governance through a faculty senate has been relatively 
ineffective at Michigan. Just as with the administration, 
the real power among the faculty and the ability to 
have great impact on the institution resides at the 
school, college, or department level, where powerful 
senior faculty, executive committees, chairs, and deans 
have the authority to address the key challenges and 
opportunities facing their academic programs. Should 
this power structure become distorted with poor 
appointments or weak faculty, the end-run culture acts 
as a check and balance by rapidly communicating such 
problems up or around the chain of command to the 
provost, president, or even the Regents.
From this discussion, it should be apparent that a 
top-down leadership style is quite incompatible with 
the Michigan culture. Those presidents who have 
chosen to ignore this reality or attempted to reign in 
this distributed power, to tame the Michigan anarchy, 
have inevitably failed, suffering a short tenure with 
inconsequential impact. 
Not to suggest that Michigan will tolerate a weak 
president. Presidents unable to adapt to the Michigan 
trailblazing saga, who are hesitant to push all the chips 
into the center of the table on a major initiative or 
incapable of keeping pace with the high energy level of 
the campus, will soon be rejected–or at least ignored–
by the faculty. Michigan embraces bold visions, and 
without these, effective leadership is simply impossible. 
But, as we have stressed, the University’s history 
strongly suggests that such visions arise most naturally 
from the grassroots efforts of the faculty, students, and 
staff involved in academic activities that, in turn, are 
embraced and supported by the leadership rather than 
imposed from on high.
Of course, Michigan probably represents one of the 
extremes of a highly decentralized academic anarchy, 
although many other institutions with exceptionally 
strong faculty lie in a similar regime of the governance 
spectrum. There are other institutions that not only 
tolerate strong, centralized leadership but actually 
require it. Some are at an early stage of evolution and 
require strong, top-down leadership to set the priorities 
and make the tough lifeboat decisions to move the 
institution to the next rung in quality. 
While the extreme decentralization of authority and 
accountability throughout the University was radical 
when introduced in the 1980s and 1990s in response to 
the decline in centrally obtained resources such as state 
support, it aligned well with the increasing complexity 
and scale of the University that evolved beyond 
centralized control. Hence, the message that today 
should be provided to all new leadership recruited from 
outside is that “Michigan exists today and must remain 
highly decentralized in authority, and its evolution 
must be driven by the talent, achievements, and goals 
of faculty, students, and staff at the grass-roots level. 
Don’t attempt to challenge this. Learn how to live with 
it!”
Yet, as the influence of powerful forces such as 
the changing needs of society, globalization, and 
technology reshape the activities of the university, one 
can expect its organization and structure to continue 
to evolve, albeit while preserving its decentralized 
character. Many research universities are already 
evolving into so-called “core in cloud” organizations 
in which academic departments or schools conducting 
elite education and basic research, are surrounded 
by a constellation of quasi-academic organizations—
research institutes, think tanks, corporate R&D 
centers—that draw intellectual strength from the core 
university and provide important financial, human, and 
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physical resources in return. Such a structure reflects 
the blurring of basic and applied research, education 
and training, the university and broader society. 
More specifically, while the academic units at the 
core retain the traditional university culture of faculty 
appointments, tenure, and intellectual traditions, 
for example, disciplinary focus, those organizations 
evolving in the cloud can be far more flexible and 
adaptive. They can be multidisciplinary and project 
focused. They can be driven by entrepreneurial 
cultures and values. Unlike academic programs, they 
can come and go as the need and opportunity arise. 
And, although it is common to think of the cloud being 
situated quite close to the university core, in today’s 
world of emerging electronic and virtual communities, 
there is no reason why the cloud might not be widely 
distributed, involving organizations located far from 
the campus. In fact, as virtual universities become more 
common, there is no reason that the core itself has to 
have a geographical focus. It could exist in cyberspace, 
independent of space and time.
To some degree, the core-in-cloud model revitalizes 
core academic programs by stimulating new ideas 
and interactions. It provides a bridge that allows the 
university to better serve society without compromising 
its core academic values. But, like the entrepreneurial 
university, it can also scatter and diffuse the activities of 
the university, creating a shopping mall character with 
little coherence. And it can create a fog that distorts the 
true nature of the university by the public.
If these institutions are to respond to future 
challenges and opportunities, the modern university 
must engage in a more strategic process of change. 
While the natural evolution of a learning organization 
may still be the best model of change, it must be guided 
by a commitment to preserve its fundamental values 
and mission. Universities must find ways to allow its 
most creative people at the grassroots level to drive 
their future. The challenge is to tap the great source 
of creativity and energy associated with this natural 
entrepreneurial activity in a way that preserves the 
university’s core missions, characteristics, and values.
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Appendix for Chapter 11
A Handy-Dandy List of UM Operating Principles
How is the University of Michigan 
organized and managed?
1. The University of Michigan is a “loosely coupled, 
adaptive system,” with a growing complexity, as its 
various components respond to changes in its environ-
ment. This entrepreneurial character of the university 
has made it remarkably adaptive and resilient.
2. The University provides faculty with the freedom, 
the encouragement, and the incentives to move toward 
their personal goals in highly flexible ways. One might 
even view the organization of a university–particular 
research universities–as a holding company of faculty 
entrepreneurs, who drive the evolution of the univer-
sity to fulfill their individual goals. 
3. The university administration manages the mod-
ern university as a federation. It sets some general 
ground rules and regulations, acts as an arbiter, raises 
money for the enterprise, and tries—with limited suc-
cess—to keep activities roughly coordinated. In fact 
leading a university is less similar to that of a corporate 
manager and more akin to that of a conductor of an or-
chestra comprised of highly skilled and highly valuable 
knowledge professionals.
4. Budget authority is delegated to the lowest level 
where assets are acquired and costs are incurred. (Typi-
cally this is at the level of deans and directors.)
5. The most important voice for academic priorities 
usually comes from the deans, particularly when act-
ing as a group. For this reason, every effort should be 
made to encourage the deans and provost to function 
as a true team.
6. Faculty governance works most effectively at the 
level of department, school, and college executive com-
mittees. In contrast to the Senate Assembly or SACUA, 
the executive committees are generally comprised of 
UM’s strongest faculty.
7. The free flow of information is absolutely critical 
to the success of the loosely-coupled character of the 
University. Attempts to keep bad news in confidence 
and promote only good news (or exaggerated informa-
tion) may benefit a few individuals but will seriously 
harm the University over the long term.
How do faculty get things done around here.?
Rule 1: NEVER accept “no” for the answer to a re-
quest. In a highly decentralized organization, there are 
lots of folks who may have the capacity to say “yes”.
Rule 2: The most important play in the Michigan 
playbook is the “end run”…around chairs to deans, 
around deans to provosts, around presidents to Re-
gents, and around the University to Lansing, Wash-
ington, or donors. Administrators should never try to 
block this, since the University would soon cease to 
function as an entrepreneurial organization.
Rule 3: it is usually better to seek forgiveness than 
ask permission.
Rule 4: Under no circumstances should faculty (or 
academic leaders) allow themselves to be constrained 
by staff in areas unrelated to core activities (e.g., de-
velopment, communications, public relations, govern-
ment relations). These individuals work to support the 
academic units, not to constrain them.
Some operating rules for UM academic leaders.
1. In simplest terms, the president’s job is to raise the 
money, the provost’s job is to determine how to spend 
it, and the VPCFO’s job is to make certain folks spend 
it the way the provost wants them to. In hierarchy, the 
president trumps the provost, and the provost trumps 
everybody else.
2. It is critical that any administrators with major au-
thority have strong backgrounds in higher education…
or at least supervisors with such backgrounds.
3. To reaffirm the role of the provost, both the Com-
mittee on Budget Administration and the Budget Pri-
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orities Committee should be reinstituted and chaired 
by the provost.
4. Because of the decentralization of the University, 
every effort must be made to benchmark all operations 
against best practices at other institutions (e.g., funding, 
staffing, achievements). In a similar sense, a rigorous 
audit operation (both external and internal) is critical.
5. Finally, since universities are based on truth and 
learning, every effort must be made to assure the flow 
of accurate information throughout the organizaton. 
Pravda-like organizations should never be tolerated!
163
As we have stressed in the preceding chapter, 
the modern research university has many of the 
characteristics of an international conglomerate of 
highly diverse businesses. It is not surprising that 
such a global enterprise requires capable management 
and visionary leadership. Many of the University’s 
activities, such as its hospitals and high-technology 
research, require the rigor and accountability of 
mission-critical corporations. Yet the unique culture 
of the academic core of the University has a character 
almost orthogonal to the modern corporation since 
its most valuable employees are faculty members 
characterized by deep and highly valued knowledge 
and skills. They furthermore are protected from 
traditional top-down management methods by two 
unique characteristics: academic freedom and tenure. 
In fact, some describe academic leadership as more akin 
to pushing wheelbarrow full of frogs, since if you jostle 
them too much, they will jump out (into an intensely 
competitive higher education marketplace).
Hence the demand for leadership of such a large 
complex organization goes beyond competence and 
experience in academic administration. It requires 
a complex system of management talent covering a 
range of disciplines expertise that would be unusual 
even for a large multinational corporation. For 
example, beyond the expertise necessary for a large 
educational institution, it requires leadership capable 
of managing large medical centers, research facilities 
that are characterized by unusual characteristics (such 
as extremely hazardous radioactive or biological 
materials), computer facilities and networks at the 
cutting edge of technology, commercial activities in tech 
transfer, educational services, and college sports, and 
on and on. And most of all, it requires the sensitivity 
more akin to a political leader than a corporate CEO.
Hence while such discussions tend to focus 
primarily on the senior leadership of the University as 
an academic institution, it must be kept in mind that 
many of their responsibilities require a network of 
leaders with capabilities and experience in decidedly 
nonacademic areas.
The Zoology of University Leadership
University Presidents
Early college presidents were expected to provide 
primarily academic leadership. In some 19th century 
institutions, the president was not only the most 
distinguished scholar, but the only scholar. The 
intellectual influence of presidents on the faculty, the 
governing board, and the students was profound, 
as suggested by a Michigan student’s admiration of 
President Tappan: “He was an immense personality. It 
was a liberal education even for the stupid to be slightly 
acquainted with him.” (Peckham, 1994)
Today the president’s role in academic affairs remains 
important but it must be exercised in a more delicate 
fashion. Technically, the shared governance policies of 
most universities delegate academic decisions to the 
faculty (e.g., criteria for student admissions, faculty 
hiring and promotion, curriculum development, 
awarding degrees). Hence the faculty usually expects 
the university president to focus on political relations, 
fund-raising, protecting their academic programs from 
threats such as intercollegiate athletics and the medical 
center, and keep hands off academic matters.
Yet in reality the most successful university 
presidents are capable not only of understanding 
academic issues but also of shaping the evolution 
of academic programs and enhancing the academic 
Chapter 12
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reputation of their university. After all, if the success 
or failure of a presidency will be based on the goal 
of leaving the university better than one inherited 
it, it is hard to imagine how one could achieve this 
without some involvement in the core activities of the 
institution, teaching and scholarship. Yet this requires 
both skill and diplomacy, since faculty reaction to a 
president’s heavy-handed intrusion into academic 
affairs can be fierce. Presidential influence is more 
generally exercised through the appointment of key 
academic leaders such as deans or department chairs, 
by obtaining the funds to stimulate the faculty to launch 
new academic programs, or by influencing the balance 
among academic priorities.
There are some presidents–unfortunately a rarity 
these days–who have had both the scholarly credentials 
and interests to play a significant role in shaping the 
intellectual direction of the university. Michigan has 
benefited from several such leaders: for example, James 
Angell, who attracted extraordinary scholars such as 
John Dewey; Harlan Hatcher, himself a distinguished 
scholar and professor of English literature who raised 
the quality of the university even as it doubled in 
size; and Harold Shapiro, who brought his own deep 
understanding of the history of the university and the 
changing nature of a liberal education in his efforts as 
provost and then as president to enhance the quality of 
the university’s students, faculty, and programs.
This leadership role is complicated by the scale and 
diversity of the contemporary university, comparable 
to that of major global corporations or government 
agencies. Today’s university conducts many activities, 
some nonprofit, some publicly regulated, and some 
operating in intensely competitive marketplaces. 
Universities teach students, conduct research for 
various clients, provide health care, engage in economic 
development, stimulate social change, and provide 
mass entertainment (e.g., college sports). Of course the 
university also has higher purposes such as preserving 
our cultural heritage, challenging the norms and beliefs 
of our society, and preparing the educated citizens 
necessary to sustain our democracy. 
The executive responsibilities of university 
presidents demand at least some degree of management 
skills. Fortunately most presidents have developed 
these through a sequence of earlier leadership 
experiences (e.g., department chair, dean, and provost). 
But this can also be taken to the extreme where the 
president becomes more of a technocrat or corporate 
CEO than an academic leader. Still others adopt more 
of a military approach, commanding their executive 
staff much as a general would command the troops. Of 
course, while the administrative staff of a university 
can adapt to such authoritarian styles, the creative 
anarchy characterizing the faculty will rebel or simply 
ignore general-presidents and continue with their own 
agendas.
Regardless of personal proclivities, successful 
presidential leadership styles must be responsive both 
to the nature of the institution and the demands of the 
times. The character of each institution, its size, mission, 
culture, and most important, its institutional saga, will 
tolerate certain styles and reject others. Authoritarian 
leadership might be effective or even demanded at some 
institutions, but the culture of creative anarchies such 
as Michigan, Berkeley, or Harvard will demand a more 
subtle approach to building grass-roots support for any 
initiative. Similarly, the turbulent 1960s and financially 
stressed 1980s required different leadership styles than 
the market-driven challenges and opportunities of 
the early 21st century. It is important that university 
presidents be capable of adapting their own leadership 
styles to fit the needs of their institution. Rigidity is not 
a particularly valuable trait for either the effectiveness 
or even the survival of university leaders!
Yet, despite the fact that university presidents have 
executive responsibilities for all of these activities 
and purposes, the position has surprisingly little 
authority. The president reports to a governing board 
of lay citizens with limited understanding of academic 
matters and must lead, persuade, or consult with 
numerous constituencies such as faculty and students 
that tend to resist authority. Hence the university 
presidency requires an extremely delicate and subtle 
form of leadership, sometimes based more on style 
than substance, and usually more inclined to build 
consensus rather than take decisive action. The very 
phrases used to characterize academic leadership such 
as “herding cats” or “moving cemeteries” suggest the 
complexity of the university presidency. Universities 
are led, not managed.
Each Michigan president seems to have filled a 
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particular leadership role for the University, perhaps 
less because of how they were selected than the degree 
to which the institution and its needs shaped their 
presidency. For example, the post-war years of the 
1940s and 1950s were a time of prosperous economy, 
growing populations, and an expanding demand for 
higher education, first as a consequence of returning 
veterans under the G. I. Bill and later through the efforts 
of the Truman Commission to extend the opportunity 
for a college education to all Americans. Hence it was 
a time for university presidents who could grasp the 
opportunity to grow their institutions, for example, 
Harlan Hatcher at Michigan and John Hannah at 
Michigan State.
In contrast, the 1960s and early 1970s were a time 
of protest, triggered first by the Free Speech Movement 
and Civil Rights, and then later by the Vietnam War 
(and the draft). University leaders were sought with the 
skills to handle dissent and confrontation, many coming 
from backgrounds in labor mediation such as Robben 
Fleming at Michigan and Clark Kerr at the University 
of California. There were also many casualties among 
those presidents from an earlier time who simply could 
not adapt to the confrontational climate of the 1960s.
The late 1970s and 1980s required still different 
leadership styles as the economy weakened, driven 
first by rising energy prices (the OPEC oil embargo) 
and later industrial competition from Japan. While the 
nation fell into recession, many industrial states such 
as Michigan faced depression-level hardships, with 
serious tax revenue shortfalls and consequently deep 
cuts in appropriations to higher education. This was a 
time of retrenchment, of focusing resources on highest 
priority, and generating new revenue streams through 
private fundraising and student fees. Leaders with 
strong financial skill (and intuition) such as Harold 
Shapiro at Michigan, Jack Peltason at the University 
of California, and Arnie Weber at Northwestern were 
key to the abilities of their institutions to restructure 
themselves financially to thrive in an era of constrained 
resources.
Although financial pressures relaxed–at least 
temporarily–in the late 1980s and 1990s, universities 
required strong entrepreneurial leadership capable 
of grasping the opportunities presented by the 
end of the Cold War, the increasing diversity of the 
American population, the forces of globalization, and 
the extraordinary transformation of our economy 
from making things (manufacturing) to creating 
and applying new knowledge, driven in part by 
rapidly evolving technologies such as the computer, 
telecommunications, and transportation. Perhaps 
indicative of the needs of higher education during this 
period was the appearance of university presidents 
with science and engineering backgrounds. While 
these university leaders were comfortable with the 
technology reshaping our society, even more important 
was a leadership style stressing teamwork, risk-taking, 
and entrepreneurial energy and capable of providing 
new visions for the university of the 21st century.
Executive Officers
One of the great myths concerning higher education 
in America–and one that is particularly appealing to 
faculty members, trustees, and legislators alike–is that 
university administrations are bloated and excessive. In 
reality, most universities have quite lean management 
structures, inherited from earlier times when academic 
life was much simpler and institutions were far smaller. 
Typically the number of administrative positions 
(and executive officers) in a university is only a small 
fraction of the number of senior administrators found 
in corporations or government agencies of comparable 
size. Furthermore, in contrast to corporations or 
government agencies, universities have quite shallow 
organizational structures. For example, there are 
typically only five organizational levels in the academic 
ranks (president, provost, dean, department chair, 
faculty member), leading to an exceptionally broad, 
horizontal organization structure at the senior level.
The direct line reports of the university president 
are the executive officers of the university, with titles 
such as vice-president or vice-chancellor in various 
functional areas–e.g., academic affairs, research, 
student affairs, business and finance, fund-raising, 
and government relations. Since the success or failure 
of the university president depends upon the quality 
of these appointments, one of the most important 
responsibilities of the president is recruiting, building, 
and leading a quality team of executive officers. 
Surprisingly for one of the nation’s largest 
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and most complex universities in the world, the 
University of Michigan always had a very small 
central administration–at least until the 2000s. It was 
characterized by a very lean executive officer team, 
with only six vice-presidents plus two chancellors for 
the Dearborn and Flint campuses, only one-half to one-
third the number of executive officers as most other 
universities. Such a lean administration could only 
succeed with outstanding people, and hence a premium 
was placed on developing or recruiting the very best 
people into these key positions. Their success required, 
in turn, recruiting outstanding senior staff in each of 
their organizations, a stress on quality that tended to 
propagate throughout the institution. 
At Michigan the two key executive officer 
positions are the provost (and vice president for 
academic affairs) and the chief financial officer (and 
vice president for business and finance). Much as in 
corporate organization, the president-provost-VP-
business represented the executive leadership core of 
chief executive officer (CEO), chief operating officer 
(COO), and chief financial officer (CFO). In 1992 the 
modifier “executive” was added to the titles of the 
provost and VPCFO to distinguish their line-reporting 
responsibilities for all academic and administrative 
units of the university, including the regional campuses 
in Dearborn and Flint. Other vice presidents such 
as those for research, student affairs, development, 
and government relations generally had staff roles, 
although in some cases they had large administrative 
units reporting to them (e.g., student housing and 
research administration). 
Next to the president, the provost (or vice president 
for academic affairs or “chief academic officer”) is the 
most important leader in the university. In effect, the 
provost is the chief operating officer of the university, 
with the line-reporting responsibility for all of the 
academic units of the university, i.e., schools and 
colleges through their deans, centers and institutes 
through their directors, and a host of academic service 
units such as admissions and financial aid. The provost 
also serves as second-in-command and backup to the 
president and is usually tapped as acting president 
when the president is on leave or absent for an extended 
period.
Clearly the position of the provost at a major 
university is daunting, as suggested by the formal 
role definition we use at Michigan: “ The provost is 
the intellectual and scholarly leader of the university, 
with ultimate responsibility for all academic programs, 
operations, initiatives, and budgets”. Note here that to 
clearly establish the priority of the academic mission 
of the institution, the Michigan provost also functions 
as the chief budget officer, preparing the budget 
that determines the detailed allocation of resources 
throughout the university and thereby integrating the 
academic and budget functions and priorities. 
Perhaps because of its vast size and complexity, 
Michigan has usually selected insiders as provosts until 
quite recently. Hence it was logical that the provost-
president relationship would frequently be an inside-
outside division of roles, in which the provost served 
as chief operating officer, managing the internal affairs 
of the institution, while the president served as CEO 
and “chairman of the board,” managing the external 
relationships (state and federal government, fund-
raising, public relations, intercollegiate athletics) and 
the sensitive relationships with the governing board 
(which could be extraordinarily time-consuming with 
a politically elected body). 
The unusual responsibility and authority of 
Michigan’s provost position and the quality of the 
academic leaders who have served in this role give 
it high visibility and influence on the national scene. 
However, it also identifies the position as an important 
source of university leadership, as evidenced by the 
number of Michigan provosts who have gone on to 
university presidencies. Yet the turnover in the position 
can be a considerable challenge to the president. There 
was an informal and quite unspoken rule that each 
Michigan president was allowed only three provost 
appointments. After that, they had to step down. 
Ironically this trend has continued to today!
Deans
The University of Michigan is known throughout 
higher education as a “deans’ university”. Because of 
our size and our highly decentralized organization, 
deans of our many schools and colleges have unusual 
freedom and authority, albeit with considerable 
responsibility and accountability. Most of the progress 
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made by schools and colleges can be traced to the 
leadership of their deans–although, of course, the 
same can usually be said for the consequences of any 
shortcomings.
Clearly, being a faculty member is the best job in 
a university–the most prestige, the most freedom, 
the most opportunity. However, if one has to be an 
academic administrator, the best role is as a dean–at 
least at Michigan. Although some academic units such 
as the College of Literature, Science, and the Arts or the 
School of Medicine rival major universities in their size, 
financial resources, or organizational complexity, for 
most University of Michigan schools and colleges, both 
the size and intellectual span is just about right to allow 
true leadership. To be sure, a dean has to answer in both 
directions, to the provost from above and their faculty 
from below. But their capacity to control both their own 
destiny and that of their school is far beyond that of 
most administrators.
The cadre of deans is usually quite remarkable 
at a leading university. To be sure, there is always a 
pecking order among deans, with the “big dogs”–
LS&A, Medicine, Engineering, Law, and Business–
sometimes standing apart from the “little dogs”–
Music, Art, Architecture, Social Work, Education, 
Pharmacy, Dentistry, Nursing, Natural Resources, 
and Public Health. The Rackham Graduate School is 
usually an anomaly and, in fact, can sometimes serve 
as an intermediary between the superpowers and the 
nonnuclear states. 
Although the deans generally meet regularly 
in a large council with the provost–once called the 
Academic Affairs Advisory Council but more recently 
called the Academic Policy Group–the size of this 
body mitigates against substantive discussion. In 
the late 1970s, when Al Sussman, former dean of the 
Graduate school, was serving as interim provost, he 
formed a clandestine group of deans known as the 
“SOUP” Group (for “Seminar on University Priorities”) 
for the purpose of breaking the deans into smaller 
discussion units. While this group, consisting of LS&A, 
Engineering, Law, Business, Social Work, Pharmacy, 
and Rackham was sometimes useful, it later evolved 
into an exclusive fraternity with members selected 
more for personality than priority of school (e.g., how 
could one possibly leave out Medicine while including 
Pharmacy). Nevertheless, for the most part, the family 
of deans was remarkable for the quality of its members 
The Deans Team during the 1980s
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and their commitment to the University.
Since the University of Michigan is so heavily 
dependent on the quality of its deans, most presidents 
and provosts make a great effort to attract the very best 
people into these important positions. It is important 
for the president and provost to work closely together 
not only in the appointment and support of these 
key academic leaders but also to build a sense of 
community among them, establishing friendships and 
bonds, since these, in turn, glue together the university. 
Perhaps because of our own experience as members of 
the “deans’ family,” we were always on the lookout for 
new ways to involve the deans more intimately in the 
leadership of the university.
To be sure, there are many drawbacks to academic 
leadership roles, such as department chairs or deans. 
These positions rarely open up at a convenient point 
in one’s career, since most productive faculty members 
usually have ongoing obligations for teaching or 
research that are difficult to suspend for administrative 
assignments. Although an energetic faculty member 
can sometimes take on the additional burdens of 
chairing a major academic committee or even leading 
a small department or research institute, the time 
requirements of a major administrative assignment 
such as department chair or dean will inevitably come 
at the expense of scholarly activity and the ability to 
attract research grants. The higher one climbs on the 
academic leadership ladder, from project director to 
department chair to dean to executive officer, the more 
likely it is that the rungs of the ladder will burn out 
below them as they lose the scholarly momentum (at 
least in the opinion of their colleagues) necessary to 
return to active roles in teaching and research.
University of Michigan Professor Dan Moerman, an 
anthropologist by training and longstanding member 
of faculty governance, suggests a very interesting 
perspective of the role of a dean as a broker between 
the two cultures of the university: the faculty (collegial, 
center-periphery, colleagues, peer respect) and the 
administration (hierarchical, top-down, bosses, 
performance evaluations). Moerman observes that, 
“When a president discusses things with deans, he calls 
a meeting; with the faculty, the president invites them 
to dinner. The dean is the mediator, the connecting 
link, between the two cultures. To be credible to the 
faculty, the dean must have scholarly credentials. 
But to relate to the administration, the dean needs to 
be competitive rather than collegial. This leads to a 
certain intentional ambiguity to the role. The dean is a 
broker, a middleman, betwixt and between–a trickster 
like Coyote or Janus.” Since deans must represent the 
views of the faculty and never be seen as losing, they 
must become quite conservative, seeking to minimize 
risk and maximize flexibility. A president who interacts 
directly with the faculty becomes very threatening to a 
dean. (“If man can talk to God, what need is there for 
a priest?”) What to do? As Moerman suggests, “Kick 
ass” says the administrator; “consult” says the faculty; 
“confuse” thinks the dean…
UM Academic Leadership, Decade by Decade
1960s-1970s
During the early years after WWII, the University 
faced the opportunity for rapid growth, sustained by 
strong and increasing state appropriations. Harlan 
Hatcher provided thoughtful and distinguished 
leadership in a patrician style, while the Board of 
Regents consisted primarily of wealthy Republicans 
who viewed their role much as members of a corporate 
board of directors, responsible primarily for the 
integrity and financial sustainability of the University, 
but staying far removed from its detailed management. 
Both the president and the Regents allowed the deans 
to provide strong leadership for the academic programs 
of the University. 
However this rapidly changed during the 1960s 
and student and faculty activism began to appear 
around issues such as student rights, the Vietnam 
War, and minority enrollments. The strength of this 
effort challenged the more passive leadership of earlier 
years and stimulated the Regents to lure Robben 
Fleming, Chancellor of the University of Wisconsin 
Madison and experienced labor negotiator to address 
the growing activism on the campus. Fleming’s skills 
of engagement and negotiation served the University 
well, calming the more radical disruptions and 
protecting the quality and integrity of the University 
during a difficult period. Fleming always maintained 
that university presidents were not all that important 
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for massive universities such as Michigan. The role of 
the president was to keep things moving smoothing 
and make outstanding appointments to key leadership 
positions, such as the provost (which he demonstrated 
through appointments of outstanding leaders such as 
Allen Smith, Frank Rhodes, and Harold Shapiro. But 
those who lived through the decade knew better since 
while many presidents floundered and failed, Michigan 
successfully weathered a painful period of transition.
Some presidents are particularly skillful at grasping 
opportunities, or rescuing victory from the jaws of defeat. 
Robben Fleming exhibited this skill at a particularly 
important moment, when campus disruptions 
could have seriously and permanently damaged the 
institution. His long experience as a labor mediator 
had taught him that sometimes conflict is necessary to 
create the most effective path to compromise. 
1980s
By the late 1970s there were already signs of 
weakening state support, along with the disappearance 
of state funding for facilities because of political issues. 
The acceptance of the Cornell presidency by Provost 
Frank Rhodes provided Fleming with the opportunity 
to appoint Harold Shapiro, a distinguished economist, 
to lead the efforts to restructure the financing of the 
University as state support declined, while he worked 
to secure funding for the Replacement Hospital Project, 
a massive $300 million effort that would later involve 
both Allen Smith as interim president and Harold 
Shapiro when he became president in 1980. 
Shapiro’s style was well-suited to addressing these 
issues, since he was highly strategic and data-driven 
in these decisions. He launched a three-phase set of 
initiatives involving increasing tuition (particularly for 
out-of-state students), launching a major fund-raising 
campaign, and pushing hard for cost reductions. To 
carry out this agenda, he appointed the LS&A Dean, 
Billy Frye, as provost, who worked closely both with 
a University-wide task force, the Budget Priorities 
Committee, and the faculty Senate Assembly on a 
Five-Year financial plan that included discontinuance 
of several academic and administrative units. Both 
Shapiro and Frye appointed a distinguished group 
of leading faculty members as deans, and began to 
transfer to them both the authority over their resources 
and the accountability for their expenditures, the first 
of what would be a sequence of steps during the 1980s 
and 1990s to decentralize power in the University to the 
level of deans and directors where resource decisions 
were best made. 
Perhaps the most important theme of the 1980s 
was Shapiro’s insistence on the goal of excellence–in 
teaching, research, and service; students and faculty; 
and the quality of academic and administrative units, 
despite the decline in state funding. This commitment set 
Michigan on a course to become a leader in many areas 
during the 1990s. From his early days as provost and 
then through his presidency, he was absolutely insistent 
on the highest academic standards for the university. 
Although his determination to raise the bar on faculty 
Presidential teams of the 1960s, 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s
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hiring, promotion, and tenure sometimes rankled 
complacent faculty and occasionally undermined 
deans, it clearly elevated the quality of the university 
to a degree that few others were able to achieve. It also 
demonstrated quite convincingly that academic leaders 
can have a major impact on institutional quality–if they 
are determined enough, have the academic background 
to recognize quality, and the courage to point out where 
it is weak.
1990s
By the late 1980s, state support finally began to 
stabilize (although it never increased to its earlier levels, 
while state funding for facilities remained modest). Since 
Harold Shapiro had given Jim, his successor as provost, 
the initial assignment to launch an ambitious planning 
effort essential to restoring both the momentum and 
leadership of the University, the transition to president 
two years later was straightforward. Furthermore 
Shapiro left behind an unusually strong team of deans 
and executive officers recruited largely by Shapiro.
This last point is very important, since the University 
has a long history of looking inside for its academic 
leadership. To be sure, the Regents have frequently gone 
outside for University presidents–with only five of its 14 
presidents selected from within. But both the deans and 
executive officers have generally come from internal 
appoints. In fact, during Shapiro and Jim’s tenure, 15 of 
Michigan’s 18 deans came from within, bringing with 
them considerable experience in University activities. 
Similarly of the 15 appointments made to executive 
officers during the 1990s administration, only 3 came 
from outside: Farris Womack, as chief financial officer, 
Maureen Hartford as vice president for student affairs, 
and Walter Harrison for external relations. For provost, 
it was particularly important to continue the long-
standing tradition of internal appointments drawn 
from the Michigan deans (e.g., Charles Vest, Gilbert 
Whitaker, and Bernard Machen). 
With this leadership experience, the University 
embarked on implementing the earlier planning effort, 
with strong engagement from the faculty, that led to 
exciting visions and initiatives to shape the future of the 
University such as the Internet and Internet2, the School 
of Information to provide leadership in technology, 
the Michigan Mandate and Michigan Agenda for 
Women, which led the University to leadership roles 
in serving underrepresented minorities and women, 
new programs in areas such as genetic medicine and 
international studies, a major stress on improving the 
quality of undergraduate education, and providing 
faculty with the incentives and support necessary to 
propel Michigan to national leadership in the amount 
of research conducted on its campus.
Although state support remained stagnant, the 
University launched the largest fund-raising effort 
in the history of public higher education, led by Joe 
Roberson and Tom Kinnear, to raise over $1.4 billion. 
Vice President Womack provided skilled management 
of the University’s endowment, increasing it by over 
a factor of 10 from $200 M in the 1980s to $2.5 B by 
the end of the 1990s, laying the foundation for what 
would become the largest endowment in public higher 
education.
2000s
By some measures, with the arrival of Lee Bollinger 
as the new president, Michigan’s leaderhip in higher 
education began to erode. Many of the major efforts of 
the 1980s and 1990s such as the diversity agenda (the 
Michigan Mandate), technology (the Internet), and 
completing the rebuilding of the University’s academic 
campuses were set aside by the new administration in 
favor of new ventures such as the arts (the annual visits 
of the Royal Shakespeare Theatre and planning for a 
new theater for a professional repertory group), big 
name architects (Robert Venturi and the Life Sciences 
Institute), and legal activities (preparing to successfully 
defend affirmative action before the Supreme Court in 
2003). Such shifts in priorities were both expected and 
traditional with a change in administration.
However the new administration went further 
and rapidly replaced several of the University’s key 
executive officers with inexperienced outsiders. They, 
in turn, replaced several layers of experienced business 
and physical plant staff, actions that would set back 
the management of the University for years to come. 
Furthermore, the decision to throttle back fund-raising 
and instead depend on increasing enrollment to 
compensate for the loss in state support with increased 
172
tuition revenue from more out-of-state students would 
launch the University down a road of growth that 
would later prove to be unsustainable.  
The administration of the late 1990s was short-
lived, lasting for only four years. The Regents selected 
experienced academic leaders from within for the 
interregnum between administrations, including B. 
Joseph White, Dean of the Business School, as interim 
president, and Paul Courant, Chair of the Department 
of Economics, as provost. Both were long-standing 
members of the University faculty, experienced leaders, 
and highly skilled in both financial management and 
strategic planning. 
However Regents once again looked outside for 
the next president, although this time they sought 
experienced leadership for the next administration. 
They selected Mary Sue Coleman, the President of the 
University of Iowa, as Michigan’s next president. Since 
interim president White had strengthen the executive 
officer team inherited by Coleman, this allowed the 
new president to focus early attention on important 
strategic issues such as the challenges faced by the 
University Hospitals, the financial operation of the 
University, and perhaps most important, private fund 
raising. The provost and vice-president for research 
assumed primary responsibility for the leadership of 
the academic units of the University.
Unfortunately, state support continued to decline 
throughout the 2000s, dropping even faster in the 
aftermath of the recession of 2008 and amounting to a 
decade-low drop of over 50% on a per student basis. To 
compensate for this loss, the administration continued 
the pattern of enrollment increases (with a bias toward 
out-of-state students) while launching two major 
fund-raising campaigns, the first successfully raising 
$3.3 B and the second, a $4 B campaign launched just 
as the University began a search for a new president. 
Fortunately because of the major success of VP Womack 
in increasing the University endowment to $2.5 B by 
the end of the 1990s, the University was able to benefit 
from continued growth of this resource through equity 
investments to the level of $10 B by 2015. 
However during this period of eroding state support, 
there was a major shift in University priorities and 
attention to the auxiliary activities of the University–
the medical center, student housing, and intercollegiate 
athletics–because of the dependence of these activities 
on the support from markets that were largely price 
insensitive (health care, student rents, and athletic 
ticket and media revenue). Massive investments were 
made in new facilities for these units, e.g. a $300 M 
cardiovascular center and a $750 M pediatrics hospital, 
$650 M for student housing renovation and construction, 
and $300 M for adding skyboxes and premium club 
facilities to Michigan Stadium and Crisler Arena. Since 
this was occurring during a period when there was 
very limited funding for academic facilities, the faculty 
became increasingly concerned that auxiliaries were 
dominating academics for the attention of the Regents 
and the executive officers.
Because of the priority given both the auxiliaries 
and activities such as fund-raising and public relations 
(e.g., “branding” the University), and the relative 
benign neglect of the academic programs, there was 
a major increase in both the number of administrative 
staff and their compensation (much of it coming from 
confidential bonuses and deferred salary agreements). 
Indeed, the compensation of senior administrators rose 
to levels exceeding that of even the leading private 
universities, while faculty salaries remained stagnant, 
The “Big Broom”chart, tracking the 
turnover of senior staff in the late 1990s,
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falling behind most peer institutions. New forms of 
hidden compensation such as “signing bonuses” and 
deferred compensation were used to buy the loyalty 
of key administration staff with little oversight and 
a level of secrecy that was a clear departure from the 
University’s long-standing practice of open reporting 
of staff salaries.
A massive public relations effort largely disguised 
these efforts and prevented most of the campus, 
including the faculty, from realizing what was occurring. 
Slowly but surely, not only the deans but the faculty 
were losing their influence though limited engagement 
with the University and through the weakening of 
existing faculty governance.
Concerns Raised and Lessons Learned
The most serious recent trend in University 
leadership over the past two decades has been the 
erosion of the power of the deans and directors. As we 
have noted, the strength of the University’s academic 
programs has been due in large measure to the quality 
of the leadership of the deans and directors. The deans 
are the key line officers of the University. They are also 
the ones most responsible for maintaining its academic 
priorities and quality. Great deans create and lead 
great schools and colleges, not to mention generating 
over 90% of the resources of the University. During the 
last half of the 20th century, high priority was given to 
dean appointments consistent with their considerable 
authority and responsibility. Since deans, directors, 
and department chairs are the key players in leading 
Michigan’s path finding ventures, great care must be 
taken both in their selection and their understanding 
both of the Michigan heritage and culture and the 
quality of their faculty and staff.
Yet in recent years there is some evidence that the 
traditional roles and power of the deans have been 
weakened. The rigid application of 10 year limits on 
the appointments of deans, with little attention given 
to easing their transitions to “life after leadership”, 
has been very discouraging and led to the departure 
of several of the University’s most talented leaders. So 
too, there has been a clear trend to fill most open dean 
positions with outsiders with little experience with 
decentralized management. From the 1960s through 
the 1990s, over 80% of the University’s dean positions 
UM Executive Officer compensation have risen to 
levels characteristing leading private universities.
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had been filled from internal candidates. Yet by 2015, 
13 of 19 dean positions had been filled with external 
candidates, in sharp contrast to the University’s 
long-standing traditions of looking inside for dean 
candidates.
Traditionally, it was the provost’s role to form the 
deans into a cohesive team working together to address 
the challenges and opportunities facing the University. 
Formed into a group, not only were they an important 
source of wisdom and strength, with unusual capacity 
to promote academic values in the face of occasional 
threats. Yet in recent years little attention has been given 
by the provost and president to building and sustaining 
a cohesive team among the deans or giving their voice 
adequate influence. 
There has been similar erosion in both the academic 
credentials and experience of the executive officers. 
In the past, most of the University’s senior leadership 
team had sufficient academic experience to merit 
faculty appointments in addition to their administrative 
assignments. Today, however, only four executive 
officers (president, provost, VP Research, and EVP 
Health System) have faculty credentials. The recent 
trend to appoint senior officers without academic 
background or experience has decoupled the central 
administration from the academic core of the University 
to an alarming degree. It is challenging enough to 
have a governing board with little experience in the 
core “business” of the university, but to then hire an 
executive team of administrators with little academic 
experience raises many concerns, particularly during a 
time of great challenge and change.
The Road Ahead
The role of leaders in a major public research 
university such as Michigan is complicated by its scale 
and diversity, comparable to that of global corporations 
or government agencies. Today’s university conducts 
many activities, some nonprofit, some publicly 
regulated, and some operating in intensely competitive 
marketplaces. Universities teach students, conduct 
research for various clients, provide health care, engage 
in economic development, stimulate social change, and 
provide mass entertainment (e.g., college sports). Of 
course the university also has higher purposes such as 
preserving our cultural heritage, challenging the norms 
and beliefs of our society, and preparing the educated 
citizens necessary to sustain our democracy. 
Inside Out
To be sure, it is important to seek a balance in 
leadership, bringing in leaders from outside for 
new ideas and energy while relying on internal 
appointments to sustain important traditions and 
values. When this balance is distorted, perhaps due to 
complacency with the status quo, or more serious, an 
effort by newcomers, frustrated with the University’s 
resistance to change, to bring in too many outsiders in 
key roles as deans or executive officers in an effort to 
change the culture of the institutions. Fortunately, the 
decentralized organization of the University is not only 
capable of responding to a changing environment but 
also repelling invasive species that attempt dramatic 
change.
So what balance should be sought? Certainly the 
majority of deans should be chosen from inside, perhaps 
in a ratio of two to one over outsiders. To be sure this is 
difficult in an era in which universities are increasingly 
dependent upon executive search consultants, tempted 
to push their existing stable of external candidates 
and motivated by compensation indexed to the 
compensation negotiated by selected candidates. At 
the executive officer level, perhaps a balance closer to 
50%-50% seems best, balancing internal and external 
experiences.
While a similar balance is probably appropriate at 
the presidential level, Michigan’s history reveals that 
most of its presidents have come from outside (Tappan, 
Angell, Burton, Little, Hatcher, Fleming, Coleman, 
and Schlissel) with only four from inside (Hutchins, 
Ruthven, Shapiro, Duderstadt, and Bollinger), which 
reverses the 2 to 1 inside to outside pattern of deans. 
To some degree this is probably because the Board of 
Regents led the search and made the choice, reflecting 
perhaps a “devil you don’t know always looks better 
than one you do”.
Interestingly enough, one finds a correlation 
between the distinction of the university and its 
tendency to appoint insiders as presidents, with 
Harvard, Yale, Princeton, Stanford, and the University 
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of California as prominent examples of leadership from 
inside. However any speculation about this arising 
from confidence that one’s own people make the best 
leaders of outstanding universities is obliterated by the 
case of Cornell, which has chosen five of its presidents 
from Michigan!
Anyway, this balance between the selection of 
leadership from within or without should be tracked 
very carefully, since it could lead to difficulties over 
time.
Leadership Development
It is very important to view leadership development 
as a strategic issue for the University. While most faculty 
prefer to remain in academic roles, some are willing to 
accept additional responsibilities in leadership roles. 
Every effort should be made to encourage and support 
such activities, providing opportunities for further 
leadership development, albeit with strong evaluation 
of leadership ability. Interestingly enough, since 
academic leadership usually requires not only time and 
effort, but also sacrificing one’s scholarly activity, such 
willingness to participate in faculty service or even 
governance should be recognized as a sign of possible 
leadership interest.
Some Suggestions for Presidential Leadership
A recent study on academic leadership by the 
Association of Governing Boards provided some 
important recommendations concerning the university 
presidency that should be kept in mind. (AGB, 2007)
1. To reconnect the president with the core academic 
mission of the university, i.e., learning and scholarship. 
It is important to resist the tendency to view the 
presidency as simply just another CEO role, dominated 
by fund-raising or lobbying, and instead re-establish 
academic leadership as a president’s highest priority.
2. To urge boards, faculties, and presidents 
themselves to view the university presidency not as a 
career or a profession in and of itself, but rather as a 
calling of immense importance, similar to those of other 
forms of public service, rather than seeking personal 
compensation and benefits far removed from the 
academy.
3. To seek to establish what the AGB study termed 
integral leadership, a new style of collaborative but 
decisive leadership: A president should exert a presence 
that is purposeful and consultative, deliberative yet 
decisive, and capable of midcourse corrections as new 
challenges emerge. Integral leadership succeeds in 
fulfilling the multiple, disparate strands of presidential 
responsibility and conceives of these responsibilities as 
parts of a coherent whole. Leadership of this sort links 
the president, the faculty, and the board together in a 
well-functioning partnership purposefully devoted to 
a well-defined, broadly affirmed institutional vision.”
Presidential Compensation
One of the most controversial issues in American 
higher education today is the alarming increase in the 
compensation of university presidents, now rising 
to the million-dollar levels more characteristic of 
corporate CEOs that academic leaders. This not only 
has undermined public confidence in the leadership 
and governance of the nation’s universities, but it 
has also decoupled the university president from the 
faculty. 
To some degree this is due to governing boards 
who fail to understand that academic leadership is a 
public calling more akin to public leadership roles 
such as governor or national leadership than corporate 
management. It has also been driven by the increasing 
use of professional search consultants whose fees tend 
to be indexed to compensation. But there is also an 
alarming tendency of university leaders to set aside the 
concept of academic service in favor of greed.
It is worth observing here that UM’s president of 
the late 1990s, Lee Bollinger, sought to become the first 
$1 million public university president. He failed in this 
quest at Michigan, but he won the war in 2015 when he 
became the nation’s highest paid president at Columbia 
with a salary of $4.6 M. A refreshing counterpoint was 
provided by President Gregory Fenves of the University 
of Texas at Austin who refused a $1 million salary in 
favor of the $750,000 salary of his predecessor.
Perhaps such excessive compensation is not 
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surprising in institutions willing to pay football and 
basketball coaches truly astronomical salaries. But it 
nevertheless is damaging, both to the public perception 
of financial behavior of academic institutions as well 
as to the reputation of their governing boards. While 
ambition and greed are frequently present in the 
negotiation of presidential compensation, hopefully 
some degree of public commitment and responsibility 
should also be encouraged.
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Higher education should be viewed as both a 
“public good” to society as well as an individual benefit 
to graduates. As such, academic leadership roles have 
a “calling” character that should be understood and 
accepted as a public service, much like other public 
leadership roles. Leading an academic organization 
should be viewed as both a privilege and a responsibility, 
not as merely a route to fame and fortune. 
Indeed, many in higher education today view 
the frequent institution hopping and excessive 
compensation of senior academic and administrative 
leaders in higher education as one of the unfortunate 
trends that has seriously undermined our society’s 
understanding of the contemporary American 
university and its public good character. 
We believe it is particularly important that 
governing boards view university leaders as public 
servants rather than corporate executives, both in their 
unique responsibilities, their accountability, and their 
compensation. To impose such a corporate culture, 
values, and compensation practices on an academic 
institution is both disruptive and dangerous to its 
fundamental purpose and mission. 
Unfortunately, these policies while both accepted 
and effective during the 1980s and 1990s, were 
largely abandoned during the 2010-2015 period, More 
specifically, Michigan faculty salaries not only dropped 
more than 20% below private university peers, but also 
dropped below several public universities including 
the University of California (both UCLA and Berkeley), 
Rutgers, Virginia, and Texas, even as adminsitrative 
salaries and undisclosed compensation through 
bonuses and hiring incentives exploded to extreme 
levels. (Ulsoy, 2012)
Appendix 
Some Comments on Executive Compensation
What about the compensation of senior academic 
leadership, at the level of deans, executive officers, 
chancellors, and presidents? While executive search 
consultants love to stress the importance of competitive 
compensation (after all, that is how many of them set 
their fees), one should be very skeptical of just how im-
portant compensation is at this level.
Believe it or not, most senior academic leaders are 
rarely lured by the dollars. To be sure, a competitive 
salary is viewed by some candidates as a measure of 
how much you want them. But it is rarely the decid-
ing factor. Far more important is the challenge, oppor-
tunity, and prestige of building a top-ranked academic 
program.
Many candidates  for senior leadership roles are 
seeking new opportunities because they have been 
blocked by the narrowing pyramid of the academic hi-
erarchy in their own institution. Some are after wealth 
and fame, but NOT from the university, but rather from 
outside their academic appointment through corporate 
boards, national commissions, or other opportunities.
Some actually view academic leadership as a “high-
er calling”, with emotional rewards and satisfaction 
that simply cannot be quantified in terms of compen-
sation. In fact, some actually have acquired a sense of 
loyalty to a university and view such assignments as a 
duty of service. If you doubt this, just look at the list of 
institutions with the highest executive salaries. Usually 
these are places you have to pay people to go, not at the 
very best institutions!
One more caution here. While it is the case that some 
public universities use their fund-raising foundations 
to supplement the salaries of senior leadership, this is 
usually provided as a payment for their development 
responsibilities. It is quite another matter entirely to so-
licit private support specifically to bring senior leader-
ship salaries up to market levels. Not only does such 
a practice run into optics problems (remember, we are 
now in the post-Abramoff era), but it can start a pub-
lic university down a very slippery slope where insti-
tutional integrity could be compromised by conflict of 
interest.
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American universities have long embraced 
the concept of shared governance, involving 
public oversight and trusteeship, collegial faculty 
governance, and experienced but generally short-term 
administrative leadership. While shared governance 
engages a variety of stakeholders in the direction of the 
university, it does so with an awkwardness that tends 
to inhibit change and responsiveness. 
The politics swirling about governing boards, 
particularly in public universities, both distracts them 
from their important responsibilities and stewardship, 
while discouraging many of our most experienced, 
talented, and dedicated citizens from serving on these 
bodies. The increasing intrusion of state and federal 
government in the affairs of the university, in the name 
of performance and public accountability, can trample 
on academic values and micromanage many institutions 
into mediocrity. Furthermore, while the public expects 
its institutions to be managed effectively and efficiently, 
it weaves a web of constraints through public laws 
that make this difficult indeed. Sunshine laws prevent 
substantive discussions between governing boards and 
administrators. Even the most sensitive business of the 
university must be conducted in the public arena, such 
as its search for a president. And even the selection of 
the president is subject to intense public scrutiny and 
influence.
Efforts to include the faculty in shared governance 
also encounter obstacles. To be sure, faculty governance 
continues to be both effective and essential for academic 
matters such as faculty hiring and tenure evaluation. 
But it is increasingly difficult to achieve effective 
faculty participation in broader university matters such 
as finance, capital facilities, or external relations. The 
faculty traditions of debate and consensus building, 
along with the highly compartmentalized organization 
of academic departments and disciplines, seem 
increasingly out of sync with the breadth and rapid 
pace required of the university-wide decision process.
The Nature of Governance 
at the University of Michigan
Much of the University of Michigan’s strength and 
leadership has arisen and been sustained because of 
a very unusual decision about its governance made 
during the earliest days of its history. Because the 
University had already been in existence for two 
decades before the State of Michigan entered the 
Union in 1837, and because of the frontier society’s 
deep distrust of politics and politicians, the new state’s 
early constitution in 1850 granted the university an 
unusual degree of autonomy as a “coordinate branch 
of state government”. Actually this also reflected the 
importance of freedom as a key Enlightenment theme 
embraced by Jefferson and his colleagues in defining the 
early structure of the republic. It was later an important 
founding principle of the Northwest Ordinance that led 
to the creation of the University. Michigan’s constitution 
delegated full powers over all university matters to 
the University’s governing board of regents, although 
surprisingly enough it did not state the purpose of the 
university. This constitutional autonomy, together with 
the fact that the university traces its origins to an act of 
Congress rather than a state legislature, has shaped an 
important feature of the university’s character. 
Throughout its history the university has regarded 
itself as much as a national university as a state 
university, as exemplified by the declaration of its 
early Regents, “The doors of all its Departments 
are open to students from Every State in the Union, 
upon the same terms as to those of our own State; so 
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that it may, in some sense, with propriety, be styled a 
National Institution, and every State in the Union has 
an interest in its prosperity.” Furthermore, Michigan’s 
constitutional autonomy, periodically reaffirmed 
through court tests and constitutional conventions, has 
enabled the university to have much more control over 
its own destiny than most other public universities. 
(Peckham, 1963) 
Hence it is apparent that the real key to the 
University’s quality and impact over its two centuries 
of history has been the very unusual autonomy granted 
the institution by the state constitution of 1850. The 
University has always been able to set its own goals for 
the quality of its programs rather than allowing these to 
be dictated by the vicissitudes of state policy, support, 
or public opinion. Put another way, although the 
University is legally “owned” by the people of the state, 
it has never been obligated to adhere to the priorities or 
whims of a particular generation of Michigan citizens. 
Rather, it has been viewed as an enduring social 
institution with a duty of stewardship to commitments 
made by generations past and a compelling obligation 
to take whatever actions were necessary to build and 
protect its capacity to serve future generations. Even 
though these actions might conflict from time to time 
with public opinion or the prevailing political winds 
of state government, the university’s constitutional 
autonomy clearly gave it the ability to set its own course. 
When it came to objectives such as program quality or 
access to educational opportunity, the University of 
Michigan has always viewed this as an institutional 
decision rather than succumbing to public or political 
pressures.
The University of Michigan is certainly no exception 
in facing the multiple challenges of university 
governance. But our institution is anomalous in another 
respect. We are one of the very few American research 
universities whose governing board is determined 
through statewide popular election, involving partisan 
candidates nominated by political parties. With two of 
our eight regents up for election every two years, the 
frequently changing political stripes of our governing 
board present a particular challenge both to the 
University and to its president.
To some degree this anomaly in the selection of the 
university’s governing board is balanced by another 
unusual feature of the university’s governance. As 
we noted earlier the Michigan constitution grants the 
university an extraordinary degree of autonomy as a 
“coordinate branch of state government,” by giving its 
regents full powers over all university matters. More 
specifically, the constitution authorizes the board to 
“have the general supervision of the university and the 
direction and control of all expenditures from university 
funds.” But the constitution also directs the board to 
elect a president who should preside, without vote, at 
all their meetings. This latter detail is very important, 
since it clearly identifies the president as both “chief 
executive officer” and “chairman of the board” (at least 
their meetings), a stature held by few other university 
presidents who generally attend governing board 
meetings only as observers. It allows the president both 
to determine the agenda and orchestrate the activities 
of the governing board. Through this mechanism, the 
state constitution deftly relieves the regents of the 
ability to administer the university. In theory, at least, 
they need only to determine policy–and, of course, hire 
and fire the president. 
Faculty governance is also unusual at Michigan. To 
be sure, the university has a long tradition of strong 
faculty governance at the level of individual academic 
units such as departments or schools through faculty 
executive committees. Here the clearly identified 
responsibilities (hiring, promotion, tenure, budget 
priorities) attract the participation of our best faculty 
members and provides effective faculty governance. 
But at the university-wide level, the limited authority of 
the faculty senate all too frequently transforms it into a 
debating society more concerned with “p-issues” (e.g., 
pay, parking, and the plant department) than strategic 
academic issues facing the university.
To be sure, most of those citizens and faculty 
members serving on various governing bodies do 
so with the best of intentions, loyal to the institution 
and committed to its welfare and capacity to serve. 
Yet all too frequently they do so within an awkward 
structure of shared governance that allows political 
forces to inhibit access to both adequate information 
and communication. It is also a structure that can easily 
be hijacked by those with strong personal or political 
agendas that could harm the university.
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1950s-1960s
Throughout much of the 1950s and 1960s the 
University’s elected board was unusually stable. 
Moderate Republican politics dominated the state 
and wealthy Republican men were nominated to run 
and elected as Michigan Regents. Stalwarts such as 
Paul Goebel, Robert Briggs, William Cudlip, and even 
a former Michigan football coach, Harry Kipke, were 
elected, and the Regents operated much like a corporate 
board of directors. 
But there were occasional challenges at the state 
level to the power of the University’s Board of 
Regents. A new state constitution was drawn up at the 
convention of 1963, reaffirming the autonomy of the 
University of Michigan, which had been established 
in the constitution of 1850 and reaffirmed in the 
revision of 1908 and extending autonomy to the other 
public universities in the state. The new constitution 
created a new State Board of Education, which was 
to have general supervision over all public education 
“except as to institutions of higher education granting 
baccalaureate degrees”. “The power of the boards of 
institutions of higher education in this constitution to 
supervise their respective institutions and control and 
direct the expenditure of the institution’s funds shall 
not be limited by this section.”
However, a controversy developed over the 
powers of the State Board of Education. It objected to 
enlargement of the Flint Senior College into a four-
year college branch of the University, as requested 
by the Flint Board of Education. The attorney general 
went on to say that the State Board of Education had 
the power to determine the location of colleges and 
the addition of departments to existing colleges. Such 
power to authorize departments was a distinct invasion 
of the autonomy of the Board of Regents and of the 
governing boards of any of the state universities. Thus, 
the scene was set for a continuing and ongoing battle 
over the autonomy of the Regents. Such challenges by 
state government to the constitutional power of the 
Regents would continue throughout the next several 
years, requiring occasional litigation (or at least the 
University’s threat of litigation to protect its autonomy).
During the 1950s and 1960s, the faculty had grown 
so large that it accomplished little in the semiannual 
meetings of the Faculty Senate, and its committee 
structure was cumbersome. In an effort to reflect faculty 
views more efficiently and more quickly, the Senate 
reorganized itself in 1966 by electing a legislative 
Assembly of sixty-five members, representing all 
schools and colleges, to meet monthly. In turn, the 
Assembly selected a nine-person Senate Advisory 
Committee for University Affairs (SACUA) as its active 
executive committee.
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s both University 
wide through SACUA and the Senate Assembly, and 
at the school, college, and department level through 
executive committees, tended to be led by distinguished 
senior faculty members with broad University interests, 
such as Shaw Livermore, Brymer Williams, and Arch 
Naylor. This experienced faculty leadership proved 
invaluable as the University faced financial difficulties 
during the late 1970s and into the 1980s.
1970s
In the early 1970s, organized labor became 
more active in nominating and electing Democratic 
candidates to the Board of Regents since the University 
was an attractive target for further unionization. In 1968 
there were two small unions: by 1974 the University 
was bargaining with numerous newly organized union 
locals and strikes became a familiar routine in campus 
life. In 1971 the Intern-Resident Association unionized, 
followed in the same year by the Teaching Fellows 
Association who formed the Graduate Employees 
Organization (the Regents chose not to contest either, 
dominated as they were by newly elected Democrats 
sponsored by organized labor).
Although of a different party, the Regents of the 
1960s and 1970s continued to be prominent men such as 
Eugene Power, Robert Nederlander, and Paul Brown, 
with corporate leadership experience. Furthermore, 
both Harlan Hatcher and Robben Fleming could look 
to experienced VPCFOs such as Wilbur Pierpont and 
James Brinkerhoff to work closely with the Regents, 
particularly on key financial issues. From time to time a 
conservative candidate from Western Michigan would 
run and be elected to the Board, such as Deane Baker, 
but throughout the 1970s and 1980s the Regents could 
be characterized as a moderate Democratic body. 
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1980s
During the early 1980s the transition from 
Republican governors (George Romney and William 
Millikan) to Democrat James Blanchard was evidence 
of more balanced politics in the state, which led 
to greater political balance among the candidates 
elected to the university governing boards. There 
was also more opportunity to diversify boards with 
both women and minority candidates. However with 
Regent nominations occurring during mid-August 
party conventions prior to statewide fall elections, 
there was less attention paid to party nominations, and 
over time these began to reflect either special interests 
or party fund-raising. Furthermore, as the statewide 
visibility of nominations for Regent dropped (surveys 
indicated that fewer than 10% of the electorate had 
any knowledge of most candidates), incumbents had a 
significant advantage in being nominated and elected 
to multiple terms. Finally, since the statewide ballots 
placed the election of university governing board 
members far down on the ballots, election of Regents 
became increasingly dependent on the coattail effects 
from the top of the ticket. In general, whichever party 
carried the governor or senate post would also capture 
the Regent elections (although in a close election, 
usually women candidates had an advantage).
The consequence to the University was an 
increasingly divided Board of Regents in terms of 
both political party and political philosophy. Put 
more bluntly, the board became more divided among 
liberal Democrats nominated by organized labor and 
Republicans nominated by its conservative wing. Such 
divided boards posed more of a challenge to University 
leadership, since Regents began to vote more along 
party lines, e.g., Republicans always opposing tuition 
increases and Democrats always supporting the 
unionization of various job families in the University. 
Such was even more the case on social issues such as 
affirmative action and gay rights, since it was important 
that Regents maintain a highly visible stance on 
political issues in an effort to better position themselves 
for the next election. And since for some members, their 
position as a Regent was their most visible role, there 
was an increasing tendency to stand for multiple terms. 
If they conformed to their party’s political agenda, 
they could be relatively certain to be renominated as 
an incumbent and could only lose their seat through a 
strong sweep of the ticket by the opposing party. 
1990s
Throughout the 1990s the Board of Regents became 
increasingly divided to the point that in the 1994 
elections, with a strong Republican governor at the top 
of the tickets, two Republicans were elected, sweeping 
out not only the Democratic chair and vice-chair of the 
Board, but creating the horror of a 4-4 political division. 
Although the president chaired the meetings of the 
Board, the University administration was increasingly 
A meeting of the University of Michigan RegentsMy 1988 public interview with 
the Regents for the UM presidency
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preoccupied with the challenge of making certain 
that it obtained at least a 5-3 majority on any critical 
issues (such as tuition) and avoided a majority vote on 
anything that would damage the institution (such as 
firing the president).
In a confidential survey taken of deans and executive 
officers during this period, there was a unanimous 
consensus that the most serious challenge facing the 
university was the deterioration in the quality of its 
Board of Regents. They went further to suggest that 
the primary responsibility of the President and the 
Executive Officers must become that of protecting the 
university from its own governing board. This challenge 
also plagued the other two public universities with 
elected boards, Michigan State University and Wayne 
State University. In a meeting with the senior editor of 
one of the state’s leading newspapers, he warned that 
the University administration’s most difficult challenge 
would be that of preventing the Board from harming 
the University. Ironically, some of our Board members 
agreed with this assessment.
This situation was complicated by a similar division 
on the part of faculty governance, as a small group 
of faculty from the Medical School managed to take 
control of SACUA and began to rattle sabres against 
both their school and the University administration 
more generally. 
As concerns grew, the University administration set 
out on a dangerous course of attempting to improve the 
quality of its governance. It attempted to restructure 
the meetings of the governing board to allow more 
discussion of key strategic issues facing the university 
rather than allowing the agenda to be dominated by 
the usual flow of routine business decisions. It assisted 
the Regents in developing internal leadership and 
discipline so that the occasional antics of maverick 
board members would not hold it hostage. 
A similar effort was directed at improving faculty 
governance.The deans were encouraged to urge 
their faculties to nominate strong candidates for the 
university’s Senate Assembly. The executive officers 
met regularly and frequently with the leadership of the 
faculty senate and most faculty advisory committees. 
Efforts were made to engage the executive committees 
of the university’s schools and colleges in university-
wide strategic issues. To facilitate interactions with 
faculty, the administration brought into the President’s 
Office former leaders of faculty governance to serve 
both as liaison and Secretary of the University.
Yet it seemed that each painful step forward would 
quickly be followed by two steps backward. An 
incumbent Regent would become irritated and attempt 
to retaliate against our UM Alumni Association’s efforts 
to encourage interested alumni to stand as candidates 
for Regent. The local newspapers would become 
attracted to our strategic discussions and attempt to use 
the state’s sunshine laws to pry into more sensitive areas 
such as business strategies or property acquisitions. A 
cabal of discontented faculty members in a particular 
school (usually Medicine) would engineer a coup to 
take over the faculty senate in an effort to push their 
personal agendas.
2000s
The governance of the University stabilized 
somewhat during the late 1990s and early 2000s. 
New members of the Board of Regents, who adopted 
a somewhat more constructive role in supporting 
institutional leadership, replaced those few who 
had assumed a more confrontational role. The board 
became more diverse in gender and age, although 
still dominated by lawyers as the most common 
occupational background. 
However faculty governance became weaker, as 
faculty members from the Flint and Dearborn campus 
began to be elected to SACUA, and new administrations 
increasingly comprised of senior officers with little 
faculty experience tended to ignore faculty concerns. A 
glaring example occurred during the late 1990s when 
the Athletic Director convinced the President that the 
Board in Control of Intercollegiate Athletics that enabled 
faculty influence over important issues such as student 
eligibility and athletic budgets, should be replaced by 
an Advisory Board on Intercollegiate Athletics chaired 
by the Athletic Director. Furthermore, over the next 
several years additional language was inserted in the 
Regents Bylaw to make it clear the new ABIA has only 
weak advisory authority. In fact, a final explanation 
point on this weakening of faculty influence over 
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athletics was made when one of the former Regents, 
was appointed as Athletic Director, with little interest 
in even convening the Advisory Board.
The weakening of faculty governance at Michigan 
stands in sharp contrast to the role that faculty 
governance was playing at other peer institutions. 
A particularly striking example was the role that 
the Faculty Senate played in blocking the efforts 
of several members of the University of Virginia 
Board of Visitors to support a vicious attack on the 
institution’s administration and force the resignation of 
its new president, Teresa Sullivan, a former provost at 
Michigan. The faculty senate stepped up, taking a vote 
of no confidence in the board and strongly supporting 
the president, which forced the governing board to back 
off. Yet many of the governance problems still remain.
Yet, even with this recent expression of faculty 
concerns, Michigan’s faculty governance has been 
remarkably stable in comparison to much of the rest 
of higher education. In fact, when the majority of the 
Michigan faculty voted overwhelmingly against the 
imposition of the “shared services” program, which 
would transfer many of their most valuable staff into 
a central administrative unit, the outgoing President 
simply announced that the University would move 
ahead despite their concerns. Needless to say, this 
created a wound unlikely to heal in the near term that 
might even re-ignite faculty activism once again.
Lessons Learned
The challenges facing the current model of university 
governance can be illustrated by several contrasting 
quotes:
“In the 1850s, when the current forms of lay board 
governance were established, the average American 
college had fewer than one hundred students and 
less than 1% of while males attended college. Over 
the past century, universities have evolved from a 
trustees-plus-president “imperium” to a more faculty-
based hegemony to a somewhat more broadly based 
sovereignty that includes government (state and 
federal) and students.”
Harold T. Shapiro 
“Our antiquated systems require seemingly 
interminable consultations with every interested 
group, provide virtual vetoes for those affected by 
any significant change, and fail to lodge authoritative 
power in any office.”
Nan Keohane 
“For years now the trustees of many colleges 
and universities have rolled over as academics and 
administrators within the institutions they’re supposed 
to govern have run amok. While trustees turn a blind 
eye, faculty and administrators have politicized and 
dumbed down the curriculum, instituted draconian 
speech and sexual-conduct codes that they have then 
enforced with all the liberalism of the Court of the 
Star Chamber, and instituted an immoral and often 
unconstitutional system of admissions apartheid.”
Wall Street Journal 
“In reality, the practice of shared governance—
however promising its original intent—often threatens 
gridlock. Whether the problem is with presidents who 
lack the courage to lead an agenda for change, trustees 
who ignore the institutional goals in favor of the football 
team, or faculty members who are loath to surrender 
the status quo, the fact is that each is an obstacle to 
progress. If higher education is to respond effectively to 
the demands being placed upon it, the culture of shared 
governance must be reshaped.”
National Commission on the Academic Presidency 
“In an attempt to improve institutional effectiveness 
and accountability, a call goes out for stronger 
leadership, quicker decisions, and a more business-
like approach to decision-making. Battles over who 
has decision-making authority over academic policy, 
technology, diversity, tenure, and administrative issues 
are growing in higher education.”
William Tierney
To understand these varied perspectives, it is 
important to recognize that shared governance is, in 
reality, an ever-changing balance of forces involving 
faculty, trustees, and administration. It represents the 
effort to achieve a balance among academic priorities, 
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public purpose, and operating imperatives such as 
financial solvency, institutional reputation, and public 
accountability. Different universities achieve this 
balance in quite different ways. For example, at the 
University of California a strong tradition of campus 
and system-wide faculty governance is occasionally 
called upon to counter the political forces characterizing 
the governing board, examples being the loyalty oath 
controversy of the 1950s, the Reagan takeover of the UC 
Board of Regents in the 1960s, and the debates over the 
use of affirmative action in student admission during 
the 1990s. 
In contrast, at the University of Michigan, campus-
wide, elected faculty governance has historically 
been rather weak, at least compared to faculty 
influence through executive committee structures 
at the department, school, and college level. Hence 
the tradition has been to develop a strong cadre of 
deans, both through aggressive recruiting and the 
decentralization of considerable authority to the 
university’s schools and colleges, and then depend 
upon these academic leaders to counter the inevitable 
political tendencies of the university’s regents from 
time to time. When the deans are strong, this checks-
and-balance system works well. When they are weak 
or myopically focused on their own academic units, the 
university becomes vulnerable to more sinister political 
forces.
Where is the influence of the university 
administration–and particularly the president–in this 
balancing act? Usually out of sight or perhaps out 
of mind. After all, senior administrators, including 
the president, serve at the pleasure of the governing 
board. They are also mindful of faculty support, since 
they may be only one vote of no confidence away 
from receiving their walking papers–a long-standing 
academic tradition recently re-established by Harvard 
and several other universities. While it has always been 
necessary for the American university president to 
champion the needs of the academic community to the 
governing board and the broader society while playing 
a role in ensuring that the academic community is in 
touch with society’s interests and needs, it is also not 
surprising that the administration is usually quite 
reluctant to get caught publicly in skirmishes between 
the governing board and the faculty.
The danger of such a bilateral balance of power 
arises when one party or the other is weakened. 
When the faculty senate loses the capacity to attract 
the participation of distinguished faculty members, 
or when a series of poor appointments at the level 
of deans, executive officers, or president weaken 
the administration, a governing board with a strong 
political agenda can move into the power vacuum. 
Of course there have also been numerous examples 
of the other extreme, in which a weakened governing 
board caved into unrealistic faculty demands, e.g. by 
replacing merit salary programs with cost-of-living 
adjustments or extending faculty voting privileges to 
part-time teaching staff in such a way as to threaten 
faculty quality.
Part of the difficulty with shared governance is its 
ambiguity. The lines of authority and responsibility 
are blurred, sometimes intentionally. Although most 
members of the university community understand that 
the fundamental principals of shared governance rest 
upon the delegation of authority from the governing 
board to the faculty in academic matters and to the 
administration in operational management, the devil in 
the details can lead to confusion and misunderstanding. 
Turf problems abound. One of the key challenges to 
effective university governance is to make certain 
that all of the constituencies of shared governance–
governing boards, administrations, and faculty–
understand clearly their roles and responsibilities.
Nothing is more critical to the future of higher 
education than improving the quality and performance 
of boards of trustees and attracting distinguished 
faculty members into leadership positions in faculty 
governance. Today during an era of rapid change, 
colleges and universities deserve governing boards 
comprised of members selected for their expertise and 
experience, members who are capable of governing 
the university in ways that serve both the long-term 
welfare of the institution and the more immediate 
interests of the various constituencies it serves. Trustees 
should be challenged to focus on policy development 
rather than intruding into management issues. Their 
role is to provide the strategic, supportive, and critical 
stewardship for their institution and to be held clearly 
publicly, legally, and financially accountable for their 
performance and the welfare of their institutions.
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It is not hard these days to find examples of 
university governing boards under fire for what critics 
regard as bad behavior. In recent years boards of 
trustees have been accused of ignoring problems (Penn 
State), meddling in campus leadership (University of 
Virginia), pursuing an ideological agenda (University of 
Texas), and forcing clearly unqualified presidents on a 
university with political objectives (University of Iowa). 
A National Commission formed by the Association of 
Governing Boards to recommend changes in higher 
education governance says actions like these jeopardize 
not only the institutions but also the public trust in 
higher education. “Far too much time and talent and 
too many resources are preoccupied with institutional 
advantage, the preservation of the status quo, internal 
disputes over governance roles and authority, and the 
advancement of political and individual agenda.”. 
(AGB)
For public boards, the need is particularly urgent. 
As long as the members of the governing boards of 
public universities continue to be determined through 
primarily political mechanisms, without careful 
consideration or independent review of qualifications 
or institutional commitment, and are allowed to pursue 
political or personal agendas without concern for the 
welfare of their institution or its service to broader 
society, the public university will find itself increasingly 
unable to adapt to the needs of a rapidly changing 
society. Every effort should be made to convince 
leaders of state government that politics and patronage 
have no place in the selection of university governing 
boards or efforts to determine their administrative 
leadership. Quality universities require quality 
leadership and governance. Even as public university 
governing boards have become increasingly political 
and hence sensitive to special interests, they have also 
become increasingly isolated from accountability with 
respect to their quality and effectiveness. Not only 
should all university governance be subject to regular 
and public review, but the quality and effectiveness of 
governing boards should also be an important aspect of 
institutional accreditation.
The Road Ahead
Despite dramatic changes in the nature of scholarship, 
pedagogy, and service to society, American universities 
today are organized, managed, and governed in a 
manner little different from the far simpler colleges 
of a century ago. We continue to embrace, indeed, 
enshrine the concept of shared governance involving 
public oversight and trusteeship by governing boards 
of lay citizens, elected faculty governance, and 
experienced but generally shorter and usually amateur 
administrative leadership. Today, however, the pace 
of change in our society is exposing the flaws in this 
traditional approach to university governance.
Hence it is appropriate to question whether the key 
participants in shared governance–the lay governing 
board, elected faculty governance, and academic 
administrators–have the expertise, the discipline, 
and the authority, not to mention the accountability, 
necessary to cope with the powerful social, economic, 
and technological forces driving change in our society 
and its institutions. More specifically, is it realistic 
to expect that the shared governance mechanisms 
developed decades (or, in some cases, centuries) ago can 
serve well the contemporary university or the society 
dependent upon its activities? Can boards comprised 
of lay citizens, with little knowledge either of academic 
matters or the complex financial, management, and 
legal affairs of the university be expected to provide 
competent oversight for the large, complex institutions 
characterizing American higher education? What 
is the appropriate role for the faculty in university 
governance, and is this adequately addressed by the 
current determination and conduct of faculty governing 
bodies? Can academics with limited experience in 
management serve as competent administrators 
(deans, provosts, presidents)? And, finally (and most 
speculatively), what works, what does not, and what 
to do about it?
As the contemporary university becomes more 
complex and accountable, it may even be time to set 
aside the quaint American practice of governing 
universities with boards comprised of lay citizens, 
with their limited expertise and all too frequently 
political character, and instead shift to true boards of 
directors similar to those used in the private sector. 
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Although it may sound strange in these times of 
scandal and corruption in corporate management, 
there is increasing evidence today that university 
governing boards should function with a structure and 
a process that reflects the best practices of corporate 
boards. Corporate board members are selected for their 
particular expertise in areas such as business practices, 
finance, or legal matters. They are held accountable to 
the shareholders for the performance of the corporation. 
Their performance is reviewed at regular intervals, 
both within the board itself and through more external 
measures such as company financial performance. 
Clearly, directors can be removed either through action 
of the board or shareholder vote. Furthermore, they can 
be held legally and financially liable for the quality of 
their decisions–a far cry from the limited accountability 
of the members of most governing boards for public 
universities. 
While it is important to provide board members 
with sufficient tenure to develop an understanding of 
the university, it is also important to avoid excessively 
long tenures. It is probably wise to limit university 
board service to a single term, since this would prevent 
members from “campaigning” during their tenure for 
future appointment or election to additional terms. 
Again drawing on the experience of corporate 
boards, let us make the more radical suggestion that 
university presidents should have some influence over 
the selection of board members, just as their colleagues 
in private universities and CEOs in the corporate sector. 
Here it is not suggested that university presidents 
actually should nominate or select board members. But 
consideration should be given to their right to evaluate 
and possibly veto a proposed board member if the 
A prescription for assessing and improving govering board performance
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individual is perceived as unduly political, hostile, or 
just simply inexperienced or incompetent. 
All university governing boards, both public and 
private alike, would benefit greatly from the presence 
of either active or retired university presidents, senior 
administrators, and distinguished faculty members 
from other institutions among their membership. Since 
the experience of most lay board members is so far 
removed from the academy, it seems logical to suggest 
that boards would benefit from the experience such 
seasoned academicians might bring. After all, most 
corporate boards find it important to have experienced 
business leaders, either active or retired, among their 
membership. University boards should do the same.
An equally controversial variation on this theme 
would be to provide faculty with a stronger voice in 
true university governance by appointing faculty 
representatives as members of the governing board. 
This would be similar, in a sense, to the practice of some 
corporate boards in providing a seat for a representative 
from organized labor. However, there would need to be 
a clear sense of accountability and liability in such an 
appointment, so that the faculty board members would 
not simply become advocates for the faculty position 
and instead be responsible to the entire institution.
Every effort should be made to convince leaders of 
state government that politics and patronage have no 
place in the selection of university governing boards 
or efforts to determine their administrative leadership. 
Quality universities require quality leadership. Even 
as public university governing boards have become 
increasingly political and hence sensitive to special 
interests, they have also become increasingly isolated 
from accountability with respect to their quality and 
effectiveness. Not only should all boards be subject 
to regular and public review, but also the quality 
and effectiveness of governing boards should be an 
important aspect of institutional accreditation.
Perhaps the simplest approach to identifying possible 
reforms in faculty governance is to examine where 
it seems to work well and why. From the experience 
as a faculty member, a former member of faculty 
governance at both the academic unit and university 
level, and a university president–faculty governance 
seems to work best when focused upon academic 
matters such as faculty searches, promotion and tenure 
decisions, and curriculum decisions. Why? Because 
the rank and file faculty members understand clearly 
that not only do they have the authority and integrity 
to make these decisions, but that these decisions are 
important to their academic departments and likely 
to affect their own teaching and research activities. As 
a result, the very best faculty members, namely those 
with the strongest reputations and influence, are drawn 
into the academic governance process, either through 
formal election or appointment to key committees 
(hiring, promotion, tenure, curriculum, executive) or at 
least consulted for influential opinions in their role as 
department mandarins. 
In sharp contrast, most active faculty members 
view university-wide faculty governance bodies such 
as faculty senates primarily as debating societies, 
whose opinions are invariably taken as advisory–
and frequently ignored–by the administration and 
the governing board. Hence, rare is the case when a 
distinguished faculty member spares the time from 
productive scholarship, teaching, or department 
matters for such university service. Of course there 
are exceptions, but more common is the squeaky 
wheel syndrome, where those outspoken faculty 
members with an axe to grind are drawn to faculty 
politics, frequently distracting faculty governance from 
substantive issues to focus instead on their pet agendas.
Hence a key to effective faculty governance is to 
provide faculty bodies with executive rather than 
merely advisory authority, thereby earning the active 
participation of the university’s leading faculty 
members. Advisory bodies, paid only lip service by the 
administration or the board of trustees, rarely attract 
the attention or the participation of those faculty most 
actively engaged in scholarship and teaching. The 
faculty should become a true participant in the academic 
decision process rather than simply a watchdog on the 
administration or defenders of the status quo. Faculty 
governance should focus on those issues of most direct 
concern to academic programs, and faculty members 
should be held accountable for their decisions. Faculties 
also need to accept and acknowledge that strong 
leadership, whether from chairs, deans, or presidents, is 
important if their institution is to flourish, particularly 
during a time of rapid social change.
Because of the unusual nature of faculty governance 
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at Michigan, vested in both university-wide structures 
such as the Senate Assembly and school and department 
level executive committees, some specific suggestions 
are appropriate for our University. First it is essential 
that the voice of the faculty on both academic and 
institutional matters be strengthened by restoring 
the executive powers of school and college executive 
committees. It is essential that newly appointed deans 
understand both the bylaws and past practices that 
have granted and recognized the executive powers 
characterizing these bodies.
Consideration should also be given to strengthening 
the Senate Assembly and the Senate Advisory 
Committee on University Affairs, both by providing 
some degree of executive authority and perhaps a new 
structure capable of attracting the engagement of the 
University’s most distinguished faculty members into 
service on these bodies. One possibly would be moving 
to a bicameral organization comprised of both elected 
faculty members from general ranks (“the house”) and 
a “senate” of appointed senior faculty with endowed or 
honorific chairs.
In conclusion, we should recognize that the 
current form of university governance, evolving over 
many decades is more adept at protecting the past 
than preparing for the future. All too often shared 
governance tends to protect the status quo–or perhaps 
even a nostalgic view of some idyllic past–thereby 
preventing a serious consideration of the future. During 
an era characterized by dramatic change, we simply 
must find ways to cut through the Gordian knot of 
shared governance, of indecision and inaction, to allow 
our colleges and universities to better serve our society. 
Our institutions must not only develop a tolerance for 
strong leadership; they should demand it. 
The complexity of the contemporary university 
and the forces acting upon it have outstripped the 
ability of the current shared governance system of 
lay boards, elected faculty bodies, and inexperienced 
academic administrators to govern, lead, and manage. 
It is simply unrealistic to expect that the governance 
mechanisms developed decades or even centuries ago 
can serve well either the contemporary university or 
the society it serves. To blind ourselves to these realities 
is to perpetuate a disservice to those whom we serve, 
both present and future generations.
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Missions
The core missions of the research university
Education Research
Service
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Mention higher education and most people think 
about “going to college,” that is, undergraduate 
education, as the core mission of the university. It is 
certainly true that undergraduate students outnumber 
graduate and professional students on most of our 
campuses. Furthermore, an undergraduate education 
frequently is a formative experience in one’s life, since 
this generally coincides with both emotional and 
intellectual maturation.
Yet much of the evolution of the American 
university–and the University of Michigan, in 
particular–during the decades following World War II 
was focused on activities such as research and graduate 
education, professional education and service, 
extension and continuing education, and auxiliary 
enterprises such as medical centers and intercollegiate 
athletics. Indeed, a quick glance at the balance sheet 
for any major university reveals that the majority of its 
resources, whether financial or personnel, are certainly 
not directed at undergraduate education. At Michigan, 
only about 15% of our budget is directed toward 
this activity; only one-third of our faculty teaches 
undergraduates.
Actually, this is also the image that much of the 
American public has about large research universities. 
They tend first to think of the commitments that public 
universities have made to the professions, to law and 
medicine, engineering and agriculture. We also might 
acknowledge the responsibilities of these institutions to 
serve the public or their important research programs. 
But few would think first about their commitment 
to undergraduate education. Rather, the image of 
undergraduate education in large public universities is 
one of thousands of students wandering in and out of 
large lecture courses in a largely random fashion, taught 
by foreign teaching assistants, possibly on their way 
from their fraternity or sorority house to the football 
stadium. We think of undergraduate students in these 
institutions as identified only by their I.D. number until 
the time of their graduation, where they are asked to 
stand and be recognized along with thousands of their 
fellow graduates.
Yet well over half of the students on the campuses of 
major public universities are undergraduates. Indeed, 
at Michigan we enroll over 29,000 undergraduates, 
including 20,000 in our liberal arts college, which makes 
it the largest commitment to liberal arts education of 
any university in the nation. Studies confirm that the 
undergraduates from flagship public universities 
comprise the largest source of professionals, scholars, 
and leaders of our society. At Michigan we have 
led the nation for many years in the number of our 
undergraduates who go on to professional careers such 
as teaching, law, engineering, and medicine.
Hence, for Michigan, the challenge of its educational 
mission is multifaceted. On the one hand, the strength 
of its professional schools and the strong research 
and scholarly orientation of our faculties should not 
be compromised. On the other hand, the University 
needs to generate a fresh commitment to cultivating 
a spirit of liberal learning among its undergraduates 
and its faculties, to encourage major efforts to improve 
the quality of teaching and learning. The University 
attempts to provide resources to ensure that these 
efforts can go forward in an atmosphere of continuous 
experimentation–of intelligent trial and error. Broad 
faculty participation is essential, and the unprejudiced 
testing of alternative ideas can be expected to generate 
vigorous debate. This is as it should be, since the stakes 
are high. The University aims to prepare its students 
not merely to function in our complex society, but to 
serve as leaders shaping society’s future directions. 
Chapter 14
Education
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For several decades following World War II, most 
large public universities focused their attention on 
building strong programs in the professions—building 
high-quality schools of law, medicine, business, 
engineering, agriculture, and so forth. Perhaps this 
was due to a sense of public responsibility. Or perhaps 
it was due to the demand for these programs from 
both students and employers. Whatever the reason, it 
is probably true that most institutions have invested 
the lion’s share of new resources in recent years in 
the graduate and professional schools rather than the 
quality of our undergraduate programs.
One might explain this by saying that curriculum 
reform is cyclic, and the pendulum is now swinging 
back after the deconstruction of undergraduate 
education accompanying student unrest in the 1960s. 
Clearly market forces are also at work. In many parts 
of the nation we experienced a major decline in the 
number of college-age students during the 1990s as 
we coasted down the backside of the post-war baby 
boom. Nothing like a demographic crunch to stimulate 
educational institutions to improve their product!
No more compelling challenge has faced our 
universities—particularly, our research universities—
than reaffirming our commitment to education, 
especially for undergraduates. If our undergraduate 
students are to love the process of learning, they must 
work closely with those who are deeply involved in 
the excitement of discovery. Students, we have learned, 
must be involved in the struggles for new knowledge. 
At the University of Michigan, instead of apologizing 
for our size, we began to take advantage of our unique 
strengths. We worked to connect undergraduates more 
directly with the vibrant intellectual activity going on 
around them—whether through hundreds of small 
seminars, student participation in faculty research 
projects, or broader community projects. Increasingly, 
even our youngest students are learning to question 
the authority of intellectual sources, instead of simply 
imbibing accepted truths. We assume they are creative 
actors, not just listeners. Our curriculum aims to 
involve students in the deep complexity of real-life 
problems, problems that have no “right” answers. 
Instead of giving students the facts of science or history, 
we strive to introduce them to the critical world views 
of scientists and historians.
Today’s complex social and intellectual problems 
overwhelm the limited resources of isolated individuals. 
In universities, in government, and in the business 
world, those who succeed are now those who collaborate 
with others. At the University of Michigan, from our 
science laboratories, to our engineering classes, to our 
art studios and concert halls, and beyond, we realized 
the need to organize student inquiry increasingly 
around teams.
Our professional schools also faced dramatic 
transformations. Our medical and business curricula 
needed to be restructured to reflect modern changes 
in practice. Our graduate programs required reform 
in order to reduce time to degree and to create more 
Undergraduate education is a core activity even in research universities such as the University of Michigan.
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opportunities for interdisciplinary majors. And 
technology such as MOOCs and connected learning 
drove new educational paradigms.
1960s
Although we have referred to the 1960s as a time 
of student protest and rejection of the established 
paradigm for the university, it was also a time of rare 
opportunity for experimentation in higher education. 
The “greatest generation” was determined to provide 
educational opportunities for their children, the baby 
boomers, and committed the necessary tax resources to 
build and expand the campuses of public universities. 
The University of California and the California Master 
plan are the most vivid examples of this, launching 
several new university campuses to explore different 
approaches to higher education, e.g., UC San Diego 
to explore an Oxbridge college approach to graduate 
education, UC Santa Cruz to focus on new approaches 
to undergraduate education, and UC Irvine, UC Santa 
Barbara, and UC Riverside to provide expanded 
education opportunities for a rapidly growing 
population.
In the early 1960s Michigan also benefited from 
relatively generous appropriations for both operations 
and facilities that allowed significant experimentation. 
New learning paradigms were explored with the Pilot 
Program of Alice Lloyd residence hall, a new program 
based on writing and the arts; the Residential College, 
a major living-learning effort located in East Quad and 
patterned after the colleges at Yale and Oxbridge, and 
the Honors Program, an interdisciplinary major for 
outstanding students. The University also developed 
a novel dual degree, Inteflex, which enabled strong 
students to enroll jointly in LS&A and Medicine, thereby 
not only gaining assurance of admission to Medicine 
when they first entered the University, but coordinating 
programs to cut a year off of the time required for the 
M.D. Engineering launched the world’s first curricula 
in new technologies such as nuclear engineering and 
computer engineering.
Unfortunately, by the late 1960s, state funding was 
already beginning to show signs of instability, and state 
funding for academic facilities began a slow decline. 
Furthermore, as the baby boomers moved through 
college ages, a baby bust was projected that provided 
little incentive for further expansion of higher education 
in the state.
1970s and 1980s
With the emergence of disruptive student activism 
and then later the erosion of state support, the 
University had other priorities during the latter years 
of the 1960s and the 1970s, and the innovation in 
academic programs languished. Facing a 30% drop 
in state support over a three-year period in the early 
1980s, the University launched a major “lifeboat” 
exercise in an effort to better focus limited resources. 
Initially three academic units were selected for review: 
the Schools of Education, Art, and Natural Resources, 
using the classical trilogy of quality, centrality, and cost. 
In the end, only the School of Education took a major 
cut, 50%, along with several other units such as the 
University Extension Service and Michigan Media. 
Ironically, over the course of the decade there were 
not only cuts but growth in some units. The path to a 
better university focused efforts on research, graduate 
education, professional training, and professional 
service, since these (and not undergraduate education) 
were the key to the University’s reputation. The 
leadership believed that only if the University was 
recognized as a leader among its peers and had financial 
strength and independence could it then afford and 
seek excellence in education. The economic needs of 
the state stimulated major growth in engineering and 
business programs. And the appearance of pervasive 
computer networks through the learning environment 
gave rise to efforts to explore new technology-intensive 
learning paradigms.
Yet, as our colleagues in elite private institutions 
have known for so long, the cornerstone of any 
distinguished academic institution is its undergraduate 
college. This college and those intellectual disciplines 
that derive from these programs form the academic 
heart, the intellectual core of our institutions, and over a 
period of time will determine both the distinction of the 
institution as well as the strength of its other endeavors 
in the professions, in research, and in service.
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New facilities were created for undergraduates and new international programs were launched.
1990s
The University of Michigan has long been firmly 
committed to the principle that research universities 
can and should play an important but unique role in 
undergraduate education. To reflect this, during the 
1990s the University leadership was determined to 
provide our undergraduates with an experience which 
draws on the vast intellectual resources of the modern 
research university: its scholars, its libraries and 
museums, its laboratories, its professional schools, its 
remarkable diversity of people, ideas, and endeavors. 
The intent was to expose our students to the 
excitement of great minds struggling to extend the 
bounds of knowledge. Of course we recognized that the 
scholars we placed in the classroom were not always 
the best teachers of knowledge in the traditional sense. 
But we were convinced that only by drawing into 
the classrooms faculty with strong commitments to 
scholarship could we stimulate our students to develop 
the skill at inquiry across the broad range of scholarly 
disciplines that is so essential to life in an age of rapidly 
expanding knowledge.
Michigan aimed to develop in our students both the 
ability and will to strive for knowledge. We believed 
that a critical component of an undergraduate education 
in a research university is the development of the will 
to seek and the skill to find knowledge. We should 
expose our students to the diversity, the complexity, 
and the pluralism of peoples, cultures, races, and ideas 
that can only be found in the intellectual melting pot 
of the modern research university. And we must also 
accept our mission to educate the leaders of American 
society. Indeed, if past experience is any guide, most of 
the leaders of this nation will continue to be produced 
by our great research universities.
The University set firm priorities on restoring core 
support for both LS&A and improving the quality of 
undergraduate education. This was done both through 
the provision of additional operating funds as well 
as special initiatives which benefited LS&A, e.g., 
the priority given to rebuilding the natural sciences, 
additional funding designed to improve the quality 
of first year undergraduate education, and special 
salary programs for outstanding faculty. However, 
in later years, the University went beyond this to 
launch an ambitious program to renovate or rebuild 
all of the buildings housing LS&A programs, which 
had deteriorated during the 1970s and 1980s as the 
University had addressed other capital priorities such 
as the new University Hospital. In the decade from 1985 
to 1996, the University invested more than $350 million 
in capital facilities for LS&A, essentially rebuilding the 
entire Central Campus area.
Improving the quality of the undergraduate 
experience became a clear priority of the University 
with the creation of the Undergraduate Initiative 
Fund to provide over $1 million per year of grants to 
faculty projects aimed at improving undergraduate 
education. The common thread throughout these 
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initiatives was grassroots involvement. The University 
sought proposals, ideas, and participation in defining 
programs from our faculty, students, and staff. It aimed 
to invest resources in a way that would motivate our 
most creative people to become involved and to become 
committed. 
The first awards in this program created an 
interesting portfolio of new initiatives. It supported 
the development of a new series of core curriculum 
courses in the liberal arts. Instruction in science and 
mathematics for the first two undergraduate years 
underwent major revisions. New initiatives were 
aimed at better integrating the arts such as theater, 
dance, and music into the undergraduate curriculum. 
Major pedagogical needs were addressed in areas as 
teaching assistant training. Substantial action was taken 
to improve counseling and sensitivity to pluralism in 
the University. The Undergraduate Initiative Fund also 
approved a number of student proposals, ranging from 
undergraduate colloquia to faculty fellow programs 
in the residence halls, to on-line counseling and 
information services on our campus computer network, 
to an alternative career center. 
LS&A launched a major effort to improve the quality 
of its introductory courses, and it received national 
acclaim for its efforts in areas such as chemistry, 
biology, and mathematics. It introduced a broad array 
of seminar courses taught by senior faculty for first 
year students. And efforts were made to create more 
learning experiences outside of the classroom through 
student research projects, community service, and 
special learning environments in the resident halls. 
So, too, other schools such as Engineering, Business 
Administration, Art, and Nursing launched major 
efforts to improve undergraduate education.
Similar efforts were launched to improve the quality 
of graduate and professional education. The School 
of Medicine completely restructured the medical 
curriculum to provide students early in their studies 
with clinical experience. Business Administration 
redesigned its MBA program to stress teamwork and 
community service. Engineering introduced new 
professional degrees at the masters and doctorate level 
to respond to the needs of industry for practice-oriented 
professionals. The School of Dentistry underwent a 
particularly profound restructuring of its educational, 
research, and service programs. The Institute for Public 
Policy Studies was restructured into a new School of 
Public Policy. The School of Library Science evolved into 
a new School of Information, developing entirely new 
academic programs in the management of knowledge 
resources.
The University’s professional schools continued to 
develop and offer high quality continuing education 
programs. Of particular note was the Executive 
Management Education of the Business School–ranked 
by some as the nation’s leading program–and an array 
of postgraduate professional education programs 
conducted by Medicine, Law, and Engineering.
International education was also given high priority 
The University has also provided state-of-the-art facilities for cyberenabled 
learning, such as the Duderstadt Center and the Angell-Haven cluster.
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during the 1990s. Following planning efforts led by 
the provost in the 1980s, a series of steps were taken to 
broaden and coordinate the University’s international 
activities. Michigan joined its Big Ten colleagues as a 
member of the Midwestern University Consortium 
for International Activities (MUCIA), the leading 
university organization for international development. 
The University created a new International Institute 
to coordinate international programs. It continued 
to expand its relationship with academic institutions 
abroad, with particular emphasis on Asia and Europe. 
Of particular note were the distance learning efforts 
of the Business School, which used computer and 
telecommunications technology, along with corporate 
partnerships, to establish overseas campuses in Hong 
Kong, Seoul, Paris, and London.
2000s
Perhaps the largest change in the nature of education 
at Michigan during the first decade of the 21st century 
was due to the impact of the massive enrollment 
growth of over 10,000 students (25%) designed to 
increase tuition revenue from out-of-state students. 
This has had a major impact on the nature of instruction 
in those academic units with large enrollments, i.e., 
LS&A and Engineering, and within these colleges, large 
departments such as economics, psychology, electrical 
engineering, and mechanical engineering. Since tenure-
track faculty size has grown only modestly during 
this period, most of the additional instructional load 
has been handled using non-tenure track instructors, 
e.g., lecturers, adjunct faculty, and graduate teaching 
assistants.
These schools have attempted to moderate the 
impact of increasing dependence on lecturers, part-time 
faculty, and teaching assistants by providing additional 
seminars and explored the possibility of technology-
based learning such as blended classrooms. Yet the 
reality is that the lower division of undergraduate 
instruction has become quite similar to that provided 
by community colleges, with very little opportunity for 
first and second year students to become engaged with 
senior faculty members of the University.
Another change in the educational environment 
of a more national character has been the dramatic 
decline over the past decade in the time students 
spend on academic pursuits. The rule of thumb 
during the 1960s-1980s was that for every hour spent 
in class, students were expected to dedicate two hours 
of study and class preparation (e.g., for a 15 credit 
hour course loads, students were expected to spent 
30 hours in additional study). Yet recent surveys 
indicate that today’s student spends less that 10 hours 
a week studying. Of course, part of the burden of this 
reduction in learning effort must rest with the faculty 
whose assignment loads apparently no longer require 
such effort. And it is also the case that there are many 
extracurricular activities available with significant 
learning opportunities. Yet it is also the case that an 
increasing number of students, particularly those from 
affluent backgrounds, come to the university to “pay 
for the party”, with a priority given to social activities 
such as fraternities and sororities or entertainment 
venues such as big-time college sports.
A third change in the educational experience in 
recent years has been driven by rapidly evolving 
technology. To be sure, many students spend inordinate 
time in social networking, e.g., Facebook and Twitter. 
However technology infrastructure plays a critical 
role in course management systems (e.g., CTools and 
Canvas) that enable not only the management of 
lectures and assignments but also access to instructors 
and other students. As we will note later, new learning 
paradigms such as Massively Open Online Courses 
(MOOCs) and cognitive tutors could drive massive 
change in the learning paradigms. But thus far, on 
most major campuses such as Michigan, these more 
advanced learning technologies are still used only 
by a few faculty members in a highly experimental 
phase, such as “flipped” classes in which students are 
expected to come to class prepared to enter discussions 
rather than listen to lectures. 
However there is one area where technology 
has already penetrated deeply into the curriculum 
by providing students with unusual tools and 
environments for creativity. For example, the creation of 
objects using 3-D printers, virtual reality environments, 
hacker fairs for software development, or the design 
and creation of new electronic devices has now become 
commonplace in the advanced workspaces and studios 
of the University. Key in these “maker” efforts are not 
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only the tools but even more important expert staff 
with both skills in the crafts of such technology but also 
the ability to teach students these skills. In fact, many of 
our most outstanding teachers are those craftsmen who 
can train students in the use of advanced technology to 
help them transform their ideas into reality.
The Road Ahead
To most students and parents, the purpose of a 
college education is to earn the college degree necessary 
for a good job, for personal economic security and well-
being. Many of today’s students approach their college 
education with very definite career goals in mind. 
They enroll with plans to become doctors or engineers 
or lawyers or teachers. While many will change their 
minds during their undergraduate years, most will 
emerge with specific career goals still uppermost in 
mind.
Employers reinforce this utilitarian approach. The 
recruiters they send to campus are looking for very 
definite skills. Perhaps they seek something highly 
specific such as a particular undergraduate major or 
Internet navigation skills. Or perhaps they seek some 
evidence that the student can communicate well and 
work comfortably in a diverse environment. Students 
are extremely sensitive to these signals from the 
employment marketplace, and the experience other 
students have with job interviews and placements can 
have a very significant impact on their own educational 
plans.
In a sense, the university is caught between the 
contradictory forces of responding to more pragmatic 
goals of students and employers while providing the 
liberal education that provides a student with the 
broader skills important for good citizenship and 
a meaningful life. Furthermore, in a world of ever-
changing needs, one objective of an undergraduate 
education certainly must be to prepare a student for a 
lifetime of learning. The old saying that the purpose of 
a college education is not to prepare a student for their 
first job but rather their last job still has a ring of truth.
Two data points provided by recent surveys are 
of interest in this regard. In longitudinal studies of 
their graduates, several universities asked alumni 
to rank the value of their various experiences while 
undergraduates. Inevitably the alumni tended to rank 
as most valuable their interactions with faculty and 
other students (the community theme again). Lowest 
in value was the actual content learned through formal 
courses. 
A more recent survey actually suggests that the 
earnings potential of those students with liberal arts 
majors may in fact be greater than those in more 
technical majors such as business. Of course one reason 
might be that students from the liberal arts generally 
plan on further education at the graduate level in 
various professional programs such as law or medicine. 
But this advantage could also be due to the broader 
learning experiences characterizing the liberal arts, 
which better prepare students for adapting to multiple 
careers later in life.
This view is reinforced by surveys of CEOs of major 
American corporations who when asked what they 
most sought in today’s college graduates, tended to 
respond: the ability to communicate, the willingness 
to continue to learn, the capacity to value and manage 
diversity, and the desire to drive change. Again, 
particular curricular content was not high on the list. 
There is a certain irony here. The contemporary 
university provides one of the most remarkable learning 
environments in our society—an extraordinary array 
of diverse people with diverse ideas supported by an 
exceptionally rich array of intellectual and cultural 
resources. Yet we tend to focus most of our efforts 
to improve undergraduate education on traditional 
academic programs, on the classroom and the 
curriculum. In the process, we may have overlooked the 
most important learning experiences in the university.
Think about it from another perspective. When 
asked to identify the missions of the university, we 
generally respond with the time-tested triad: teaching, 
research, and service. Yet undergraduate education is 
usually thought of only from the perspective of the first 
of these missions, teaching. Clearly, we should broaden 
our concept of the undergraduate experience to include 
student involvement in other aspects of university life.
For example, at a research university, every 
undergraduate should have the opportunity—or 
perhaps even be required—to participate in original 
research or creative work under the direct supervision 
of an experienced faculty member. While the few 
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students who have been fortunate enough to benefit 
from such a research experience usually point to it as one 
of the most important aspects of their undergraduate 
education, most see their education only through the 
more standard curriculum. Interestingly enough, many 
faculty members who have supervised undergraduate 
research projects also find it to be an exhilarating role, 
since undergraduate students are frequently more 
questioning and enthusiastic than graduate students!
So too there is ample evidence to suggest that 
students’ learning benefits significantly from 
community or professional service experiences. Such 
activities provide students with experience in working 
with others and applying knowledge learned in formal 
academic programs to community needs. Since many 
students arrive on campus with little experience in 
relating to broader community values, the experience 
of doing something for others can be invaluable.
In fact, major studies suggest that knowledge is 
created, sustained, and transformed in “communities 
of practice.”  Learning is seen as a form of membership 
that evolves as the individual engages in the practices 
and activities of the community, which becomes 
the living repository of knowledge. While there are 
numerous opportunities for volunteer community 
service in all universities, a more structured approach 
would be valuable in better aligning these experiences 
with the goals of an undergraduate education. Indeed, 
such community or professional service might even 
be considered as a requirement for an undergraduate 
degree.
There seems little doubt that the undergraduate 
experience needs to be reconsidered from a far broader 
perspective. Better alignment with the multiple 
missions of the university—providing undergraduates 
with education through teaching, research, and 
service—would seem an appropriate goal for most 
universities. All too frequently each of the missions 
of the university is associated with a different 
component—a liberal education and teaching with the 
undergraduate program, research with the graduate 
school, and practical service with professional schools. 
However, in reality, all components of the university 
should be involved in all of its missions—particularly 
undergraduate education.
Today’s college graduate will face a future in which 
perpetual education will become a lifetime necessity 
since they are likely to change jobs, even careers, many 
times during their lives. To prepare for such a future, 
students need to acquire the ability and the desire to 
continue to learn, to become comfortable with change 
and diversity, and to appreciate both the values and 
wisdom of the past while creating and adapting to the 
new ideas and forms of the future. These objectives are, 
of course, those that one generally associates with a 
liberal education.
What is unique about education at universities 
such as Michigan? What is the “market niche” of the 
comprehensive research university? We all share 
a serious commitment to scholarship as well as a 
commitment to unusual breadth across a rich diversity 
of academic disciplines, professional schools, and social 
and cultural activities. We have all achieved an unusual 
degree of diversity in our students, faculty, and staff. 
Our campuses demonstrate an unusual degree of 
participation of faculty and students in the university 
decision process. And we all share in an unusually 
strong commitment to the quality of our students, our 
faculty, and our programs.
In a sense, the strength of our institutions depends 
upon our efforts to achieve an optimum blend of quality, 
breadth, and scale. We attempt to do a great many 
things, to involve and benefit a great many people, and 
we attempt to do everything very well. Furthermore, we 
attempt to achieve a balance among teaching, research, 
and service, as well as undergraduate education, 
graduate education, professional education, and 
faculty scholarship and development. It is important to 
note that we do not view achieving this balance as a 
conflict among competing goals. Rather we view it as 
an opportunity to exploit an important creative tension.
It is this blend of missions that provides the research 
university with such a unique environment for 
undergraduate education. We are not, nor should we 
try to imitate, a small liberal arts college, with a faculty 
chosen primarily for their teaching skills and with 
a curriculum limited both by design and resources. 
Rather, we are large, comprehensive universities, 
spanning almost every intellectual discipline and 
profession. We have the capacity to attract and sustain 
many of the world’s leading scholars. We provide 
intellectual resources unmatched elsewhere in our 
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society, whether in the extent of our library and museum 
collections, or in the laboratory facilities we provide, or 
in the exotic new tools of our intellectual trades ranging 
from supercomputers, to the sophisticated equipment 
required for solid-state electronics and recombinant 
DNA research, to the expensive instrumentation used 
for positron emission tomography in our medical 
centers.
Yet it is important to stress that Michigan’s approach 
to undergraduate education is built upon the liberal 
arts–the humanities and arts, the social and natural 
sciences–as conveyed by its College of Literature, 
Science, and Arts. As President, Harold Shapiro once 
framed the objectives of a liberal education at Michigan 
as:
 “The need to better understand ourselves and 
our times, to discover and understand the great 
traditions and deeds of those who came before us; 
the need to free our minds and our hearts from 
unexamined commitments in order to consider 
new possibilities that might enhance both our own 
lives and build our sympathetic understanding 
of others quite different from us; the need to 
prepare all thoughtful citizens for an independent 
and responsible life of choice that appreciates the 
connectedness of things and peoples.” (Shapiro, 
1988) 
So, where do the liberal arts fit into the contemporary 
university? Of course, for the medieval university, they 
comprised the curriculum for free men (from the Latin 
liberalis) rather than those skills characterizing the 
servile arts (like masonry and engineering). Although, 
originally identified by the disciplines of the trivium 
(grammar, logic, and rhetoric) and later the quadrivium 
(geometry, arithmetic, astronomy, and music) that 
comprised the curriculum of the medieval university.
Each age has added further to the liberal arts, e.g., 
the humanities, the physical and biological sciences, 
and the social sciences in the 19th and 20th century. 
Still excluded from the liberal arts are topics that are 
specific to the professions such as medicine, pedagogy 
(i.e., education), business, and of course, engineering! 
As Shapiro notes, additional objectives have also 
been added to the concept of a liberal education, such 
as freeing of the individual from previous ideas, the 
disinterested search for truth, the pursuit of alternative 
ideas, the development and integrity of the individual, 
and the power of reason. Here, it is important to 
acknowledge that the content of a liberal education for 
the 21st Century continues to evolve. 
As difficult as it is to define and as challenging 
as it is to achieve, perhaps the elusive goal of liberal 
learning remains the best approach to prepare students 
for a lifetime of learning and the capacity to both adapt 
to and occasionally drive change.
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During past eras of challenge and change, Congress 
has acted decisively to create innovative partnerships 
to enable its universities to enhance American security 
and prosperity. While engaged in the Civil War, 
Congress passed the Morrill Land-Grant Act of 1862 to 
forge a partnership between the federal government, 
the states, higher education, and industry aimed at 
creating universities capable of extending educational 
opportunities to the working class while conducting 
the applied research to enable American agriculture 
and industry to become world leaders. The results were 
the green revolution in agriculture that fed the world, 
an American manufacturing industry that became the 
economic engine of the 20th century and the arsenal of 
democracy in two World Wars, and an educated middle 
class that would transform the United States into the 
strongest nation on earth. 
A hundred years later, emerging from the Great 
Depression and World War II, guided by a critical 
report, Science, the Endless Frontier, drafted by Vannevar 
Bush, head of the wartime research, Congress acted 
once again to strengthen this partnership by investing 
heavily in basic research and graduate education on 
the campuses. The national research policies adopted 
at that time created a partnership between the federal 
government and the nation’s leading universities. 
These policies were based on the premise that the 
nation’s health, economy, and military security required 
continual deployment of new scientific knowledge, and 
that the federal government was obligated to ensure 
basic scientific progress and the production of trained 
personnel in the national interest. They declared that 
federal patronage was essential for the advancement 
of knowledge. These policies also accepted a corollary 
principle: that the government had to preserve “freedom 
of inquiry,” to recognize that scientific progress results 
from the “free play of free intellects, working on 
subjects of their own choice, in the manner dictated by 
their curiosity for explanation of the unknown.” 
This effort succeeded in building the world’s finest 
research universities, capable of providing the steady 
stream of well-educated graduates and scientific 
and technological innovations central to our robust 
economy, our vibrant culture, our vital health enterprise, 
and our national security in a complex, competitive 
and challenging world. This expanded research 
partnership enabled America to win the Cold War, put 
a man on the moon, and develop new technologies 
such as computers, the Internet, GPS, and new medical 
procedures and drugs that have contributed immensely 
to national prosperity, security and public health. 
As important as research universities are today in 
our everyday lives, it seems clear that in the future, they 
will play an even more critical role. They will become 
the key players in providing the knowledge resources—
knowledge itself and the educated citizens capable 
of applying it wisely—necessary for our prosperity, 
security, and social well-being. As Erich Bloch, 
former Director of the National Science Foundation, 
stated in Congressional testimony: “The solution of 
virtually all the problems with which government is 
concerned, health, education, environment, energy, 
urban development, international relationships, space, 
economic competitiveness, and defense and national 
security, all depend on creating new knowledge—
and, hence, upon the health of America’s research 
universities.” 
The University of Michigan can lay claim to being 
one of the earliest research universities in America, 
adopting Wissenschaft, a culture of scholarship, from 
the German universities, hiring faculty who were 
scholars as well as instructors, and building one of 
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the largest telescopes in the world in the 1850s under 
the leadership of its first president Henry Tappan. He 
expected his faculty to teach, to push back the frontiers 
of knowledge, and to initiate their students into a world 
of intellectual exploration. 
1950s-1960s
From its creation, Michigan has provided 
leadership in research that continued well into the 
20th century, intensifying following WWII with 
federal policies that established university campuses 
as the source of the majority of the nation’s basic 
research. Michigan participated aggressively in this 
new environment. The University’s involvement in 
wartime research was quickly transformed into major 
research activities through Project Michigan at the 
Willow Run Laboratories in areas such as electronics, 
remote sensing, and computing. The presence of 
one of the nation’s leading programs in aerospace 
engineering established Michigan as a leading research 
center in rocket science and spaceflight, including 
astronaut training. The relocation to the University of 
leading social science research programs from WWII 
established the Institute for Social Research, which in 
turn stimulated the rapid evolution of the social science 
disciplines on the campus into world leaders. Similar 
advances were made in biomedical research, with the 
clinical trials demonstrating the effectiveness of the 
Salk vaccine in the 1950s, heart transplant surgery in 
the 1960s, and the early development of human gene 
therapy with the discovery of the gene responsible for 
cystic fibrosis and the subsequent effort in molecular 
medicine of the 1980s.
It was also during the post-World War II era 
that Michigan became known as a world leader in 
interdisciplinary programs. Much older programs, 
such as our many international area studies programs 
and the Horace H. Rackham School of Graduate 
Studies, were joined by new ones, including the 
Michigan Memorial Phoenix Project, the Institute for 
Social Research, the Howard Hughes Medical Research 
Institute, the Institute for Science and Technology, and 
literally hundreds of other institutes, centers, programs, 
seminars, and other informal groups.
1970s
In the late 1960s and 1970s, under President 
Robben Fleming, the University reviewed its research 
priorities. At that time, over half of the research 
funding at Michigan came from military projects, and 
a number of investigators were engaged in classified 
research. After much debate and campus protests, the 
faculty voted to restrict classified studies. At the same 
time, the University divested itself of the Willow Run 
laboratories, which were supported almost entirely 
by the military, dropping the level of military funding 
on campus to below 10 percent of the total. Finally, in 
another important decision, the faculty established the 
“end-use” rule, prohibiting “any classified research 
contract with the specific purpose of which is to 
destroy human life or to incapacitate human beings.” 
This again represented a new post-war realization of 
the importance of university research to the rest of the 
world, and of the University’s responsibility to consider 
the ultimate impact of its discoveries.
Although few new departments were created during 
this period, the tendency toward specialization within 
departments increased. Departments became more 
splintered of loose confederations of faculty in rarefied 
subfields who had more in common with peers in their 
disciplines at other universities than with campus 
colleagues. Generous funding for the sciences also 
widened the already immense gulf between the social 
sciences, the natural sciences, and the humanities.
Since the effort of faculty to attract external grants 
for funding research and graduate education was 
so critical, the University explored special efforts to 
provide incentives for grantsmanship, as well as to make 
the case for faculty support of indirect cost recovery 
as critical to adequate funding research grants. While 
chair of the Academic Affairs Advisory Committee to 
both Provost Frank Rhodes and Harold Shapiro, Jim 
was able to make the case for strong incentives for such 
efforts, including grants based on the percentage of 
indirect cost recovery and PhD student participation. 
Although this was not implemented in the 1970s, it 
was later funded in the 1980s by Provost Billy Frye and 
remains in place today.
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1980s
Simultaneously with the effort to encourage 
faculty to seek grants, the University also moved to 
adopt a far more aggressive stance toward technology 
transfer. In the late 1980s it modified its intellectual 
property policies to provide more faculty incentives 
for transferring knowledge developed on the campus 
through patents, startup companies, and industrial 
partnerships. Advisory groups were formed to assist in 
technology transfer and small business development. 
The University also worked to build strong partnerships 
with private sector companies, for example, the 
partnership to develop the Internet with IBM and MCI, 
the Fraunhofer Institute with the German government 
and local industry, and the Tauber Manufacturing 
Institute with a consortium of business partners.
The University was successful in convincing 
the State of Michigan to create an annual Research 
Investment Fund that would invest $25 million each 
year in technology ventures aimed at economic 
development in the State. The College of Engineering 
was able to capture $10 million of these funds for 
three initiatives: the Solid State Electronics Laboratory, 
Advanced Manufacturing program, and Robotics effort. 
In addition, it also received $1 million per year to create 
an Applied Physics program between Engineering and 
Physics. Over the next several years these funds became 
a part of the base budget of the College.
1990s
The chairmanship of the National Science Board, 
both the nation’s leading science policy body as well 
as the board of directors for the National Science 
Foundation, provided Jim an excellent opportunity as 
the University’s president to strengthen the University’s 
research activities. 
Four key themes were converging during the 
1990s: i) the importance of the university in an age 
in which knowledge had become a key factor in 
determining security, prosperity, and quality of life; ii) 
the global nature of our society; iii) the ease with which 
information technology and telecommunications 
enabled the rapid exchange of information; and iv) 
networking, the degree to which informal cooperation 
and collaboration among individuals and institutions 
was replacing more formal social structures such as 
governments and societal structures.
Michigan was determined to play a significant role 
in all of these arenas. During the 1980s, the University 
had recruited some of the nation’s leaders in these 
areas, including Doug Van Houweling from Carnegie-
Mellon, Lynn Conway from Xerox, Doug Hofstadter 
from Indiana, and Randy Frank from Utah, who joined 
campus leaders such as Dan Atkins, Bernie Galler, John 
Holland, Richard Phillips, and Eric Aupperle. Drawing 
from the experience of major projects such as the 
statewide MERIT computer network, Van Houweling 
headed up a major effort that led the University to join 
corporate partners IBM and MCI to build and manage 
the NSFnet, the backbone of the rapidly developing 
Internet. This positioned the University to play a key 
leadership role in the evolution of the “information 
superhighway”, as it evolved into a worldwide 
network linking hundreds of millions of people. Even 
as the University provided this national leadership, it 
was continuing to make substantial investments in its 
oncampus information technology environment that 
kept it at the cutting edge for students, faculty, and staff.
Rather than focusing its efforts to develop 
sophisticated computing capability for a handful of 
scholars, as did many other universities who invested 
in supercomputers, Michigan instead followed a 
philosophy of “power to the people”–namely, to 
provide as much computer and networking capability 
as possible to as many members of the University 
community as it could. It was determined to provide 
students and faculty with maximum flexibility and 
few constraints, so they could let their creativity and 
curiosity drive their use of these resources. 
Through close cooperation with industrial leaders 
such as IBM, Apple, Sun, MCI, Xerox, and Hewlett-
Packard, the University established itself as a clear 
leader in the quality of its information technology 
environment for teaching and research. It played a key 
role in developing much of the technology used today 
in the Internet, and it managed the transition from time-
sharing mainframe systems to client-server networks. 
Through innovative programs such as the Fall Kickoff 
Computer Sales by which sophisticated computer 
systems were sold to students at deep discount, the 
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Rescomp program that placed numerous clusters 
of advanced computers directly into the residence 
halls, and the unusual array of oncampus computing 
resources and centers–including massive facilities such 
as the Angell-Haven Computer Center and the Media 
Union–it provided students with extraordinary access 
to this technology.
By the mid-1990s, Michigan was recognized 
throughout the world as one of the most important 
leaders in the development, application, and use of 
digital technology. It was exceptionally well positioned 
for leadership as this rapidly evolving technology 
revolutionized the nature of an increasingly knowledge-
driven civilization.
The University also began to play a leadership role 
in the digital age, through its leadership of the national 
digital library project, the evolution of its School of 
Library Science into a new School of Information 
focused on the management of digital information, 
and the Media Union which established Michigan as 
a leader in the development and use of multimedia 
technologies. Major investments were made in the 
research capability of the University through new 
research facilities (e.g., three major medical science 
research buildings, new physics and chemistry 
laboratories, and a major expansion of the laboratories 
of the College of Engineering). 
Furthermore, the University’s government relations 
efforts in both Lansing and Washington were increased 
with the establishment of permanent offices and 
Chair, National Science Board Chair, Advsory Committee on Cyberinfrastructure
Member, NRC Committee on Science, Engineering
and Public Policy (COSEPUP
Chair, NRC Committee on Information Technology
and the Reseach University
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additional staff, as well as a strategic focus on key 
research initiatives. Similarly, the University was far 
better positioned to compete effectively for major 
federal research grants, including the establishment 
of major national centers such as the NSF Center for 
Ultrafast Optics, the National Cancer Research Center, 
the Human Genome Project, and the many programs of 
the Institute for Social Research. 
As a result, the University of Michigan’s ranking 
with respect to the amount of sponsored research 
activity rose from its traditional rank of 7th or 8th 
nationally to overtake MIT and Stanford to be ranked 
1st in the nation. Put another way, by this measure, by 
the 1990s, the University could rightly claim the title 
of America’s leading research university. Beyond the 
impact that such research had on society in areas such 
as genetic medicine, public policy reform, information 
technology, and humanistic studies, this dimension 
of University activity greatly added to the intellectual 
excitement on campus and brought instructional 
programs to the cutting edge of the knowledge base.
2000s
Throughout the first decade of the 21st century, the 
University of Michigan has remained one of the world’s 
leading research universities. The level of its research 
activities continued to increase. However there were 
new challenges.
Although there was initially optimism that the 
federal government was prepared to make the strong 
investment in its research universities with the 
doubling of the budget of the National Institutes of 
Health, other federal priorities such as two wars (Iraq 
and Afghanistan), health care for an aging population, 
tax cuts, and a weakening economy soon undermined 
this research support. While the NIH budget was 
initially doubled, stimulating universities to build new 
biomedical research facilities and hire more faculty 
and postdoctoral researchers, this support has fallen 
off by over 40%. The hope generated by the passage of 
the American Competes Act in 2007 that would have 
doubled the funding of NSF, DOE Science, and NIST 
has rapidly faded with new pressures on Congress to 
limit expenditures (although there was a brief burst 
of support associated with one-time funding aimed 
at stimulating the economy following the recession 
of 2008-2009). A conservative Congress has shifted 
its attention away from investments in the future 
through research and education, putting large research 
universities at risk.
The University of Michigan maintained its status 
as the nation’s leader in research expenditures (rising 
to $1.32 billion in 2013). However the erosion of NIH 
funding by Congress coupled with stagnant funding 
in the physical sciences and engineering forced the 
University to commit more internal resources ($384 
million in 2013) to sustain research groups and service 
the debt on new research facilities. 
Despite the erosion in federal research support, 
the University continued its efforts to increase its 
research activity with the acquisition of the Pfizer 
Duderstadt Center Angell-Haven Computer Center
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Global Research Center to build a North Campus 
Research Center, funded by $108 million by the Medical 
Center and providing facilities for joint University-
industry research. There was also heightened activity 
in identifying promising intellectual property and 
assisting faculty in entrepreneurial efforts to bring it to 
market.
There were also many new research programs. 
The University had long been a leader in research in 
energy sciences, technology, and policy. However 
a presidential committee recognized that more was 
needed to position Michigan for the unusual challenges 
and opportunities presented by the need to increasingly 
shift the nation to carbon-free energy sources. To 
this end the faculty recommended and the Regents 
approved a new Michigan Energy Institute that would 
support multidisciplinary energy research across the 
University. The Institute was designed as an enabling 
rather than an operational or managing organization, 
serving to focus the broad spectrum of University 
energy expertise and programs. Its functions are to 
coordinate (research projects, partners, or clients), to 
serve as a clearinghouse linking expertise both on and 
off campus, to assist in identifying and developing 
research opportunities (perhaps enabled with seed 
funding), to market the University’s capabilities in 
energy research (to government, industry, and the 
public), to stimulate the development of educational 
programs, and to manage those facilities designed to 
support University-wide, multidisciplinary research 
activities. New facilities for the Michigan Energy 
Institute were built adjacent to the Phoenix Memorial 
Laboratory, which also broadened its research activities 
beyond nuclear research.
A second major program, also created by a 
University-wide committee, was the program in 
Science, Technology, and Public Policy (STPP) located 
in the Ford School of Public Policy. In response to 
increasing demand for experts in the politics and 
processes of science and technology policymaking as 
well as a need for sustained intellectual engagement on 
these issues, the STPP aims to develop both educational 
and research initiatives in this area. This program 
addresses two primary questions. First, it explores 
“science and technology for policy”: how science and 
technology are used to develop public policy in a broad 
array of domains such as national security, public 
health, economic competitiveness, and environmental 
sustainability. Second, it examines “policy for science 
and technology”: how policies are developed to 
promote beneficial scientific and technological 
development at the international, national, state, and 
local levels, such as the allocation of research funding 
and regulation of new research and technologies. 
As one of the world’s leading research universities, 
typically ranked among the top three in the nation in 
research activity across an unusually broad range of 
disciplines, the STPP program provides the University 
of Michigan with both an important opportunity and 
significant obligation to influence policy development 
in science and technology. 
Of particular importance were the various leadership 
roles Jim was able to play in organizations such as 
the National Academies of Science, Engineering, and 
Growth in UM Research Volume (inflation adjusted)Michigan Energy Institute
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Medicine, federal agencies such as the Department of 
Energy, the National Science Foundation, and various 
White House initiatives, which greatly enhanced the 
visibility and influence of the University. In recognition 
of this leadership role in serving the nation through 
public service, in 2015 he received the Vannevar Bush 
Award, the nation’s leading recognition for leadership 
in science and technology policy.
The Road Ahead
Today, our nation faces new challenges, a time of 
rapid and profound economic, social, and political 
transformation driven by the growth in knowledge 
and innovation. A decade into the 21st century, a 
resurgent America must stimulate its economy, address 
new threats, and position itself in a competitive world 
transformed by technology, global competitiveness, and 
geopolitical change. Educated people, the knowledge 
they produce, and the innovation and entrepreneurial 
skills they possess, particularly in the fields of science 
and engineering, have become key to America’s future. 
Restoring the nation’s research capacity will require 
a balanced set of commitments by each of the partners–
federal government, state governments, research 
universities, and business and industry-to provide 
leadership for the nation in a knowledge-intensive 
world and to develop and implement enlightened 
policies, efficient operating practices, and necessary 
investments. It is important to create linkages and 
interdependencies among these commitments that 
provide strong incentives for participation at comparable 
levels by each partner. Success will require a decade-
long effort when both challenges and opportunities are 
likely to change, evolving from an early emphasis on 
more efficient policies and practices to later increases in 
investment as the economy improves.
Yet today, many research universities are forced 
to subsidize underfunded sponsored research grants 
from resources designated for other important 
university missions, such as undergraduate tuition 
and patient fees for clinical care. This is no longer 
acceptable and must cease. If the federal government 
and other research sponsors would cover the full costs 
of the research they procure from the nation’s research 
universities, they, in turn, could hold steady or reduce 
the amount of funding from other sources they have 
had to provide to subsidize this federal research. 
Universities should be able to allocate their various 
resources more strategically for their intended purpose. 
Both sponsored research policies and cost recovery 
negotiations should be applied in a consistent fashion 
across all academic institutions.
In a similar spirit, both the federal government 
and the states should reduce or eliminate regulations 
that increase administrative costs, impede research 
productivity, and deflect creative energy without 
substantially improving the research environment.
Over the past two decades, in the face of shifting 
public priorities and weak economies, states have 
decimated the support of their public research 
universities, cutting appropriations per enrolled 
student by an average of 35 percent, totaling more than 
$15 billion each year nationally. (McPherson, 2009) Yet, 
The 2015 Vannevar Bush AwardUM Ranking in research expenditures
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even as the states have been withdrawing the support 
necessary to keep these institutions at world-class levels, 
they have also been imposing upon them increasingly 
intrusive regulations. As the leader of one prominent 
private university put it, “The states are methodically 
dismantling their public universities where the majority 
of the nation’s campus research is conducted and two-
thirds of its scientists, engineers, physicians, teachers, 
and other knowledge professionals are produced.” 
(Holliday, 2012)
Hence, the nation must challenge the states to 
recognize that the devastating cuts and meddlesome 
regulations imposed on their public research 
universities is not only harming their own future, but 
also putting at great risk the nation’s prosperity, health, 
and security. While strongly encouraging the states to 
begin to restore adequate support of these institutions 
as the economy improves, we also urged them to move 
rapidly to provide their public research universities with 
sufficient autonomy and agility to navigate an extended 
period with limited state support. One way to stimulate 
this would be new federal programs to support critical 
university needs such as new faculty positions and 
infrastructure needs (e.g., cyberinfrastructure) though 
funds that would require match from state or private 
contributions.
It is important that the relationship between 
business and higher education should shift from that 
of a customer-supplier—of graduates and intellectual 
property—to a peer-to-peer nature, stressing 
collaboration in areas of joint interest and requiring 
joint commitment of resources. Strong support of a 
permanent federal tax for research and development 
and more efficient management of intellectual property 
by businesses and universities to improve technology 
transfer are also needed. Such a tax credit would 
stimulate new research partnerships, new knowledge 
and ideas, new products and industries in America, and 
new jobs. Better management of intellectual property 
would result in more effective dissemination of research 
results, thus also generating economic growth and jobs.
Although universities seek high efficiency in 
their teaching and research–particularly public 
universities in the face of eroding state support, it is 
essential that the nation’s research universities strive 
even harder to address the concerns of the American 
public that their costs are out of control. To this end, 
universities should set and achieve bold goals in cost-
containment, efficiency, and productivity. They should 
strive to constrain the cost escalation of all continuing 
activities—academic and auxiliary—to the national 
inflation rate or less through improved efficiency and 
productivity. This will require the development of more 
powerful, strategic tools for financial management and 
cost accounting, tools that better enable universities to 
determine the most effective methods for containing 
costs and increasing productivity and efficiency. It is 
essential that universities, working together with key 
National Academies Study of Research Universities American Academies Study of U.S. Research
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constituencies, intensify efforts to educate people about 
the distinct character of American research universities 
and cease promoting activities that create a public sense 
of unbridled excess on campuses.
Research universities should restructure doctoral 
education to enhance pathways for talented 
undergraduates, improve completion rates, shorten 
time-to-degree, and strengthen the preparation of 
graduates for careers both in and beyond the academy. 
(Wendler, 2010) To this end, the federal government 
should achieve a better balance of fellowships, 
traineeships, and research assistantships. Both 
universities and research sponsors should address the 
many concerns characterizing postdoctoral research 
appointments including the excessive length and low 
compensation of such service and the misalignment 
of these experiences with career opportunities. Such 
efforts would increase cost-effectiveness and ensure 
that we can draw from the “best and brightest” for our 
nation’s future doctorates.
Research universities should intensify their efforts 
to improve science education throughout the education 
ecosystem, including K-12 and undergraduate 
education. Furthermore, all research partners should 
take action to increase the participation and success 
of women and underrepresented minorities across all 
academic and professional disciplines and especially 
in science, mathematics, and engineering. As careers 
in STEM fields continue to expand, recruiting more 
underrepresented minorities and women into those 
fields is essential in order to meet the workforce needs 
of our nation and to secure economic prosperity and 
social well-being.
Federal agencies should make visa processing for 
international students and scholars who wish to study 
or conduct research in America as efficient and effective 
as possible, consistent also with homeland-security 
considerations. This should include the possibility of 
granting residency to each foreign citizen who earns a 
doctorate in an area of national need from an accredited 
research university (“attaching a green card to each 
diploma”).
While achieving these goals will be challenging, 
particularly in a rapidly changing economic 
environment, it is important to state what is needed 
and then to develop implementation strategies in 
collaboration with the various constituencies that are 
key to achieving these goals.
Clearly such actions would require significant policy 
changes, productivity enhancement, and investments 
on the part of each member of the research partnership: 
the federal government, the states, stakeholders 
such as business and philanthropy, and most of all, 
the nation’s research universities. However, these 
recommendations do comprise a fair and balanced 
program that will generate significant returns to the 
nation. Such commitments are necessary for the future 
prosperity, health, and security of America.
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The comprehensive university is a distinctively 
American institution. These unique institutions 
are a primary societal mechanism for the creation, 
preservation, and dissemination of knowledge through 
their educational and research activities. They are also 
expected to apply this knowledge to serve society as a 
whole. In many ways, the university has become the 
very embodiment of the American dream. It provides 
opportunity through education. Its research fuels the 
progress of industry, the quality of health care, and the 
security of our nation. Its cultural activities enrich our 
lives. It helps to protect our natural environment. It 
accepts a profound responsibility to serve our society at 
a multitude of levels.
Public service represents the “real-world” extension 
of the research, teaching, and professional expertise 
of the faculty. The support of public universities 
through general taxation implies particular service 
responsibilities, and the commitments that such 
institutions are willing to assume for society cannot 
remain implicit. The public has the right to ask how 
public universities are responding to its needs, and 
these institutions have an obligation to provide a clear 
answer.
Our universities are also at the forefront of efforts to 
create new jobs from new knowledge. Our technology-
transfer activities encourage researchers to bring their 
discoveries to the marketplace. As the world economy 
enters a time of unpredictable change, the university 
is working hard to ensure that our nation sustains 
momentum as an economic powerhouse. We work 
directly with business and industry, helping to produce 
and compete more efficiently.
Research universities are particularly responsive to 
national needs, working closely with government and 
industry to strengthen national security in both wartime 
and peace. They have embraced a mission to stimulate 
economic prosperity through the transfer of technology 
from the campuses into industry and the marketplace. 
As a haven for those in critical need, our medical 
centers have served society with the most advanced 
care for decades. Each year, our emergency helicopters 
transport thousands of critically-ill patients, our 
hospitals serve millions, and our doctors develop 
the medical breakthroughs of the future. From cuts 
and bruises to the most traumatic injuries and life-
threatening illnesses, our academic health centers 
provide a sense of security and hope.
Most large universities have launched a diverse 
range of efforts to strengthen local communities. Many 
programs draw on the expertise of all the university’s 
schools and colleges, supporting local communities 
with healthcare, economic development, environmental 
assessment, and other services. Some programs are 
based on student volunteers and internship. As critical 
catalysts for change, community service projects draw 
students, faculty, and staff into neighborhoods to serve 
and to learn that our true community encompasses the 
world, not just the campus.
Many public universities have extended their reach 
and impact beyond their communities, states, and the 
nation to address global needs. Since modernizing 
agriculture was one of the primary goals of the land-
grant acts, it is not surprising that the nation’s land-grant 
universities have been long involved in international 
activities, first extending the green revolution of 
modern agricultural science and today embracing 
broader agendas such as feeding the world–not an 
insignificant challenge with the population explosions 
in underdeveloped regions such as Africa (anticipating 
feeding a population of 2.3 billion in 2050.) The land-
grant universities have been joined by those with the 
Chapter 16
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health sciences providing global outreach in public 
health and medical care.
Today’s university is more heavily involved than 
ever in public service activities, ranging from economic 
development to health care delivery to strengthening 
inner-city schools. Yet, in this world of intense 
economic competition, technological change, and social 
complexity, public universities are continually besieged 
by requests, demands, and exhortations to do even 
more to serve the public.
In the late 20th Century, the public’s willingness to 
support higher education tends to be determined not by 
the value placed on its traditional missions of teaching 
and scholarship, but instead, by the perception of 
direct and immediate benefit stemming from its public 
service activities. Populism and parochialism are again 
affecting public attitudes toward higher education. The 
themes of today are no longer “excellence in teaching 
and research,” but, rather, “excellence for whom and 
for what purpose”—or, more to the point, “What have 
you done for me lately?”
Michigan’s Service Mission
Clearly the University of Michigan has great impact 
on the state. Consider for example, some of its state-
specific statistics
200,000 alumni, 42,000 employees who live and 
work in Michigan
24,000 students enrolled from the state of Michigan
2 million visits by state residents to UM hospitals 
and clinics
$1.5 billion in UM purchases from 45,500 Michigan 
companies
$7 billion of revenue attracted into the state
Yet the more directed activity of public service has 
always been an important component of the mission of 
the University of Michigan. Perhaps President James 
Angell articulated this best:
“Perhaps in no other particular is the contrast 
between the old college and the new university more 
marked than in the close relation of the university, and 
especially the university in the West, to the public and 
to the schools. It is not easy for us to realize how great 
an extent the college of 50 years ago was isolated from 
the public. By the great mass of common people it was 
regarded as the home of useless and harmless recluses, 
of the mysteries of whose life they knew nothing and 
for whose pursuits they cared nothing. But we all know 
how conspicuous most of the universities have been 
in recent years. They have abandoned their monastic 
seclusion. They have sought to make their aims and 
their life known to the public and to interest all classes 
of men in their welfare. Public and private generosity 
thus rival each other in the hearty support of the 
universities which have had the wisdom to dedicate 
themselves with all their resources to public service.” 
The University evolved with the State of Michigan, 
responding to its needs as its economy and society 
expanded and diversified. From the earliest days the 
The scale of the University of Michigan is shown in the colored areas on an aerial of Ann Arbor.
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The impact of the service activities of the University have been immense, from nuclear science 
to industrial technology to pharmaceutical research to robotics to the Internet to the Hathitrust.
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University was animated by social purpose through 
the social responsibility expected of its graduates to 
justify public investment, the faculty commitment to 
educating undergraduates to civil and practical life, 
and the improvement of public institutions throughout 
the state. Later, as research, professional training, and 
graduate education took firm hold, these too were 
infused with public purpose. Indeed, from its founding, 
the University of Michigan has been identified as one 
of the most progressive forces in American higher 
education, establishing a strong tradition of service to 
the society that supported it.
Michigan engineers and scientists were instrumental 
in developing the technologies necessary to defend the 
nation during world wars, including remote sensing 
and satellite reconnaissance. Michigan was heavily 
involved in both aeronautical engineering and space 
science and spaceflight. The University developed the 
first research and educational programs concerning the 
peaceful uses of atomic energy. Their School of Public 
Health performed the clinical trials for the Salk polio 
vaccine, and their medical school developed not only 
an array of clinical treatments but also launched early 
programs in human gene therapy. And its work in 
computer networks and digitization led to the Internet 
and digital libraries.
To illustrate this in more detail, it is useful to consider 
two of the most significant areas of the University’s 
public service: clinical care and economic development.
An Example of Public Service: 
The Academic Medical Center
Perhaps the best example of the manner in which 
the missions of education, research, and service 
interweave is the academic medical center, certainly 
the most complex component of the university. 
Furthermore, its missions of education, research, and 
clinical care are conducted all on a scale that dwarfs 
most other university programs. There is also no part 
of the university that has experienced such powerful 
forces of change in recent years because of the profound 
changes in the ways in which health care is delivered 
and financed. There is also no part of the university that 
has required so much time and attention of university 
leaders.
American universities have long been an important 
source not only of physicians, nurses, dentists, 
pharmacists, and other health care professionals but 
also for health care through their hospitals and clinics. 
Medical education and practice has been an important 
priority for the University since its earliest days in 
Ann Arbor, and during the late 19th century Michigan, 
together with Penn and Columbia, defined the character 
of medical education within a graduate paradigm 
based upon laboratories and teaching hospitals. With 
one of the largest hospitals in the nation, built during 
the 1920s, the University became one of the leading 
providers of health care to the state and of medical 
research for the world.
Both the Medical School and the University 
Hospital experienced rapid growth throughout the 
post-war decades. This growth continued throughout 
the 1970s and 1980s, even as there were pressures to 
reduce the enrollments in the Medical School, arising 
from the growing awareness that there was an over 
supply of physicians—specialists in particular. Even 
though the Medical School reduced its enrollment of 
medical students by 30 percent during the 1980s (to 180 
students per class), the number of faculty in the School 
continued to grow to its present level of over 1,200, 
driven by the increasing clinical needs of the hospitals. 
Similarly, both the physical size and the level of patient 
activities of the University Hospital—more correctly 
“hospitals,” since the medical center spawned separate 
facilities for activities, such as pediatrics, maternal care, 
geriatrics, cancer treatment, ophthalmology, and so 
on—continued to grow through the 1980s and 1990s. 
Today, the university health system receives almost 
two million patient visits per year, with total revenues 
of $3.0 billion/year, ranking it as one of the largest 
academic medical centers in the nation.
The primary reason for this extraordinary growth 
was both the increasing health care needs of an aging 
population, and, of course, the need to generate revenue 
from patient care. Since the University Hospitals 
operates as an auxiliary unit of the University, without 
state or University subsidy, it needs to generate 
sufficient revenues to cover its expenses. Since scale 
determined market competitiveness, there were strong 
incentives for growth.
Yet the Medical Center faced major challenges in 
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The clinical services of the University of Michigan Hospitals
provide an extraordinary resource to the citizens of the State of Michigan.
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the later half of the 20th century as medical practice 
changed and the University’s clinical facilities needed 
to be upgraded. The University presidents of those 
years, notably Presidents Fleming, Smith, and Shapiro, 
“bet the ranch” on the Replacement Hospital Project, 
at $350 million, the largest project in the history of 
the University. Although this was an extraordinary 
gamble, particularly during the early 1980s when 
the state’s economy was in a deep recession, the new 
facility provided the University Medical Center with a 
highly competitive advantage as it came on line in the 
late 1980s. This, coupled with a series of restructuring 
and cost-reduction efforts led by UMH Director John 
Forsyth, rapidly positioned the University Hospitals 
as among the most profitable in the nation. Indeed, 
during the early 1990s, the Hospitals were routinely 
generating surpluses of $50 million or more each year. 
Hospital reserves grew to over half-a-billion dollars, 
and a combination of Hospital reserves and clinical 
income generated by Medical School faculty funded 
an extraordinary period of new research and clinical 
facilities, including sophisticated research laboratories, 
a new pediatric and women’s hospital, a cancer center, 
a geriatrics center, and extensive outpatient facilities. 
Yet the changes in health care delivery and financing 
continued to accelerate as increasing resistance to 
health care costs led to strong market forces driving 
intense competition and new health care organizations 
to provide managed care. Again, the leadership of the 
Medical Center was visionary and launched major new 
efforts such as the M-Care HMO, a network of primary 
care facilities scattered throughout southeastern 
Michigan, including a new medical campus in northeast 
Ann Arbor and important strategic alliances with 
hospitals and health care insurance providers.
As each wave of changes in health care swept 
across the nation, the University Medical Center, both 
because of commitments made in the past and an 
aggressive vision for the future, seemed to thrive and 
become even stronger. Today the renamed University 
Health System has grown to over $3.2 billion in clinical 
activity, and together with the teaching and research 
activities of the Medical School, represents almost 50% 
of the budget of the entire University. Yet today there 
are increasing concerns that the University Hospitals 
may have moved too far out on a limb in the expansion 
of clinical facilities. The massive investments in new 
facilities during the past decade (the $200 million 
Cardiovascular Center and the $760 million Mott 
Pediatrics Hospital) have driven operating revenues 
into the red, running deficits in the range of $100 million 
to $200 million a year over the past several years. While 
the $2.2 billion of UMH reserves generate sufficient 
investment income to compensate for these operating 
losses, the University soon will face the need to replace 
the massive Adult General Hospital, which is already 
showing obsolescence after only 30 years of operation 
(in part because of the new restrictions to private rooms 
because of the risk of infection and infrastructure such 
as elevator towers no longer able to handle the changing 
characteristics of the population served by the Hospital 
such as patient weight).
Today all academic medical centers are under great 
stress, because of both federal policy and the changing 
nature of the marketplace for health care. The rapid 
growth of managed care organizations (where payment 
is not structured around clinical services but on a fixed 
basis for maintaining the health of each individual) 
has changed dramatically the nature and financing of 
health care. The marketplace has become intensively 
competitive because of an excess of hospital capacity, 
and the entry of for-profit organizations. Because of 
the high costs associated both with the tertiary clinical 
mission and teaching function, many academic medical 
centers face serious financial challenges today that 
threaten their very survival. 
Compounding these challenges is the Affordable 
Health Care Act, passed in 2010, which attempts to 
rapidly expand the availability of health care to the 
millions of Americans currently without health care 
plans, while controlling costs. Although under continual 
attack by conservative political forces, the role of 
government in creating and supporting national health 
care policy has been adopted by almost all nations, 
and the further evolution toward more government 
influence on the marketplace seems inevitable.
In simple terms, what is really occurring is a shift 
in the risk associated with providing health care.  In 
the past, the “fee-for-services” payment system placed 
most of the risk on third-party payers, such as the 
federal government or insurers. Physicians and patients 
were focused on the quality, rather than the costs, of 
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health care, since others picked up the tab. Managed 
care shifts the risk from third party payers to health 
care providers. Managed care organizations negotiate 
a fixed cost per person, regardless of the costs of their 
medical treatments. The burden is placed on health 
care providers to manage the costs of maintaining the 
health of the “managed lives” in the contract. In most 
academic medical centers, this risk has been borne 
initially by the hospitals.
It is increasingly clear that for teaching hospitals 
to survive, they must have increasing freedom to 
control their costs—to operate like a business—with 
attention given to the bottom line, even if this conflicts 
on occasion with their teaching and research mission. 
In particular, most teaching hospitals are taking a far 
more aggressive stance toward negotiating physician 
services from their associated medical schools. In 
practical terms, this means that they are seeking to shift 
the risk associated with health care costs once again, 
this time to the clinical faculty and the medical school. 
The implications, both for medical schools and their 
host universities, are serious indeed.
Economic Development
Research universities have become important 
players in regional economic development. The 
key ingredients in technology-based economic 
development are technological innovation, technical 
manpower, and entrepreneurs. Research universities 
produce all three. Through their on-campus research, 
they generate the creativity and ideas necessary 
for innovation. Through their faculty efforts, they 
attract the necessary “risk capital” for economic 
development through massive federal R&D support. 
Through their education programs they produce the 
scientists, engineers, and entrepreneurs to implement 
new knowledge. They are also the key to knowledge 
transfer, both through traditional mechanisms, such as 
graduates and publications, as well as through more 
direct contributions such as faculty/staff entrepreneurs, 
the formation of start-up companies, and strategic 
partnerships with business and industry.
The Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 reflected the federal 
interest in the transfer of technology from the campuses 
into the marketplace and permitted universities and 
small businesses to retain title to inventions developed 
with federal R&D funds. Furthermore, there is ample 
evidence to support the impact of research universities 
on technology-driven economic development. We need 
only look at MIT’s impact on the Boston area, Stanford’s 
and UC-Berkeley’s impact on Northern California, 
Caltech’s impact on Southern California, and the 
Research Triangle activity stimulated by the University 
of North Carolina, North Carolina State University, and 
Duke University.
In examining such experiences, one can identify 
several key stages to technology transfer:
To attract the key people;
To create the knowledge;
To facilitate the transfer of knowledge;
To create a sufficiently entrepreneurial culture both 
on and off campus;
To form or attract new companies; and
To help these companies grow and flourish.
The new knowledge necessary to stimulate economic 
activity flows directly from the research performed by 
universities. Estimates suggest that over 50 percent of 
the new job growth in America can be traced to new 
knowledge coming out of our research laboratories. 
Through research grants and contracts, the federal 
government, augmented by industry, foundations, 
and internal university support, supplies the resources 
for the development of new knowledge. But here it is 
important to keep in mind that such support continues 
to be provided primarily through a competitive process 
based upon merit review. The quality of the faculty 
and students determines the quality of the proposals 
and hence the success in attracting external support for 
research. There is strong evidence that the most highly 
ranked universities attract the most research support, 
generate the most new knowledge, and thus stimulate 
the most regional economic development. Excellence 
determines impact. 
Research universities—particularly public research 
universities—have a major obligation to make every 
effort to transfer intellectual properties resulting from 
their academic activities into the private sector where 
they will benefit society more broadly, in a manner 
consistent with their academic missions, of course. Such 
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technology transfer will occur most rapidly when those 
who create the new knowledge—faculty and staff—
have maximum incentive, opportunity, and support to 
transfer it to the private sector. A research university’s 
ability to recruit and retain outstanding faculty and 
staff will be increasingly influenced by the environment 
it provides to allow, encourage, and facilitate such 
knowledge-transfer activities. There is strong evidence 
suggesting that in many cases the best “academics” and 
“entrepreneurs” are one and the same!
Furthermore there is considerable evidence that 
interaction with the broader society is a critical factor in 
stimulating creative research in some areas. Knowledge 
transfer activities can have a positive impact on the 
quality of basic research since they create pressures to 
work in exciting, high risk, interdisciplinary areas to 
achieve the quantum leaps in knowledge not normally 
available in the industrial setting. In this sense, it 
is wrong to equate commercial value with applied 
research. Frequently the real barriers to application 
are due to a shortage of basic knowledge, only gained 
through fundamental research.
The University of Michigan has long accepted the role 
of transferring technology from its research programs 
to local and regional economic development. During 
the 1960s and 1970s, numerous companies were created 
in the Ann Arbor area, assisted by the University’s 
efforts to create sources of venture capital. In the 
1990s, intellectual property policies of the University 
were modified to give inventors not only streamlined 
legal and technology transfer activities, but to provide 
inventors with the right of refusal and ownership if 
they believed they could be more efficient in creating 
companies and products. New organizations such 
as the Industrial Technology Institute and the North 
Campus Research Center were launched to encourage 
and incubate spinoff activity.
However it should also be acknowledged that 
while technology transfer has been long regarded as an 
important mission of the University, it has been difficult 
to ignite the same level of economic activity that 
characterizes other high-tech hot spots such as Silicon 
Valley, Route 128, or the Research Triangle. In part, this 
has to do with the State of Michigan’s culture of “the 
big”, i.e., big companies, big unions, big government, 
and big universities. Hence the infrastructure of 
financial institutions and management expertise does 
not provide the nurturing environment for startups 
that characterize many other parts of the nation. In fact, 
several Michigan students and faculty members have 
been quite successful in starting technology-based 
companies elsewhere.
Yet there are several cautions that should be 
noted. Although many research universities look to 
reap financial benefits from equity interest in spinoff 
activities, the reality is that less than ten universities 
today generate more revenue from technology transfer 
activities than they spend on the lawyers and staff in 
their technology transfer offices. In almost every case 
where an actual “profit” has been made on the spinoff 
activity, this has resulted from a single big hit, usually in 
the pharmaceutical area (e.g., Wisconsin and Columbia). 
The Industrial Technology Institute The North Campus Research Center
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Hence it seems unlikely that most universities will reap 
substantial income through direct control of intellectual 
property through mechanisms such as patent licenses 
and equity interest in spin-off companies, at least in the 
near term. Institutions could gain substantial indirect 
benefits from aggressive technology transfer efforts 
through increased public support and private gifts. 
The strong support of Stanford by William Hewlett 
and David Packard is but one example. But the real 
motivation for technology transfer from the campus to 
the marketplace should be viewed as a form of public 
service, not as a profitable business.
Universities must take care to avoid a paternalistic 
attitude toward their faculty and staff. In perhaps well-
intentioned efforts to protect them from the harsh, 
cruel world of private enterprise, the university may 
constrain and frustrate those already experienced in 
such activities. It would also prevent the development 
of a learning process among others (albeit sometimes 
by the school of hard knocks), while removing the 
incentive for widespread faculty involvement in 
technology transfer activities. It is best to begin with the 
premise that faculty and staff in universities are mature, 
responsible individuals who will behave properly 
in balancing the university’s interests and their own 
responsibilities for teaching and research against their 
interests in intellectual property development and 
technology transfer. The key to avoiding conflict of 
interest is public disclosure.
In summary, knowledge transfer from the campus 
to the market will only succeed if we recognize that it 
is highly people-dependent. It is essential to stimulate 
and encourage the individual researcher-inventor 
to participate in these activities and to remove the 
constraints to provide maximum incentive and 
opportunity for this process to occur, but also to view 
this as a public service, indeed obligation, rather than 
as a source of riches.
Perhaps more important is the formation of strategic 
alliances between university researchers and industry 
and government. Such university-industry alliances 
should be viewed as symbiotic associations between 
two unlike organisms for the benefit of each. Of 
course, both industry and university have a “service to 
society” component. But their fundamental goals are 
quite different: industry seeks to make a profit, while 
universities seek to create and maintain knowledge 
and impart it to students. In a university-industry 
partnership, it is important that each partner focuses 
on what it does best.
While industry partnerships have existed for 
many years, they have tended to rely on traditional 
relationships, such as the hiring of graduates, the use 
of faculty consultants, or the sponsorship of research. 
Today, we face new challenges. The time required 
for technology transfer from university to industry 
must be reduced dramatically to meet the needs of 
existing companies and to spawn new industries. Yet 
academic institutions are ill equipped to respond to the 
highly focused immediate needs of industry without 
considerable disruption of on-campus responsibilities. 
We need to improve mechanisms for achieving direct 
industrial support of academe through financial 
assistance, equipment donations, and visiting staff. It 
The intellectual property resulting from the University’s research 
is used to generate new companies and prosperity.
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is clear that both industry and academia need stronger, 
more sophisticated, and sustained relationships 
with each other in order to respond to the needs and 
capabilities of each type of organization.
While technology transfer is important and the 
launch of new companies is an appropriate subject for 
instructional activities, the University should avoid 
jumping on the bandwagon of hype about creating 
“centers for entrepreneurship” or entrepreneurship 
courses for undergraduates in the hopes that the next 
Bill Gates, Larry Page, of Mark Zuckerberg will spring 
from their campuses. Only a tiny fraction of students 
have the character to become a true entrepreneur, and 
most of these will fail many times before achieving the 
rare success.
A final caution is appropriate here. Today many 
universities view technology transfer as a new source 
of wealth. They see dollar signs in the vision of the 
next Apple or Microsoft or Facebook (although these 
were all started by college dropouts...) But as we 
have noted earlier,, there are few riches available to 
most universities in technology transfer. Rather, their 
primary motivation for such activities should be 
serving society. Indeed, some universities are even 
considering viewing the intellectual property produce 
on their campuses as a “public good”, available to 
anybody subject to licensing restrictions that prevent it 
from being patented by others and restricted in use.
Other Service Activities
Services provided by the academic medical 
center and technology transfer represent highly 
organized and quite substantial organizations to 
provide University services. But for a major research 
university such as Michigan, there are countless service 
activities provided by faculty, staff, and students. For 
example, many faculty members contribute their time 
to important public service activities such as serving 
on scientific advisory bodies such as the National 
Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine or 
serving as technical consultants to federal agencies such 
as the National Science Foundation, the Department of 
Energy, or the Department of Defense. Many provide 
consulting services to industry or state agencies.
Major universities with a world-class presence 
also contribute important international services such 
as public health, economic development, or conflict 
resolution. Although such missions as international 
development were once a key mission of land-grant 
universities with their strong expertise in agricultural 
sciences, today all public universities have major 
international outreach activities. For example Michigan 
has extensive programs to assist sub-Saharan Africa in 
the development of public health and education. It has 
long had strong engagement with Asian nations, dating 
from over a century ago when President Angell, then 
serving as envoy to China, arranged for the reparation 
payments for the Boxer Rebellion to be kept in China 
to found a major technical university, Tsinghua, that 
today has become comparable to MIT in its quality 
and impact. Yet it is also very important today to avoid 
“colonial” approaches to globalization, e.g., establishing 
campuses in other parts of the world, but instead 
developing these as true peer-to-peer partnerships 
with other institutions seeking international activities. 
A good example here is the joint school of engineering 
operated by the University of Michigan and Shanghai 
Jiao Tong University.
Although the University does not have a school 
of agriculture, during the 1990s it joined with the 
land-grant universities as a member of the Midwest 
University Consortium of International Activities, 
participation in addressing global public health and 
economic development activities. With the emergence 
of the Internet, such global service activities became 
even more of a priority.
Lessons Learned
As we have noted, the relationship between the 
university and American society has evolved over the 
years and continues to do so today. In this sense, the 
mission of the University naturally acquires a trinity 
character of teaching, research, and service, or in more 
contemporary terminology, learning, discovery, and 
engagement.
The Land Grant acts established a model through 
which universities distributed and applied existing 
knowledge to serve an emerging industrial nation. The 
federal government-university research partnership 
shifted the emphasis to the generation of new 
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knowledge through campus-based research. Today, 
as the role of the federal government as a major agent 
in addressing social concerns has shifted to the states 
and the communities, the university will be expected 
to assume new roles. For example, the increasing pace 
in the development and application of knowledge 
requires forming new relationships with both private 
industry and government agencies. So, too, does the 
direct support of university activities by institutions 
in both the public and private sector. Our colleges are 
drawn into new and more extensive relationships with 
each passing day.
This is understandable because research universities 
have vast resources capable of contributing to public 
needs. They are civic institutions with a long history of 
building the nation through their educational, research, 
and service activities. Yet, despite this past history and 
contemporary need, few universities are strategically 
situated for public service. Few university leaders and 
even fewer faculty members would place public service 
toward the top of the university’s priorities. As Derek 
Bok put it, “Most universities continue to do their least 
impressive work on the very subjects where society’s 
need for greater knowledge and better education is 
most acute.” 
To be sure, the public service role can, if not 
carefully managed, undermine the stability of our 
educational institutions. Part of the challenge here is 
not only knowing what are appropriate public service 
activities to conduct, but also knowing when it is time 
to cease or spin off a particular service activity, and then 
to accomplish this task without alienating important 
constituencies of the university. There are times when 
a particular service activity has simply outlived its 
usefulness. At other times, a service activity might 
be more effectively and appropriately performed by 
other social institutions, perhaps in the private sector. 
And there are some occasions when the service activity 
becomes so large and complex that it begins to distort 
the fundamental academic character of the university. 
Many faculty members are concerned that much of 
university public service is simply not linked closely 
enough to its academic mission. But this may be in 
part a matter of definition, for it is clear that a very 
wide range of university activities do benefit both the 
campus and the public alike. For example, universities 
benefit the public directly through their libraries and 
museums (preservation of knowledge), their theaters 
and concerts (provision of aesthetic experiences), 
intercollegiate athletics (entertainment for the masses), 
their custodianship of the young, and a host of direct 
services including hospitals, testing laboratories, 
publishing companies, hotels and restaurants, and so 
on. While not an “extension service” in the traditional 
sense, these activities certainly provide important 
services to the public.
The basic functions of the university continue to be 
core academic activities. Other major activities of the 
university gain legitimacy only to the degree that they 
are linked with education and scholarship. In this sense, 
public service that is based on teaching and research is 
not a function but one of a number of principles that 
animate and guide the basic work of a university.
For example, the early growth of the Internet was 
managed by a consortium of universities through 
federally sponsored projects such as NSFnet. But in the 
1990s it became apparent that the rapid evolution of 
the Internet and its increasingly commercial character 
required that it be spun off to private contractors. Today 
there are many signs that the changing nature of health-
care delivery and financing may require the spin-off 
of major academic medical centers and health care 
systems. And some would contend that intercollegiate 
athletics—at least the commercially dominated sports 
of football and basketball that serve as a source of public 
entertainment—so threaten the academic integrity of 
the university that it is time that they be spun off before 
they damage our institutions.
This growing demand for our services may be one 
of our greatest contemporary challenges. Increasingly, 
the public’s willingness to support higher education 
tends to be determined not by the value placed on its 
traditional missions of teaching and scholarship, but 
rather by the perception of direct and immediate benefit 
through its public service activities.
One of the greatest challenges is balancing 
the various complex roles of the modern research 
university, even as these roles are rapidly changing. 
How does one achieve an optimum balance between 
teaching and research? Public service versus our role as 
an independent critic of society? The liberal arts and the 
professions? The tensions among these various roles 
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occur in part because of the incompatibility in the needs, 
values, and expectations of the various constituencies 
served by higher education.
This challenge is particularly difficult for the 
public research university since so many different 
constituencies must be served. In a sense, each of its 
constituencies responds to a different aspect or role of 
the university. The tax-paying public and its elected 
state representatives expect these institutions to serve 
state and national interests while providing access 
to education for peoples of diverse racial, cultural, 
and economic backgrounds. These groups tend to 
emphasize the teaching function of the university, which 
is both demanding and essential for the dissemination 
of knowledge.
Other constituents such as industry and the federal 
government believe these institutions also have 
important obligations as research centers to achieve 
and maintain the highest possible level of excellence in 
the discovery of ideas and knowledge. Governments 
and public-interest groups seek expertise applicable to 
current social problems, foreign policy issues, or health 
care needs. At the same time, various publics expect the 
university to create an environment that sustains the 
research and inquiry that sometimes requires years of 
labor before coming to fruition. The interaction of these 
various functions can be creative and enriching, but 
the contrasting expectations of diverse constituents can 
also lead to a conflict in missions.
Public service, in a restricted sense, is comprised 
of those activities that are aimed at serving the needs 
of society, as dictated by an agenda set by the public 
and its representatives, rather than the institution itself. 
Public service is in this context primarily a responsive 
activity, designed to respond to societal needs, rather 
than a proactive effort that is in alignment with the 
primary academic objectives of the university. Another 
common restricted definition construes public service as 
work that draws upon one’s professional expertise—an 
outgrowth of one’s academic discipline. This includes 
applied research for an external client, consultation 
and technical services, clinical work or performance, or 
instruction within continuing education programs. In 
this sense, public or “professional” service is an applied 
version of teaching or scholarship.
Unfortunately, it has been precisely these restrictive 
definitions of public service that have led to the 
diminishment of public support for higher education. 
While there continue to be complaints that higher 
education is unresponsive to the needs of society, 
quite the opposite is true since the competitiveness of 
American universities causes them to pay close attention 
to their constituencies. This intense desire to respond 
has, in fact, led many institutions to reallocate limited 
resources away from their primary responsibilities in 
teaching and research in an effort to generate more 
direct public awareness and support.
By attempting to respond to unrealistic public 
aspirations and expectations, by attempting to be all 
things to all people, higher education has whetted an 
insatiable public appetite for a host of service activities 
of marginal relevance to its academic mission. A quick 
glance around any community with a local university 
provides numerous examples of this, from extension 
offices for continuing education to medical clinics to 
incubation centers for high-tech business formation to 
athletic camps for K-12 students.
Yet such responsiveness to the needs—indeed, 
even the whims—of society by higher education may, 
in the long run, be counterproductive. Not only has it 
fueled an inaccurate public perception of the primary 
mission of a university and an unrealistic expectation 
of its role in public service, but it has also stimulated an 
increasingly narrow public attitude toward the support 
of higher education. A “What-have-you-done-for-me-
lately?”attitude now permeates federal, state, and local 
government. This fuels powerful forces of parochialism 
that force institutions to spread themselves ever more 
thinly as they scramble to justify themselves to their 
elected public officials. 
The Road Ahead
There is little doubt that the need for and the pressure 
upon universities to serve the public interest more 
directly will intensify. The possibilities are endless: 
economic development and job creation; health-care; 
environmental quality; the special needs of the elderly, 
youth, and the family; peace and international security; 
rural and urban decay; and the cultural arts. There is 
also little doubt that if higher education is to sustain both 
public confidence and support, it must demonstrate its 
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capacity to be ever more socially useful and relevant to 
a society under stress.
As we enter the age of knowledge, the traditional 
articulation of the mission of the university as a triad 
of teaching, research, and service may be too narrow. 
We need to consider more contemporary forms of 
our fundamental mission of creating, preserving, 
integrating, transferring, and applying knowledge. 
Yet, as the University responds to both the need 
and opportunity to intensify service activities, several 
caveats and suggestions seem appropriate:
While there continue to be complaints that higher 
education is unresponsive to the needs of society, 
quite the opposite is true, since the competitiveness 
of American universities causes them to pay close 
attention to their constituencies. This intense desire to 
respond has led many institutions to reallocate limited 
resources away from their primary responsibilities of 
teaching and research in an effort to generate more 
direct public awareness and support. By attempting 
to respond to unrealistic public aspirations and 
expectations, to be all things to all people, higher 
education has whetted an insatiable public appetite for 
a host of service activities of only marginal relevance to 
its academic mission.  
Yet such responsiveness to the needs—indeed, 
even the whims—of society by higher education may 
in the long run be counterproductive. Not only has it 
fueled an inaccurate public perception of the primary 
mission of a university and an unrealistic expectation 
of its role in public service, but it has also stimulated an 
increasingly narrow public attitude toward the support 
of higher education. Powerful forces of parochialism 
compel institutions to spread themselves ever more 
thinly as they scramble to “justify” themselves to their 
elected public officials. Faculty and administrators 
alike feel under intense pressure to demonstrate 
their commitment to public service, even when they 
recognize that this will frequently come at the expense 
of their primary academic missions.
It is important to always remember that education 
and scholarship are the primary functions of a 
university, its primary contributions to society, and 
hence the most significant roles of the faculty. When 
universities become overly distracted by other activities, 
they not only compromise this core mission but they 
also erode their priorities within our society. Yet, 
public service must be a major institutional obligation 
of the American university. The public supports the 
university, contributes to its finance and grants it an 
unusual degree of institutional autonomy and freedom, 
in part because of the expectation that the university 
will contribute not just graduates and scholarship, but 
the broader efforts of its faculty, staff, and students in 
addressing social needs and concerns. It is some concern 
that the role of public service in higher education has 
not received greater attention in recent years, since this 
was an original mandate for many of our institutions. 
Our institutions need a continually refreshed vision 
of their role that responds to the ever-changing needs of 
the society we serve. As we evolve along with broader 
society, the linkages between us become more varied, 
complex, and interrelated. Within this context of 
change, it is clear that public service must continue to be 
an important responsibility of the American university.
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Mention Ann Arbor, and the first image that 
probably comes to mind is a crisp, brilliant weekend 
in the fall: walking across campus through the falling 
leaves to Michigan Stadium; gathering at tailgate 
parties before the big game; the excitement of walking 
into that magnificent stadium–“the Big House”–with 
110,000 fans thrilling to the Michigan Marching Band 
as they step onto the field playing “Hail to the Victors.”
Intercollegiate athletics provide some of the very 
special moments: The excitement of a traditional football 
rivalry such as Michigan vs. Ohio State. Or, perhaps, 
special events such as a Rose Bowl or a NCAA Final 
Four. Intercollegiate athletics programs at Michigan are 
not only an important tradition at the University, but 
they also attract as much public visibility as any other 
University activity. 
They are also a critical part of a university president’s 
portfolio of responsibilities. As any leader of a NCAA 
Division I-A institution will tell you, a president 
ignores intercollegiate athletics only at great peril--both 
institutional and personal. There is an old saying in 
presidential circles that the university might be viewed 
as a very fragile academic entity, delicately balanced 
between the medical center at one end of the campus 
and the athletic department at the other. The former can 
sink it financially–the latter can sink it through public 
gaffs.
Although it is perhaps understandable that a large, 
successful program such as Michigan would dominate 
the local media, it also has more far-reaching visibility. 
Michigan receives far more ink in the national media–
the New York Times or the Washington Post or even the 
Wall Street Journal–for its activities on the field that it 
ever did for its classroom or laboratory contributions. 
This media exposure is due in part to the University’s 
long tradition of successful athletics programs of 
high integrity. It also stems from the increasingly 
celebrity character of college sports: successful and 
quotable coaches such as Bo Schembechler and Jim 
Harbaugh, outstanding players such as Tom Brady, 
Desmond Howard, Cazzie Russell and Jaylen Rose, 
and flamboyant teams such as the Fab Five, and the 
extraordinary scale of Michigan athletics, with a 
football stadium averaging 110,000 spectators a game.
The popularity of Michigan athletics is a two-
edged sword, however. While it certainly creates great 
visibility for the University–after each Rose Bowl or 
Final Four appearance, the number of applications for 
admission surges–it also has a very serious potential for 
instability. Every college athletic department, no matter 
how committed and vigilant its leadership, nevertheless 
can depend on an occasional misstep. After all, most 
college student-athletes are still in their teens; the great 
popularity of college sports attracts all hangers-on to 
key programs, some well-intentioned, some not; there 
is intense pressure from the sports media; and the 
NCAA rulebook is larger and more complex than the 
Chapter 17
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Michigan takes the field!
222
United States Tax Code.
Perhaps far more serious is the extraordinary 
emotional attachment that ordinarily rational people 
can develop toward college sports–at least toward 
successful programs. We have all seen how fans behave 
at sporting events–not simply cheering the favored 
team on, but taunting the opposition, berating officials, 
and even occasionally booing their own players and 
coaches. For many, this emotional involvement extends 
far beyond simply the moment of athletic competition. 
After a series of disappointing seasons, boosters and 
alumni are not only likely to call for the firing of the 
coach, but for the athletic director and the president as 
well. Why not get rid of the whole @#$%& bunch?! And 
their one-dimensional view of the university through 
their sports binoculars is not only conveyed to other 
fans, but to legislators and regents as well–folks who 
have the power and sometimes the inclination to do 
really serious damage!
Corner any university president in a candid 
moment, and he or she will admit that many of the 
problems they have with the various internal and 
external constituencies of the university stem from 
athletics. Whether it is an appropriate concern about 
program integrity, or a booster-driven pressure for 
team success, or media pressure, or over-involvement 
by trustees, presidents are frequently placed in harm’s 
way by athletics. As a result, whether they like it or not, 
most presidents learn quickly that they must become 
both knowledgeable and actively involved in their 
athletics programs. As Peter Flawn, former president of 
the University of Texas, put it in his wonderful “how-
to” book on university leadership, “If you don’t like or 
understand college football, learn how to fake it”.
1960s
Far more histories have been written about Michigan 
athletics than have been written about the University 
itself. The names of Michigan’s sports heroes—Yost, 
Crisler, Harmon—are better known than any members 
of Michigan’s distinguished faculty or its presidents. 
Tellingly, most of these histories have been written by 
sportswriters, former athletic directors, coaches, or fans. 
Hence it seems both appropriate and amusing to provide 
a brief historical corrective from our perspective of long 
time members of the UM community and service in an 
array of Michigan leadership roles.
Although the legends of the good old days of 
Michigan athletics make enjoyable reading, this 
purpose is better served by beginning somewhat later, 
in the mid-1960s, when Michigan athletics, and college 
sports more generally, began their mad dash toward the 
cliff of commercialization. During today’s heady times 
of national championships and lucrative television 
and licensing contracts, Michigan fans sometimes 
forget that the University’s athletics programs have 
not always been so dominant. During the 1960s, the 
Michigan football program had fallen on hard times, 
with typical stadium attendance averaging 60,000 
to 70,000 per game (about two-thirds the capacity of 
Michigan Stadium). Michigan State University, just up 
the road, drew most of the attention with its powerful 
football teams—actually, this was part of President John 
Hannah’s strategy to transform Michigan Agricultural 
College into a major university. Furthermore, student 
interest on activist campuses such as Michigan’s had 
shifted during the 1960s from college athletics to 
political activism, with great causes such as racial 
discrimination and an unpopular war in Vietnam to 
protest.
There were, nevertheless, a few bright spots in 
Michigan’s athletic fortunes. Michigan’s basketball 
team had enjoyed considerable success in the mid-
1960s, with Cazzie Russell leading the team to the 
NCAA championship game, only to lose to an upstart 
UCLA team (which would then dominate the sport 
for the next decade). Largely as a consequence of this 
success, the University used student-fee-financed 
bonds to build a new basketball arena, Crisler Arena, 
named after former football coach and athletic director 
Fritz Crisler. Actually, this facility was also known to 
many as simply “the house that Cazzie built.”
Some of the other athletics programs were also 
successful. The ice hockey team won the national 
championship in 1964. Swimming began what was to 
become a three-decade long domination of the Big Ten 
Conference. There were considerable accomplishments 
in other sports such as wrestling, track, and gymnastics. 
But, at Michigan, football was king, and when the 
football fortunes were down, students and fans were 
apathetic about Michigan athletics.
223
This began to change in the late 1960s. Although 
many attribute Michigan’s turnaround to a new athletic 
director, Don Canham, reputed to be the shrewd 
marketing genius who transformed Michigan athletics 
into a commercial juggernaut, most of the faculty 
saw the situation somewhat different. Following 
the advice of the former football coach Bump Elliot, 
Canham recruited a talented young football coach, Bo 
Schembechler, who revitalized the Michigan program 
in his first year, beating Ohio State and going to the 
Rose Bowl. The sports scene in southeastern Michigan 
strongly supports winners, and within a couple of 
years, Michigan Stadium began to sell out on a regular 
basis. It doesn’t take a rocket scientist—or a Michigan 
faculty member, for that matter—to realize that if one 
can regularly fill the largest football stadium in the 
country with paying customers, prosperity and success 
soon follow. And indeed it did, since year after year 
Michigan fielded nationally ranked football teams.
The annual matchup between Michigan and 
Ohio State, often personified as a battle between 
Bo Schembechler and Woody Hayes, soon grew to 
mythical proportions. Fans experienced some initial 
frustration because of a Big Ten Conference rule, which 
allowed only the conference champion to compete in a 
bowl game, the Rose Bowl. However the quality of the 
Michigan and Ohio State teams during the early 1970s 
soon forced the Big Ten to relax this rule, and Michigan 
began to add a bowl game to its schedule every year.
To be sure, Canham was inventive. He began to market 
Michigan football in sophisticated ways. For instance, 
he arranged for planes to pull banners advertising 
Michigan football over Detroit’s Tiger Stadium during 
the 1968 World Series. He launched the practice of 
mass-mailed advertising and catalogs of souvenir 
items. Michigan athletics began to function more as 
a business, complete with marketing, advertising, 
and promotion, along with the development of new 
commercial activities. To many, Canham became the 
stereotype of the athletic director CEO-czar who would 
drive college sports into a commercial entertainment 
industry.
1970s-1980s
During the 1970s and 1980s, for all intents and 
purposes, Michigan athletics was a one-sport program. 
Football ruled the roost, and other sports were clearly 
secondary priorities. Taking a more objective look at 
this era, one cannot help but note that while several of 
the men’s programs competed effectively within the Big 
Ten Conference, none were regarded as national leaders. 
Don Canham, defining the AD Czar Coach Bo Schembechler
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In fact, Michigan went twenty-five years without a 
national championship in any sport, from 1964 when Al 
Renfrew’s hockey team won the national championship 
until 1989 when Steve Fisher’s basketball team won the 
Final Four. Even the football team, generally nationally 
ranked during the season, always fell short by season’s 
end, either losing to Ohio State in the season finale or in 
its annual bowl appearance.
While Michigan’s leadership in commercializing 
college sports was successful in generating new 
revenues, this was not viewed as necessarily beneficial 
to the University’s image and reputation, at least by 
the faculty. The Athletic Department’s increasing 
autonomy largely eliminated any substantive role of 
the faculty in governing intercollegiate athletics. While 
other universities moved rapidly to introduce varsity 
programs for women, Michigan remained largely 
fossilized in a prehistoric state of football-dominated 
men’s sports. In fact, in 1976, Michigan became a 
test case for gender discrimination in intercollegiate 
athletics under Title IX of the Higher Education Act. 
Indeed, it remained one of the few universities to field 
only male cheerleaders (other than Yale) well into the 
1970s.
Although Michigan had long had a reputation for 
successful programs, there were warnings as early as the 
1970s about systemic flaws in its Athletic Department. 
Although in theory the athletic director reported 
directly to the president, the Athletics Department 
used its proclaimed financial independence to skirt 
the usual regulations and policies of the university 
and operate according to its own rules and objectives, 
usually out of sight and out of mind of the university 
administration. Its financial success, due almost entirely 
to Schembechler’s success in filling Michigan Stadium 
on football weekends in the fall, led to a mindset 
within the Department that it was administratively 
separate from the rest of the University and therefore 
not subject to the rules and policies governing other 
units. The Athletic Department routinely ignored 
University regulations and policies concerning 
personnel, financial accountability, and conflict of 
interest. Although criticized from time to time for 
the increasing independence and commercialism of 
Michigan athletics, Canham usually shrugged it off, 
pointing to Schembechler’s winning football teams and 
the department’s financial health. Yet the “Michigan 
model,” in which the revenues from the football 
program—due primarily to the gate receipts generated 
by the gigantic Michigan Stadium—would support all 
other athletic programs, would eventually collapse, as 
the need to add additional programs (e.g., women’s 
sports), coupled with an unwillingness to control 
expenditures, led to financial disaster by the late 1990s. 
The vast gulf between the Athletic Department and 
the University isolated student-athletes from academic 
life and coaches and staff from the rest of the University 
community. The recruiting philosophy of high visibility 
programs such as football and basketball shifted 
during the 1970s, away from recruiting strong students 
who were outstanding athletes to recruiting, instead, 
outstanding athletes with marginal academic ability, 
athletes who would “major in eligibility” as long as 
they could compete. While this generated winning 
programs, it would eventually erode the integrity of 
the department and lead to scandal. The University 
experienced one of its most serious rules violations in its 
modern history during the 1980s, with a major scandal 
in the baseball program involving slush funds, illegal 
payments to players, and recruiting violations, that led 
to the firing of the coach and the acceptance of NCAA 
sanctions. Further investigation of the Department at 
that time revealed numerous violations of University 
policies that arose from weak management and 
inadequate oversight.
Following a effort by basketball coach Bill Frieder 
to promise admissions to recruits with inadequate 
academic credentials that led to their rejection by 
the Office of Admissions, it was necessary to use 
the authority of the provost to reestablish control of 
admissions and academic eligibility for student athletes. 
As provost, Jim stepped in to negotiate new admissions 
constraints on the coaches of football, basketball, and 
hockey. But the high visibility of Michigan athletics and 
the myth of its financial wealth and autonomy could 
continue to haunt the university for years to come. This 
vast separation between Michigan athletics and the rest 
of the University posed a real challenge. 
Hence in the late 1980s an effort was launched 
to “mainstream” Michigan athletics with the goals 
and culture of an academic institution. There was an 
important symbolism associated with the leadership 
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for this effort coming from the Office of the Provost, 
since as the University’s chief academic officer, the 
involvement of the provost made a strong statement 
that athletics should be related to the academic nature 
of the university. The effort began by arranging a 
series of events that brought together student-athletes 
and coaches in various academic settings—museums, 
concert halls, and such. The goal was to stress that 
student-athletes were students first, and that coaches 
were, in reality, teachers. In the process of arranging 
and hosting these events, it soon became apparent that 
the isolation among sports programs was just as serious 
as the chasm between the Athletic Department and the 
rest of the University. Students and coaches enjoyed 
the opportunity to meet participants from other sports 
programs. The effort led to stronger relationships 
between the administration and the coaches and 
Athletic Department staff, both through attending 
events and by meeting with them individually. 
The efforts to strengthen relationships between the 
University leadership with student-athletes, coaches, 
and staff of the Athletic Department led to some 
strong friendships between the administration and the 
coaches, among them Bo Schembechler. In fact, in 1988 
Bo made it a point to show up at the public interview 
for the University president. When the papers reported 
its selection by the Regents the next day, whose picture 
should be on the front page but Bo’s, with the quote: 
“He was my choice!” 
Yet the role of the university president relative to 
college sports was changing rapidly, driven by new 
pressures. The NCAA adopted a fundamental principle 
that institutional control and accountability of athletics 
rested with the presidents. The incorporation of the 
Big Ten Conference during the 1980s required that the 
university presidents serve as its board of directors. 
This new corporate conference structure demanded 
both policy and fiduciary oversight by the presidents, 
frequently in direct conflict with the athletic directors. It 
also demanded a great deal of time and effort, since the 
operations of the Big Ten Conference are more extensive 
than those of the professional athletic leagues. Many 
were the lonely, invisible battles Michigan presidents 
would fight for the university on such issues as sharing 
football gate revenue, conference expansion, and 
gender equity. Some were won. Some were lost. But 
most battles were unseen, unrecognized, and certainly 
unappreciated.
While such an active presidential role clearly 
provided additional powers to restore and maintain 
the integrity of Michigan athletics, it was sometimes 
not well understood or accepted by the old guard. Yet 
it was increasingly clear that the Athletic Department 
needed to be brought back into the mainstream of 
University life. By the late 1980s, it had also become 
clear that the days of the czar athletic director and 
the autonomy of Michigan athletics were coming 
to an end. Intercollegiate athletics activities were 
simply too visible and had too great an impact on 
the university to be left entirely to the direction of the 
athletics establishment, its values, and its culture. The 
administration faced the challenge of reining in the 
excesses of the Athletic Department during the days of 
two particularly powerful figures, athletic director Don 
Canham and football coach Bo Schembechler, both of 
whom were media celebrities adept at building booster 
and press support for their personal agendas. 
Despite considerable resistance, President Harold 
Shapiro successfully negotiated Don Canham’s 
retirement. Yet from the beginning of the athletic 
director search for a successor to Canham, it was clear 
to the chair of the search committee, President Emeritus 
Robben Fleming, that Bo Schembechler would not 
only be an important factor, but that he also would 
be considered as a serious candidate to succeed Don 
Canham. However, since the administration believed 
it would be very difficult for any mortal to hold both 
the jobs of head football coach and athletics director, 
Fleming came up with an ingenious idea. A long-
serving and well-liked stalwart of the University, 
Associate Vice President for Business and Finance, Jack 
Weidenbach, was asked to serve as associate athletics 
director and handle the detailed management of the 
Department while Bo was involved in coaching duties. 
Weidenbach was an outstanding choice. During 
the 1980s, as Canham had become less involved in the 
management of the Athletics Department, particularly 
during winter months spent in Florida, Jack has been 
assigned by the administration to handle many of 
its financial matters, a role that became even more 
important following the baseball scandals. Hence he 
already knew many of the key issues and was well 
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The success in Michigan athletics during the 1988-1989 
provided an  interesting first year in a new presidency
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known and respected by the staff and coaches of the 
Department. He was an athlete himself (a skier and 
distance runner) and had been long involved in the 
effort to build women’s athletics at Michigan. Hence 
backing up Bo was a natural assignment for him.
1990s
After a year as football coach and athletics director, 
Bo decided to accept an offer from Tom Monahan to 
become president of the Detroit Tigers. After efforts to 
talk him out of it failed, he was given a year’s leave of 
absence in the hopes he might later change his mind, and 
Jack Weidenbach was asked to serve as interim athletics 
director for this period. However, Weidenbach did such 
a spectacular job in the role that when Bo decided to stay 
with the Tigers, it was decided to dispense with a full 
search and obtain approval by the Regents to appoint 
him as the permanent athletic director. During his 
tenure, there were major changes facing college athletics 
at the conference and national level that required a 
close relationship between the athletics director and 
the president. Weidenbach had developed a close 
relationships with the Executive Officers and Regents 
over his many years of leadership at the University, and 
this enabled him to provide outstanding leadership for 
Michigan Athletics. In fact there is no other five-year 
period in the history of Michigan athletics programs 
with more conference championships, bowl wins, Final 
Four appearances, and All-Americans–both athletic 
and academic. In addition, the financial structure of 
Michigan athletics was stabilized, its physical plant 
was rebuilt, and the coaches and student-athletes were 
more clearly integrated into the broader life of the 
campus community. 
Unfortunately, Weidenbach was already close to 
retirement when he agreed to provide leadership for the 
Athletic Department. Hence in the 1990s the University 
was obliged to launch another major national search 
for his successor, chaired by VPCFO Farris Womack. 
The search identified several outstanding candidates 
and proceeded with early negotiations with the lead 
candidate. Unfortunately, the booster crowd got 
wind of the possibility that a “non-Michigan man” 
might be selected and began to apply pressure on the 
Regents to force the administration to turn away from 
external candidates and look inside the Department 
for a successor. The administration finally concluded 
that it was simply too dangerous to the University to 
continue the external search in the face of the pressure 
on both the University and the Regents. Instead, with 
the support of the search committee, Joe Roberson, then 
Director of the Campaign for Michigan, was persuaded 
to accept an appointment as athletic director. Actually, 
The new AD: Bo Schembechler
(and also stilll football coach)
Jack Weidenbach: Second in Command under Bo
and then Michigan’s Athletic Director
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Roberson’s name had been considered as a top 
candidate early in the search, but his role as the director 
of the University’s billion-dollar fund-raising campaign 
was felt to be more important. Yet the circumstances 
had changed, and his loyalty to the University led him 
to accept this call to duty.
Roberson’s appointment was a surprise to outsiders. 
He was, however, a former college athlete and 
professional baseball player as a pitcher with the Los 
Angeles Dodgers. More important, he had served as both 
dean and interim chancellor of the UM-Flint campus. 
He was an individual of great integrity, with a strong 
sense of academic values in addition to his experience 
with both college and professional sports. Beyond his 
strong and wise leadership of the department, his long 
experience with students and academic life as a faculty 
member and academic leader enabled him to elevate the 
importance of young competitors as students first and 
athletes second, in priority, even in a highly competitive 
program such as Michigan. Certainly Joe Roberson had 
a better understanding of the mission and culture of 
an academic institution than any athletic director of 
his era. He was also an excellent leader. When he was 
finally pushed out by a new administration in 1997, he 
left the Athletics Department with a football program 
that would win the national championship in 1998 
(the first in 50 years) and, moreover, an outstanding 
financial condition with reserves of over $33 million.
However, the heightened public visibility of 
Michigan athletics, particularly in the marquee sports 
of football and men’s basketball, accompanied by the 
ever-escalating expectations on the part of Michigan 
fans, put great pressure on both coaches and players 
alike. After five Big Ten championships in a row and 
the entrance of Penn State into the conference, the 
football team experienced a series of mediocre seasons 
(although “mediocre” for Michigan meant winning 
only eight or nine games a season and appearing 
in only a second-tier holiday bowl). In basketball, 
although Steve Fisher managed to continue to recruit 
top talent after the Fab Five, his teams never were 
able to win the Big Ten championship or return to the 
Final Four. Each misstep by a student athlete or coach, 
the inevitable defeats that characterize every leading 
program in off years or the loss of a key recruit resulted 
in a torrent of adverse media coverage. The sports 
media, which had been strong Michigan boosters 
during the championship years, were now viciously 
critical of these same programs and coaches as they 
struggled through occasionally mediocre seasons. The 
unrealistic expectations of Michigan fans, coupled with 
the ruthless criticism of the sports media, soon pushed 
both Michigan football and basketball to the crisis point.
Facing increasing pressure from fans, football coach 
Gary Moeller had an altercation with the police while at 
a Detroit nightclub that was captured on video by the 
media. Because of the intense public attention given the 
incident, Roberson asked Moeller to take a brief leave, 
but he decided instead to step down and exercise his 
retirement option. Lloyd Carr was later appointed as 
his successor, thereby maintaining the momentum of 
the program.
The high visibility of the “Fab Five” basketball 
team led to a continual onslaught of media attention, 
although without serious impact. However, unknown 
to Coach Fisher or anyone else in the University 
(including noted author, Mitch Albom, who wrote a 
book concerning the Fab Five) one of the players, Chris 
Webber, had received substantial payments from a 
local Detroit gambler. This serious violation by a player 
would be confirmed several years later resulting in 
major penalties. However, unlike earlier incidents in 
Joe Roberson, another Michigan stalwart,
becomes Athletic Director.
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the 1980s that involved Athletics Department staff (e.g., 
the baseball coach), this violation was confined to three 
Michigan basketball players.
In summary, during the 1990s, working closely 
with the sequence of athletic directors who succeeded 
Canham—Bo Schembechler, Jack Weidenbach, and Joe 
Roberson—the University administration took a series 
of actions to better align athletics with the academic 
priorities of the University. It demanded that student-
athletes receive the same educational and extracurricular 
opportunities as other Michigan students. Coaches 
were provided with more encouragement for their roles 
as teachers and more security as staff members. Clear 
policies were developed in a number of areas including 
admissions, academic standing, substance abuse, and 
student behavior that were consistent with the rest of 
the University.
At the same time, the University took a series of 
steps to secure the financial integrity of Michigan 
athletics. The Athletic Department began to apply cost-
containment methods to its operations, and a major 
fund-raising program was launched. The department 
developed more sophisticated methods for licensing. 
Finally, the University invested in major improvements 
in the athletics facilities, including rebuilding Michigan 
Stadium (returning to natural grass and repairing the 
stadium infrastructure) and new facilities for swimming, 
gymnastics, ice hockey, tennis, track, and new fields for 
women’s soccer, field hockey, and softball.
During this period the University finally began to 
take women’s athletics seriously by providing women 
with the same opportunities for varsity competition 
as men. Major investments were made in existing 
women’s programs as well as in the addition of new 
programs (women’s soccer and women’s rowing). In 
fact, despite decades of neglect, Michigan became one 
of the first major universities in the nation to make a 
public commitment to achieving full gender equity in 
intercollegiate athletics by the late 1990s.
There were also improvements in Michigan’s 
overall competitiveness. While once Michigan had 
been content to be successful primarily in a single 
sport, football, during the 1990s it began to compete 
at the national level across its full array of 23 varsity 
programs. It began to rank each year among the top 
institutions nationwide for the national all-sports 
championship (the Sears Trophy). During the decade 
from 1988 to 1998, Michigan went to five Rose Bowls 
and won a national championship (1997) in football; 
three Final Fours and a national championship (1989) in 
men’s basketball; and four hockey Final Fours and two 
NCAA championships in ice hockey (1996 and 1998). 
Michigan teams won over 50 Big 10 championships 
during this period, dominating the Big Ten in men’s 
and women’s swimming (including winning the 
NCAA championship in men’s swimming), men’s and 
women’s cross-country, women’s gymnastics, men’s 
and women’s track, and women’s softball. Michigan 
athletes provided some of the most exciting moments 
in Michigan’s long sports tradition, including two 
Heisman trophies (Desmond Howard and Charles 
Woodson) and a number of Olympians.
Despite the leadership and integrity of Athletic 
Director Joe Roberson, new president Lee Bollinger 
decided to replace him with Tom Goss, an executive 
with a soft drink company in California, who had been 
a former football player at Michigan. Goss, in turn, 
moved rapidly to fire Steve Fisher in the wake of the 
investigation of the relationship between Chris Webber 
and a Detroit gambler, Eddie Martin, although at the 
time there was no evidence of any wrong doing on 
Webber’s part, and there never has been any indication 
that Fisher was as fault as coach. But the Regents were 
determined for change, and both Bollinger and Goss 
took their marching orders.
For a brief moment, the sun came out for Michigan, 
with a national championship in 1997 for Lloyd Carr’s 
football team with an undefeated season and a victory 
over Washington State in the Rose Bowl (although 
Nebraska tied for the national championship with 
Michigan). The new administration embraced the 
event, and President Bollinger perched royally in a 
horse-drawn carriage in the Ann Arbor parade to 
celebrate the team, ignoring, of course, that both the 
appointment of Carr and the development of the team 
had been accomplished by Joe Roberson. 
2000s
However with the changes at the helm, things 
soon began to go downhill. Goss appointed Fisher’s 
assistant basketball coach as his successor, who was 
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clearly unqualified for the post, and the team rapidly 
collapsed. The financials of the Athletics Department 
were mismanaged and deficits began to appear, a 
first for Michigan. In fact, Bollinger agreed to put in 
$3 million from his “president’s fund” (whatever that 
was) to plug the dike (or to make Bo happy, as some 
rumored). But Goss was a goner after another push 
from the Regents.
In searching for a successor, Bollinger tried to find an 
insider to do the job but after a couple probes without 
success, he was approached by Bill Martin, a local real 
estate developer, who offered his services. Although 
Martin had chaired a special committee to assess the 
financials of the Athletics Department after losses began 
to appear, his own experience was questionable. To be 
sure, he was a member of the U.S. Olympic Committee, 
but his sport was yachting, not college sports. 
Martin was a business man and a real estate 
developer, and his goal was to embark on a massive 
renovation of Michigan Stadium to install skyboxes and 
premium facilities (dining, entertaining) characteristic 
of professional venues, financed by a dramatic increase 
in ticket prices and premium payments (“seat license” 
fees for the privileges to purchase season tickets in 
prime locations) that would support both the stadium 
renovation and the Department. Although this was 
highly controversial since it would essentially price 
Michigan football beyond levels affordable by most 
students, faculty, staff, townspeople, and long-time 
fans, transforming the stadium crowd into the high 
roller (or obsessed) fans characteristic of a professional 
franchise, Bollinger, his successor Mary Sue Coleman, 
and the Regents nodded their approval, and it was 
off to the races. The Michigan Stadium project moved 
ahead, and ticket prices soared…from $25 per game to 
$75 plus the seat tax…to the point where the average 
ticket price, including seat tax, rose to $230 per game, 
and even student tickets were $50 per game, both the 
highest in the nation. Martin’s experience as a real estate 
developer, builder, and businessman were strongly in 
evidence.
As we noted earlier, Martin and Bollinger also 
transformed the long-standing faculty Board in Control 
of Intercollegiate Athletics into an Advisory Board on 
Intercollegiate Athletics. Although this was intended to 
provide the Athletic Director with more power, it also 
decoupled the faculty from the University’s athletic 
programs, thereby eroding the relationship between 
the academic mission of the institution and its athletic 
activities. Later Martin was to acknowledge that this 
was one of the most damaging decisions made during 
his tenure.
Martin’s inexperience with college sports soon 
began to show in other areas. He hired a new 
basketball coach, Tommy Amaker, who had all the right 
credentials, smart, talented, and former player at Duke, 
but all the wrong cultural characteristics to handle the 
Big Ten. Amaker was soon replaced by John Belein, an 
experienced coach from West Virginia who would take 
Michigan to the Final Four, and Amaker went on to 
Bollinger enjoyed the thrill of riding in the 1997 championship parade, 
but  his attempt to place a “Halo” on Michigan Stadium fell flat.
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success at Harvard.
But football became the Achilles heel. Whether 
pushed or pulled, Lloyd Carr stepped down after a 
long and successful tenure as football coach, and Martin 
launched a search that ended up with Rich Rodriguez, 
a successful coach at West Virginia, but a total misfit at 
Michigan, where both his personal style (about as anti-
academic as one could find) and his flawed approach 
to Big Ten football left the team in a shambles, with 
losing seasons and strong fan disapproval. By this time, 
Martin’s “my way or the highway” business approach 
to athletic leadership had worn thin, so he stepped 
down after ten years.
But if Martin was misaligned for athletic director, his 
successor, Dave Brandon, was even further removed, 
coming to the post from a career in advertising and 
serving as a former Regent of the University. Brandon 
did have some experience with Michigan athletics. He 
was walk-on quarterback for Schembechler in the 1980s, 
although he only made it into one game. Bo helped him 
get a job afterward with a large Detroit advertising 
company, and when Domino’s Pizza was acquired by 
Bain Capital, they named him CEO where his marketing 
and advertising skills were valued (although the 
quality of the company’s pizza deteriorated to the point 
at which Stephen Corbert suggested that it amounted 
to ketchup spread on cardboard).
Since Brandon had been instrumental in hiring 
Mary Sue Coleman when he was a Regent, nobody was 
particularly surprised when he was hired as Athletic 
Director. Unfortunately Brandon’s background was 
in marketing, with no experience in managing college 
sports, so that is the tact that he took, pushing out over 
143 long-standing employees (including 11 coaches) 
and replacing them with 200 new staff who were 
directed to “build the brand” of Michigan athletics 
and add the “Wow” factor to market it to the world. 
He moved quickly to fire Rodriguez, but strangely 
replaced him with an obscure coach, Brady Hoke, from 
San Diego State, who continued the malaise in the 
football program. 
Ignoring the poor performance of the football 
program that was generating the revenue, Brandon 
continued to raise ticket prices and take on more debt 
with projects such as the renovation of the Crisler 
Arena (now renamed “Center”) to resemble more of 
a department store with numerous shops along the 
entrances and concourses and a proposed $300 million 
investment in new facilities for the non-revenue sports. 
Advertising became the name of the game, with gigantic 
video displays not only inside Michigan Stadium but 
also outside to lure (and, more likely, distract) drivers 
as they approached the stadium. As the financial data 
indicates, the expenditures rose by over 50% during the 
Brandon years, mostly to fuel the rapid expansion of 
staffing (particularly in the marketing area) and debt 
service. Perhaps it is no surprise that student athletic 
support increased by only 10% during this period, 
clearly reflecting the new priorities.
Faculty influence was also essentially eliminated, 
Athletic Director David Brandon The “Wow” Factor
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since as chair of the faculty Advisory Board on 
Intercollegiate Athletics, Brandon was able to schedule 
meetings with limited consequence. Furthermore, 
since few faculty members could afford the new ticket 
prices, they rapidly became disengaged with Michigan 
athletics, treating it largely with benign neglect. 
Despite growing criticism from members of the 
University and Ann Arbor community who were 
priced out of Michigan football, basketball, and 
hockey events, Brandon was determined to continue 
his focus on elevating both the Michigan brand and 
its pricing, while aggressively pushing private fund 
raising in competition with the rest of the University. 
Michigan Athletics became increasingly a commercial 
entertainment company marketing primarily to the 
wealthy and effectively severed from the University. 
Yet Brandon also trampled on student interests 
by implementing a general admission policy that 
prevented them from sitting with their friends. Hence 
student attendance dropped in half, from 21,763 in 2012 
to 11,569 in 2014, igniting student protest that eventually 
resulted in thousands of students descending on the 
President’s House demanding that Brandon be fired.
The final straw was cast by a tragic incident , 
which occurred when the football coaches allowed a 
clearly injured quarterback to remain in a game with 
a concussion. The intense national exposure to this 
incident, shown live on a national television broadcast 
of the game, together with the growing frustration 
about Brandon’s effort to sever the relationships with 
the University and the community through excessive 
ticket pricing and restrictive policies, finally exploded 
into calls for his firing. After performing extensive due 
diligence through discussions with many different 
perspectives, the University’s new president, Mark 
Schlissel, concluded that Brandon’s reign must come to 
an end, and he negotiated his “resignation” (at a cost 
of $3 million due to the excessive contract provided 
Brandon by Coleman early in his tenure).
Fortunately, the new president was able to persuade 
a former Michigan athlete, Jim Hackett, recently 
retired as CEO of Steelcase, to step in immediately 
as interim athletic director, and he demonstrated the 
skill of corporate recruiting by landing former UM 
quarterback Jim Harbaugh as the coach. Harbaugh’s 
outstanding coaching records at San Diego, Stanford, 
and the San Francisco 49er’s made him the top choice, 
and his acceptance of the offer created great excitement. 
Perhaps equally important, both Harbaugh and Hackett 
were shrewd enough to immediate open their arms to 
both former Michigan coaches and players and to the 
large community of football fans that had been pushed 
away by Brandon’s escalating pricing and “wow” 
approach.
However, more broadly it was apparent that 
considerable rebuilding would be necessary after two 
decades of leadership from three different athletic 
directors with little experience with college sports. 
Michigan’s new football coach Jim Harbaugh Lloyd Carr, Jim Hackett, Jim 
Harbaugh, and Gary Moeller
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Over that period both the quality and the character of 
Michigan athletics have clearly deteriorated. Needless 
to say, the “leaders and best” had become anything 
but...
Of course, one could always blame this decline and 
fall on the presidents, as many do for other areas of 
institutional performance. But here it is important to 
realize that building a competitive athletics program 
requires many years, so that its performance in one era 
can usually be attributed to the era of one’s predecessor. 
For example, the spectacular success of Michigan 
athletics in the 1990s, e.g., five Rose Bowl appearances 
and national championships in basketball, hockey, and 
swimming benefited from the development of these 
programs during the late 1980s. Similarly the football 
national championship won during Bollinger’s first 
year was certainly not due to his administration but 
rather to the leadership of Joe Roberson as Athletic 
Director, Lloyd Carr as coach, and many others during 
the preceding years.
Lessons Learned
It is appropriate to conclude this chapter with some 
very personal and candid comments about the future 
of college sports, at least at the level of Michigan. Four 
decades as a college athlete, a faculty member, provost 
and president of the University of Michigan, and 
member and chair of the Presidents’ Council of the Big 
Ten Conference, has led to several conclusions: 
First, while most of intercollegiate athletics are 
both valuable and appropriate activities for our 
universities, big-time college football and basketball 
stand apart, since they have clearly become commercial 
entertainment businesses. Today they have little if any 
relevance to the academic mission of the university. 
Furthermore, they are based on a culture, a set of values 
that, while perhaps appropriate for show business, are 
viewed as highly corrupt by the academy and deemed 
corrosive to our academic mission. 
Second, while one might be able make a case for 
The Michigan Marching Band apparently understood where college football was headed in 2010!
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relevance of college sports to our educational mission 
to the extent that they provide a participatory activity 
for our students, there is no compelling reason why 
American universities should conduct intercollegiate 
athletics programs at the current highly commercialized, 
professionalized level of big-time college football and 
basketball simply for the entertainment of the American 
public, the financial benefit of coaches, athletic directors, 
conference commissioners, and NCAA executives, and 
the profit of television networks, sponsors, and sports 
apparel manufacturers. 
One can argue that there are only three reasons why 
a university would want to conduct big-time college 
sports: i) because it benefits the student-athletes; 
ii) because it benefits the university (reputation, 
community, revenue); and iii) because it benefits 
the larger community. Big-time college football and 
basketball, as currently conducted, fail to meet any of 
these criteria.
Third, and most significantly, there is growing 
evidence that big-time college sports do far more 
damage to the university, to its students and faculty, 
its leadership, its reputation and credibility, that most 
realize--or at least are willing to admit. The evidence 
seems overwhelming:
Far too many of our athletics programs exploit 
young people, recruiting them with the promise of a 
college education—or a lucrative professional career—
only to have the majority of Division 1-A football and 
basketball players achieve neither. 
Furthermore, particularly in violent sports such as 
football and hockey, student-athletes are subjected to 
unacceptable health risks through injuries that could 
cripple them for life, without adequate protection or 
lifelong health security.
Scandals in intercollegiate athletics have damaged 
the reputations of many of our colleges and universities. 
Big time college football and basketball have put 
inappropriate pressure on university governance, as 
boosters, politicians, and the media attempt to influence 
governing boards and university leadership. 
The impact of intercollegiate athletics on university 
culture and values has been damaging, with poor 
behavior of both athletes and coaches, all too frequently 
tolerated and excused. 
So too, the commercial culture of the entertainment 
industry that characterizes college football and 
basketball is not only orthogonal to academic values, 
but it is corrosive and corruptive to the academic 
enterprise
Some Myths and Realities of College Sports
Myth 1: Intercollegiate athletics are self-supporting.
Reality: No college programs in America today cover 
all their expenses (even those who claim to such as USC, 
U Texas, Ohio State, Michigan, and even Notre Dame). 
Athletic directors use flakey accounting methods that 
do not include full costs of capital expenditures, hidden 
subsidies such as instate tuition for out-of-state athletes, 
indirect costs born by the institution, fund-raising that 
competes with academic units, and, of course, the 
strange legislation that inserted a tax loophole that treats 
skybox rent and seat taxes as charitable “education” 
deductions. The NCAA estimates that in 2009 the total 
costs for intercollegiate athletics was $10.5 billion, while 
the total revenue was $5.6 billion (including ticket sales, 
television broadcasting, licensing, etc.). In reality the 
only people who make money –and big-time money, 
at that– from big time athletics are the coaches, athletic 
directors, NCAA brass, and the networks. But certainly 
not the “student athletes” and certainly not their host 
institutions. 
In 2012 the media budget deficits for NCAA Division 
1 programs averaged $9 million per year. From 2005 
to 2009 athletics departments increased spending on 
student athletes by 50%, to $91,050 per athlete, while 
the increase for normal students was 20% to $13,470 per 
student.
Myth 2: Intercollegiate athletics are important for 
fund raising.
Reality: Donors who give because of winning teams 
give to wining programs, not to academic activities. But 
it gets even worse, since the tax-benefited “premium” 
payments for skyboxes and preferred seating generally 
come out of gifts that would otherwise have gone to 
academic purposes. At Michigan, our largest donors 
could not care less about college sports! They view it 
largely as a distraction from the primary mission of the 
University (except for Steve Ross, of course, who gave 
$100 million to the Athletics Department in 2013 to help 
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While the expenditures of the Athletics Department have almost doubled over the past seven year 
(driven tickets and seat taxes), most of this revenue has gone to salaries and not students.
236
The disparity between expenditures per student on athletics (upper curve) and academics
(lower curves)  continues to diverge, particularly in the leading confences and institutions.
build a “Walk of Champions”, whatever that is).
Myth 3: All athletic facilities are self-financed.
Reality: Actually many require either institutional 
or public subsidy. But even those that are debt financed 
must pledge student tuition revenue for borrowing 
equity, not anticipated gate receipts or television 
revenue. They also depend on questionable tax practices 
such as being counted as 80% “charitable” deductions 
by the IRS despite the fact that they are quid pro quo 
required payments for benefits such as premium 
seating. If these tax loopholes disappear, many of the 
big stadium projects will collapse like a house of cards.
Myth 4: The power of the NCAA will protect the 
status quo.
Reality: Today the NCAA is in serious trouble and 
fighting for its survival. Its tax status is dependent upon 
rulings long ago that its primary purpose is educational. 
Yet grants-in-aid based on athletic performance could be 
ruled as “pay for play” and hence require employment 
rights for athletes (including unionization). The 
O’Bannon case could require payment to players for the 
use of their images for commercial purposes. Litigation 
associated with brain injuries or long-term health 
impact could cripple both the NCAA and universities. 
Finally, the compensation of coaches ($5 M and up), 
athletic directors ($1 M and up), and athletic staff (now 
several times that of faculty) is now so extreme that it 
raises the threat of federal action.
Myth 5: Intercollegiate athletics is important for 
school spirit.
Reality: Sure, student applications do go up after a 
major championship. But the students attracted to an 
institution are not necessarily those most concerned 
about academic achievement. Besides, how important is 
athletics to the school spirit of institutions like Harvard, 
Yale…and Caltech? And how important is athletics to 
Penn State these days?
Myth 6: But we do pay student athletes! We give 
them valuable scholarships!
Reality: A quote from a recent book on college sports 
by Taylor Branch, the great historian on civil rights in 
America, puts this in an interesting context.
“‘Scholarship athletes are already paid,” declared 
the Knight Commission members, in the most 
meaningful way possible: with a free education.’ 
This evasion by prominent educators severed my 
last reluctant, emotional tie with imposed amateur-
ism. I found it worse than self-serving. It echoes 
masters who once claimed that heavenly salvation 
would outweigh earthly injustice to slaves.”
Myth 7: But we are preparing athletes for professional 
careers.
 Reality: Michigan surveys indicate that most student 
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athletes realize their odds of making the pros are very 
remote. Instead they view their college experience as 
an opportunity to enter careers very similar to other 
students in fields such as business, law, and medicine. 
But after a few weeks on campus, many of the most 
vigorously recruited student athletes realize they 
are woefully academically unprepared and saddled 
with 50-60 hour/week “jobs” and lives controlled by 
coaches. Hence they are forced to shift to “majoring 
in eligibility”, enrolling in cupcake majors (sports 
management, communications, general studies). The 
attrition rates are tragic, with 6-year graduate rates: less 
than 50% for football; 40% for basketball. Even those 
who graduate frequently have meaningless degrees 
(e.g., recreational sports, golf-course management).
What to do? The Traditional Approach
The actions suggested to protect student-athletes 
and their universities are both numerous and obvious:
Freshman Ineligibility: All freshmen in all sports 
should be ineligible for varsity competition. The first 
year should be a time for students to adjust intellectually 
and emotionally to the hectic pace of college life.
Financial Aid: Eliminate the “athletic scholarship” or 
“grant-in-aid” and replace it with need-based financial 
aid. Note this would not only substantially reduce the 
costs of college sports, but it would also eliminate the 
legal risks of continuing what has become, in effect, a 
“pay for play” system.
Mainstream Coaches: Throttle back the salaries 
of coaches, athletic directors, and other athletic 
department staff to levels comparable to faculty and 
other university staff. Subject coaches to the same 
conflict of interest policies that govern other faculty 
and staff (e.g., eliminating shoe contracts, prohibiting 
the use of the university’s name and reputation for 
personal gain, etc.)
Mainstream the Administration of Intercollegiate 
Athletics: Intercollegiate athletics is a student 
extracurricular activity and, as such, should report to 
the vice president for student affairs. Academic matters 
such as student eligibility, counseling, and academic 
support should be the responsibility of the university’s 
chief academic officer (e.g., the provost). Financial 
matters should be under the control of the university’s 
chief financial officer. Medical issues should be under 
the control of staff from the university medical center 
or student health service. 
Financial Support: We should adopt the principle 
that if intercollegiate athletics are of value to students, 
they should be subsidized by the General and Education 
budget of the university. To this end, we might consider 
putting athletics department salary lines (coaches and 
staff) on the academic budget and under the control of 
the provost. We could then use a counter flow of athletic 
department revenue into the General and Education 
budget to minimize the net subsidy of college sports.
Faculty control: We need to restructure faculty 
athletics boards so that they are no longer under control 
of athletic directors but instead represent true faculty 
participation. It is important to keep “jock” faculty off 
these boards and to give priority to those faculty with 
significant experience in undergraduate education. It 
is also important for faculty boards to understand and 
accept their responsibilities for seeing that academic 
priorities dominate competitive and commercial goals, 
while student welfare and institutional integrity are 
priorities.
Rigorous Independent Audits and Compliance 
Functions: Here we need a system for independent 
auditing of not simply compliance with NCAA and 
conference rules, but as well financial matters, student 
academic standing, progress toward degrees, and 
medical matters.
Limits on Schedules and Student Participation: 
We should confine all competitive schedules to a 
single academic term (e.g., football in fall, basketball, 
hockey in winter, etc.). Competitive schedules should 
be shortened to more reasonable levels (e.g., football 
back to 10 games, basketball to 20 games, etc.). We need 
to constrain competitive and travel schedules to be 
compatible with academic demands (e.g., no weekday 
competition). Student participation in mandatory, 
noncompetitive athletics activities during off-season 
should be severely limited (including eliminating spring 
football practice, summer conditioning requirements, 
etc.).
Throttle Back Commercialization: It is time to forget 
about the possibility of Division 1-A football playoffs 
and drastically reduce the number of post-season 
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bowls. Perhaps we should return the NCAA Basketball 
Tournament to a two-week, conference champion only 
event. Furthermore, we need to stop this nonsense of 
negotiating every broadcasting contract as if dollars 
were the only objective and chase the sports press out 
of the locker rooms and lives of our students.
Of course, the first arguments launched against 
such reform proposals always have to do with money. 
College football and basketball are portrayed as the 
geese that lay the golden eggs for higher education. 
However these arguments, long accepted but rarely 
challenged, are flawed. Essentially all intercollegiate 
athletic programs are subsidized, to some degree, by 
the academic programs of the university (when all 
costs are included, such as amortization of facilities 
and administrative overhead.) Furthermore, in the 
scheme of things, the budgets of these programs are 
quite modest relative to other institutional activities 
(e.g., at Michigan, the $150 M/y budget of our athletic 
department is only about 2% of our total budget, and, 
more to the point, less than the amount of state support 
we have lost over the past three years!).
The current culture of college sports is driven by the 
belief that the team that spends the most wins the most. 
Not surprisingly, therefore, the more revenue athletic 
programs generate, the more they spend. Since most 
of the expenditures are in areas such as grants-in-aid, 
coaches and staff salaries, promotional activities, and 
facilities, many of the proposals in the previous section 
would dramatically reduce these costs. 
More generally, the first step in reconnecting college 
sports to the academic enterprise is to stop treating our 
athletic departments, coaches, and student-athletes 
as special members of the university community, 
subject to different rules and procedures, policies 
and practices than the rest of university. The key to 
reform is to mainstream our athletics programs and 
their participants back into the university in three key 
areas: financial management, personnel policies, and 
educational practices.
Financial management: Athletics departments 
should be subject to the same financial controls, policies, 
and procedures as other university units. Their financial 
operations should report directly to the chief financial 
officer of the university and be subject to rigorous 
internal audit requirements and full public disclosure 
as an independent (rather than consolidated) financial 
unit. All external financial arrangements, including 
those with athletic organizations (e.g., conferences 
and the NCAA), commercial concerns (e.g., licensing, 
broadcasting, endorsements), and foundation/booster 
organizations should be under strict university controls. 
In that regard, it might be best to take the Sarbanes-
Oxley approach, designed to eliminate abuses in the 
financial operations of publicly-held corporations, by 
requiring the Athletic Director, President, and chair of 
the Governing Board to sign annual financial statements 
and hold them legally accountable should these later be 
found to be fraudulent.
Possible Cost Reductions: There are many 
opportunities for significant cost reductions. For 
example, replacing the current system of grants-in-aid 
by need-based financial aid would reduce these costs by 
at least a factor of two. Throttling back the extravagant 
level of celebrity coaches salaries (and applying conflict 
of interest to eliminate excessive external income and 
perks) would do likewise. Demanding university 
control of all auxiliary activities such as broadcasting 
and licensing so that revenue flows to the institution and 
not to the coaches would also help. And reducing the 
expenditures required to mount big-time commercial 
entertainment events would also reduce costs, thereby 
compensating for lost broadcasting revenue.
Personnel: All athletics department staff (including 
coaches) should be subject to the same conflict-of-
interest policies that apply to other university staff 
and faculty. For example, coaches should no longer 
be allowed to exploit the reputation of the university 
for personal gain through endorsements or special 
arrangements with commercial vendors (e.g., sports 
apparel companies, broadcasting, automobile dealers). 
Employment agreements for coaches should conform 
to those characterizing other staff and should be subject 
to review by university financial and personnel units. 
All personnel searches, including those for coaches, 
should comply fully with the policies and practices 
characterizing other staff (e.g., equal opportunity)
Who Should Take the Lead in Reform?
Several years ago, an invitation appeared from 
William Friday, former president of the University of 
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North Carolina, to testify before the Knight Commission 
on Intercollegiate Athletics. The book on college sports 
had just appeared, and they were interested in views on 
this complex subject. After stating several concerns, a 
possible approach to reform was suggested that began 
with the premier academic organization, the Association 
of American Universities (AAU). If these institutions 
were to adopt a series of reforms–a disarmament treaty, 
if you will– for their members, much of the rest of the 
higher education enterprise would soon follow. It was 
hoped that such an effort by the AAU would propagate 
rather rapidly throughout other organizations such 
as the National Association of State Universities and 
Land Grant Colleges and even the American Council 
on Education.
The testimony concluded by stressing the point that 
as higher education entered an era of great challenge 
and change, it was essential that we re-examine each 
and every one of our activities for their relevance and 
compatibility with our fundamental academic missions 
of teaching, learning, and serving society. From this 
perspective, there appeared to be little justification 
for the American university to mount and sustain big-
time football and basketball programs at their current 
commercial and professional level simply to satisfy 
the public desire for entertainment and pursue the 
commercial goals of the marketplace. The damage 
to our academic values and integrity was simply too 
great. If intercollegiate athletics was to be retained as 
an appropriate university activity, it was essential 
to decouple our programs from the entertainment 
industry and reconnect them with the educational 
mission of our institutions.
After these remarks, the co-chair of the commission, 
Father Theodore Hesburg, former president of Notre 
Dame, was first to respond by stating that my concerns 
reinforced many of those of the Commission (after 
offering a prayer: “May God have mercy on your 
soul!”)!  He suggested that my comments had provided 
a first draft of the Commission’s report. Of course, 
others on the Commission challenged some of the more 
outspoken conclusions and recommendations. But in 
the end, most of the conclusions seemed to stand, as 
evidenced by the strong statement in the final report of 
the Commission:
“After digesting the extensive testimony offered 
over some six months, the Commission is forced to 
reiterate its earlier conclusion that at their worst, 
big-time college athletics appear to have lost their 
bearings. Athletics continue to threaten to overwhelm 
the universities in whose name they were established. 
Indeed, we must report that the threat has grown rather 
than diminished. Higher education must draw together 
all of its strengths and assets to reassert the primary of 
the educational mission of the academy. The message 
that all parts of the higher education community must 
proclaim is emphatic: Together, we created today’s 
disgraceful environment. Only by acting together can 
we clean it up.”
A Call to Action: Reconnecting College Sports 
 and Higher Education
The Knight Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics 
 June, 2001
Yet, in retrospect, it is now clear that while both this 
testimony and the Knight Commission report urgently 
portrayed the threat to American higher education 
posed by the ever-increasing commercialization and 
corruption of big-time college sports, neither proposed 
an effective method to deal with the problem. In fact, a 
major reason why the various efforts to reform college 
sports over the years have failed is because we continue 
to bet on the wrong horse. Reformers continue to 
propose that the university presidents take the lead into 
the reform of college sports, whether through academic 
organizations such as the AAU and ACE (my proposal) 
or the NCAA (the Knight Commission). And very little 
happens, and the mad rush toward more and more 
commercialism and corruption continues.
Perhaps this is not so surprising. After all, university 
presidents are usually trapped between a rock and a 
hard place: between a public demanding high quality 
entertainment from the commercial college sports 
industry they are paying for, and governing boards 
who have the capacity (and all too frequently the 
inclination) to fire presidents who rock the university 
boat too strenuously. It should be clear that few 
contemporary university presidents have the capacity, 
the will, or the appetite to lead a true reform movement 
in college sports.
Well, what about the faculty? Of course, in the end, 
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it is the governing faculty that is responsible for its 
academic integrity of a university. Faculty members 
have been given the ultimate protection, tenure, to 
enable them to confront the forces of darkness that 
would savage academic values. The serious nature of 
the threats posed to the university and its educational 
values by the commercialization and corruption of big-
time college sports has been firmly established in recent 
years. It is now time to challenge the faculties of our 
universities, through their elected bodies such as faculty 
senates, to step up to their responsibility to defend the 
academic integrity of their institutions, by demanding 
substantive reform of intercollegiate athletics.
To their credit, several faculty groups have 
responded well to this challenge and stepped forward 
to propose a set of principles for the athletic programs 
conducted by their institutions. Beginning first in the 
Pac Ten Conference universities, then propagating to 
the Big Ten and Atlantic Coast Conferences, and most 
recently considered and adopted by the American 
Association of University Professors, such principles 
provide a firm foundation for true reform in college 
sports.
Yet as the influence of the faculty has been pushed 
out of intercollegiate athletics by eliminating oversight 
boards, as athletic departments have taken over control 
of academic counseling (and at some institutions, even 
admission and academic standing), and as even faculty 
participation as spectators has eroded due to premium 
pricing of tickets, little wonder that most faculty 
members treat the Athletics Department with benign 
neglect (at least until its missteps severely damage the 
integrity of their institution).
What about trustees? The next obvious step in this 
process is for the faculties to challenge the trustees of our 
universities, who in the end must be held accountable 
for the integrity of their institutions. To be sure, there 
will always be some trustees who are more beholding 
to the football coach than to academic values. But most 
university trustees are dedicated volunteers with deep 
commitments to their institutions and to the educational 
mission of the university. Furthermore, while some 
governing boards may inhibit the efforts of university 
presidents willing to challenge the sports establishment, 
few governing boards can withstand a concerted effort 
by their faculty to hold them accountable for the 
integrity of their institution. In this spirit, several faculty 
groups have already begun this phase of the process by 
launching a dialogue with university trustees through 
the Association of Governing Boards. 
Ironically, it could well be that the long American 
tradition of shared university governance, involving 
public oversight and trusteeship by governing boards 
of lay citizens, elected faculty governance, and 
experienced but generally short-term and usually 
amateur administrative leadership, will pose the 
ultimate challenge to big time college sports. 
After all, even if university presidents are reluctant 
to challenge the status quo, the faculty has been 
provided with the both the responsibility and the status 
(e.g., tenure) to protect the academic values of the 
university and the integrity of its education programs. 
Furthermore, as trustees understand and accept their 
stewardship for welfare of their institutions, they will 
recognize that their clear financial, legal, and public 
accountability compels them to listen and respond to 
the challenge of academic integrity from their faculties.
What about a rising tide of public frustration? To 
be sure, many of those in charge of college athletics are 
unable (or unwilling) to understand the minefields that 
lie in the path of their plans. For example, the Big Ten 
leadership (conference commissioner and presidents) 
has largely destroyed the conference, adding new 
institutions that fail to meet the tests of geographical 
location, athletic competitiveness, or academic quality. 
As fans begin to realize that long-standing rivalries 
among academic peers (e.g., Michigan vs. Wisconsin) 
will largely disappear to satisfy the Big Ten Network, 
they could well abandon any loyalty to either teams or 
institutions. Of course, they could be replaced by new 
fans with interests more akin to professional sports 
such as automobile racing or boxing. After all, sports 
remain the “opiate of the masses”.
Possible “Planet Killers” for College Sports
In summary, who will protect the interests of the 
student athletes? 
Not the coaches or ADs or NCAA. They clearly have 
conflicts of interests.
What about faculty? They have been pushed to the 
241
side.
What about university leaders like presidents or 
trustees? They clearly have abdicated all responsibility!!!
What about the government? They got us into this 
trouble!!!
What about…lawyers? Perhaps that is the only 
protection left!!!
There are still several possibilities on the horizon 
that could become “planet killers” for college sports as 
we know them today:
The federal government could finally step up to 
its responsibility to treat big-time athletics like other 
business enterprises, subjecting it to more reasonable 
treatment with respect to tax policy, employee 
treatment (meaning student-athletes), monopoly and 
cartel restrictions, and possibly even salary constraints.
The O’Bannon case has demonstrated that litigation 
may become a formidable force for changing college 
sports as we know it today. There are early signs that 
student-athletes may be given rights that protect 
them against exploitation by coaches and athletic 
departments, and others for personal gain.
But the most serious threat on the horizon is the 
increasing evidence of the damage that intensifying 
violent sports such as football, basketball, and hockey 
do to the health of young athletes. In recent years, there 
is growing medical evidence about the long-term impact 
of concussions and other trauma on longer-term illness 
such as dementia and Alzheimers. These concerns are 
broadening out to explore the epidemiology of longer 
health impact including life expectancy (now found 
to be as low as 57 for NFL players). Although most 
attention has been focused on the health implications 
of competition at the high school and professional 
level, it is only a matter of time before college sports 
falls under the microscope. Beyond the concerns about 
the impact of violent sports on the health of student 
athletes, these studies are likely to open up a Pandora’s 
Box of litigation on issues such as institutional liability 
and requirements for the support of long-term health 
care that could financially cripple many institutions 
that insist on continuing to compete at the current 
level of intensity. In fact, the threat of litigation as class 
action suits could even eliminate violent sports such as 
football and hockey as we know them today at all but 
the professional levels.
A Magic Potion for Chasing Away 
the Commercialization of College Sports
Several years ago, a visit to give a major address 
to European university leaders at the University of 
Barcelona suggested another possible remedy. Across 
the street from the Barcelona campus was the incredible 
complex of FC Barcelona, one of Europe’s most 
glamorous, successful, and profitable football clubs.
Check out their their website: 
http://www.fcbarcelona.com/web/english/
and you’ll find that FC Barcelona has essentially every-
thing that Michigan Athletics desires: the excitement of 
a winning program, the exceptional loyalty of 150,000 
members of the “football club”, quality treatment of 
athletes, and high integrity. FC Barcelona also has not 
only a “football” club but also basketball and hockey 
programs, along with several “amateur” Olympic 
sports as part of the club. Its massive facilities, includ-
ing Estadio Camp Mou, the largest stadium in Europe 
is adjacent to the University of Barcelona campus, but 
there is no direct relationship between the university 
and the football club. 
There is one more characteristic of note: FC Bar-
celona’s revenue in 2014 was over 600 million Euros 
($700 million), far beyond that of Michigan, or any 
other college or professional sport in the United States. 
How, you might ask, can it achieve this? Because FC 
Barcelona is not a university or professional sports 
franchise but rather a corporation, with thousands of 
shareholders, and both a city (Barcelona) and region 
(Catalonia) of loyal fans.
So here is the proposal: How about conducting 
an IPO for the Michigan Wolverines? I’m sure that 
there would be hundreds of thousands of fans willing 
to participate in the initial stock offering. And the 
athletic directors are always looking for more revenue 
(and compensation, of course). The University could 
license to the new for-profit corporation, FC Michigan 
Wolverines, the trademark and lease them the stadium. 
With these funds, the University could return to truly 
amateur competition with REAL student participants 
and coaches as teachers, competing with other has-
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been big time programs that also sought escape from 
commercialism by taking their revenue-generating 
programs through a similar IPO process. 
Seriously, this might be regarded as the way to finally 
separate “big time college sports” from the university, 
while maintaining a revenue flow to support “non-
revenue” sports for students through licensing the 
UM “trademark” and renting its facilities. This might 
even be portrayed as “taking the Michigan Wolverines 
public” by enabling hundreds of thousands to become 
members of FC Michigan, even if they have never had a 
direct relationship with the University. (And of course 
it would also allow players, no longer necessarily 
students, to also benefit financially from the market for 
top talent...think Ronaldo or Beckham...)
Most important, it would allow the University 
to focus on its fundamental missions, teaching and 
research, while giving the public what it wants and 
eliminating the hypocrisy that now characterizes big 
time (and highly commercialized) college sports.
Perhaps this sounds crazy? But perhaps it also 
provides a future in which the commercial character 
of college sports is spun off to satisfy a sports craving 
public, leaving our universities to return to true 
amateur athletics with the fundamental purpose of 
student participation.
A Final Observation
Today there is a growing number of past and current 
university leaders who believe that higher education has 
entered an era of great challenge and change. Powerful 
social, economic, and technological forces are likely to 
change the university in very profound ways in the 
decades ahead. As our institutions enter this period of 
transformation, it is essential that we re-examine each 
and every one of our activities for their relevance and 
compatibility with our fundamental academic missions 
of teaching, research, and serving society. 
If we are to retain intercollegiate athletics as 
appropriate university activities, it is essential we 
insist upon the primacy of academic over commercial 
values by decoupling our athletic programs from the 
entertainment industry and reconnecting them with the 
educational mission of our institutions.
The American university is simply too important to 
the future of this nation to be threatened by the ever 
increasing commercialization, professionalization, and 
corruption of college sports.
Is this a hopeless quest for change? Here one might 
recall a quote from Thomas Paine’s Common Sense 
(February 14, 1776) that applies to this issue:
“Perhaps the sentiments contained in these pages are 
not yet sufficiently fashionable to procure them general 
favour; a long habit of not thinking a thing wrong, gives 
it a superficial appearance of being right, and raises at 
first a formidable outcry in defense of custom. But the 
tumult soon subsides. Time makes more converts than 
reason.”
Perhaps this is a model for the future of the Michigan Wolverines...
243
Another proposal for opening up Michigan Stadium once again to the “common man”
Oh, yes...there is one more observation about the success 
of Michigan athletics over the past half-century...
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Michigan vs Ohio State and Michigan State Football Rivalries (season national ranking #)
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Concerns
The Provost’s “Jaws” Chart, showing the amount of annual State appropriation loss from inflation.
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Beyond characteristics such as size, quality, and 
financial sustainability that can be tracked over 
time through quantitative data, there are other 
important characteristics of a university that require 
a more subjective approach. Universities are complex 
organizations that develop unique cultures over time 
not only influencing their fundamental missions of 
learning, discovery, and engagement with society, 
but also how they function as communities. In many 
cases these characteristics are not only unique to the 
institution but soon become evident to visitors, usually 
associated with the institutional “saga” of an institution, 
developing over a long period of time. (See Appendix.) 
Other characteristics such as how an institution accepts 
new members or sustains community activities or 
operates in making decisions or commitments are more 
subtle and can change significantly over a few years 
because of external or internal events.
In fact, we have noted that one of the core 
competencies of the University is its capacity to create 
learning communities. As a consequence there are many 
communities within the institution that are key to its 
intellectual, cultural, and social life. Some are organized 
along academic lines through faculty groups, institutes, 
centers, symposia, and salons. Others are organized 
about events, such as athletics and performing arts. 
Most require resources such as meeting places (e.g., 
Inglis Highlands), performance venues (e.g., Hill 
Auditorium, Power Center, Walgreen Center), and 
athletic complexes (...ah, yes...even the “Big House”).
Changes in academic communities tend to occur 
slowly, particularly in the faculty, student, and staff 
cultures, because of its complexity and diversity. 
Fundamental academic values—academic freedom, 
intellectual integrity, striving for excellence—still 
dominate the faculty culture, as they must in any great 
university. Yet today fewer faculty members look to the 
University for long term academic careers and instead 
became nomadic, moving from institution to institution 
in an increasingly competitive academic marketplace.
Student communities change more rapidly, 
dependent in part on the nature of the student body. 
For example, fraternities and sororities have become 
more important as the student body has come from 
wealthier backgrounds (particularly those paying out-
of-state tuition). So, too, student communities are more 
sensitive to challenges facing our society, e.g., conflicts, 
inequities, diversity, and the challenges of finding a job 
after graduation.
Radical changes in University communities can also 
happen due to “invasive species”, new people joining 
the University with limited knowledge or respect for 
its long-standing traditions. For example, the Michigan 
Wolverines have always attracted an intensely loyal 
community of fans, consisting of students, alumni, 
and friends. Yet several years ago this was pushed 
aside by a new athletic director who proclaimed his 
intensely commercial approach as. “If it ain’t broke, 
then break it!” He proceeded to break apart the loyal 
fan community by commercializing Michigan athletics 
to raise ticket prices so high that many students, faculty, 
staff, alumni, and loyal fans were pushed aside.
This philosophy of breaking apart communities that 
were certainly not broken has occurred in many other 
areas, usually by those unfamiliar or uncaring about 
University values and traditions. The academic and 
pastoral role of deans for the faculty community was 
broken apart by demanding highest priority given to 
the whims of wealthy donors. Resources that support 
faculty activities were discarded, such as replacing 
the University Club in the Michigan Union by an Au 
Bon Pan fast-food court and first restricting the Inglis 
Chapter 18
Culture, Community, and Continuity
247
Highlands estate for fund-raising purposes and then 
attempting to sell it rather than return it to academic use. 
And, as we will demonstrate, the practice of “breaking 
the unbroken” continues and poses a constant threat 
and requires a sustained battle to protect important 
University traditions.
But first it is important to understand how these 
many communities had evolved as they were once 
nurtured.
University Families
The contemporary university is much like a city, 
comprised of a bewildering array of neighborhoods 
and communities. To the faculty, it has almost a 
feudal structure, divided up into highly specialized 
academic units, frequently with little interaction even 
with disciplinary neighbors, much less with the rest 
of the campus. To the student body, the university is 
an exciting, confusing, and sometimes frustrating 
complexity of challenges and opportunities, rules and 
regulations, drawing students together only in major 
events, such as fall football games or campus protests. 
To the staff, the university has a more subtle character, 
with the parts woven together by policies, procedures, 
and practices evolving over decades, all too frequently 
invisible or ignored by the students and faculty. In 
some ways, the modern university is so complex, so 
multifaceted, that it seems that the closer one is to it and 
the more intimately one is involved with its activities, 
the harder it is to understand its entirety and the more 
likely one is to miss the forest for the trees.
But a university is also a diverse community of many 
families: students, faculty, staff, and students; deans 
and executive officers; office staff and even presidents. 
While Michigan enjoys an intense loyalty among these 
families, it can also be a tough environment for many. 
It is a very large and complex institution, frequently 
immersed in controversial social and political issues. 
Senior academic and administrative leaders not only 
become members of these families but also must assume 
responsibilities to understand, support, encourage, 
and protect these communities, to understand their 
concerns and their aspirations, and to advance their 
causes. 
Students, of course, comprise the most important 
family for the university, but they are also the most 
diverse, and for very large institutions such as 
Michigan, they are also the largest of our families. While 
one generally thinks of the student body as comprised 
of young high school graduates, roughly one third of 
the students in major research universities are adults 
engaged in graduate or professional study. In fact, an 
increasing number are adults with families and careers 
seeking further education. Hence both understanding 
and relating to this exceptionally diverse constituency 
can be a considerable challenge, particularly when it 
has a strongly activist nature such as Michigan.
The faculty–rather, the many faculties, since they are 
quite diverse–comprise another family, responsible not 
only for the intellectual life and impact of a university 
but also for its quality. Yet here too there is great diversity, 
from young scholars striving to achieve the quality of 
scholarship, teaching, and grantsmanship necessary 
for tenure, to more mature scholars commanding 
great respect and impact in the fields, to senior faculty 
approaching the end of careers and contemplating the 
endgame of retirement. 
Students and faculty members tend to take the staff 
of a university pretty much for granted. While they 
understand these are the people who “keep the trains 
running on time” and who provide them with the 
environment they need for teaching and research, most 
view staff as only the supporting cast for the real stars, 
the faculty. When staff comes to mind at all, it is usually as 
a source of complaints. To many faculty members, such 
service units as the Plant Department, the Purchasing 
Department, and the Office of University Audits are 
sometimes viewed as obstacles to their interests rather 
than allies. Yet throughout the university, whether at 
the level of secretaries, custodians, or groundskeepers 
or the rarified heights of senior administrators for 
finance, hospital operations, or facilities construction 
and management, the quality of the university’s staff, 
coupled with their commitment and dedication, is 
actually just as important as the faculty in making 
Michigan the remarkable institution it has become
The deans themselves form yet another family of 
the university, occasionally in competition with one 
another, more frequently working together, but always 
requiring the attention and the pastoral care of the 
president and the provost. Being a faculty member 
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is the best job in a university (with the most prestige, 
the most freedom, and the most opportunity), but if 
one has to be an academic administrator, the next best 
role—at least at Michigan—is that of a dean. Although 
some of Michigan’s academic units (e.g., the College 
of Literature, Science, and the Arts and the School of 
Medicine) rival major universities in their size, financial 
resources, and organizational complexity, both the 
size and the intellectual span of most UM schools 
and colleges is just about right to allow true academic 
leadership. To be sure, deans have to answer in both 
directions, to the provost from above and to their 
faculty from below. But their capacity to control both 
their own destiny and that of their school is far beyond 
that of most administrators.
The executive officers are also a family, although, 
quite unlike the deans, they are characterized by great 
diversity in roles and backgrounds. Although many of 
the executive officers at universities come from outside 
the academy (e.g., business and law), Michigan has 
usually benefited those few executive officers with 
academic roots, some even with faculty appointments 
and ongoing teaching and research responsibilities. 
This not only provides a leadership team with a deep 
understanding of academic issues, but it gives the 
University important flexibility in breaking down 
the usual bureaucracy to form multi executive officer 
teams to address key issues, such as federal research 
policy, fund-raising, resource allocation, and even 
academic policy—issues that would be constrained to 
administrative silos in other universities.
The UM Board of Regents comprises yet another 
family. Although most governing board members are 
dedicated public servants with a strong interest and 
loyalty to the university, as with any family, there are 
occasional disagreements—indeed, long-standing 
feuds—that might last months or even years. But this 
is not surprising for public governing boards that owe 
both their selection and support to highly partisan 
political constituencies.
There are many other University families beyond 
the campus, e.g., alumni, Ann Arbor citizens, and 
dedicated football fans. All are characterized by a 
respect for–indeed, a love of–at least some of the 
University’s activities.
1960s to 1970s
When we first arrived in Ann Arbor, it was a time 
when low salaries priced many young faculty families 
out of the housing market. Hence the University 
allowed us to live for a bit in married student housing 
(Northwood IV), and this became our first introduction 
to the faculty family–at least those new faculty families 
who, like us, were sufficiently destitute to live in 
University housing. Yet among these early friends are 
several still at the University today, a half-century later, 
albeit in more pleasant surroundings and important 
roles.
The first exposure to academic communities was 
through the seminars, luncheons, and other events of a 
small Department of Nuclear Science and Engineering. 
Since the department conducted only graduate level 
programs in those early years, there was a strong bond 
between graduate students and the younger faculty. 
Students and faculty members played together (poker, 
basketball, baseball with the Nuclear Nine), went to 
the Old Heidelberg or Fraser’s Pub after seminars, 
and celebrated each new PhD with a party hosted by 
each dissertation advisor. The chair of the Department 
and his spouse accepted major responsibilities for 
mentoring new faculty and hosting numerous events 
to entertain both faculty and students, a practice quite 
common throughout the University.
Fortunately, within a few weeks after our arrival, 
Anne encountered the first signs of the strong social 
network that had developed within the University 
through faculty spouses and women of the faculty. She 
was contacted by the leaders of the Newcomers Section 
of the Faculty Women’s Club and invited both to join 
and to meet other new arrivals at a series of social get-
togethers for the several hundred women joining the 
University faculty community each year.
Here it is important to stress just how important this 
community organization was to new faculty families. 
As noted earlier, the University is a very diverse and 
complex organization, broken up into smaller social 
groups usually aligned with academic departments 
or work areas. One can image the differences among 
academic units such as Law, Medicine, Engineering, 
and LS&A, or among the diverse departments and 
programs in each of these units. While most of these 
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organizations made some effort to welcome and 
orient their new faculty members, their families were 
generally ignored.
In contrast, the Faculty Women’s Club spanned the 
entire university, hosting an unusually broad set of 
activities and interest groups both for faculty partners 
and more broadly their families. In fact, since being 
launched by President Marion Burton’s wife, Nina 
Burton, in the 1920s, it had become the primary social 
organization for pulling together faculty members and 
their families across the University. While many of the 
women in the Faculty Women’s Club would remain 
active throughout their lives (including many of the 
wives of senior university leaders such as presidents 
and deans), the FWC Newcomers group played a 
particularly important role both in welcoming new 
arrivals to the University and providing them with 
opportunities to become engaged in its broad range of 
activities, both as members and as families. 
Anne immediately joined the group and soon 
found herself not only with a host of new friends from 
other arriving faculty families, but also developing 
relationships with many of the women leaders of the 
University, including Sally Fleming and Alene Smith 
(both president’s wives) and the spouses of leading 
faculty members such as Phyllis Wright, Sue Yohe, Betty 
Richart, and Florence Crane. Her participation in various 
Newcomers interest groups such as International 
Cooking, Parenting and Child Care, and Book Reviews 
gave both of us an immediate opportunity to meet 
other faculty families and make new friends across the 
entire breadth of the University. In fact, Jim was almost 
overwhelmed when at one of Anne’s events he found 
himself seated directly across from President Robben 
Fleming!!! Needless to say, for a brand-new assistant 
professor, this was a bit terrifying, until we learned 
just how warm and gracious the Flemings were. (As 
we will describe later, Robben and Sally Fleming were 
to become our primary tutors in learning the art of the 
university presidency during the brief several-month 
period when he became Interim President, just when 
we were thrust into the presidency as the successors to 
Harold and Vivian Shapiro.)  
Of course, there were other opportunities for faculty 
members to come together, such as family events 
(school programs, summer activities), cultural events 
(performing arts), or “cosmic athletic events” (UM 
football and basketball), which usually appealed to 
particular interests or periods in family life (e.g., school-
age children). There were also numerous cultural events 
such as the May Festival hosted by the University 
Musical Society and the array of performances by 
students and faculty of the School of Music. 
All were important in sustaining community life in 
the University and Ann Arbor.
1970s
Our community activities shifted somewhat with 
the appointment to Dean of Engineering in 1981, since 
with the academic leadership role of the dean came an 
array of community building activities involving both 
1968 Department of Nuclear Science and Engineering 1970 Faculty Women’s Club Newcomers
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of us. As “Dean” and “Deanette”, we were expected to 
host numerous events both for the department chairs 
and the Engineering faculty more broadly, organizing 
events to celebrate the beginning of the fall term, holiday 
season, and an array of special events for students and 
special visitors.
We found ourselves part of new communities such 
as the deans team (Chuck Vest, Dan Atkins, Scott Fogler, 
and later Lynn Conway and Walt Hancock), working 
closely with the provost (in this case, Billy Frye). In 
addition, we learned that the Dean of Engineering 
was part of a small informal committee of deans, the 
SOUP group (with the innocuous name of the “Seminar 
on University Priorities), which in fact served as the 
executive council of deans, working closely with the 
President and Provost on major strategic issues. Anne 
was particularly influential in using her long-standing 
friendships with the spouses of the deans of Michigan’s 
other schools and colleges to provide a wonderful 
opportunity to build bonds with these units. 
The role with the Faculty Women’s Club also 
evolved, first as chair of the FWC Newcomers, and 
then as FWC President, in 1984 a role that provided not 
only leadership but also mentoring for the group. The 
presidency of the Faculty Women’s Club strengthened 
these relations, forming a network of these women 
leaders that would prove invaluable as we moved up 
the ladder to more senior positions in the University.
While we very much enjoyed both the communities 
of faculty, students, and staff within the College, 
our responsibilities and hence activities necessarily 
broadened by the late 1980s with the appointment 
of Provost. Here our community building activities 
bumped up a notch to include all of the deans and many 
of the senior staff of the University. Once again, this 
required a very considerable effort both to strengthen 
and build new community bonds throughout the 
University. A series of monthly dinners held at Inglis 
House to bring together faculty couples from across the 
University.  A tradition was launched to host an event 
in the Alumni Memorial Hall each spring to honor 
newly promoted faculty. An effort was even made to 
take on the challenge of “mainstreaming” Michigan 
athletics by arranging events where student-athletes 
and coaches were brought together in various academic 
settings–e.g., museums and concert halls. We wanted to 
stress that student-athletes were students first, and that 
coaches were, in reality, teachers.
1990s
Our community roles changed once again with the 
appointment as President in 1988. It had long been a 
tradition that the “First Family” of the University played 
a key role both in building and sustaining its various 
communities for its faculty, students, and staff. Here we 
accepted a responsibility for several new communities. 
The Executive Officers were a particularly important 
team, and numerous events were arranged and hosted 
including a Fall Kickoff picnic, holiday dinners, 
and a spring “Thank heavens the term is ending!” 
celebration. We also accepted responsibility for another 
more challenging community, the University’s Board of 
Regents, hosting them for their monthly meetings and 
arranging for their care during special events such as 
the Rose Bowl and Final Four Championship.
We also found ourselves involved in numerous 
external communities, e.g., the presidents and spouses 
of those universities belonging to the Association of 
American Universities, the elite institutions in the 
Tanner Trust, the Business Higher Education Forum–all 
organizations in which the dual nature of the university 
presidency, president and spouse, was recognized and 
valued.
In our role in the presidency, Anne inherited an 
important legacy from the contributions of early 
first ladies of the university. Each had brought to the 
University a unique style, but all had been totally 
committed to this important role. Early in the our 
tenure, she took on the challenge of major renovation of 
the two primary ceremonial facilities of the University, 
the President’s House and the Inglis Highlands estate. 
The President’s House had been home for all of the 
University’s presidents since 1852. Its location in the 
center of the campus gave it a special symbolism, much 
as the White House in Washington. Furthermore, as the 
oldest building on the campus, it was of major historical 
significance. When the decision was made to modernize 
the mechanical systems of the President’s House during 
the last year of the Shapiro presidency, it was also 
recognized that such a massive system replacement 
would require as well significant renovation of the 
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interior design. Funding was set aside so that carpets 
could be replaced, walls could be painted, and plaster 
repaired. However, when we assumed the presidency 
in the midst of this project, Anne suggested a different 
direction. Rather than simply replacing the existing 
carpets and decoration details, she instead worked 
within the original project budget to restore many of 
the house’s original features.
A similar opportunity soon presented itself with 
the Inglis Highlands estate, which had long provided 
not only a guest house for distinguished visitors to 
the University, but more important as a heavily used 
meeting facility for academic groups. Again, the 
driving factor was another project, in this case the need 
to replace the massive slate roof of the manor house, 
which was in danger of collapse. It was soon realized 
that the cost of renovating the interior of the house could 
be accomplished through only a small addition to the 
original project cost. Again, Anne took responsibility 
for both the design and the renovation project. And 
again, working closely with the gardening staff, the 
formal gardens and grounds of the Inglis Highlands 
estate were totally replanted and nurtured back to their 
original elegance. 
There were other facilities important to University 
community life that required attention. Anne worked 
closely with the staff of the Athletics Department and 
the University Plant staff to redesign the entertaining 
areas in Michigan Stadium, including major redesigns 
of the reception and seating areas in the press box. 
She also was involved in the design of additional 
entertaining areas in the University Golf Course Club 
House.
Beyond the array of facilities development, Anne also 
built a strong staff that supported her many activities to 
build communities throughout the University. And, as 
the quality of the events hosted by the President and 
executive officers increased, there was a strong ripple 
effect across the campus, resulting in an increase in 
quality in all areas. Yet, even as the standards for the 
quality of University events increased, Anne also was 
unrelenting in her expectation that costs be kept under 
control. She sought these same objectives–excellence 
and efficiency–in a broad range of other projects: 
presidential events, football weekends, bowl events, 
fund-raising, etc. 
Finally, it was first in this role that Anne launched a 
major effort to recapture the history of the University. 
She was instrumental in creating the University History 
and Traditions Committee and the position of University 
Historian, first occupied by Robert Warner, Dean of the 
School of Library and former United States Archivist. 
She worked with numerous University faculty and staff 
on projects ranging from the restoration of the Detroit 
Observatory (led by Sandy Whitesell) to producing a 
series of publications on the history of the University. 
These historical activities would continue long after our 
presidency.
Throughout our years in the presidency, we sought 
not only to lead the University but to create a broad 
understanding that we viewed this as a “public 
calling”, a role through which we served those varied 
The President’s House The Inglis Highlands Estate
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History and Traditions Committee
communities of faculty, students, and staff that 
comprised the institution. In a sense, we tried to make 
it clear to everyone that we worked for them, that they 
could trust us, and that we were determined both to 
protect and advance our institution, the University 
of Michigan. We were very much servants of the 
University.
2000s
Of course, with new leadership comes new ideas, 
priorities, agendas, and people, which over time leads 
to the appearance of new cultures and characteristics. 
This was certainly true for the administrations of the 
post-2000 years, which established new priorities and 
practices for engagement and outreach that created 
new communities while casting aside others. 
Many of the events designed to build leadership 
teams among the deans, Executive Officers, and Regents 
disappeared during the early years of the new century. 
No longer do the Regents and executive officers gather 
for dinner and discussions at Inglis House during their 
monthly meetings. So too, the fall, holiday, and spring 
events for the deans and executive officers hosted by 
the president have disappeared. With the withdrawal 
of Inglis House for faculty and academic events during 
the fund-raising campaigns of the 2000s, the monthly 
faculty dinners by the provosts and the many events to 
honor distinguished achievements by faculty have also 
vanished.
While there are still faculty social communities 
within various departments or smaller schools, many of 
the University-wide faculty activities have weakened. 
The University’s faculty governance through the 
Senate Assembly and Senate Advisory Committee on 
University Affairs has assumed more of an advisory 
role, in contrast to the strong working relationship that 
existed with the president and executive officers in the 
Planning for the Inauguration
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1960s to 1990s. Its role as the voice of the faculty, once 
symbolized by its meetings in the amplitheater of the 
Rackham Hall of Graduate studies, has been muted by 
moving its meetings to the Palmer Commons. While 
there remain numerous committees and boards seeking 
faculty members, there also has been a long-standing 
suspicion that when the administration wants to avoid 
action, it appoints yet another committee which tends 
to discourage faculty participation. 
For most of its history the senior faculty has enjoyed 
a number of clubs for both scholarly conversation 
and social engagement. Many of these clubs, dating 
from the 19th Century, such as the Apostles and 
Church Wardens and the Catholespistimead have long 
since disappeared. However several still remain: the 
Scientific Club (now comprised of faculty from any 
of the University disciplines), the Azazels (a Hebrew 
word for scapegoat), and the Economics Dinner Group 
(containing both faculty and business leaders) still are 
active, their composition has become older and their 
meetings more difficult to organize.
Unlike many other universities, Michigan has not 
had a University-wide faculty club for many years. 
Decades ago the Michigan Union had provided not 
only a University Club but also a bar and tap room, but 
today these spaces have been transformed into an Au 
Bon Pain food court. Efforts to build faculty support 
for such facilities or perhaps even a club for emeritus 
faculty have failed to receive strong support from either 
faculty or the University leadership.
The Faculty Women’s Club, founded by Nina 
Burton in the 1920s, remains quite active and includes 
both faculty wives and women faculty. But like the 
other clubs, its membership has declined significantly 
over the past several decades, although it continues to 
perform valuable services for the University.
There are several possible reasons for the decline 
of interest in these clubs. With the increasing number 
of two-career couples and the limited time for family 
activities, these clubs are clearly not the priority for 
the limited free time of faculty. The increasing cost 
of housing in Ann Arbor have pushed many faculty 
families into neighboring communities such as Saline, 
Dexter, and Chelsea, where they form their social 
groups.
After locking faculty events out of Inglis House for
fund-raising, the administration tried to sell the estate!
The UM Economic Dinner Group was forced 
to meet at Washtenaw Community College!
While the Faculty Women’s Club met in
the University of Michigan Depression Center!
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The Inglis Highlands estate was kept in excellent condition and used heavily by academic units, Regents, and 
visitors to the University until 2011 when the administration ceased allowing access.
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In  2011 the estate was closed, the maintenance of the house and grounds abandoned, and much of its furniture 
moved over into the President’s House. Even the memorial to the Duderstadts was dismantled.
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It is also the case, however, that in recent years the 
leadership of the University has simply not given these 
groups the attention of earlier presidents. Although the 
Faculty Women’s Club still holds a holiday reception in 
the Presidents House, a tradition throughout its history, 
the president stopped attending years ago and, in fact, 
charges the group thousands of dollars each year for 
this affair. The Inglis Highlands estate, which has long 
been the meeting place for important groups such 
as the Economics Dinner Group, the Henry Russell 
Lecturers, and the Faculty Women’s Club, as well as 
faculty meetings with the provost and other executive 
officers (not to mention fund-raising activities) has been 
withdrawn from University use with the intent to sell 
the nine acre estate given to the University for use by 
the president in the 1950s, for commercial development, 
a short-sighted decision to the extreme. These groups 
now must meet in off-campus space such as local 
restaurants and Washtenaw Community College, an 
embarrassing experience for a great University!
There are few opportunities for members of the 
University community–students, faculty, staff, alumni–
to join together for major events. Over the long history 
of the University, athletic events (particularly football, 
basketball, and hockey) and musical and theatrical 
performances (both the University Musical Society and 
the School of Music) have provided these.
Yet, driven by aggressive new leadership of the 
Athletic Department in 2010, Michigan athletics became 
more focused on achieving national leadership in 
revenues and expenditures (already doubling budgets 
to rank 2nd in the nation) rather than building winning 
programs or serving University needs.It raised ticket 
prices beyond the range of all but the wealthiest fans. 
Few faculty members, staff, or even Ann Arbor township 
people could afford the ticket prices characterizing 
Michigan Stadium (averaging $230 per game, including 
premium and seat license fees). Student ticket prices 
rose to the highest in the nation. And, as a result, the 
crowds attending events in Michigan Stadium and the 
Crisler Center and the “wow” entertainment provided 
to them became more typical of professional athletics. 
(This was not surprising, since many of the new staff 
hired by Michigan Athletics come with experience 
in professional sports including promotion and 
marketing.) 
Unfortunately, the May Festival has disappeared. 
While the extraordinary quality of the events hosted by 
the University Musical Society provides a wonderful 
community experience for a great many members of 
the Ann Arbor community, the rising prices of these 
events are a challenge for many. Perhaps here the 
solution is not through pricing, which is driven by a 
broader commercial market, but rather more strongly 
promoting the availability of the extraordinarily 
diverse array of student and faculty performances 
provided at modest cost (or indeed free) by the School 
of Music. It is also important that both the University 
Musical Society and School of Music better coordinate 
and promote their activities and avoid competing for 
either audiences or donors.
Longer Term Concerns
From Serving the “Common Man” to 
Pampering the “Uncommonly Rich”
The University moved rapidly to develop effective 
fund-raising and alumni relations activities during the 
1980s and 1990s to respond to declining state support, 
although it continued without restraint to make massive 
investments in staffing and funding development, 
communications, and marketing efforts that would 
seriously distort the culture of the University by the 
early 2000s, essentially selling both the name and 
purpose of the institution to the highest bidder. As one 
by one, ambitious development staff sold the names 
Students leaving “broken” Michigan Stadium.
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of the schools and buildings to rich donors (who only 
contributed a modest amount to their construction or 
operation), it was only natural to wonder whether they 
were selling the University’s visibility as well. After 
all, how many outsiders would know from their new 
names that the Taubman School of Architecture, the 
Penny Stamps School of Art and Design, and the Ross 
School of Business Administration were really part of 
the University of Michigan.
We have noted earlier the increasing degree to which 
the University of Michigan has become “an engine of 
inequality” as it enrolled an increasing number of high 
income out-of-state students while the enrollment of 
students from low-income backgrounds dropped to 
among the lowest level of any many public university. 
But this is only one of many signs of the degree to which 
the University is not only increasingly dependent upon 
but also shifting its focus to serving the wealthy. As we 
have noted, few can afford the soaring costs of tickets 
imposed by Michigan Athletics. University Musical 
Society events are following a similar commercial 
trend in price escalation, albeit with the School of 
Music continuing to provide a very high quality but 
remarkably low price alternative.
As bit by bit the University has been selling its 
resources to the highest bidder–student enrollments, 
the names of programs and places, access to athletic 
and cultural events, etc.–faculty, staff, and indeed 
many students are beginning to feel no longer welcome 
or even tolerated by the armies of new staff now 
determined to redefine and market the “brand” of the 
university. 
This bias increasingly toward the wealthy has 
also influenced University staff policies. As noted 
earlier there has been an extraordinary growth in both 
staffing of the central administration and compensation 
provided to senior administrators at a time when 
faculty and staff compensation has been relatively 
stagnant. Through the use of hidden devices such as 
one-time bonuses, deferred compensation, or incentive 
awards, the compensation of executives in the central 
administration and selected deans and directors is now 
considerably above that of most other public universities 
and challenging some of the leading private universities. 
While such executive compensation is usually argued 
as driven by market considerations both by leadership 
and compensation, it must be kept in mind that 
nonprofit organizations such as universities should not 
be driven by corporate models. Furthermore, unlike the 
compensation of corporate executives, which require a 
rigorous incentive compensation policy consistent with 
accounting practices and public disclosure, university 
compensation is all too often determined by ad hoc 
decisions made by senior administrators rather than 
adhering to rigorous, public salary structures.
While executive search consultants love to stress the 
importance of competitive compensation (after all, there 
fees are frequently based on this), one should be very 
skeptical of just how important compensation is at this 
level. Instead, most senior academic leaders are rarely 
lured by the dollars. To be sure, a competitive salary is 
viewed by some candidates as a measure of how much 
you want them. But it is rarely the deciding factor. 
Far more important is the challenge, opportunity, and 
prestige of building a top-ranked academic program.
Many candidates are seeking new opportunities 
because they have been blocked by the narrowing 
pyramid of the academic hierarchy in their own 
institution. Some are after wealth and fame, not from 
the university, but rather from outside their academic 
appointment through corporate boards, national 
commissions, or other opportunities. Some actually 
view academic leadership as a “higher calling”, with 
emotional rewards and satisfaction that simply cannot 
be quantified in terms of compensation. In fact, some 
actually have acquired a sense of loyalty to a university 
and view such assignments as a duty of service. 
Anyone doubting this should just look at the list of 
institutions with the highest executive salaries. Usually 
these are places you have to pay people to go, not at the 
very best institutions!
The Erosion of the Michigan Saga
It has been suggested that a key feature of the 
Michigan saga, its particular character and impact, 
over most of its history has been its role as a pathfinder 
for higher education. It has leveraged its unusual 
combination of quality, breadth, scale, and risk-taking 
spirit to blaze new trails for learning, discovery, and 
engagement to serve society. In fact, this pathfinding 
role has occasionally been so profound that it has 
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changed the world itself. 
Recently the University has seemed more content 
to follow the lead of others, to embrace more common 
themes in higher education such as “interdisciplinarity”, 
“engaged learning”, and “entrepreneurism”. Its 
pioneering spirit seems to be lagging. The novelty 
is missing in its initiatives. To be sure, the financial 
challenges faced by the University with the loss of 
much of its state support have required attention by 
both the University’s leadership and its Regents. It is 
also the case that over the past 15 years many of the 
key leadership and administrative positions have been 
intentionally filled through external appointments 
of those unfamiliar with the University’s history, 
weakening somewhat the corporate memory and, 
indeed, corporate culture of the University. Indeed, there 
are many signs that they have been slowly decoupling 
the University from its past, just as did the disruptions 
of the protest movements of the 1960s. In fact, long-
standing programs such as the University’s History 
and Traditions Committee have been ignored and then 
abandoned. The opportunity to utilize the Bicentennial 
Year to understand and recommit the University to the 
spirit that led to two centuries of leadership for not only 
higher education but for the world now seems to be set 
aside in favor of using this moment to push yet another 
fund-raising campaign.
As many of the priorities of the University have 
shifted to activities such as development, public 
relations, marketing, and promoting the University by 
those from the commercial world with little experience 
with academe, it has become increasingly evident that 
the first years of the new century have become yet 
another “lost” decade similar to the 1970s when little of 
the traditional pathfinding achievements of University 
leadership occurred.
Whatever the reason, it is clear that this new culture 
of defining and promoting the “brand” of the University 
through slogans such as “Victors for Michigan”, by 
those with little understanding of either its academic 
character, history, or saga will seriously undermine the 
leadership role it has played in higher education over 
the years if allowed to continue. Put another way, a 
culture which transforms one of the great universities 
of the world into a follower rather than a pathfinder 
should be strongly resisted by those who understand 
and value Michigan’s remarkable contributions to the 
state, the nation, and the world throughout its long 
history.
The Road Ahead
So, how might the University begin to rebuild some 
of the communities and resources that have disappeared 
over the past two decades? Put another way, how might 
they glue back together broken communities?
First, it is important to counter those practices that 
tend to compete with academic communities, such as:
Allowing wealthy donors to distort both the 
priorities and traditions of the University (particularly 
through “naming” gifts).
Stressing once again that the primary role of chairs 
and deans is not fund-raising but rather academic 
leadership, and the constituencies they serve are 
students and faculty, not wealthy donors.
Seeking a better balance between external and 
internal appointments for key leadership positions 
(e.g., chairs, deans, executive officers, and president), 
perhaps by countering the external bias of search 
consultants.
Achieving a better balance between the attention 
given to the priorities of academic and auxiliary units. 
To be sure, units such as the University Medical Center, 
University Housing, and the Athletics Department do 
have access to vast resources. But the heart and purpose 
of a university are learning and scholarship, and 
whether prosperous or not, these activities and their 
associated communities involving faculty and students 
must be given the priority.
It is also critical to recommit the University to both 
the maintenance and community use of key facilities 
such as the President’s House, the Inglis Highlands 
estate, the Michigan Union, and the Michigan League. 
The importance of long-standing organizations such 
as the Faculty Women’s Club and the Economics Dinner 
Group should be both recognized and supported 
through University policies and resources (e.g., Inglis 
Highlands).
The degree to which commercialism has fractured 
the community of long-standing fans of Michigan 
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Alumni Memorial Hall
Athletics, a community including not only students, 
alumni, and fans but also faculty and staff, must be 
addressed. There needs to be a significant restructuring 
of both costs and pricing, as well as positioning the 
University once more as a leader in reforming college 
sports rather than exemplar in their excesses.
Finally new communities should be considered. 
For example, there is a need for new faculty clubs for 
senior faculty similar to those longstanding historical 
groups such as the Scientific Club and the Azazels.
The possibility of clubs for faculty couples should 
be considered, perhaps modeled after several of the 
Interest Sections of the Faculty Women’s Club.
Strong consideration should be given about the 
possibility of a faculty club for emeritus faculty 
members. Since faculty retirement is increasingly 
accompanied by a strong desire to retain some level 
of intellectual, cultural, and social interaction with the 
University community, Michigan should join many 
other institutions in providing resources to support this 
continued engagement.
Here we might note that the University used to 
have such clubs. Alumni Memorial Hall, which was 
built by the Alumni as a War Memorial to honor fallen 
University of Michigan students, faculty, staff and 
alumni, was completed in 1910, dedicated a large room 
in the basement was used for the University Club, a 
faculty organization.
When the Michigan Union was expanded in 1936, 
it provided space for a new University Club for the 
faculty.
University Club Faculty Lounge
Michigan Union
Faculty Recreation Room
Michigan Union
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Appendix
Weakening of Key Assets and Cultures
The University of Michigan, Circa 2015
Continuities
“An uncommon education for the common man”
...Loss of student economic and social diversity
...Loss of leadership diversity
...UM today is pandering primarily to the rich
....Over commercialization of athletics, UMS,...
The Michigan Saga
...leadership of past two decades failed to honor the 
UM saga as pathfinder
...tendency to neither appreciate nor honor UM 
history
...grasping at the straws of “me-too isms”
Weakening of Historical Assets
...Limited priority given by the Bentley Library
...Elimination of History and Traditions Committee
...Elimination of University Historian
...Failure to take advantage of UM 2017
...Limited role of UM Press in UM History projects
...Disappearance of UM courses on University His-
tory (particularly the Stenecks course in LS&A)
Erosion or Loss of Major UM Assets
...Inglis Highlands Estate
...Ford Fairlane Estate
...Historical Role of Bentley and UM Press
...Ford Nuclear Reactor and Phoenix Project 
...Alumni Memorial Hall
Culture
Faculty activism and engagement
...erosion of SACUA and Senate Assembly influence
...muzzling by leadership
...”Board in Control” to “Advisory Board” for Inter-
collegiate Athletics
Overrun by administration
...shared services
...growth in central administration
Migratory nature of faculty
...no longer committed to livelong UM careers
...responsive to market pressures
Staff Pressures
...lowering priorities given staff
...layoffs, weak compensation
...shared services, IT rationalization
Decentralization vs Centralization
Weakening of Deans
...Loss of teamwork
...Disappearance of SOUP group
...Dominated by outsiders (13 to 6)
...Overwhelmed by fund-raising pressures
...Inadequate support by administration
...Intentional weakening by provost and president
Lack of EOs with faculty experience
...EO “faculty”: president, provost, VPR, VPHA
Student activism
...wealthy students are “paying for the party”
...erosion of student diversity and inclusion
...disappearance of “common man” priority
Governance
...What is the priority of the Regents? To act as 
trustees to protect the University, or as gover-
nors to demand its near-term service to state?
...Commitment to fiduciary responsibilities?
...Inadequate interaction with UM administration
Community
Weakening of key social organizations
...Faculty Women’s Club
...Senior Faculty Clubs
...Decline of EO, Dean social events for faculty
...Loss of Inglis House for faculty groups
...Pricing of athletics and performance venues
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The University of Michigan, highlighted for its 
free and liberal spirit during its early years, has a long 
history of activism on the part of its students, faculty, 
and alumni. Student and faculty concerns upon and 
extending beyond the University’s campus have 
frequently not only addressed but also influenced 
major national issues, such as civil rights and the 
Teach-Ins against the war in Vietnam in the 1960s, 
the environmental movement of the 1970s, and in the 
1980s and 1990s, the University’s leadership in helping 
reaffirm the importance of diversity to higher education. 
Of course this sometimes runs against the grain of 
political opinion in the community, state government, 
or the public at large. But the University’s constitutional 
autonomy, coupled with the long-standing principle of 
academic freedom, gave it both the capacity and the 
responsibility to challenge the norms and beliefs of 
society from time to time.
While Ann Arbor may be a small Midwestern 
community, the University itself has always had more 
of the hard edge characterizing the urban centers of 
the Northeast. Although sports fans might suggest 
this flows naturally from Michigan’s reputation in 
violent sports such as football and hockey, in reality 
it has evolved as a defensive mechanism to protect 
the University against the reality of its harsh political 
environment. In a sense, the University of Michigan 
grew up in a rough neighborhood and had to become 
lean and mean and capable of looking out for itself. 
Michigan is a state characterized by confrontational 
politics. It was long dominated by the automobile 
industry–big companies, big labor unions, and big state 
government. During the last half of the 20th century, 
as the state’s economy and population faced the 
challenges and hardships driven by global competition 
and poverty in its industrial cities, this political 
atmosphere has become more strident, with organized 
labor fighting to retain its control of the Democratic 
party while the conservative communities of western 
Michigan, dominated by the religious right, now 
control the Republican party and State government. 
In many ways, Ann Arbor is an oasis, a liberal 
eastern community planted in the center of a tough 
Midwestern state. The politics of the city of Ann Arbor 
still reflect the rebellious spirit of the protest days of 
the 1960s (declaring itself in the 1980s as “a nuclear free 
zone”!). The community continues to this day to mark 
its history of civil disobedience by celebrating each April 
1 with the annual Hash Bash, where thousands come 
to promote and experience the evil weed, uninhibited 
by Ann Arbor’s pot law, a $5 fine for possession of 
marijuana.
The relationship between public universities and 
their states varies significantly. Some universities 
are structurally organized as components of state 
government, subject to the same hiring and business 
practices characterizing other state agencies. Others 
possess a certain autonomy from state government 
through constitutional provision or statute. All are 
influenced by the power of the public purse--by the 
nature and degree of state support.
Although the University of Michigan faced many of 
the challenges experienced by other state universities, 
declining state appropriations, intrusive sunshine laws, 
over-regulation, politically motivated competition 
among state institutions, and a politically determined 
governing board–there are two characteristics of 
our relationship with the state that are quite unique. 
First, as noted earlier the University was given 
unusual autonomy in the state constitution, autonomy 
comparable to that of the Legislature, Executive, and 
Judicial branches. While it was certainly subject to state 
Chapter 19
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funding decisions and regulations, the University’s 
elected Board of Regents possessed exceptionally strong 
constitutionally derived powers over all academic 
activities of the institution. Second, both because of 
the University’s autonomy and its long history, first 
as a territorial institution and then later, in effect, as 
a national university–and today, one might argue, a 
world university–it was determined to do whatever 
was necessary to protect both the quality of and access 
to its academic programs. 
In particular, the University refused to allow the 
quality of its academic programs to be determined by 
state appropriations or policies, which were usually 
insufficient to support a world-class institution. 
Instead it developed an array of alternative resources 
to supplement state support, including student tuition, 
federal research support, private giving, endowment 
earnings, and auxiliary activities such as clinical care. 
Furthermore, it used its constitutional autonomy to 
defend its commitment to serving a diverse population, 
reaching out not only to underserved minority 
communities and students from low income families, 
but also to students from across the nation and around 
the world. While this philosophy of independence was 
key to the quality of the University and its ability to 
serve not simply the people of the state, but those of 
the nation and the world, it did not always endear the 
University to state government, which tended to equate 
the University’s independence with arrogance.
Political winds shift over time, and this has certainly 
been the case for the political fortunes of the University 
of Michigan. For its first century, the University enjoyed 
a privileged position. Many of its alumni were in the 
state legislature and in key positions in government 
and communities across the state. Political parties were 
disciplined, and special interests had not yet splintered 
party solidarity. In that environment the University 
had little need to cultivate public understanding or 
grassroots support. A few leaders from the University 
met each year with the governor and leaders of the 
legislature to negotiate our appropriation (rumored 
to be in a duck blind…). That was it. The University 
was valued and appreciated. There was a historic and 
intense public commitment to the support of public 
higher education that had characterized the founders 
of the University of Michigan and the generations of 
immigrants who followed, sacrificing to provide quality 
public education as the key to their children’s future. 
But, as we shall see, this broad public support for 
a world class public research university is a far cry 
from the political cauldron in which flagship public 
universities find themselves today.
1950s - 1970s
This University of Michigan’s privileged position 
and broad support changed dramatically in the 1950s 
and 1960s, both because of the aggressive ambition 
of the other state colleges and universities and the 
detached and occasionally arrogant attitude of the 
University of Michigan. In the early 1950s, Michigan 
State’s legendary president John Hannah transformed 
that institution from an agricultural college into a major 
research university, relying both on his own political 
skill and UM’s missteps. Hannah began, ironically 
enough, with football, by maneuvering Michigan State 
into the opening left by the University of Chicago’s 
departure from big-time football and the Big Ten 
Conference. With this visibility, he then persuaded the 
State Legislature to change the name of his institution to 
Michigan State University and later added professional 
schools such as medicine and law. The University of 
Michigan adamantly and unsuccessfully opposed 
each of these steps, finally attempting to save face 
by capitalizing the word “The” in its own title. (We 
ended this arrogant practice during the 1990s.)  These 
unsuccessful battles firmly established UM’s reputation 
for arrogance in Lansing, as in, “those arrogant asses 
from Ann Arbor.” 
A story contrasting the styles of the presidents 
of the two universities at the time illustrates the 
challenge: Michigan’s president, Harlan Hatcher, a 
tall and distinguished scholar, used to arrive to visit 
legislators in Lansing driving up in his chauffeur-
driven Lincoln. John Hannah, in shirtsleeves, would 
drive himself over in his Ford pickup to make the case 
to legislators more typically from outstate farm country 
than big-city Detroit. A second Hannah story: during 
the 1950s and 1960s, the Michigan State campus was 
pockmarked with construction projects. The legend 
was that Hannah would get funds from the legislature 
for a single building, and then use the funds to dig the 
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foundations of several more buildings, and then turn to 
the legislature for the funds to fill all those holes in the 
ground with new buildings.
A long-time leader of the state legislature portrayed 
Michigan during this period of its history as a university 
led by a distinguished but conservative president and 
moneyed Republican Regents determined to hang onto 
the past. They were surprised when the state legislature 
not only labeled Michigan as arrogant but actually took 
great delight in disadvantaging it relative to other public 
universities. The student protests on campus during 
the 1960s provided even more ammunition to those 
who wanted to attack Michigan for political reasons. 
The University entered the 1970s with both a bruised 
ego and a damaged reputation–at least in Lansing. 
Slowly the University began to realize that the world 
had changed, and that it no longer had monopoly on 
state support. The state was in the midst of a profound 
economic transformation that was driving change in 
the political environment. Political parties declined in 
influence. Special-interest constituencies proliferated 
and organized to make their needs known and influence 
felt. Even as the University became more central in 
responding to the needs of the state, it was also held 
more accountable to its many publics. 
Driving the complexity of this situation was a grow-
ing socioeconomic shift in priorities at both the state 
and federal level. In Michigan, as in many other states, 
priorities shifted from investment in the future through 
strong support of education to a shorter-term focus, as 
represented by the growing expenditures for prisons, 
social services, and federal mandates such as Medicaid, 
even as conservative administrations cut taxes in the 
1990s. This was compounded by legislation that ear-
marked a portion of the state budget for K-12 education, 
leaving higher education to compete with corrections 
and social services for limited discretionary tax dollars. 
As a result, the state’s support for higher education de-
clined rapidly in real terms during the early 1980s and 
continued to drop, relative to inflation, throughout the 
remainder of the decade.
In summary, during the last half of the 20th century 
the University of Michigan’s political influence in 
Lansing plummeted. Although changing external 
factors such as the rise of populism, changing 
demographics, and the rise of the religious right in 
western Michigan were key factors, the University’s 
presidents had been largely ineffective in reversing the 
situation since the 1940s. Ruthven’s declining health 
prevented his active role in Lansing. Hatcher was 
effective with moneyed Republicans, but he was a poor 
match for John Hannah’s shirtsleeve approach. Fleming 
relied heavily on others, keeping his powder dry for 
the periodic crises erupting on the campus during the 
volatile protest years of the 1960s and 1970s. Shapiro 
was dedicated and tireless, but the sharp mismatch 
of his thoughtful style with the crude populism and 
paranoia of legislative was simply too great. 
The key factor allowing the University to sustain its 
quality during this difficult period was its constitutional 
autonomy. Relying heavily on this autonomy to control 
its own destiny, the University began to increase 
both its tuition and its nonresident enrollments to 
compensate for the loss of state support. Yet even 
the constitutional autonomy of the University faced 
formidable challenges from legislative efforts to control 
President Harlan HatcherPresident John Hannah
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admissions, gubernatorial efforts to freeze tuition, and 
even onslaught from the media under the guise of 
the state’s sunshine laws to control everything from 
presidential searches to Regental elections. 
The situation was quite different in the University’s 
relationships with the federal government. Although 
the United States leaves most of the responsibility for 
higher education to the states and the private sector, the 
federal government does have a considerable influence 
on higher education, both through federal policies, in 
areas such as student financial aid and through the 
direct support of campus activities such as research and 
health care. In fact some would maintain that the most 
transformative changes in American higher education 
have usually been triggered by federal actions such as 
the Land Grant Acts of the 19th Century, the G. I. Bill and 
government-university research partnership (Vannevar 
Bush’s Science, the Endless Frontier) following World 
War II, and the Higher Education Acts of the 1960s. 
As Washington became convinced that higher 
education was important to the future of the nation in 
the decades after World War II, the federal government 
began to provide funding to colleges and universities 
in support of research, housing, student financial aid, 
and key professional programs such as medicine and 
engineering. Of course, with significant federal support 
also came massive federal bureaucracy. Universities 
were forced to build large administrative organizations 
just to interact with the large administrative 
bureaucracies in Washington. Federal rules and 
regulations snared universities in a web of red tape 
that not only constrained their activities but became 
important cost drivers. Universities were frequently 
whipsawed about by the unpredictable changes in 
Washington’s stance toward higher education as the 
political winds shifted direction each election year. Yet, 
it was strong federal support rather than state support 
or philanthropy that transformed universities like 
Michigan into global leaders as research universities.
1980s
Despite the changing nature of its economic and 
politics, the State of Michigan was characterized very 
much by a blue-collar mentality in the 1980s, perhaps 
best illustrated by a comment by a senior executive 
of General Motors during a visit to GM headquarters: 
“As long as we can put a car on the showroom floor 
for fewer dollars per pound than anybody else, we 
will dominate the global marketplace!” Of course, the 
Japanese demonstrated convincingly that people no 
longer bought cars by the pound–they chose quality 
instead. Similarly, in the global, knowledge-driven 
economy of the 21st Century, it was the quality of a 
workforce that counts, as evidenced by the increasing 
tendency of American companies to outsource–rather, 
offshore, in contemporary language–not only unskilled 
labor but high-skilled activities such as software 
engineering. Higher education in Michigan tended to 
be treated at best with benign neglect and at worst as a 
convenient political whipping boy.
The 1980s began with a deep national recession–
read “depression” in Michigan, since when the nation 
gets a cold, Michigan catches pneumonia because of the 
sensitivity of the automobile industry to the national 
economy. Although the University of Michigan was 
not singled out for abuse, it suffered greatly along with 
the rest of higher education. It also faced an unusual 
alignment of the political planets when legislative 
champions for Michigan State University and Wayne 
State University assumed the chairs of the key higher 
education appropriation committees, along with two-
decade long succession of Michigan State alumni as 
governors.
There were many theories about what was actually 
happening. Despite the fact that the state’s governors 
paid lip service to the unique role of the University 
of Michigan as the state’s flagship university, none 
lifted a finger to help the University if political capital 
were at stake. As William Hubbard, former UM dean 
of medicine and UpJohn CEO, put it, the state was 
cursed with an “extreme intolerance of extraordinary 
excellence.” And it was certainly true that an angry 
strain of populism ran throughout the state. As one 
key legislator summarized the situation: “It is no 
longer possible for a kid like me to go to the University 
of Michigan. The University’s prospects in Lansing 
are at a low point. The Senate is controlled by MSU 
Republicans more interested in agriculture and boosting 
their alma mater. The Democrats are simply not very 
effective, dominated by the Detroit Black Caucus. The 
key legislators are simply no longer swayed by public 
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pressure. They cannot be intimidated, since they cannot 
be beaten in their gerrymandered districts.” 
With fewer and fewer Michigan graduates in 
influential positions in state government, it was 
questionable whether a traditional approach to lobbying 
legislators would be effective. There were those who 
believed the UM bashing had become a popular sport 
in Lansing because the University no longer had allies 
with sufficient power or commitment to threaten 
retaliation. The University was drifting politically 
without a plan of attack or even an effective defense. 
Another Lansing observer put it this way: “Michigan is 
big, vulnerable, and it doesn’t dance very well!”
Much of the University of Michigan’s political 
challenge was stimulated by its very success as one of 
the nation’s leading research universities. Its aspirations 
for excellence frequently were met by state government 
and the public at large with questions of “Excellence 
for whom?” and “Excellence for what purpose?”, 
assuming that excellence really meant an elitism that 
would exclude their constituents. Furthermore, as one 
of the largest and most prominent universities in the 
nation, Michigan was frequently targeted by those in 
the federal government hoping to use it as a lynchpin 
for driving broader change in higher education. Since 
the University operates one of the nation’s largest 
and financially most successful university medical 
centers, it was understandable that Michigan would 
be the target for federal efforts to reduce health care 
reimbursement and funding for medical training. 
The University’s national leadership in sponsored 
research also made it an attractive target for the same 
congressional investigations that trampled Stanford 
in the early 1990s, ironically led by Michigan’s own 
Congressman John Dingell. However unlike Stanford, 
we were prepared and immediately responded to the 
Congressional attack not only with a strong public 
defense led by alumnus Mike Wallace, but also back-
channel conversations with the Congressman that 
successfully deflected the attack. 
There were other factors that frequently placed 
the University in the political bull’s-eye. The success 
and visibility of the University’s athletic programs–
particularly its football team–made the University a 
primary target for the enforcement of gender equity 
through Title IX in the 1970s. As the largest employer in 
Ann Arbor, with vast assets in the billions of dollars, it 
was also natural that Michigan would become a popular 
target of litigation on almost every issue imaginable 
from those plaintiffs and lawyers who were hoping that 
the institution’s deep pockets would lead to a quick 
settlement, regardless of the merits of the case.
The University’s public purpose, “an uncommon 
education for the common man”, and its success in 
leading the struggle for campus diversity through 
efforts such as the Michigan Mandate, which doubled 
minority student and faculty representation on campus 
during the early 1990s, gave the University even more 
prominence. Hence it was not surprising that the 
institution would become a target for conservative 
groups seeking to challenge and roll back affirmative 
action policies in college admissions, an effort which 
would lead to the important Supreme Court decision 
of 2003.
As an interim strategy, the University lowered its 
sights from hogging the entire trough of state support 
to simply trying to stay even with Michigan State. But 
even this proved to be a formidable challenge, with 
Michigan State alumni as governors (James Blanchard 
and John Engler) in the 1980s and 1990s. Although the 
University of Michigan at least managed to avoid being 
low man on the totem pole during the latter part of the 
1970s, the University’s Replacement Hospital Project 
exhausted the state’s discretionary capacity to fund 
higher education capital facilities. The cupboard was 
bare.
The 1980s started off positively enough for the 
University when the new Blanchard administration 
made a special effort to recognize the impact of the 
research universities on the state’s economy through 
the Research Excellence Fund, a special $30 million 
annual appropriation for campus-based research. The 
College of Engineering was able to capture roughly 
$11 million/year of this annual appropriation flowing 
to the University. But this effort to differentiate among 
institutions and mission soon ran afoul of Lansing 
politics, and eventually the special funding for research 
disappeared.
Blanchard’s second term became a disaster for higher 
education when he realized through polling that he could 
get more votes by attacking the rising tuition levels of 
public universities–a consequence of inadequate state 
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support–than investing in their capacity. The governor 
launched a major effort to constrain tuition as a cheaper 
political alternative to providing adequate support for 
the state’s universities in gaining political popularity. 
In parallel, the state established a prepaid tuition plan, 
the Michigan Education Trust, that portrayed itself 
as a state-guaranteed program to help parents meet 
the cost of a college education–although, in reality, it 
provided no real guarantee and was constructed as a 
Ponzi scheme, in which the unrealistic price of early 
contracts would be compensated by later participants. 
Since the financial–and political–integrity of the Trust 
was heavily dependent on tuition levels, the governor 
launched a major effort to force universities to freeze 
tuition increases.
This was the challenging political environment the 
University faced in the late 1980s. It had to resist the 
state’s effort to dictate tuition, since these resources 
represented the only real alternative to maintaining 
the quality and health of higher education in Michigan 
during a time in which state support was declining. 
The President’s Council of Public Universities waged 
a bitter yet successful struggle to resist the governor’s 
efforts to control tuition. We also fought hard to 
maintain the University’s autonomy in areas such as 
the admission of out-of-state students. State funding 
for higher education dropped from 12% to less than 
8% of the state’s budget during the decade. Even more 
dramatically, the state of Michigan fell into the bottom 
quartile in its support of higher education, dropping as 
low as 45th in the nation at one point. 
Fortunately, the University had a top-notch state-
relations team with experience on both sides of the 
aisle. Although we soon reaffirmed the pragmatic 
conclusion of our predecessors that it was unlikely 
that the University would ever again benefit from its 
flagship status in Lansing, we also realized that we 
were destined to continue to lose in state politics as 
long as we stayed on the defensive, simply reacting to 
whatever trumped-up charge–out-of-state enrollments, 
high tuition, racism on campus, whatever–that our 
enemies used to disadvantage us with respect to other 
state universities. 
Instead, we adopted a quite different strategy by 
forming a bond with the presidents of Michigan State 
and Wayne State to build a team of the leaders of the 
state’s public universities that would both advocate 
for stronger support of higher education and resist 
efforts to challenge our constitutional autonomy by 
controlling issues such as enrollments, tuitions, and 
academic priorities. In particular, we visited most of the 
major cities in the state, holding press conferences for 
visibility and hosting numerous receptions to recruit 
our alumni who were in leadership roles in communities 
throughout the state–in business, the professions, and 
public service-to assist in this efforts. This “treetops” 
strategy was extremely effective, and not only beat 
back the efforts of the Blanchard administration to 
control our institutions, but was a factor in electing his 
successor, John Engler, as “the education governor”!
1990s
Higher education faced a paradoxical situation as it 
approached the 1990s. On the one hand, it was clear that 
the universities were becoming more critical players 
in a society increasingly dependent upon knowledge, 
upon educated people and their ideas. They were not 
only more important to society than ever, but they 
were more deeply engaged through a broad range 
of activities ranging from education to health care to 
public entertainment (through athletics). Yet, even as 
the university moved front and center stage, it also 
came under attack from many directions: the cost of 
education, political activities on campus, student and 
faculty behavior, and racial diversity and affirmative 
Charting the “forces of darkness”
threatening the university.
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action. The American university became for many just 
another arena for the exercise of political power, an 
arena for the conflict of fragmented interests, a bone 
of contention for proliferating constituencies. It was 
increasingly the focus of concern for both the powerful 
and the powerless.
One of the most important roles of a university 
president is to protect the university from hostile 
political forces, both internal and external, that could 
cause it great harm. At the beginning of each academic 
year our leadership team of executive officers would 
meet together for a risk-assessment session, to predict 
the most political significant threats to the University 
and develop strategies for its defense. We actually 
developed a threat chart identifying the greatest 
concerns for the year ahead. At the top of the chart 
would usually be the governor, since whether by 
opportunistic intent or just neglect, this state leader was 
frequently the source of many of the woes facing higher 
education in the state. Close behind was the state 
legislature, dominated during the 1980s by graduates 
of Michigan State University, who took great delight in 
thrashing that arrogant institution in Ann Arbor.
Washington also posed an ongoing threat, 
usually through the meddling of federal agencies 
or Congressional action. There were times when 
even members of our own Michigan Congressional 
delegation would make the list, for example, when 
manipulated by their staff into taking positions hostile 
to the University in order to win political influence or 
visibility at the national level. 
Next on the chart would be the Fifth Estate, 
particularly the hometown newspapers–which, in 
Michigan’s case, included not only the Ann Arbor News 
but also the Detroit papers. While most hometown 
newspaper editors soon realize that university 
controversies stimulate interest and advertising sales, 
the Ann Arbor paper often was led by those who 
actually carried a chip on their shoulders about the 
University–perhaps because Michigan was perceived 
as elitist and arrogant, or because of rocky town-gown 
relations, or even because we refused to invest heavily 
in building degree programs in journalism (flames 
occasionally fanned by several of our own faculty 
members). We usually didn’t bother listing the student 
newspaper, the Michigan Daily, as a major threat since 
it was usually more preoccupied with college sports or 
student causes such as disciplinary policies.
We never included any students, faculty, or staff 
on our threat chart. We believed that student activism, 
while occasionally annoying to administrators, was 
nevertheless an important and positive element 
of the Michigan saga. To be sure, Michigan had its 
share of outspoken students and faculty members, 
some enjoying the spotlight of campus politics, some 
as squeaky wheels pushing one personal agenda 
or another, and some speaking out on issues of 
considerable importance to the institution or broader 
society. But generally we regarded this as a normal–
indeed desirable–characteristic of a campus with an 
activist tradition. We preferred to not only tolerate but 
actually encourage such behavior, even when, in one 
case, it led to the Supreme Court case on affirmative 
action. Although we occasionally had outspoken staff 
members as well, particularly on union issues, most 
staff were intensely loyal university citizens and were 
viewed as strong allies rather than threats.
We did include on our threat chart an occasional 
member of our Board of Regents, however. We viewed 
most members of the board as conscientious public 
servants, basically supportive of the University, 
although some had their particular hang-ups such 
as football, campus architecture, or student rights. 
However, we always had one or two regents who 
were renegades, frequently seizing on opportunities to 
embarrass or even disrupt the University to promote 
their personal visibility and political agenda. 
Finally, there was the usual array of special-interest 
groups, some on campus, some off, inclined to use the 
University as a convenient and highly visible target to 
further their particular cause. Here the list was very 
long and ever changing, spanning the political spectrum 
from the Marxist left to the Genghis Khan right.
To test our assumptions, we decided to conduct a 
reality check with a number of the state’s political and 
corporate leaders. Each was asked to challenge the 
following assumptions: First, because of the limited 
will and capacity to support higher education, and 
in the face of a weakened economy and other social 
needs, the state would, at best, be able to support 
higher education at the level of a regional four-year 
college—not at the level of a world-class research 
274
university. Second, political pressures would make it 
increasingly difficult for state leaders to give priority to 
state support for flagship institutions. Instead, strong 
political forces would drive a leveling process in which 
state appropriations per student would equalize across 
all state universities.
In the end, few of these leaders disagreed with 
our premises. Furthermore, all believed that the 
University’s only prudent course was to assume that 
state support would continue to deteriorate throughout 
the 1990s. Consistent with the University’s long-
standing philosophy of refusing to let the state control 
our quality, we continued Harold Shapiro’s strategy: i) 
to build alternative revenue streams (tuition, federal 
grants and contracts, auxiliary enterprises, private 
giving, and building endowment through wise 
investment strategies) to levels sufficient to compensate 
for the loss in state support; ii) to deploy our resources 
far more effectively than the University had in the past 
by focusing on quality at the possible expense of breadth 
and capacity, while striving to improve efficiency 
and productivity; and iii) to enhance the University’s 
ability to control its own destiny by defending our 
constitutional autonomy, building strong political 
support for our independence, and strengthening the 
quality of the university’s Board of Regents.
Yet it was clear that the University of Michigan was 
a creature of the state constitution, and it was unlikely 
that it could ever separate itself from this constraint. Yet 
it was also the case that the political realities of the past 
several decades had shifted the University’s Lansing 
strategy from offense, e.g., maximizing state support, to 
defense, i.e., minimizing the damage to the University 
from state government. We needed a new and more 
aggressive strategy to move toward operating more like 
a private institution while becoming less dependent 
on the state. With a new Republican administration 
coming to power in the early 1990s, the pressure on 
controlling university tuition and enrollments subsided 
somewhat–although state support continued to decline. 
A similar shift was also occurring in federal support 
of higher education. There were signs that the nation 
was no longer willing to invest in research performed by 
universities, at least at the same level and with a similar 
willingness to support basic research. Furthermore, 
even the basic principles of this extraordinarily 
productive research partnership began to unravel, 
changing from a partnership to a procurement process. 
This view unleashed on the research university an 
army of government staff, accountants, and lawyers all 
claiming as their mission that of making certain that the 
university meets every detail of its agreements with the 
government. 
To address this, during the 1990s we substantially 
increased the University’s presence in Washington 
by establishing a permanent office on Capital Hill, 
significantly expanding our federal relations staff, 
and mobilizing our extensive army of alumni in the 
Washington area. We strongly encouraged University 
faculty members to become actively involved in federal 
policy activities, providing support through our 
Washington office and federal relations team. Perhaps 
most important, however, was our acceptance of a 
major role in acting on behalf of all of higher education 
on important issues ranging from research policy to 
student financial aid to health care to diversity. We 
encouraged our federal relations team to work closely 
with the various national higher education associations. 
This spirit of building alliances was very similar to that 
we had employed in our state-relations efforts, since we 
realized that the interests of the University of Michigan 
were best served when we helped advance the interests 
of all of higher education.
Michigan’s very success in rising to a position of 
national leadership in attracting federal support for its 
research activities placed it at considerable risk during 
this period of shifting federal priorities and attitudes. 
As one of America’s leading research universities, 
it generally was targeted by every federal effort to 
restructure the long-standing partnership between 
the nation and its universities. For example, although 
Stanford University was the primary target of the 
vicious attacks on research grant overhead charges by 
Congressman John Dingell’s powerful investigative 
committee, Michigan also was attacked by committee 
staff members. Efforts to transfer more of the expense 
of federally procured research to universities through 
artificial constraints on overhead payments or excessive 
cost-sharing requirements hit Michigan harder than 
most institutions.
The University continued to experience the usual 
ups and downs in its relationships with the city of Ann 
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Arbor that had characterized not only its history but 
town-gown relations in other campus communities. 
The factors causing tensions between the University 
and the city were also not surprising: rowdy students, 
traffic, competition for housing, and removing property 
from the tax roles. The efforts taken by the University 
to work more closely with fraternities and sororities to 
address neighborhood concerns had a positive impact. 
There was a genuine effort to strengthen relationships 
between the University leadership, city government, 
and leaders of the local business community, and 
overall there was progress in improving town-gown 
relations.
The University also intensified its outreach efforts 
with other Michigan communities. Its Schools of 
Education, Public Health, and Social Work intensified 
their activities with the metropolitan Detroit area. Many 
other units and individual faculty became engaged 
in research and service in Detroit and worked to 
strengthen relations with the city’s leadership. Efforts 
with other Michigan cities also gained momentum. Of 
particular note here were the efforts of UM-Flint and 
UM-Ann Arbor to work closely with city government, 
industry, labor, private foundations, and private 
leadership to address a wide range of issues facing the 
City of Flint, including education, public health, and 
economic development.
The University also took important steps to 
improve its relationship with the media. It appointed 
Walt Harrison, the former head of a major national 
public relations firm, to the post of Vice President for 
University Relations, and he moved ahead rapidly to 
build a strong communications program capable of 
supporting all of the University’s external relations 
activities.
In summary, much of the attention of the 
administration during the 1990s was directed at 
building far stronger relationships with the multitude 
of external constituencies served by and supporting 
the University. Efforts were made to strengthen bonds 
with both state and federal government, ranging from 
systemic initiatives such as opening and staffing new 
offices in Lansing and Washington to developing 
personal relationships with key public leaders (e.g., the 
Governor, the White House). A parallel effort was made 
to develop more effective relationships with the media 
at the local, state, and national level. These included 
major media campaigns such as the Big Ten public 
service announcements and national organizations 
such as the Science Coalition. Additional efforts were 
directed toward strengthening relationships with key 
communities including Ann Arbor, Detroit, and Flint.
2000
The nature of Michigan’s relationships with its 
various constituencies began to shift yet again during 
the first decade of the 21st century. Although Republican 
John Engler was succeeded by a Democrat, Jennifer 
Granholm, who had long standing relationships with 
several Regents, the erosion of state support dropped 
even more precipitously. In later interviews, Granholm 
There were times when we went to higher authorities...the 60 Minutes cast and the Dalai Lama!
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explained that whenever she put a list of state priorities 
such as crime (build more prisons), the economy (cut 
more taxes), and education (K-12 comes first) in front 
of audiences, higher education always came up last, so 
this is what she decided to sacrifice. Of course, since 
she had attended UC Berkeley and Harvard herself, she 
should have understood well the importance for the 
long term in investing in higher education, but instead 
she took a “let them eat cake” approach and sacrificed 
university funding.
 One might ask where was the University of Michigan 
during this period. After all, the University had led a 
successful effort in the 1990s by uniting all of the public 
universities in the state to galvanize their leading 
alumni (“the treetops” strategy) to beat back a similar 
effort to cut higher education funding while freezing 
tuition by Democratic Governor James Blanchard. Of 
course, one explanation for Michigan’s failure to get off 
the bench and get back in the game of state relations 
during the past decade involves the degree to which 
Michigan shifted more of its attention on private fund-
raising. However there was also a serious failure to make 
adequate investment in its state relations activities, with 
only a small office and one part-time state relations staff 
member based in Lansing, in contrast to the well-staffed 
effort of the 1990s. This neglect of state relations would 
become even more damaging when the University 
failed to beat back a petition drive that successfully led 
to a state constitutional amendment to ban affirmative 
action in college admissions, depressing the enrollment 
of underrepresented minorities at the University even 
further.
  While the University had a more effective 
relationship with the federal government, with a 
well-staffed office on Capital Hill, perhaps its most 
influential role was through a number of its faculty who 
served in leadership roles in government agencies and 
advisory groups. In fact, this breadth of involvement 
of Michigan faculty at the highest level of the federal 
government and its various advisory bodies (NSF, NIH, 
DOE, NASA, DOEd, National Science Board, National 
Academies, American Association for the Advancement 
of Science) was one of the reasons that the University 
had created its program in Science, Technology and 
Public Policy.
 Interactions with the City of Ann Arbor were 
largely characterized by benign neglect. Since this 
relationship only became awkward when students 
misbehaved or the athletics director irritated the city by 
disrupting traffic or mounting a gigantic video sign to 
blast advertising along the main thoroughfare running 
by Michigan Stadium, they simply assigned a staff 
member to calm down the mayor (who occasionally 
taught at the University anyway). (Of course, the 
president didn’t help matters by suggesting that 
citizens concerned about the gigantic video sign should 
“drive responsibly and not be distracted by it”.
  While the interactions with the media had always 
been a major priority of the University, particularly 
when facing vigorous investigative journalism, the 
demise of the Ann Arbor News, coupled with the shift 
in the interest of the Detroit papers from statewide 
interests to the collapse of the City of Detroit, left only 
the Michigan Daily as a truly independent source of 
news. This erosion of the fourth estate was intensified by 
a massive increase in the communications, marketing, 
and public relations activities of the University, that 
took over control of most of the information flow both 
within the University and to the media. When electronic 
news media began to appear, such as MLive.com, their 
staff was easily co-opted by controlling their access to 
University sources (particularly Michigan Athletics) 
based on their behavior toward the University. That 
left only the blogosphere as independent critics of the 
institution. The refusal of the University to respond 
to requests for information, even when accompanied 
by formal FIOA searches became a problem. The 
windowless character of the Fleming Building that 
houses the central administration became reflective of 
the attitude of the University toward controlling all 
communications activity.
 
Today’s Challenges
Some of the most significant short-term pressure 
for change in universities is driven by a converging 
political agenda at every level with multiple, not 
always compatible goals: to limit educational costs, 
even at the expense of quality; to make education ever 
more widely available; to draw back from the national 
commitment to research support, at least in the forms 
and amounts we have depended on since World War II; 
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and to accelerate institutional transformation through 
application of information technology.
Running counter to these goals are a few troublesome 
trends already affecting our universities. Public funding 
for higher education has been declining in a climate 
where education is seen increasingly as a personal 
economic benefit rather than as a public good in and of 
itself. Long-standing policies such as affirmative action, 
which represented earlier commitments to equity and 
social justice, are now being challenged by governing 
bodies, in the courts, and through public referenda. 
The allocation of research funding is increasingly 
driven by those with great skepticism (or fear) of 
scientific reasoning, particularly in areas such as the 
social sciences and climate change. Our curriculum 
is deformed by the competitiveness and vocational 
demands of students whose debt load impels them 
toward excessive careerism, even as other voices call 
for a return to an idealized “classical” curriculum based 
on the great works of Western civilization.
Of particular concern is the intrusion of political 
forces in nearly every aspect of university governance 
and mission. State and federal government seek to 
regulate admissions decisions and financial aid. There 
are egregious examples of political or judicial intrusion 
in the research process itself, for example, Star Chamber 
hearings before government bodies investigating 
scholarly research integrity or the expenditure of 
research funds. We are only beginning to feel the 
crippling effects of open-meetings requirements on the 
conduct of business and on hiring. We are over regulated, 
and the costs of accountability are excessive both in 
dollars and in administrative burden. Governance of 
public institutions is too often in the hands of people 
selected for partisan political reasons rather than for 
their understanding and support of higher education. 
Most distressing, there is an increasing tendency 
by ambitious politicians to use the university as a 
whipping boy for personal political gain. These trends, 
symptomatic of the erosion of public confidence in 
universities, parallel the loss of trust in our institutions 
across the board.
Not that we in universities are blameless. We 
too often have been reactive rather than proactive 
in responding to demands from students, faculty, 
government, politicians, patrons, ideologues, 
and demagogues who distort or undermine our 
fundamental values and purposes. Academic structures 
are too rigid to accommodate the realities of our rapidly 
expanding and interconnected base of knowledge and 
practice. Higher education as a whole has been divided 
and competitive at times when we need to speak with 
a single unequivocal voice. Our entrenched interests 
block the path to innovation and creativity. Perhaps, 
most dismaying, we have yet to come forth with a 
convincing case for ourselves, a vision for our future, 
and an effective strategy for achieving it.
The fortunes of higher education in America seem 
to ebb and flow from generation to generation. The 
principal themes of America’s colleges and universities 
during the latter half of the 20th Century have been 
diversification and growth. In the three decades 
following World War II, strong public investments 
allowed our system of higher education to expand 
rapidly to keep pace with expanding populations and 
growing aspirations. The research university became the 
cornerstone of our national effort to sustain American 
leadership in science and technology, thereby ensuring 
both our economic prosperity and military security. 
The triad mission of our colleges—teaching, research, 
and service—acquired a degree of prestige and public 
support unprecedented in our history.
Today, higher education faces a much different 
world with its own unique challenges. In many parts 
of the country, the pool of college-bound students 
graduating from high school has been declining for two 
decades, as the surge of post-war baby boomers has 
swept through. Although we will hit the bottom of this 
demographic dip this decade, growth in this traditional 
source of college students will remain modest for at 
least another decade, with the exception of sunbelt 
states experiencing the impact of immigration. Yet 
at the same time, the increasing skill and education 
requirements of the high performance workplace are 
spurring a rapid growth in the number of adult college 
students. Universities are also facing both the challenge 
and the uncertainty of an aging professoriate, no longer 
compelled to retire after the removal of mandatory 
retirement caps and increasingly posing a logjam for 
younger academicians. 
Public support of higher education has leveled off 
in the face of other competing social needs. As the 
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share of college costs financed by both state and federal 
governments has fallen, the share borne by families 
has inevitably increased.  And as families have been 
asked to bear a larger share of the costs of educating 
their offspring, the outcry about the “excessive” cost of 
a college education has reached a crescendo.
Yet there has also never been a time when the 
university was the target of greater concern and 
more criticism from our society, ranging from elected 
public officials and corporate leaders to the press and 
members of the public at large.  While we may disagree 
with many of our critics, we should nevertheless listen 
carefully to them, consider, and respond. Many of the 
concerns voiced by our multiple constituencies contain 
a good deal of truth. Others, while perhaps not on 
target, may reveal deeper concerns worthy of attention. 
Among this array of criticisms, one in particular 
stands out: the growing frustration of society with the 
hesitancy or reluctance of the university to face up 
to the challenge of change. In our rapidly changing 
world, corporations have undergone restructuring and 
re-engineering. Governments and other public bodies 
are being overhauled, streamlined, and made more 
responsive. More individuals are facing a future of 
impermanence, in their employment, in their homes, 
even in their families. Even the nation-state itself has 
become less relevant and permanent in an increasingly 
interconnected world.
Yet, at least according to our critics, the university 
has responded to the needs of a changing society 
largely by defending the status quo. Change has 
usually occurred in higher education on glacial time 
scales—not surprising since the career of a tenured 
faculty member typically spans three decades or more. 
Even in the late 20th Century, when our society, our 
nation, and the world itself are changing rapidly, the 
university tends to frame its contemporary roles largely 
within traditional paradigms. It resists any major 
changes in curricula or pedagogy. Students continue 
to be evaluated and credentialed relative to “seat time” 
or course credit hours rather than learning outcomes. 
The technology that is changing our world has largely 
bounced off the classroom, which continues to function 
largely as it has since the 19th Century. Tenure is seen 
not as a protection for academic freedom but rather as 
a perquisite that shields the faculty from accountability 
and change.
At times we are tempted to respond to our critics: 
“We agree with you. Our universities are not good 
enough, not accountable enough, and not smart 
enough. But they are the best in the world.” And in fact, 
the American university is the envy of the world, both 
as attested by the multitude of foreign students seeking 
education in our institutions and by the effort of other 
nations to imitate the American approach to higher 
education. But this argument may no longer suffice, 
particularly if the university should become more 
detached from a changing world or should other social 
institutions compete more effectively for our roles.
The Road Ahead
Many of the most powerful forces driving change in 
higher education come from the marketplace, driven by 
new societal needs, the limited availability of resources, 
rapidly evolving technologies, and the emergence of 
new competitors such as for-profit ventures. Clearly, 
in such a rapidly changing environment, agility and 
adaptability become important attributes of successful 
institutions. 
Unfortunately, the governance of public universities, 
whether at the level of state government or institutional 
governing boards, is more inclined to protect the past 
than prepare for the future. Furthermore, all of higher 
education faces a certain dilemma related to its being 
far easier for a university to take on new missions and 
activities in response to societal demand than to shed 
missions as they become inappropriate, distracting, or 
too costly. This is a particularly difficult matter for public 
universities because of intense public and political 
pressures that require these institutions to continue 
to accumulate missions, each with an associated 
risk, without a corresponding capacity to refine and 
focus activities to avoid risk. Examples here would 
include pressures to launch expensive new academic 
programs in areas such as medicine or engineering 
without adequate resources or to embark on high-risk 
economic development activities through university-
business partnerships that may be incompatible with 
the academic culture. Furthermore there are many 
demands from state and federal government, governing 
boards, and public opinion for increasing accessibility, 
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decreasing costs, and accountability for learning 
outcomes. All of these forces have long constrained the 
agility of public universities.
Little wonder that one finds an increase in the efforts 
of public research universities to free themselves from 
the constraints of politically-determined governing 
boards, the tyranny of university systems, and the 
intrusive regulation of state government in the hope of 
achieving the autonomy and agility to adapt to a future 
with limited state support. Steps should be taken to 
ensure that during a time of great financial stress on 
flagship public universities, they are provided with the 
autonomy and agility to restructure their operations to 
enable them to survive with their quality intact what 
is likely to be a generation-long period of inadequate 
state support. After all, should the states intentionally 
allow their public research universities to decline 
significantly in quality and capacity, it would be a 
major blow to the nation’s prosperity and security since 
public universities are the primary source of advanced 
degrees and basic research for the United States. Put 
another way, states should be warned not to add insult 
to injury by strangling their research universities 
with unnecessary regulation or intrusion on sensitive 
political issues such as climate change or gay rights, 
even as they starve them with inadequate support.
The challenges in the state of Michigan today are 
obvious. We have experienced decades of eroding state 
support without much hope of turning this around 
significantly (Delphi, GM, Ford, …and an entire industry 
will continue to decline). It has been over a decade since 
Michigan has had a significant capital outlay bill for 
academic facilities. Recent polling suggests that many 
(most?) Michigan parents still think their children 
can find decent jobs with only a high school diploma, 
while even Michigan CEOs view lowering taxes as 
more important than raising the quality of Michigan’s 
workforce (a rather alarming perspective at odds with 
almost every other state). Numerous conversations 
suggest that much of the state’s business leadership 
really does not understand or appreciate the University 
of Michigan. And, there is almost total public ignorance 
(including politicians, business leaders, and the media) 
about Michigan’s real problems–a 1950s tax structure, 
ignoring the inevitability of the “creative destruction” 
necessary to grow new economic activity, …all of the 
other flat world issues.
In looking back over the past five decades, the 
University has been most effective in stimulating new 
state investments when the times are the toughest. In 
the early 1980s, after we had lost roughly one-third of 
our state support, Harold Shapiro was able to leverage 
his “smaller but better” philosophy into a strategic 
effort to restore state funding of operations and capital 
facilities along with unusual programs such as the 
Research Excellence Fund, which gave highest priority 
to the state’s research universities. Then again, at the 
bottom of a similar trough in the state’s economy in 
1990, we were able to unite PCSUM (and particularly 
UM, MSU, and WSU) in a “treetops” alumni strategy, 
activating key alumni leadership across the state, 
protecting institutional autonomy (meaning tuition 
control), triggering capital outlay support, and electing 
a new governor more supportive of higher education.
This spirit of “when the going gets tough, the tough 
get going” seems highly appropriate today. There is 
ample evidence from years past that the University of 
Michigan is almost unique in its capacity to lead this 
effort.
Yet for much of the post-2000 years, higher education 
had been largely invisible in Lansing, even as the State 
Legislature has cut its support by over 50% per student. 
The absence of such efforts by higher education stands 
in sharp contrast to the late 1980s and early 1990s when 
the University of Michigan had led a strong coalition of 
public university presidents using a “treetops” strategy 
to bring political pressure to resist such budget cuts. 
The growing concerns in Lansing about the failure 
of the University of Michigan to lead an effort by the 
state’s universities to make the case for higher education 
suggests the following strategy for the University: The 
University of Michigan needs to develop and then 
provide strong leadership for a full-court press effort 
aimed at public education that will likely take several 
years to have the desired effect. While the president 
of the University will play the key role as public 
spokesperson for this effort, it is important to leverage 
leadership with a carefully designed and highly 
strategic communications effort. Put most simply, the 
University’s communications operation must become 
much more of the type of a marketing effort one would 
find in a political campaign, complete with sophisticated 
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polling, market segmentation, and a highly strategic 
media plan. Our state relations operation should 
operate more like a development campaign, identifying 
and cultivating key alumni in each legislative district 
focused on political influence–akin to the NRA. In fact, 
the similarity of the effort to a development campaign 
suggests that our own development staff might well be 
a third member of this team.
Possible elements of such an effort would include:
1. First, forming a high-level executive officer team 
to design and implement the strategy.
2. Getting MSU and WSU on board (although 
recognizing that they are likely to remain far behind 
the front lines as UM marches into battle until they see 
what is in it for themselves).
3.At some point the Presidents Council of State 
Universities of Michigan (PCSUM) needs to be pulled 
into this, although perhaps only in with a view that “a 
rising tide raises all boats”.
4. Sophisticated polling is a critical element, since 
we really do not understand very well what various 
segments of the public thinks about higher education 
and the future of the state–much less the University 
of Michigan, for that matter. Perhaps ISR can help, 
although experience suggests we might be better off 
getting a professional such as Market Opinion Research 
involved.
5. Building the necessary alumni leadership 
networks (the “treetops” strategy) will be key and 
likely involve some degree of segmentation–UM, 
UM+MSU+WSU, and PCSUM. Here a network of 
development volunteers will be essential.
6. Defining the message will be critical. Here the 
Ford School can help, but there are others across the 
University who can be of assistance. Key issues will 
be tax policy, the state budget, the importance of 
education–>higher education–>research universities–
>and the UM, R&D and tech transfer, etc.
7. Media outreach and cultivation in every major 
population center of the state will be essential. Again, 
this should be less of a “public relations” effort and 
more a “political campaign”.
8. Advertising might be a possibility. Here we might 
use some of the material that Leo Burnett produced 
for the Big Ten advertising campaign of the mid-1990s, 
“Higher Education Makes Dreams Come True”, when 
we used our free institutional advertising time on 
football and basketball broadcasts to promote higher 
ed. 
9. Truth squads: Again, consistent with the political 
campaign theme, we will occasionally need tiger teams 
to counter falsehoods (e.g., the recent media stories on 
waste in higher education or the attack on sabbaticals). 
We will probably also need spear chuckers and spear 
catchers. 
Finally, it is important to stress once again that such 
an effort will take time to build and even more time 
to have an impact. But in a region likely to continue 
to have serious economic difficulties for the foreseeable 
future, such a long-term effort seems essential both for 
the welfare of the state and the University of Michigan.
One Final Possibility
An important theme throughout the history of 
American higher education has been the evolution 
of the public university. The nation’s vision and 
commitment to create public universities competitive 
in quality with the best universities in the world 
were a reflection of the democratic spirit of a young 
America. With an expanding population, a prosperous 
economy, and imperatives such as national security and 
industrial competitiveness, the public was willing to 
make massive investments in higher education. While 
elite private universities were important in setting 
the standards and character of higher education in 
America, it was the public university that provided the 
capacity and diversity to meet our nation’s vast needs 
for post-secondary education and research.
Today, however, in the face of limited resources and 
the pressing social priorities of aging populations, this 
expansion of public support of higher education has 
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slowed. While the needs of our society for advanced 
education and research will only intensify as we 
continue to evolve into a knowledge-driven global 
society, it is not evident that these needs will be met 
by further expansion of our existing system of state 
universities. The terms of the social contract that led to 
these institutions are changing rapidly. The principle 
of general tax support for public higher education as 
a public good and the partnership between the states, 
the federal government, and the universities for the 
conduct of basic research and education, established in 
1862 by the Morrill Act and reaffirmed a century later 
by post-WWII research policies, are both at risk.
These forces are already driving major change in the 
nature of the nation’s public research universities. One 
obvious consequence of declining state support has been 
the degree to which many leading public universities 
may increasingly resemble private universities in the 
way they are financed, managed, and governed, even 
as they strive to retain their public character. Public 
universities forced to undergo this privatization 
transition–or, in more politically acceptable language, 
“self-sufficiency”–in financing must appeal to a 
broader array of constituencies at the national—indeed, 
international—level, while continuing to exhibit a 
strong mission focused on state needs. In the same way 
as private universities, they must earn the majority of 
their support in the competitive marketplace, that is, 
via tuition, research grants, and private giving, and this 
will require actions that come into conflict from time 
to time with state priorities. Hence, the autonomy of 
the public university will become one of its most critical 
assets, perhaps even more critical than state support for 
many institutions.
Yet such efforts to portray these financial transitions 
in the face of declining state support as “privatizing” 
the public university is a flawed concept. The public 
character of state research universities runs far 
deeper than financing and governance and involves 
characteristics such as their large size, disciplinary 
breadth, and deep engagement with society through 
public service. These universities were created as, and 
today remain, public institutions with a strong public 
purpose and character. Hence the issue is not whether 
the public research university can evolve from a 
“public” to a “private” institution, or even a “privately 
funded but publicly committed” university. Rather, the 
issue is a dramatic broadening of the “publics” that 
these institutions serve, are supported by, and become 
accountable to, as state support declines to minimal 
levels.
In view of this natural broadening of the institutional 
mission, coupled with the increasing inability (or 
unwillingness) of states to support their public research 
universities at world-class levels, it is even possible to 
conclude that the world-class “state” research university 
may have become an obsolete concept. Instead, many 
of America’s leading public research universities may 
evolve rapidly into “regional,”  “national,” or even 
“global” universities with a public purpose to serve 
far broader constituencies than simply the citizens of 
a particular state who no longer are able or willing to 
provide sufficient support to sustain their programs at 
world-class levels. In fact, one might well argue that 
states today would be better off if they encouraged 
their flagship public research universities to evolve into 
institutions with far broader missions (and support), 
capable of accessing global economic and human 
capital markets to attract the talent and wealth of the 
world to their regions. 
Today public research universities have become 
critical to the national interests such as security, 
prosperity, and public welfare. Yet the states have not 
only cut dramatically their support of these institutions 
and then attacked them for the consequent rise in 
tuitions as the state subsidy has been withdrawn. 
Today many  state leaders have actually attacked their 
public universities for personal political gain. Clearly it 
is necessary to alert the body politic concerning what 
is at risk in this environment. As the states turn their 
backs on their public universities, they are ignoring the 
needs of the nation during a time of great challenge to 
America.
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The University of Michigan was established in 1817 
in the village of Detroit by an act of the Northwest Ter-
ritorial government and financed through the sale of In-
dian lands granted by the United States Congress. Since 
it benefited from this territorial land grant, the new uni-
versity was subject to the Enlightenment themes of the 
Northwest Ordinance guaranteeing civil rights and re-
ligious freedom. Envisioned by the people of the Michi-
gan Territory as truly public, Michigan became the first 
university in America to successfully resist sectarian 
control. Buoyed by committed students, faculty, staff, 
and the citizens of our state, the University of Michigan 
has consistently been at the forefront of higher educa-
tion, grappling with the difficult issues of plurality and 
promoting equality.
In many ways, it was at the University of Michigan 
that Thomas Jefferson’s statement of the principles of 
the Enlightenment in his proposition for the nation, 
“We hold these truths to be self-evident: That all men 
are created equal”, was most fully embraced and real-
ized. Whether characterized by gender, race, religion, 
socioeconomic background, ethnicity, or nationality–
not to mention academic interests or political persua-
sion–the university has always taken great pride in the 
diversity of its students, faculty, and programs. 
Particularly notable here was the role of Michigan 
President James Angell in articulating the importance 
of Michigan’s commitment to provide “an uncommon 
education for the common man” while challenging the 
aristocratic notion of leaders of the colonial colleges 
such as Charles Eliot of Harvard. Angell argued that 
Americans should be given opportunities to develop 
talent and character to the fullest. He portrayed the 
state university as the bulwark against the aristocracy 
of wealth. However the journey to achieve Angell’s vi-
sion of the University’s public purpose did not come 
easily. 
As with most of higher 
education, the history of 
diversity at Michigan has 
been complex and often 
contradictory. There have 
been many times when 
the institution seemed to 
take a step forward, only 
to be followed by two 
steps backward. Michi-
gan was one of the earli-
est universities to admit 
African-Americans and 
women in the late 19th 
century. At our found-
ing, we attracted students 
from a broad range of European ethnic backgrounds. In 
the early 1800s, the population of the state swelled with 
new immigrants from the rest of the country and across 
the European continent. The University took pride in 
its large enrollments of international students at a time 
when the state itself was decidedly insular. By 1860, the 
Regents referred “with partiality,” to the “list of foreign 
students drawn thither from every section of our coun-
try.” Forty-six percent of our students then came from 
other states and foreign countries. Today more than one 
hundred nations are represented at Michigan.
In contrast, our record regarding Native Americans 
has been disappointing. In 1817, in the treaty of Fort 
Meigs, local tribes became the first major donors when 
they ceded 1,920 acres of land for “a college at Detroit.” 
A month later the Territorial Legislature formed the 
“university of Michigania,” and accepted the land gift 
in the college’s name. Today, although the number of 
Native American students enrolled is very low, they 
continue to make vital cultural and intellectual contri-
butions to the University.
Chapter 20
Public Purpose
President James Angell
284
The first African American students arrived on cam-
pus in 1868, without official notice. In the years follow-
ing Reconstruction, however, discrimination increased. 
Black students joined together to support each other 
early in the century and staged restaurant sit-ins in the 
1920s. It was not until the 1960s that racial unrest finally 
exploded into campus-wide concerted action. 
Michigan’s history with respect to gender is also 
very mixed. Michigan was the first large university in 
America to admit women. At the time, the rest of the 
nation looked on with a critical eye. Many were certain 
that the “experiment” would fail. The first women who 
arrived in 1870 were true pioneers, the objects of intense 
scrutiny and resentment. For many years, women had 
separate and unequal access to facilities and organiza-
tions. Yet, in the remaining decades of the 19th Century, 
the University of Michigan provided strong leadership 
for the nation. Indeed, by 1898, the enrollment of wom-
en had increased to the point where they received 53 
percent of Michigan’s undergraduate degrees. Howev-
er, during the early part of the 20th Century, and even 
more with the returning veterans after World War I, the 
representation of women in the student body declined 
significantly. It only began to climb again during the 
1970s and 1980s and, for the first time in almost a centu-
ry, once again exceeded that of men in 1996. During the 
past several decades, the University took a number of 
steps to recruit, promote, and support women staff and 
faculty, modifying University policies to better address 
their needs. True equality has come slowly, driven by 
the efforts of many courageous and energetic women.
1960-1970s
The University of Michigan faltered badly in its 
public purpose of achieving a campus characterized by 
the diversity of the society it served in the post-WWII 
years. As minority enrollments languished and racial 
tensions flared in the 1960s and 1970s, it was student 
activism that finally stimulated action. Although the 
University had made efforts to become a more diverse 
institution, both black and white students, frustrated 
by the slow movement, organized into the first Black 
Action Movement (BAM) in 1970, which demanded 
that the University commit to achieving 10% black en-
rollments. The administration building was occupied 
and students boycotted classes. Yet many positive ad-
vances came from this outpouring of student solidarity. 
The number of African American faculty and students 
on campus increased during the 1970s, new programs 
were initiated and old programs were funded. 
Yet after only a few years, minority enrollments be-
gan to fall once again and funding waned by the late 
1970s. Two more student movements (BAM II and III) 
formed in an effort to stimulate the University to once 
again take a systematic look at the difficult problems 
of race on campus. While the University renewed its 
efforts to achieve diversity and the enrollment of un-
derrepresented minorities began to increase, this soon 
envolved into a largely bureaucratic effort based on 
affirmative action and equal opportunity policies, and 
minority enrollments continued to decline. Although 
there were occasional expressions of concern about the 
lack of University progress on these fronts, these were 
not sufficient to reorder University priorities until the 
late 1980s.
 
1980s
Throughout the 1980s there were increasing signs of 
a reoccurrence of racial tensions on several of the more 
politically active campuses across the country. Both UC 
Berkeley and Columbia had experienced the first signs 
of a new generation of student activism along racial 
lines. By the late l980s concern about minority affairs 
had also appeared at Michigan through a movement 
known as the Free South Africa Coordinating Com-
mittee, or FSACC, led by a small group of graduate 
students in the social sciences. Although the group ini-
tially built most of their activism around the case for 
divestment of University holdings in firms doing busi-
ness in apartheid South Africa, there were a series of 
other issues including demands that the University es-
tablish Martin Luther King Day as an official University 
holiday, that it re-evaluate the manner in which tenure 
was provided to minority faculty, and that it discard 
the normal admissions requirements such as the use 
of standardized test scores. Although such activism 
continued at a fairly vocal level, it was stable and did 
not escalate until a series of racist events occurred in 
early l987. This activism was generally manifested in 
occasional rallies on the Diag, angry testimony to the 
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Regents at public comments sessions, or letters to the 
editor of the Michigan Daily. 
Nevertheless, there were other signs that all was not 
well within the University. The University was subject 
to occasional attacks from both of the Detroit newspa-
pers about its lack of success in achieving racial diver-
sity. It was clear that the effort to recruit minority stu-
dents was not a top University priority in the late l970s 
and early l980s, and minority student enrollment de-
clined throughout this period. Furthermore, the num-
ber of minority faculty had leveled off and began to de-
cline; indeed, there were losses of key minority faculty 
throughout the l980s. This led to a growing sense of 
frustration on the part of a number of minority faculty 
and staff. 
Early in l987, student activism shifted from divest-
ment to focus instead on racism as its rallying cry. 
FSACC was renamed the United Coalition Against Rac-
ism, or UCAR, and the rallies on the Diag began to ad-
dress incidents of racism on campus. Coincidentally, the 
number of charges of racist incidents began to increase, 
including the appearance of racist flyers in dormitories 
and complaints about racist slurs directed against mi-
nority students. Needless to say, these charges attracted 
great attention from the Detroit papers, which had be-
come almost fixated on the subject of racism because of 
the increasing racial polarization of that city.
1990s
By the late 1980s, it had become apparent that the 
university had made inadequate progress in its goal to 
reflect the rich diversity of our nation and our world 
among its faculty, students and staff. In assessing this 
situation, the new administration concluded that al-
though the University had approached the challenge 
of serving an increasingly diverse population with the 
best of intentions, it simply had not developed and ex-
ecuted a plan capable of achieving sustainable results. 
More significantly, we believed that achieving our 
goals for a diverse campus would require a very major 
change in the institution itself. 
It was the long-term strategic focus of our planning 
that proved to be critical, because universities do not 
change quickly and easily any more than do the societ-
ies of which they are a part. Michigan would have to 
leave behind many reactive and uncoordinated efforts 
that had characterized its past and move toward a more 
strategic approach designed to achieve long-term sys-
temic change. Sacrifices would be necessary as tradi-
tional roles and privileges were challenged. In particu-
lar, we understood the limitations of focusing only on 
affirmative action; that is, on access, retention, and rep-
resentation. The key would be to focus instead on the 
success of underrepresented minorities on our campus, 
as students, as faculty, and as leaders. We believed that 
without deeper, more fundamental institutional change 
these efforts by themselves would inevitably fail–as 
they had throughout the 1970s and 1980s. 
The challenge was to persuade the university com-
munity that there was a real stake for everyone in seiz-
ing the moment to chart a more diverse future. People 
needed to believe that the gains to be achieved through 
diversity would more than compensate for the neces-
sary sacrifices. The first and most important step was to 
link diversity and excellence as the two most compel-
Protest Shanties on the Diag Protests in the President’s Office
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ling goals before the institution, recognizing that these 
goals were not only complementary but would be tight-
ly linked in the multicultural society characterizing our 
nation and the world in the future. As we moved ahead, 
we began to refer to the plan as The Michigan Mandate: 
A Strategic Linking of Academic Excellence and Social 
Diversity. 
Over the first two years, hundreds of discussions 
with groups both on and off campus were held. We 
reached out to alumni, donors, and civic and political 
leaders and groups, while meeting with countless stu-
dent faculty and staff groups. Great care was taken to 
convey the same message to everyone as a means of 
establishing credibility and building trust among all 
constituencies. Meetings were sometimes contentious, 
often enlightening, but rarely acrimonious. Gradually 
understanding increased and support grew. Although 
the plan itself came from the administration, it would 
be individuals and units that would devise most of the 
detailed plans for carrying it forward. University publi-
cations, administrators’ speeches and meetings, Faculty 
Senate deliberations, all carried the message: Diversity 
would become the cornerstone in the University’s ef-
forts to achieve excellence in teaching, research, and 
service in the multicultural nation and world in which 
it would exist.
The mission and goals of the Michigan Mandate 
were stated quite simply: 1) To recognize that diver-
sity and excellence are complementary and compelling 
goals for the university and to make a firm commitment 
to their achievement. 2) To commit to the recruitment, 
support, and success of members of historically under-
The Michigan Mandate: MLK Day Unity March, addressing student and alumni groups, Professor Bunyon 
Bryant, Professor Charles Moody (with President Ford), Dean Rhetaugh Dumas, Associate Vice Provost 
Lester Monts, toasting the heros of the successful Michigan Mandate.
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represented groups among our students, faculty, staff, 
and leadership. 3) To build on our campus an environ-
ment that sought, nourished, and sustained diversity 
and pluralism and that valued and respected the dig-
nity and worth of every individual.
Associated with these general goals were more spe-
cific objectives: 
1) Faculty recruitment and development: To sub-
stantially increase the number of tenure-track faculty in 
each underrepresented minority group; to increase the 
success of minority faculty in the achievement of pro-
fessional fulfillment, promotion, and tenure; to increase 
the number of underrepresented minority faculty in 
leadership positions. 
2) Student recruitment, achievement, and outreach: 
To achieve increases in the number of entering un-
derrepresented minority students as well as in total 
underrepresented minority enrollment; to establish 
and achieve specific minority enrollment targets in all 
schools and colleges; to increase minority graduation 
rates; to develop new programs to attract back to cam-
pus minority students who have withdrawn from our 
academic programs; to design new and strengthen ex-
isting outreach programs that have demonstrable im-
pact on the pool of minority applicants to undergradu-
ate, graduate, and professional programs. 
3) Staff recruitment and development: To focus on 
the achievement of affirmative action goals in all job 
categories; to increase the number of underrepresented 
minorities in key University leadership positions; to 
strengthen support systems and services for minority 
staff. 
4) Improving the environment for diversity: To fos-
ter a culturally diverse environment; to significantly re-
duce the number of incidents of racism and prejudice 
on campus; to increase community-wide commitment 
to diversity and involvement in diversity initiatives 
among students, faculty, and staff; to broaden the base 
of diversity initiatives; to assure the compatibility of 
University policies, procedures, and practice with the 
goal of a multicultural community; to improve commu-
nications and interactions with and among all groups; 
and to provide more opportunities for minorities to 
communicate their needs and experiences and to con-
tribute directly to the change process. 
A series of carefully focused strategic actions was 
developed to move the University toward these ob-
jectives. These actions were framed by the values and 
traditions of the University, an understanding of our 
unique culture characterized by a high degree of fac-
ulty and unit freedom and autonomy, and animated 
by a highly competitive and entrepreneurial spirit. The 
strategy was both complex and pervasive, involving 
not only a considerable commitment of resources (e.g., 
fully funding all financial aid for minority graduate 
students) but also some highly innovative programs.
To cite just one highly successful example, the Uni-
versity established what was called the Target of Op-
portunity Program aimed at increasing the number of 
minority faculty at all ranks. Traditionally, university 
faculty searches were driven by a concern for academic 
specialization within their respective disciplines. Too 
often in recent years the University had seen faculty 
searches that were literally “replacement” searches 
rather than “enhancement” searches. To achieve the 
goals of the Michigan Mandate, the University had to 
free itself from the constraints of this traditional per-
spective. Therefore, the administration sent out the fol-
lowing message to the academic units: be vigorous and 
creative in identifying minority teachers/scholars who 
can enrich the activities of your unit. Do not be limited 
by concerns relating to narrow specialization; do not be 
concerned about the availability of a faculty slot within 
the unit. The principal criterion for the recruitment of 
a minority faculty member is whether the individual 
can enhance the department. If so, resources will be 
made available to recruit that person to the University 
of Michigan.
By the mid 1990s Michigan could point to significant 
progress in achieving diversity. The representation of 
underrepresented minority students, faculty, and staff 
more than doubled over the decade-long effort. But, 
perhaps even more significantly, the success of under-
represented minorities at the University improved even 
more remarkably, with graduation rates rising to the 
highest level among public universities, promotion and 
tenure success of minority faculty members becoming 
comparable to their majority colleagues, and a grow-
ing number of appointments of minorities to leadership 
positions in the University. The campus climate not 
only became more accepting and supportive of diversi-
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Graduation rates of African-American student 
cohorts six years afer initial entry
Number of minority tenured and tenure-track faculty
Number of university minority graduate fellowships Number of African-American faculty
Minority student enrollments (percentages) African-American student enrollments (percentages)
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Student Access and Success
Undergraduate Student Access
 Wade McCree Incentive Scholarship
 King/Chavez/Parks Program
 Summer programs (e.g., DAPCEP)
 College Day visitation for families
  Tuition grants to all Native American students 
   from Michigan.
Special Undergraduate Programs
 Undergraduate Research Opportunity Program
 21st Century Program
 CRLT Programs
 Leadership 2017
 Office of Academic Multicultural Initiatives
Graduate Student Support
 Fully funding minority graduate support
 Rackham Graduate Merit Fellowship Program
Special Programs
Tapped grass-roots creativity and energy using 
 $ 1 M/y Presidential Initiatives Funds tor
  competitive proposals from faculty and 
 student groups.
Results
Enrollments:
 83% increase in students of color (to 28%)
 90% increase in underrep min (to 15%)
 57% increase in AA (to 2,715 or 9.1%)
 126% increase of Latinos (to 4.3%)
 100% increase in Native Americans (to 1.1%)
Graduation rates for African Americans highest 
 among public universities.
UM ranked 27th in nation in minority BA/BS
  8th for M.S. degrees, 7th for PhD degrees
  1st in African American PhDs (non HBCU’s)
Graduate education
 Increased minority fellowships by 118%
 Of 734 Rackham Fellows in 1994, 
  51% were African American,
  29% were Latino
Professional Schools:
Business: 12% AA, 28% color
Medicine: 11% AA, 39% color
Law: 10% AA, 21% color
Faculty
Target of Opportunity Program
Faculty Development (Faculty Awards Program for 
minority faculty)
Cluster hiring
Creating a welcoming and supportive culture (net-
works, centers, surveys)
Enlarging candidate pool by increasing PhD enroll-
ments
Results
+62% for African Americans (128)
+117% for Latinos (52)
+75% for Native Americans (7)
Senior academic leadership (URM): from 14 to 25
Staff
Demanded accountability in hiring and promotion
Human Resources and Affirmative Action pro-
grams
Consultation and Conciliation Services
Results
Top managers: +100% (to 10% of management)
P&A: +80 (from 449 to 816)
More Generally
Building University-wide commitments
Office of Minority Affairs, Vice-Provost for Minor-
ity Affairs
Demanding accountability
Included in compensation review
Included in budget review
Included in appointment review
Leadership
Half of Executive Officers were African American
Executive VP Medical Center (Rita Dumas)
Secretary of University (Harold Johnson)
VP Research (Homer Neal)
UM Flint Chancellor Charlie Nelms
UM Dearborn Chancellor James Renick
JJD’s Successor was African American (Homer Neal)
Some Actions and Results of the Michigan Mandate by 1996
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ty, but students and faculty began to come to Michigan 
because of its growing reputation for a diverse campus. 
Perhaps most significantly, as the campus became 
more racially and ethnically diverse, the quality of the 
students, faculty, and academic programs of the Uni-
versity increased to the highest level in the institution’s 
history. This latter fact reinforced our contention that 
the aspirations of diversity and excellence were not 
only compatible but, in fact, highly correlated. By every 
measure, the Michigan Mandate was a remarkable suc-
cess, moving the University beyond the original goals 
of a more diverse campus. 
Even while pursuing the racial diversity goals of the 
Michigan Mandate, we realized we could not ignore 
another glaring inequity in campus life. If we meant to 
embrace diversity in its full meaning, we had to attend 
to the long-standing concerns of women faculty, stu-
dents, and staff. Here, once again, it took time–and con-
siderable effort by many women colleagues to educate 
the administration to the point where we began to un-
derstand that the university simply had not succeeded 
in including and empowering women as full and equal 
partners in all aspects of its life and leadership. 
In faculty hiring and retention, despite the increas-
ing pools of women in many fields, the number of new 
hires of women had changed only slowly during the 
late twentieth century in most research universities. 
In some disciplines such as the physical sciences and 
engineering, the shortages were particularly acute. We 
continued to suffer from the “glass ceiling” phenom-
enon: that is, because of hidden prejudice women were 
unable to break through to the ranks of senior faculty 
and administrators, though no formal constraints pro-
hibited their advancement. The proportion of women 
decreased steadily as one moved up the academic lad-
der. Additionally, there appeared to be an increasing 
Listening, learning, planning, and selling the Michigan Agenda for Women
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tendency to hire women off the tenure track as post-
doctoral scholars, lecturers, clinicians, or research sci-
entists. The rigid division among various faculty ap-
pointments offered little or no opportunity for these 
women to move into tenured faculty positions. 
Many of our concerns derived from the extreme con-
centration of women in positions of lower status and 
power—as students, lower-paid staff, and junior fac-
ulty. The most effective lever for change might well be 
a rapid increase in the number of women holding posi-
tions of high status, visibility, and power. This would 
not only change the balance of power in decision-mak-
ing, but it would also change the perception of who and 
what matters in the university. Finally, we needed to 
bring university policies and practices into better align-
ment with the needs and concerns of women students 
in a number of areas including campus safety, student 
housing, student life, financial aid, and childcare.
To address these challenges, the university devel-
oped and executed a second strategic effort known as 
the Michigan Agenda for Women. With the assistance 
of the President’s Advisory Council on Women’s Issues 
(PACWI), chaired by Carol Hollenshead, director of 
the Center for Women, a broad agenda was developed. 
While the actions proposed were intended to address 
the concerns of women students, faculty, and staff, 
many of them benefited men as well. In developing the 
Michigan Agenda, we knew that different strategies 
were necessary for different parts of the university. Ac-
ademic units varied enormously in the degree to which 
women participated as faculty, staff, and students. What 
might work in one area could fail miserably in another. 
Some fields, such as the physical sciences, had very few 
women represented among their students and faculty. 
For them, it was necessary to design and implement a 
strategy which spanned the entire pipeline, from K-12 
outreach to undergraduate and graduate education, to 
faculty recruiting and development. For others such as 
the social sciences or law, there already was a strong 
pool of women students, and the challenge became one 
of attracting women from this pool into graduate and 
professional studies and eventually into academe. Still 
other units such as education and many departments 
in humanities and sciences had strong participation of 
women among students and junior faculty, but suffered 
from low participation in the senior ranks and in lead-
ership roles. 
Like the Michigan Mandate, the vision was again 
both simple yet compelling: that by the year 2000 the 
university would become the leader among American 
universities in promoting and achieving the success of 
women as faculty, students, and staff. Again the presi-
dent took on a highly personal role in this effort, meet-
ing with hundreds of groups on and off campus, to lis-
ten to their concerns and invite their participation in the 
initiative. Rapidly there was again significant progress 
on many fronts for women students, faculty, and staff, 
including the appointment of a number of senior wom-
en faculty and administrators as deans and executive 
officers, improvement in campus safety, and improve-
ment of family care policies and child care resources. 
In 1988 Michigan appointed its first woman Dean of 
LS&A, Edie Goldenberg, in 1993 our first Vice Provost 
for Health Affairs, Rhetaugh Dumas, and in 1997 our 
first woman provost, Nancy Cantor. Finally, in 2002, the 
University of Michigan named its first woman presi-
dent, Mary Sue Coleman.
The University also took steps to eliminate those 
factors that prevented other groups from participating 
fully in its activities. For example, we extended our anti-
discrimination policies to encompass sexual orientation 
and extended staff benefits and housing opportunities 
to same-sex couples. This was a particularly controver-
sial action because it was strongly opposed not only by 
the religious right but also by several of the Universi-
ty’s Regents. Yet, this was also an issue of equity, deeply 
frustrating to many faculty, staff, and students, which 
required attention. 
Harold Shapiro had tried on several occasions to 
Number of women faculty
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persuade the regents to extend its anti-discrimination 
policies to include the gay community, without success. 
Finally, with a supportive, albeit short-lived, Demo-
cratic majority among the Regents, we decided to move 
ahead rapidly to put in the policy while there was still 
political support, no matter how slim. The anticipated 
negative reaction was rapid and angry–an attempt by 
the Legislature to deduct from our appropriation the es-
timated cost of the same-sex couple benefits (effectively 
blocked by our constitutional autonomy), a personal 
phone call to the president from our Republican gov-
ernor (although it was a call he did not want to make, 
and he did not insist upon any particular action), and a 
concerted and successful effort to place two conserva-
tive Republican candidates on our Board of Regents in 
the next election (resulting in the horror of a 4-4 divided 
board during the administration’s last two years).
We were determined to defend this action, however, 
as part of a broader strategy. We had become convinced 
that the university had both a compelling interest in 
and responsibility to create a welcoming community, 
encouraging respect for diversity in all of the charac-
teristics that can be used to describe humankind: age, 
race, ethnicity, nationality, gender, religious belief, sex-
ual orientation, political beliefs, economic background, 
geographical background.
2000s
But, of course, this story does not end with the suc-
cessful achievements of the Michigan Mandate in 1996. 
Beginning first with litigation in Texas (the Hopwood 
decision) and then successful referendum efforts in 
California and Washington, conservative groups such 
as the Center for Individual Rights began to attack poli-
cies such as the use of race in college admissions. Per-
haps because of Michigan’s success with the Michigan 
Mandate, the University soon became a target for those 
groups seeking to reverse affirmative action with two 
cases filed against the University in 1997, one challeng-
ing the admissions policies of undergraduates, and the 
second challenging those in our Law School. 
Even as the new Bollinger administration launched 
the expensive legal battle to defend the use of race in 
college admissions, it discontinued most of the effec-
tive policies and programs created by the Michigan 
Mandate, in part out of concern these might complicate 
the litigation battle, but also because such action was 
no longer a priority of the new administration. Indeed, 
even the mention of the Michigan Mandate became a 
forbidden phrase in its effort to erase the past.  
As a consequence, the enrollment of underrepre-
sented minorities began almost immediately to drop 
at Michigan, eventually declining from 1997 to 2010 by 
over 50% for African American students overall and by 
as much as 80% in some of UM’s professional schools. 
In 1996 half (5) of the Executive Officers were minority, 
but by the early 2000s, only one out of 11 executive offi-
cers and one out of 18 deans in the new administration 
were underrepresented minorities. 
Although the 2003 Supreme Court decisions were 
split, supporting the use of race in the admissions poli-
cies of our Law School and opposing the formula-based 
approach used for undergraduate admissions, the most 
important ruling in both cases stated, in the words of 
the court: “Student body diversity is a compelling state 
interest that can justify the use of race in university ad-
mission. When race-based action is necessary to further 
a compelling governmental interest, such action does 
A quilt assembled from student T-shirts reflecting the 
University’s diversity in 1996 presented by student 
government to the Duderstadts.
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The decline and fall of UM’s racial diversity with a new administration in the late 1990s.
Changes in minority enrollments over past four decades
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A comparison of Michigan with other peer institutions demonstrates the catastrophic decline in minority 
enrollments that began at UM in the late 1990s and continued for the next 15 years. (Atlantic, 2014)
not violate the constitutional guarantee of equal protec-
tion so long as the narrow-tailoring requirement is also 
satisfied.” Hence, the Supreme Court decisions on the 
Michigan cases reaffirmed those policies and practices 
long used by most selective colleges and universities 
throughout the United States. But more significantly, it 
reaffirmed both the importance of diversity in higher 
education and established the principle that, appropri-
ately designed, race could be used as a factor in pro-
grams aimed at achieving diverse campuses. Hence the 
battle was won, the principle was firmly established by 
the highest court of the land. We had won. Or so we 
thought… 
While an important battle had been won with the 
Supreme Court ruling, we soon learned that the war for 
diversity in higher education was far from over. As uni-
versity lawyers across the nation began to ponder over 
the court ruling, they persuaded their institutions to ac-
cept a very narrow interpretation of the Supreme Court 
decisions as the safest course. Actually, this pattern be-
gan to appear at the University of Michigan during the 
early stages of the litigation process. Although the Su-
preme Court decision supported the use of affirmative 
action (if “narrowly tailored”), many universities began 
to back away from programs aimed at recruitment, fi-
nancial aid, and academic enrichment for minority un-
dergraduate students, either eliminating entirely such 
programs or opening them up to non-minority students 
from low-income households. Threats of further litiga-
tion by conservative groups have intensified this re-
trenchment. 
After the years of effort in building successful pro-
grams such as the Michigan Mandate and defending 
the importance of diversity in higher education all 
the way to the Supreme Court, the tentative nature of 
the decision (“narrowly tailored race considerations”) 
probably caused more harm than good by unleashing 
the lawyers on our campuses to block successful efforts 
to broaden educational opportunity and advance the 
cause of social justice. Ironically, the uses of affirmative 
action (and programs that involved racial preference) 
actually were not high on the agenda of the Michigan 
Mandate. Rather our success involved commitment, en-
gagement, and accountability for results.
Minority enrollments continued to decline at Michi-
gan throughout the 2010s as the new priority became at-
tracting large numbers of wealthy out-of-state students 
capable of paying high tuition and generating the rev-
enue to compensate for the loss of state support. No ef-
fort was made to resume those programs that had been 
so successful in the 1990s under the Michigan Mandate. 
As the charts above indicate, Michigan’s decline in di-
versity ranked among the most precipitous among its 
peers during this period.
In 2006, Michigan voters approved a constitutional 
referendum similar to that of California’s Proposition 
209 to ban the use of affirmative action in public 
institutions. Although most of the decline in minority 
295
enrollments had occurred by this time, this referendum 
prevented Michigan colleges and universities from 
using even the narrowly tailored prescriptions of the 
2003 Supreme Court decision, and the decline in the 
enrollments of underrepresented minority students 
continued, erasing most of the gains with the Michigan 
Mandate strategy in the 1990s and returning this 
measure of diversity to the levels of the 1960s. More 
specifically (as shown in several charts depicting the 
enrollments of underrepresented minorities over 
the past 40 years), enrollments of underrepresented 
minority students dropped from 14% of all students 
in 1996 to 10% in 2015.  African American enrollments 
have dropped from a peak of 9.3% in 1996 to 4.8% 
in 2015. While nce Michigan’s professional schools 
were leaders in minority enrollments (with Medicine, 
Business, and Law at 10% to 12% African American 
enrollments in the 1990s); today they have fallen badly 
to levels of 5% or less. ,
 While the very recent decline may be attributable 
in part to the impact of the State of Michigan’s Propo-
sition 2 passed in 2006 that restricted the use of affir-
mative action, racial diversity on campus has actually 
been declining for well over a decade, suggesting more 
fundamental concerns about the University’s commit-
ment to diversity. It clearly began when a new admin-
istration in the late 1990s halted all of the programs of 
the Michigan Mandate, and then continued to fall rap-
idly following the 2003 Supreme Court decision, when 
University attorneys cautioned against reinstating the 
aggressing programs of the 1990s because of concerns 
about the ambiguity of the Supreme Court decision. 
While racial diversity remained a goal of the University, 
few programs were put in place to achieve it, and ac-
countability for progress weakened.  Ironically, instead 
the priority was given to a rapid expansion of students 
from affluent backgrounds capable of paying the high 
tuition necessary to generate revenues to compensate 
for the loss of state support. 
Economic Diversity
Throughout the last decade, there has been an in-
creasing concern that many public universities, partic-
ularly flagship research universities such as Michigan, 
were also losing the economic diversity that char-
acterized their public purpose. A 2010 report by the 
Education Trust, Opportunity Adrift, stated: “Founded 
to provide ‘an uncommon education for the common 
man’, many flagship universities have drifted away 
from their historic mission”. (Haycock, 2010) Analyz-
ing measures such as access for low-income and under-
represented minority students and the relative success 
of these groups in earning diplomas, they found that 
the University of Michigan and the University of Indi-
ana received the lowest overall marks for both prog-
ress and current performance among all major public 
universities in these measures of public purpose. For 
example, Michigan’s percentage of Pell Grant students 
in its freshman class (the most common measure of ac-
cess for low-income students) has fallen to 11%, well 
below most other public universities including Michi-
gan State (23%) and the University of California (32%); 
it even lags behind several of the most expensive pri-
vate universities including Harvard, MIT, and Stan-
ford. (Campbell, 2015)
Yet, another important measure of the degree to 
which public universities fulfill their important mis-
sion of providing educational opportunities to a broad 
range of society is the degree to which they enroll first 
generation college students. It is disturbing that today 
less than 6% of the University’s enrollment consists of 
The drop in underrepresented minorities
over the past 20 years.
Change in Minority Enrollments
Minority 1996 2015 Change
African Am 2,824 1,801 -36%
Hispanic 1,473 2,018 +37%
Native Am  227   92 -60%
Underrep 4,524 3,921 -14%
Change in Minority Percentages
Minority 1996 2015 Change
African Am 9.3% 4.8% -48%
Hispanic 4.5% 5.4% +20%
Native Am 0.7% 0.25% -64%
Asian Am 11.6% 13.5% +13%
Underrep 14.1% 10.1% -32%
Fresh AA 9.3% 5.1% -45%
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such students, compared to 16% by its public universi-
ty peers and 14% of the enrollments of highly selective 
private universities. 
What was happening? To be sure, the State of Michi-
gan ranks at the bottom of the states in the amount of 
need-based financial aid it provides to college students, 
requiring the University to make these commitments 
from its own internal funds. But it is also due to the de-
cision made in the late 1990s to compensate for the loss 
of state support by dramatically increasing enrollments 
with a bias toward out-of-state students who generate 
new revenues with high tuition. Clearly students who 
can pay annual tuition-room & board at the out-of-state 
rates of $60,000 come from highly affluent families. In-
deed, the average family income of Michigan under-
graduates now exceeds $150,000 per year, more charac-
teristic of the “top 1%” than the “common man”.
Lessons Learned
It seems appropriate to end this chapter on the Uni-
versity’s public purpose with several conclusions: First, 
we must always keep in mind that the University of 
Michigan is a public university, created as the first such 
institution in a young nation, evolving in size, breadth, 
and quality, but always committed to a truly public 
purpose of “providing an uncommon education for the 
common man”.
Today there is an even more urgent reason why the 
University must once again elevate diversity to a higher 
Michigan’s ranking in Pell Grant students lags badly behind other public universities.
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priority as it looks toward the future: the rapidly chang-
ing demographics of America. The populations of most 
developed nations in North America, Europe, and Asia 
are aging rapidly. In our nation today there are already 
more people over the age of 65 than teenagers, and 
this situation will continue for decades to come. Over 
the next decade the percentage of the population over 
60 will grow to over 30% to 40% in the United States, 
and this aging population will increasingly shift social 
priorities to the needs and desires of the elderly (e.g., 
retirement security, health care, safety from crime and 
terrorism, and tax relief) rather than investing in the fu-
ture through education and innovation. 
However, the United States stands apart from the 
aging populations of Europe and Asia for one very im-
portant reason: our openness to immigration. In fact, 
over the past decade, immigration from Latin America 
and Asia contributed 53% of the growth in the United 
States population, exceeding that provided by births 
(National Information Center, 2006). This is expected 
to drive continued growth in our population from 300 
million today to over 450 million by 2050, augment-
ing our aging population and stimulating productivity 
with new and young workers. As it has been so many 
times in its past, America is once again becoming a na-
tion of immigrants, benefiting greatly from their ener-
gy, talents, and hope, even as such mobility changes the 
ethnic character of our nation. By the year 2030 current 
projections suggest that approximately 40% of Ameri-
cans will be members of minority groups; by mid-cen-
tury we will cease to have any single majority ethnic 
group. By any measure, we are evolving rapidly into a 
truly multicultural society with a remarkable cultural, 
racial, and ethnic diversity. This demographic revolu-
tion is taking place within the context of the continuing 
globalization of the world’s economy and society that 
requires Americans to interact with people from every 
country of the world.
The increasing diversity of the American population 
with respect to culture, race, ethnicity, and nationality 
is both one of our greatest strengths and most serious 
challenges as a nation. A diverse population gives us 
great vitality. However, the challenge of increasing di-
versity is complicated by social and economic factors. 
Today, far from evolving toward one America, our so-
ciety continues to be hindered by the segregation and 
The majority of both in-state and out-of-state UM Freshman 
now come from families with incomes greater than $150,000.
298
non-assimilation of minority and immigrant cultures. 
If we do not create a nation that mobilizes the talents of 
all of our citizens, we are destined for a diminished role 
in the global community and increased social turbu-
lence. Higher education plays an important role both in 
identifying and developing this talent. And the Univer-
sity of Michigan faces once again a major challenge in 
reclaiming its leadership in building a diverse campus. 
To be sure, there is ample evidence today from states 
such as California and Texas that a restriction to race-
neutral policies will limit the ability of elite programs 
and institutions to achieve diversity across all under-
represented groups. In fact, many of the approaches 
used by the University of California in the wake of 
Proposition 209 have been considered by Michigan. 
The UC reached out to low-performing high schools, 
making it possible for students achieving at top levels 
in these schools would not be penalized in admission 
decisions for the weaknesses of their schools. They 
changed its standardized test requirements to put pri-
mary emphasis on achievements tests rather than ap-
titude tests. They sought to look more carefully at ap-
plicants to identify those who had overcome serious 
obstacles in preparing themselves for higher education. 
They worked with K-12 schools and community colleg-
es to strengthen the preparation for under represented 
minority students. They launched a major effort to let 
students, parents, and counselors know about the op-
portunities UC provided in financial aid, broadened 
applications, and preparation for attendance. 
Yet, as former UC President Richard Atkinson and 
his colleagues concluded, “Today if we look at enroll-
ment overall, racial and ethnic diversity at the Univer-
sity of California is in great trouble. A decade later, the 
legacy of Proposition 209 is clear. Despite enormous ef-
forts, we have failed badly to achieve the goal of a stu-
dent body that encompasses California’s diverse popu-
lation. The evidence suggests that–without attention to 
race and ethnicity–this goal will ultimately recede into 
impossibility.” Today the University of Michigan pro-
vides further evidence from the collapse of its minority 
enrollments of the difficulty of achieving a diverse cam-
pus in the wake of Proposal 2.
However, when one turns to economic diversity, the 
University of California provides a sharp contrast to 
the University of Michigan. Today 42% of all UC un-
dergraduates are Pell Grant eligible, compared to 12% 
at UM. 46% of UC’s entering California residents come 
from families where neither parent graduated from col-
lege, compared to 6% for UM. Approximately 25% of 
undergraduates come from underrepresented minority 
populations (African American, Chicano/Latino, and 
Native American) compared to 12% at UM (although 
this later comparison is due in part to the very large 
growth in the Latino population of California). Key to 
the UC’s success in achieving this remarkable economic 
diversity have been two key factors: i) the importance 
of the state’s Cal Grant program providing need-based 
financial aid that essentially doubles the support of Pell 
Grant eligible students, and ii) a strategic relationship 
Two tragic realities: 1) Michigan tuition is determined largely by state support.
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between California’s community colleges and the Uni-
versity of California, carefully articulated in the Califor-
nia master plan, that enables their associated degrees 
to serve as stepping stones from secondary school into 
baccalaureate programs at UC. 
In sharp contrast, the State of Michigan during the 
2000s eliminated essentially all state need-based finan-
cial aid. Furthermore, the autonomy granted Michi-
gan’s community colleges allows them to focus more 
on providing more adult education programs in their 
communities rather than serving as “junior colleges” to 
prepare students for admission to university programs.
To be sure, rising tuition levels in Michigan’s public 
universities have also been a factor. However this has 
not been the fault of higher education in the state, since 
there is strong evidence that the actual cost of its educa-
tional programs has increased only at the inflation rate. 
Instead, the real blame for the increasing costs seen by 
parents must fall on the State of Michigan, which has 
dramatically cut its support of higher education. In fact, 
a chart comparing state appropriations with University 
tuition and fees demonstrates that almost all of the in-
crease in the costs faced by students and parents has 
been driven by the erosion of the state subsidy through 
appropriations. Hence restoring the University’s eco-
nomic diversity will require action along several fronts.
Of highest immediate priority is restoring a signifi-
cant need-based financial aid program at the state level 
capable of augmenting the modest Pell Grants received 
by low income students to enable them to attend col-
lege. Next, there needs to be serious effort to better 
define the mission of the state’s community colleges 
in preparing students for further university education 
and developing appropriate articulation agreements to 
support this transition. Finally, it is absolutely essential 
to the future of the State of Michigan and the welfare 
of its people that it begin to restore adequate support 
for higher education. Michigan’s ranking in the bottom 
10% in its ranking of state support for higher education 
is not only embarrassing but also indicative of why the 
state’s economic performance today and in the future 
will similarly lag the rest of the nation. 
Hence achieving the University’s objectives for di-
versity will require not only a serious restructuring of 
Michigan’s financial strategies, but even more impor-
tant, a renewed commitment to the fundamental public 
purpose that has guided the University for almost two 
centuries. While the University of Michigan’s concerted 
effort to generate support from other patrons, particu-
larly through private giving and sponsored research, it 
simply must realize that these will never be sufficient to 
support a world-class university of this size, breadth, or 
impact. Without substantial public support, it is unre-
alistic to expect that public universities can fulfill their 
public purpose.
Hence the highest priority should be to re-engage 
with the people of Michigan to convince them of the 
importance of investing in public higher education and 
unleashing the constraints that prevent higher educa-
tion from serving all of the people of this state. This 
2) Although the University makes a substantial commitment to need-based financial aid, it is unable to 
compensate for the absence of a meaningful state need-based financial aid program in Michigan.
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must become a primary responsibility of not only the 
leadership of the University, but its Regents, faculty, 
students, staff, alumni, and those Michigan citizens 
who depend so heavily on the services provided by one 
of the great universities of the world.
Returning again to President Atkinson’s analysis, he 
suggests “We need a strategy that recognizes the con-
tinuing corrosive force of racial inequality but does not 
stop there. We need a strategy grounded in the broad 
American tradition of opportunity because opportu-
nity is a value that Americans understand and support. 
We need a strategy that makes it clear that our society 
has a stake in ensuring that every American has an op-
portunity to succeed—and every American, in turn, has 
a stake in our society. Race still matters. Yet we need to 
move toward another kind of affirmative action, one in 
which the emphasis is on opportunity and the goal is 
educational equity in the broadest possible sense. The 
ultimate test of a democracy is its willingness to do 
whatever it takes to create the aristocracy of talent that 
Thomas Jefferson saw as indispensable to a free society. 
It is a test we cannot afford to fail.”
The Road Ahead
Hence perhaps we need a bolder approach, simi-
lar to that when in 1862 President Lincoln signed the 
Morrill Act to create the land-grant colleges to serve 
both the working class and build an industrial na-
tion. Or perhaps better yet, when President Roosevelt 
signed the G.I. Bill in 1944 or President Johnson signed 
the Higher Education Act in 1965. In this spirit, then, 
consider the following three recommendations, drawn 
from the work of the 2007 National Commission on the 
Future of Higher Education (Miller, 2006).
Learn Grants for the Millennium Generation
Many disadvantaged students (and parents) do not 
see higher education as an option open to them, but 
rather as a privilege for the more affluent. As a result, 
these students do not have the incentive to perform 
well in K-12 (nor do their parents have the incentive to 
support them), hence falling behind early or dropping 
out of the college-bound ranks. To provide strong in-
centives, the idea would be to provide EVERY student 
with a “529 college savings account”, a “Learn-Grant”, 
when they begin kindergarten.  Although this account 
would be owned by the students, its funds would be 
managed by an independent agency and could only be 
used for postsecondary education upon the successful 
completion of a high school college-preparatory pro-
gram.  Each year students (and their parents) would re-
ceive a statement of the accumulation in their account, 
with a reminder that this is their money, but it can 
only be used for their college education (or other post-
secondary education). An initial contribution of, say, 
$10,000 (say, a $5,000 federal grant with a state $5,000 
match) would accumulate over their K-12 education to 
an amount that, when coupled with other financial aid, 
would likely be sufficient for a four-year college educa-
tion at a public college or university.
Beyond serving as an important source of financial 
aid, the Learn Grants would in themselves be a criti-
cal incentive for succeeding in K-12 and preparing for a 
college education. The program might be funded from 
any of a number of sources, e.g., from a federal plus 
state match. Learn Grants would be provided to all stu-
dents when entering K-12 (in order to earn broad politi-
cal support) and could be augmented with additional 
contributions from public, private, or parental sources 
during their pre-college years. As to cost, if we assume 
roughly 4.5 million children enter K-12 each year (the 
estimate for 2010), then at $10,000 per student, this 
would cost $40 billion annually ($20 billion each to the 
states and the federal government). While such a sum 
is, in fact, immense, it is about the cost of one year of 
K-12 education (or college education, on the average). 
It also should be compared to other public expendi-
tures (Medicaid, corrections, defense, and even student 
financial aid).  From this broader perspective, it really 
does notseem excessive when viewed as an investment 
in the future of the nation.
Building a Society of Learning through a National 
Commitment to Lifelong Learning
The nation would commit itself to the goal of pro-
viding universal access to lifelong learning opportuni-
ties to all its citizens, thereby enabling participation in 
the world’s most advanced knowledge and learning so-
ciety. While the ability to take advantage of educational 
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opportunity always depends on the need, aptitude, 
aspirations, and motivation of the student, it should 
not depend on one’s socioeconomic status. Access to 
lifelong learning opportunities should be a civil right 
for all rather than a privilege for the few if the nation 
is to achieve prosperity, security, and social well being 
in the global, knowledge- and value-based economy of 
the 21st century. Perhaps no other recommendation, if 
implemented, would drive a greater transformation in 
higher education in America, changing very dramati-
cally whom it serves, how it is financed, and how it is 
provided. It would clearly transform higher education 
into a resource capable of serving a 21st century nation 
in a global, knowledge economy.
A Final Appeal to “Us”...the “Me” Generation
When we joined the University of Michigan com-
munity in the late 1960s, our parents’ generation was in 
the final stages of a massive effort to provide education-
al opportunities for all Americans. Returning veterans 
funded through the GI bill had doubled college enroll-
ments, particularly at large public universities such as 
Michigan. The post-WWII research strategy developed 
by the federal government was transforming flagship 
institutions such as Michigan into research universities 
responsible for most of the nation’s basic research. The 
Truman Commission had proposed that all Americans 
should have the opportunity of a college education, 
and California responded with its Master Plan, which 
would expand the opportunities for providing “an un-
common education for the common man” at great pub-
lic universities such as the University of Michigan.
Our nation–and, indeed, the world–benefited great-
ly from these efforts both to provide the educational op-
portunity and new knowledge necessary for economic 
prosperity, social well being, and national security. We 
saw spectacular achievements such as sending men to 
the Moon, decoding the human genome, and, of course, 
creating the Internet and the digital age. Although our 
generation of baby boomers benefited greatly from the 
commitments of the “Greatest Generation”, our priori-
ties in the 1960s lay elsewhere–protesting the war in 
Vietnam, fighting for civil rights, saving the environ-
ment, and, of course challenging the establishment.
Yet, fast-forwarding to today, fifty years later, our 
generation has clearly failed to embrace the commit-
ments made by our parents to educational opportunity. 
The quality of our primary and secondary schools lags 
many other nations as K-12 teaching has been trans-
formed into a blue-collar profession. Over the past 
decade, state support of our public universities has 
dropped by roughly 35%, with the University of Michi-
gan regarded as the poster child as its state appropria-
tions dropped from 80% of our academic budget in 
1960 to less than 8% in 2015. Perhaps most telling of 
all are the extraordinary inequities characterizing edu-
cational opportunity today. As one of our colleagues 
has put it: “If you are poor and smart, today you have 
only a one-in-ten chance of obtaining a college degree. 
In contrast, if you are dumb and rich, your odds rise to 
nine-in-ten!” Something has gone terribly wrong!
Both the tragedy and irony of this situation flows 
from the realization that today our world has entered 
a period of rapid and profound economic, social, and 
political transformation driven by knowledge and in-
novation. It has become increasingly apparent that the 
strength, prosperity, and welfare of region or nation 
in a global knowledge economy will demand a highly 
educated citizenry enabled by development of a strong 
system of education at all levels. It will also require in-
stitutions with the ability to discover new knowledge, 
develop innovative applications of these discoveries, 
and transfer them into the marketplace through entre-
preneurial activities. 
Now more than ever, people see education as their 
hope for leading meaningful and fulfilling lives. Just 
as a high school diploma became the passport to par-
ticipation in the industrial age, today, a century later, a 
college education has become the requirement for eco-
nomic security in the age of knowledge. Furthermore, 
with the ever-expanding knowledge base of many 
fields, along with the longer life span and working 
careers of our aging population, the need for intellec-
tual retooling will become even more significant. Even 
those with advanced degrees will soon find that their 
continued employability requires lifelong learning.
Education in America has been particularly respon-
sive to the changing needs of society during early pe-
riods of major transformation, e.g., the transition from 
a frontier to an agrarian society, then to an industrial 
society, through the Cold War tensions, and to today’s 
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global, knowledge-driven economy. As our society 
changed, so too did the necessary skills and knowledge 
of our citizens: from growing to making, from making 
to serving, from serving to creating, and today from 
creating to innovating. With each social transformation, 
an increasingly sophisticated world required a higher 
level of cognitive ability, from manual skills to knowl-
edge management, analysis to synthesis, reductionism 
to the integration of knowledge, invention to research, 
and today innovation, and entrepreneurship. 
So what can our generation do to address these chal-
lenges, much as our parents and our ancestors did for 
us? After all, the  generation–protested as students dur-
ing the 1960s and 1970s, demanded less government 
and lower taxes in the 1980s and 1990s, and today are 
embracing a “Let’s eat dessert first since life is uncer-
tain!” attitude, even while denying the impact that their 
way of life poses to future generations
Perhaps it is time as we enter our “golden years” that 
we should be challenged to finally step forward to ac-
cept a greater degree of generational responsibility for 
the educational opportunities that we provide our de-
scendants. Perhaps it is time that we use our influence, 
our wisdom, and for many, our considerable wealth, to 
make our own bold commitments for the educational 
resources that will be needed by future generations. 
Today a rapidly changing world demands a new 
level of knowledge, skills, and abilities on the part of 
our citizens. Just as in earlier critical moments in our 
nation’s history when its prosperity and security was 
achieved through broadening and enhancing educa-
tional opportunity, it is time once again to seek a bold 
expansion of educational opportunity. But this time we 
should set as the goal providing all American citizens 
with universal access to lifelong learning opportunities, 
thereby enabling participation in the world’s most ad-
vanced knowledge and learning society. 
Let us suggest that perhaps it should be our gen-
eration’s legacy to ensure that our nation accepts a re-
sponsibility as a democratic society to provide all of its 
citizens with the educational, learning, and training 
opportunities they need and deserve, throughout their 
lives, thereby enabling both individuals and the nation 
itself to prosper in an ever more competitive global 
economy. While the ability to take advantage of edu-
cational opportunity will always depend on the need, 
aptitude, aspirations, and motivation of the student, it 
should not depend on one’s socioeconomic status. Ac-
cess to livelong learning opportunities should be a right 
for all rather than a privilege for the few if the nation 
is to achieve prosperity, security, and social well being 
in the global, knowledge- and value-based economy of 
the 21st century.
303
Several of the many awards received by the University 
for its national leadership role in achieving diversity during the 1990s
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Chapter 21
The University of Michigan Circa 2017
Today, much of American higher education is still 
recovering from the impact of the Great Recession of 
2008 and 2009. Endowments are growing again, but 
state support remains at the lowest levels in decades 
and faculty and staff layoffs are still all too common. 
Yet, the University of Michigan appears to be enjoying 
a period of relative peace, prosperity, and growth. 
New buildings are appearing across the campus–the 
new Mott Pediatrics Hospital, a new graduate student 
residence hall, a massive expansion of the Athletics 
Campus, new buildings for the Ross Business School, 
the Law School, and the School of Nursing, a major new 
complex for the biological sciences, and a $650 million 
renovation of most of the student residence halls. 
In contrast to the rest of higher education, Michigan 
seems financially secure, completing a $3.2 billion 
fundraising campaign in the 2000s and today in the 
midst of an even larger $4 billion campaign. Student 
applications and enrollments continue to grow, as do 
research expenditures, now exceeding $1.3 billion 
per year. The University’s endowment has topped 
$10 billion. To be sure, some highly visible University 
programs have been enduring hard times, e.g., the 
first losing seasons of the Michigan football teams 
in over half a century and the athletic dominance 
over the Wolverines by Ohio State and–even worse–
Michigan State. But an exciting new football coach (Jim 
Harbaugh) has arrived and a highly competent athletics 
director (Jim Hackett) has taken over, putting Michigan 
Athletics once again on the upswing. The spirit of the 
campus seems upbeat, confident, and secure. Or at least 
so we are told by the ever-optimistic and ever-present 
communications machinery of the University.
Yet, if one looks more closely, there are numerous 
warning signs that suggest that below the surface the 
University community should not be so sanguine. 
State support per student remains at its lowest levels 
since the 1960s. While there has been significant new 
debt-financed construction in auxiliary units (notably 
the Medical Center, student housing, and athletics), 
academic units have seen only a handful of projects 
financed by gifts, debt financing, or reallocation, but 
none with significant state support. Much of cost savings 
has come from constrained faculty/staff salaries and 
benefits programs (although certainly not for senior 
administrators whose compensation has soared to the 
levels of private universities) and assigned cost cutting 
targets for academic units. While research expenditures 
continue to lead the nation, externally sponsored 
research has declined while University subsidies of 
sponsored research projects have now grown to over 
30% of research volume. Student applications have 
increased largely because of the Common Application 
now used in higher education, but the University’s 
yield rate from admitted students remains lower than 
many of its peer universities. Faculty quality has been 
challenged by the University’s struggle to retain top 
faculty in the face of increasing instructional loads, 
modest compensation, and aggressive offers from 
competing institutions. In recent years the University 
has suffered a serious erosion in its public purpose with 
the tragic decline in enrollments of underrepresented 
minority and low income students. Compared to earlier 
decades, the University’s pathfinding achievements 
appear to be lagging both in number and impact.
Beyond these signals of possible problems, a more 
thorough investigation suggests that Michigan is clearly 
facing many of the challenges currently experienced by 
the rest of higher education, e.g., the unsustainability 
of its traditional sources of financial support, the 
increasing competition for the best students and faculty, 
and mission creep in auxiliary activities that dilutes the 
priority given to the academic core of the university. 
Cracks are beginning to appear in our façade of 
confidence. There is a growing fear we may be whistling 
through the graveyard, ignoring serious issues and 
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concerns that could threaten our most fundamental 
goals of quality, public purpose, leadership, and even 
our institutional saga as a pathfinder for American 
higher education.
Through the lessons learned from our exercise in 
tracking the ebb and flow of various characteristics of 
the University of Michigan over the past half-century, 
we have identified a number of current concerns. We 
summarize them in this chapter and then suggest 
possible remedies in the next.
Growth
The rapid growth in student enrollments coupled 
with the unbridled expansion of auxiliary activities 
(hospitals, housing, and athletics) has triggered concern 
that the University is on a determined path toward 
becoming big, bigger, and biggest at the expense of 
both quality of its academic programs and the quality of 
life both on campus and beyond. While growth brings 
opportunities (and pride), it also brings challenges such 
as financing and managing such a gigantic complex. 
Overwhelming size commands respect, but we have 
many disturbing examples of how size and complexity 
can lead to disaster, e.g., the dinosaurs and General 
Motors.
Quality
Michigan’s character as leader through its path-
finding and trailblazing required it to build spires of 
excellence in key fields, rather than trying to achieve a 
uniform level of lesser quality across all of its activities. 
Only by attempting to be the best in these fields can we 
develop in our students, faculty, and staff the necessary 
intensity and commitment to excellence. Furthermore, 
only by competing with the best can Michigan establish 
appropriate levels of expectation and achievement. 
The University culture has traditionally operated by 
placing very large bets in high-risk ventures involving 
our very best people at the grass roots level. Few 
of these have been top-down from the University’s 
leadership but rather from the willingness to work hard 
to prospect, identify, and support major opportunities 
among its faculty, students, and staff.  
Here a particular warning flag should be raised 
Over the last 15 years UM enrollments
have increased by 10,000 students (25%).
Another demonstration of enrollment growth.
Growth of student high-rise apartments in Ann Arbor.
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about the use of initiatives at the presidential or 
executive officer level to lead or steer the university, 
since Michigan throughout its history has been very 
much a bottom-up driven institution. It is not just 
that most top-down initiatives are soon rejected by 
the Michigan grassroots culture and fade away into 
obscurity, but more important, the true creativity, 
wisdom, and drive flourishes best at the grass-roots 
level with outstanding faculty members, students, and 
staff rather than administrators. 
Balance (Academics vs. Auxiliaries)
Although the academic activities of the University 
remain key to its reputation and impact, the attention 
of recent University administrations and Regents 
has increasingly been focused on nonacademic 
opportunities. During the first decades of the new 
century there has been a growing faculty concern that 
the rapid growth of the Michigan’s auxiliary activities 
(hospitals, housing, and athletics), now comprising 
almost 50% of the University’s budget, has driven an 
increased focus on these activities by the leadership 
and governance of the institution to the neglect of 
academic programs. To be sure, the auxiliary units 
operate in markets that are relatively insensitive 
to pricing compared to the tuition constraints and 
limited public support of academic units. But there is 
growing concern that this rapid growth is also driven 
by unusually aggressive leadership of auxiliary units as 
well as the priority given by the University’s leadership 
and governance. There is also the related issue as to 
whether the aggressive growth of the auxiliary units 
actually completes with and draws resources away 
from the academic core.
This concern about academic priorities applies not 
only to resource allocation but also to the attention of 
governance (the Regents), leadership (the Executive 
Officers), and management (central administration 
functions such as development and communications). 
Too many universities have seen the quality of their 
academic programs deteriorate through the distraction 
of important but clearly secondary activities such as 
fund-raising (e.g., donor cultivation and influence), the 
management of billion-dollar enterprises such as health 
systems, the public visibility of intercollegiate athletics, 
and the misguided efforts to force upon universities 
many of the inappropriate practices of business and 
commerce (e.g., “shared services”).
While much of this is driven both by the differing 
financial opportunities and challenges facing academic, 
auxiliary, and administrative activities, it is also due to an 
erosion of the academic voice in University leadership. 
Michigan provides a disturbing example of the impact 
of the increasingly “corporate” nature of large research 
university, with an increasing fraction of its central 
administration comprised of staff with little experience 
in higher education, and decision making largely 
detached from academic considerations. Here we must 
note again the efforts to recentralize resource control, 
weakening the power of deans and directors, launching 
new initiatives from the central administration rather 
than harvesting them from faculty and students, and 
imposing upon faculty and academic programs a 
corporate bureaucracy that is orthogonal to the spirit of 
academic freedom and creativity.
Pathfinding Leadership
It has been suggested that a key feature of the 
Michigan saga, its particular character and impact, 
over most of its history has been its role as a pathfinder 
for higher education. It has leveraged its unusual 
combination of quality, breadth, scale, and risk-taking 
The 2015 UM Budget demonstrating the balance
between academics and auxiliary activities.
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spirit to blaze new trails for learning, discovery, and 
engagement to serve society. In fact, this pathfinding 
role has occasionally been so profound that it has 
changed the world itself. 
Yet in recent years the University has seemed 
more content to follow the lead of others, to embrace 
more common themes in higher education such 
as “interdisciplinarity”, “engaged learning”, and 
“entrepreneurism”. Its pioneering spirit seems to be 
lagging. The novelty is missing in its initiatives. To be 
sure, the financial challenges faced by the University 
with the loss of much of its state support have required 
attention by both the University’s leadership and its 
Regents. It is also the case that over the past 15 years 
many of the key leadership and administrative positions 
have been filled through external appointments of those 
unfamiliar with the University’s history, weakening 
somewhat the corporate memory and corporate culture 
of the University. Indeed, there are many signs that 
they have been slowly decoupling the University 
from its past, just as did the disruptions of the protest 
movements of the 1960s.
As many of the priorities of the University have 
shifted to activities such as development, public 
relations, marketing, and promoting the University by 
those from the commercial world with little experience 
with academe, it has become increasingly evident that 
the 2010s became a “lost” decade similar to the 1970s 
when little of the traditional pathfinding role of the 
University occurred.
Whatever the reason, it is clear that this new culture 
of defining and promoting the “brand” of the University 
through slogans such as “Victors for Michigan”, by 
those with little understanding of either its academic 
character, history, or saga will seriously undermine the 
leadership role it has played in higher education over 
the years if allowed to continue. Put another way, a 
culture which transforms one of the great universities 
of the world into a follower rather than a pathfinder 
should be strongly resisted by those who understand 
and value Michigan’s remarkable contributions to the 
state, the nation, and the world throughout its long 
history.
Students
Of particular note here has been the growing 
concern about the increase in student enrollments, 
from 35,000 in the 1990s to almost 44,000 today, a 25% 
growth occurring mostly at the undergraduate level 
with a particular emphasis on enrolling wealthy out-
of-state students in an effort to increase tuition revenue 
to compensate for the loss of state support. This 
enrollment growth has had a significant impact both 
on the character of the University’s academic programs 
and the nature of the University community. Since 
tenure-track faculty size has increased only modestly 
in those units undergoing major expansion (e.g., LS&A 
and Engineering), this has shifted lower division 
instruction toward an increasing dependence on part-
time or nontenure-track faculty (who now provide 
over 50% of lower division undergraduate instruction). 
Teaching loads, as measured by students per full-time 
faculty member, are the highest in the University’s 
history. 
There is also a concern about the significant growth 
in students from high income backgrounds (with 
family incomes now averaging over $150,000/year) are 
distorting the culture of the student body, attending 
Michigan more in the spirit of “paying for the party” 
(fraternities and sororities, big-time athletics, sushi bars 
in the residence hall dining) than academic challenge 
and excellence. In fact, there is considerable evidence 
that the University is no longer honoring its long-
standing public purpose of providing “an uncommon 
education for the common man”. 
Tragically, the University’s leadership in providing 
exceptional educational opportunities to low income 
and underrepresented minority students has declined 
as its state support has eroded. More specifically, the 
percentage of Pell Grant students enrolled at UM Ann 
Arbor (the standard measure used by higher education 
of measuring enrollment by low income students) 
has dropped to 11% (compared to an average among 
flagship public universities of 22%), while its fraction 
of underrepresented minorities is now down to 10% 
(low again compared to an average of 25%). It is also 
disturbing that its percentage of first generation college 
students has now dropped to less than 6% compared 
to 16% of its public university peers and 14% of the 
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Michigan’s poor ranking in Pell Grant recepients
enrollment of highly selective private universities. In 
fact, a 2010 report by the Education Trust, Opportunity 
Adrift, stated: “Founded to provide ‘an uncommon 
education for the common man’, many flagship 
universities have drifted away from their historic 
mission”. (Haycock, 2010) Analyzing measures such as 
access for low-income and underrepresented minority 
students and the relative success of these groups in 
earning diplomas, they found that the University of 
Michigan and the University of Indiana received the 
lowest overall marks for both progress and current 
performance among all major public universities in 
these measures of public purpose. 
To be sure, the State of Michigan ranks at the bottom 
of the states in the amount of need-based financial aid 
it provides to college students, requiring the University 
to make these commitments from its own internal 
funds. But it is also due to the decision made in the late 
1990s to compensate for the loss of state support by 
dramatically increasing enrollments with a bias toward 
out-of-state students who generate new revenues with 
high tuition. Clearly students who can pay annual 
tuition-room & board at the out-of-state rates of $60,000 
come from highly affluent families. Indeed, the average 
family income of Michigan undergraduates now 
exceeds $150,000 per year, more characteristic of the 
“top 1%” than the “common man”.
Of comparable concern is the significant drop in 
enrollments of underrepresented minority students, 
dropping from 14% of enrollments in 1996 (including 
9.4% African American) to 10% in 2015 (4.8% 
African American). Once Michigan’s professional 
schools were leaders in minority enrollments (with 
Medicine, Business, and Law at 12% African American 
enrollments in the 1990s); today they have fallen badly 
to levels of 5% or less. Although this dramatic decline 
is usually blamed on the state’s adoption in 2006 of a 
constitutional amendment banning affirmative action 
in college admissions, it actually began in the late 1990s 
when a new administration abandoned the successful 
programs of the Michigan Mandate. Minority 
enrollments continued to decline throughout the 2010s, 
even with the positive Supreme Court decision of 2003, 
declining to levels even below those of the 1960s. It 
was clear that the University leadership no longer gave 
diversity the priority that it had received in 1990s.
This decline was particularly tragic since during 
the 1990s the University led the nation in its efforts 
to achieve diversity through efforts such as the 
Michigan Mandate, which doubled the population 
of underrepresented minority students, faculty, and 
staff. But, perhaps even more significantly, during the 
1990s, the success of underrepresented minorities at 
the University improved even more remarkably, with 
graduation rates rising to the highest level among 
public universities, promotion and tenure success of 
minority faculty members becoming comparable to 
Following the major growth during the 1990s, minor-
ity enrollments have been dropping precipitously.
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their majority colleagues, and a growing number of 
appointments of minorities to leadership positions in 
the University. The campus climate not only became 
more accepting and supportive of diversity, but students 
and faculty were attracted to Michigan because of its 
growing reputation for a diverse campus. Perhaps most 
significantly, as the campus became more racially and 
ethnically diverse, the quality of the students, faculty, 
and academic programs of the University increased to 
the highest level in the institution’s history. This fact 
reinforced the premise of the Michigan Mandate that 
the aspirations of diversity and excellence were not 
only compatible but, in fact, highly correlated. By every 
measure, the Michigan Mandate was a remarkable 
success, moving the University beyond our original 
goals of a more diverse campus while enhancing its 
excellence and achievement.
Faculty and Staff
Looking back over the past 50 years, it is clear that 
the career trajectories of the faculty have changed 
significantly. No longer do young faculty expect a 
career at a single institution, but they anticipate more of 
a nomadic path moving from institution to institution 
in order to rise up the promotion ladder. Yet, of even 
more concern, the opportunities for establishing an 
academic career are dwindling, with non-tenure track 
appointments as post-doctoral scholars, lecturers, and 
adjunct faculty now providing the majority of lower 
division instruction, a feature driven by the efforts of 
universities to cut costs and improve productivity with 
a more flexible faculty workforce. As a consequence, 
today less than 50% of the instructional staff is 
comprised of tenured or tenure-track faculty.
The marketplace has become even more intense 
as faculty careers span multiple institutions, now 
remaining less than a decade at each waystation on 
their route to a professorial chair or administrative 
position. New elements have been added to the package 
of negotiations, including not only promotion, salary 
increases, startup funding, and perhaps an endowed 
chair, but now dual-career family placement, more 
generous sabbatical leaves, lower teaching assignments, 
and even signing bonuses. The competition among 
institutions has become ever more intense.
The analysis of faculty attrition during the past 15 
years finds that the loss of Michigan faculty to other 
institutions has been unusually high among junior 
faculty, and particularly among women and minorities. 
Although some of this is due to the long-standing 
process of tenure evaluation, the number of young 
faculty with distinguished records who leave the 
University for appointments at peer institutions (e.g., 
Harvard, MIT, Yale, Stanford, University of California) 
is cause for concern.
But it also must be recognized that despite rhetoric 
to the contrary, faculty salaries simply have not been a 
priority of the University administration in recent years. 
Recent comparative analyses of faculty and staff salaries 
found the average salary of full professors at Michigan 
not only fall 20% below those of private universities 
but also lag many public universities. In sharp contrast 
the compensation of senior administrators (Executive 
Officers, deans, and senior financial administrators) are 
30% to 40% higher than all other peer public universities, 
and when undisclosed bonuses are included, rank at the 
top of all institutions, public and private. The impact 
on faculty morale of excessive compensation of senior 
administrators has been considerable.
Adopting such corporate approaches to university 
management and leadership is not only orthogonal to 
The drop in underrepresented minorities
over the past 15 years.
Change in Minority Enrollments
Minority 1996 2015 Change
African Am 2,824 1,801 -36%
Hispanic 1,473 2,018 +37%
Native Am  227   92 -60%
Underrep 4,524 3,921 -14%
Change in Minority Percentages
Minority 1996 2015 Change
African Am 9.3% 4.8% -48%
Hispanic 4.5% 5.4% +20%
Native Am 0.7% 0.25% -64%
Asian Am 11.6% 13.5% +13%
Underrep 14.1% 10.1% -32%
Fresh AA 9.3% 5.1% -45%
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the spirit of academic freedom and creativity. But when 
coupled with the nomadic life it imposes upon today’s 
faculty members, such actions also seriously damage 
faculty loyalty to institutions. Little wonder than many 
of Michigan’s most accomplished and distinguished 
faculty members have largely stepped back from 
efforts to influence the future of the University through 
service in a faculty governance role with little power 
or through initiatives that are usually ignored or 
overwhelmed by the public relations efforts of the 
central administration. In a very real sense, perhaps one 
of the greatest challenges to the University of Michigan 
today, as it is to other great public research universities, 
is to find a way to empower once again those faculty 
members whose contributions in teaching, scholarship, 
and service have been the key factor in establishing and 
sustaining the reputation of the University.
Yet in the same way that an increasingly corporate 
approach to University management and decision-
making now threatens academic priorities, it also puts 
talented staff at great risk, as evidenced by the degree 
to which cost-saving ventures such as administrative 
shared services and reduction in benefits all too 
frequently have their most negative impact on the staff. 
The significant growth of high salary staff in the central 
administration has raised many concerns, since many 
of these new staff not only enjoy salaries far above those 
of the faculty, but also benefit from undisclosed bonus 
and deferred compensation that boost their salaries 
even higher (amounting to more than $46 million in 
2013), while many staff members in academic units are 
seriously under paid. Despite the critical role they play 
in teaching and research, their colleagues in roles such 
as branding. marketing, and fund raising in the central 
administration enjoy compensation far beyond that 
they would merit in business or industry.
Financials
The highly competitive nature of higher education 
in America has created an intensely Darwinian winner-
take-all ecosystem in which the strongest and wealthiest 
institutions become predators, raiding the best faculty 
and students of the less generously supported and 
more constrained public universities and manipulating 
federal research and financial policies to sustain a 
system in which the rich get richer and the poor get 
devoured. These institutions now find themselves 
caught with declining state support and the predatory 
wealthy private universities competing for the best 
students, faculty, and support.
So how might we assess the financial state of the 
University over the past 50 years? As state support 
declined over the past five decades, the University of 
Michigan found itself a predominantly “privately-
supported” public university, in the sense that roughly 
95% of its revenues now come from non-state sources 
such as student tuition, clinical fees, research grants, 
and private gifts that are determined by competitive 
markets.
While the loss of state support has largely been 
compensated by ramping up enrollments of students 
paying nonresident tuition, this remedy has approached 
a ceiling. Today the current out-of-state undergraduate 
General contribution of state support to
the UMAA General Fund budget
Projections of longer term financial support (Hanlon)
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tuition of $45,000 has caught up with leading private 
universities such as Harvard and Stanford. Furthermore 
although there are strong pressures to continue to 
grow enrollment, while holding permanent faculty 
lines relatively constant, the increasing instructional 
load in UM’s large undergraduate colleges, LS&A and 
Engineering, are already becoming unbearable for 
many faculty members.
While private support is important, frequently 
these funds are heavily constrained by donor intent 
and unavailable to meet the highest priorities of the 
University. Furthermore, although the University’s 
current development and marketing staffing is several 
times that of the 1990s, it has failed to achieve any real 
growth in annual giving, ranking below many other 
public and private universities. 
The one bright spot is the impressive growth in 
Michigan’s endowment, due largely to the extraordinary 
success in creating a $2.5 billion endowment during the 
1990s. Yet, although Michigan’s $10 billion endowment 
today appears impressive, paticularly for a public 
institution, the University’s endowment-per-student is 
only one-tenth the level of leading private institutions.
While research expenditures have continued to 
grow, maintaining the University’s position as the 
nation’s leader by this measure, the fact that over 30% 
of UM research expenditures are now provided from 
institutional funds such as tuition revenue and clinical 
fees suggest that plugging the hole in eroding federal 
sponsorship of research with University funds may also 
be distorting institutional priorities. Yet it is also clear 
that the financial dependence on such growth creates a 
dependence that makes it hard to reverse.
On the other side of the ledger, the University has 
launched an ambitious cost reduction effort during the 
past decade, with the goal of trimming roughly 1.5% 
to 2.0% each year of annual expenditures. While this 
has resulted in part from more efficient management 
of energy and supply acquisition and administration, 
much of the highly touted recent “savings” of the 
University have come out of faculty-staff benefits. 
Furthermore faculty and staff compensation has been 
modest, dropping 20% below its private university 
peers and lagging behind several other leading public 
universities. Hence there is a serious concern that 
further cuts in benefits could cripple UM’s efforts to 
attract outstanding faculty and staff.
To be sure, the University has survived in the face of 
losing over 50% of its state support, with its reputation 
largely intact. Yet, from the late 1990s to the 2010s, a 
series of short term actions have been taken that may 
have walked the University out on a financial limb. In 
recent years faculty surveys suggest growing concerns 
about whether the current financial strategy of the 
University is capable of sustaining both the quality and 
the public purpose of the institution. 
Facilities
The University of Michigan campus has continued 
to evolve over the past two decades, despite the 
disappearance of state support for capital facilities. 
The two major complexes designed by architect Robert 
Stern, Weill Hall (for the Ford School) and North Quad, 
provide elegant entrances to the Central Campus, albeit 
at very considerable cost. The major buildings of the 
Ross School of Business Administration and expansion 
of the Law School are also important academic projects. 
While Venturi’s Life Sciences complex is actually a 
somewhat smaller version of a buildings he designed 
for Yale and UCLA, the biomedical research complex on 
Huron and Observatory is important for the continued 
expansion of research activity in the life sciences, as 
well as the recently acquired North Campus Research 
Center (the former Pfizer R&D Center). 
The University has taken advantage of exceptionally 
low interest rates to launch a massive series of 
renovations of residence halls ($650 million) that will 
be important for the growing student enrollment. The 
addition of skyboxes and club facilities has brought 
in additional revenue for Michigan athletics, albeit at 
possible risk because of its dependence on generous 
federal tax treatment and its serious impact on the 
morale of long-time campus and community fans who 
can no longer afford to attend events. Finally, the clinical 
facilities for the University Hospitals have grown 
very significantly with the addition of the Frankel 
Cardiovascular Center and the new Mott Pediatrics 
Hospital, along with planned expansion of the Medical 
School, although there are already warning signs about 
the costs of these very large new clinical facilities in 
view of the current health care market in Michigan and 
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North Quad Weill Hall
Life Sciences Institute Biomedical Sciences Building
Ross School of Business Administration Law School South Hall
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Mott Children’s Hospital Frankel Cardiovascular Center
Hill Dining Hall Munger Graduate Residence Hall
North Campus Research Center Michigan Energy Institute
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the future restructuring of federal health care policies 
such as the Affordable Care Act (with recent operating 
losses in the $100 million to $200 million per year).
Yet, here there are also more general concerns. 
Most of the campus growth (75%), at least in terms 
of investment ($4 billion), has occurred in auxiliary 
units (i.e., clinical activities, housing, athletics) and 
are funded by auxiliary revenue streams, albeit with 
debt secured by student fee revenues. Those buildings 
responding to academic needs have generally depended 
upon anticipated federal research support (e.g., Public 
Health Annex), private funding (Ross Business School, 
Weill Hall), or debt-financing (Biosciences Center). This 
raises a serious question as to just how, in the absence 
of state support, the University will meet the future 
capital facilities needs of those academic units that 
have no donors or other external revenue sources (e.g., 
federal R&D).
The budget growth of auxiliary units (hospitals, 
housing, athletics) also raises the important issue of 
university priorities and balance. At Michigan there is 
some truth to the old saying that the academic core of 
the contemporary university is a quite fragile institution 
struggling to survive between the pressures exerted by 
the football stadium on one end of the campus and the 
university hospital on the other. But more serious is 
the issue of how one sustains the highest priority for 
the academic core of the university in an increasingly 
resource-driven (and for many academic units, 
resource-starved) environment constrained by “fund 
accounting”, in which it is increasingly difficult to 
provide cross-subsidies from one unit to another (and 
particularly from auxiliary units to academic units).
Technology
The primary missions of the University, its 
teaching, research, and service activities (or 
alternatively, its activities of learning, discovery, 
and engagement with society) are increasingly 
dependent on cyberinfrastructure, i.e., information and 
communications technology. The rapid advances in 
these technologies are not only reshaping but creating 
entirely new paradigms for research, education, and 
application not only in science and engineering but 
in all of the academic and professional disciplines. It 
has been clear for some time that to maintain world-
class academic programs, the University must also 
achieve leadership in the quality and relevance of the 
cyberinfrastructure it provides at the level of each of its 
highly diverse teaching and research programs.
This is particularly challenging since the features 
of information technology such as processing speed, 
memory, and bandwidth, have been increasing in power 
at rates of 100 to 1,000 fold per decade since WWII. This 
is one of the major reasons for the continued surprises 
we get from the emergence of new applications–the 
Internet, social networks, big data, machine learning–
appearing in unexpected ways at a hyper exponential 
pace. We have learned time and time again that it 
makes little sense to simply extrapolate the present 
into the future to predict or even understand the next 
Michigan Stadium Expansion Chrisler Center Expansion
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“tech turn”. These are not only highly disruptive 
technologies, but they are highly unpredictable. Ten 
years ago nobody would have imagined Google, 
Facebook, Twitter, etc., and today, nobody really can 
predict what will be a dominant technology even five 
years ahead, much less ten! 
Too much of the current focus is shaped by today’s 
technologies, not tomorrow’s, e.g., cloud services, big 
data, analytics. Again, overdependence on commodity 
products, particularly to the degree we constrain the 
cyber environments of academic units through policies 
such as purchasing and shared services, will harm the 
loosely coupled adaptive culture of the university that 
is one of our greatest strengths. This is particularly 
dangerous if we become overly dependent on particular 
vendors because of top-down rather than bottom-up 
forces. The reality is (and always has been) that it has 
been our faculty, staff, and students who spot the next 
big trends in technology and then drive change upward 
through the institution. 
The tension between centralization of technology 
(or “rationalization”, the term used by University 
consultant Accenture) and decentralization (where 
cacophony leads to innovation) can be very threatening, 
particularly to those parts of the University that need 
to make the trains run on time (e.g., financial services, 
hospitals, etc.) Fortunately, in the past, the wisdom of 
maintaining a loosely coupled adaptive system at the 
academic level finally bubbles up to the leadership 
of the institution, and academic units are set free 
once again. To be sure, the University has important 
responsibilities that require mission critical computing. 
But it is at the level of academic units rather than the 
enterprise level where innovation and leadership must 
occur. Why? Because they are driven by learning and 
discovery, by experimentation, by tolerance for failure, 
and by extraordinarily talented faculty, students, and 
particularly, staff. 
Leadership and Governance
One of the most serious recent trends in University 
leadership has been the erosion of the power of the 
deans and directors. As we have noted, the strength 
of the University’s academic programs has been due 
in large measure to the quality of the leadership of 
the deans. The deans are the key line officers of the 
University. They are also the ones most responsible for 
maintaining its academic priorities and quality. Great 
deans create and lead great schools and colleges, not 
to mention generating over 90% of the resources of the 
University. 
Yet in recent years there is some evidence that the 
traditional roles and power of the deans have been 
weakened. The rigid application of 10 year limits on 
the appointments of deans, with little attention given 
to easing their transitions to “life after leadership”, 
has been very discouraging and led to the departure 
of several of the University’s most talented leaders. So 
too, there has been a clear trend to fill most open dean 
positions with outsiders with little experience with 
decentralized management. 
The Univerity provides a rich cyberinfrastructure environment for students and faculty.
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The long-standing practice of achieving a balance 
between the appointment of internal and external 
candidates for senior leadership positions such as 
deans seems to have been abandoned.  During the 1970s 
through the 1990s, the majority of the deans came from 
internal appointments of outstanding faculty. In recent 
years there has been a very significant preference for 
external candidates, now comprising over two-thirds 
of the deans and the majority of the executive officers. 
Indeed, by 2015, 13 of 19 dean positions had been 
filled with external candidates. When comprised with 
the 10-year limit on deans service, the influence of the 
deans on University-wide issues has been substantially 
weakened. 
This is an important issue since there has  been a 
long University tradition of making certain that the 
University’s distributed academic leadership is well 
balanced between long-time members of the University 
faculty who understand the unique Michigan culture 
of pathfinding and innovation and those newcomers 
to the University who may not understand its culture 
initially but bring in new ideas and insights. Such a 
balance is able to preserve the University’s long role 
as a pathfinder, not a follower. But perhaps the most 
worrisome trend has been the weakening of the voice 
and influence of the University’s deans in recent years. 
The deans and department chairs are the key players 
in such pathfinding ventures. They are the ones who 
understand best both the quality of their faculty and 
the unusual nature of the Michigan culture. Hence 
throughout the history of the University, the deans 
have been given extraordinary authority, accompanied 
by responsibility, in providing the leadership necessary 
to build and sustain outstanding program. 
There has been similar erosion in both the academic 
credentials and experience of the executive officers. 
In the past, most of the University’s senior leadership 
team had sufficient academic experience to merit 
faculty appointments in addition to their administrative 
assignments. Today, however, only four executive 
officers (president, provost, VP Research, and EVP 
Health System) have faculty credentials. The recent 
trend to appoint senior officers without academic 
background or experience has decoupled the central 
administration from the academic core of the University 
to an alarming degree. 
Michigan has also seen some change in its 
shared governance involving faculty, trustees, and 
administration. Such a system represents the effort 
to achieve a balance among academic priorities, 
public purpose, and operating imperatives such as 
financial solvency, institutional reputation, and public 
accountability. Quality universities require quality 
leadership and governance. Nothing is more critical 
than attracting experienced and dedicated citizens in 
standing for election to Michigan’s Board of Regents 
and attracting distinguished faculty members into 
leadership positions in faculty governance. 
But here the University of Michigan system of 
faculty governance is somewhat different than most 
institutions. Its Senate Assembly, the campus-wide, 
elected faculty governance, is primarily advisory in 
nature, in contrast to the strong executive committee 
structures at the department, school, and college level. 
Hence while the faculty is strong at the school and 
college level, it is relatively weak on University-wide 
issues. 
Since the influence of faculty governance at the 
University is primarily concentrated in powerful 
elected faculty executive committees at the school, 
college, and department level rather than with a 
University-wide faculty senate, the deans also have 
primary responsibility for making certain that academic 
priorities dominate the attention of the University 
administration and governing board. To weaken the 
access and influence of the deans relative to both the 
Executive Officers and Regents of the University is 
tantamount to weakening the academic priorities of the 
institution.
Here the deans must play an important role, since 
the decentralized nature of the University allocates to 
them not only the power of resource control but also the 
responsibility for defending University-wide academic 
priorities. When the deans are strong, this checks-and-
balance system works well. When they are weak or 
myopically focused on their own academic units, the 
university becomes vulnerable to political forces.
Organization and Management
Today, the primary missions of the University, 
its teaching, research, and service to society, are 
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characterized by extraordinary scale and complexity. To 
accommodate the necessary financial restructuring and 
growth of the University during the 1980s and 1990s, 
the University of Michigan began a decade-long effort 
to decentralize both authority and responsibility to the 
level of its academic and auxiliary operating units, with 
the deans and directors assuming the role of distributed 
management responsibility for both revenue generation 
and expenditure controls. This system allowed the 
University not only to adapt and maintain academic 
priorities and quality, but its “loosely coupled adaptive 
ecosystem” structure has enabled it to withstand 
stresses that might cripple smaller institutions. 
Unfortunately, as the University entered a new 
century, the recruitment of new deans and senior 
administrators from institutions with more centralized 
cultures has stimulated efforts to recentralize the 
institution, leading to major growth in both the 
numbers and compensation of administrators. It also 
resulted in efforts to apply corporate management 
styles, complete with the demands to centralize and 
standardize services, bonus-based compensation 
systems, and excessive investment in corporate-like 
functions (e.g., marketing, branding, advertising, and 
other forms of “institutional advancement”). Such 
attempts to recentralize the institution’s management 
have encountered strong faculty opposition because of 
the threat of damage to the core academic mission by 
such a corporate-style central administration.
Here, Michigan provides a disturbing example of 
the impact of the increasingly “corporate” nature of 
large research university, with an increasing fraction of 
its central administration comprised of staff with little 
if any experience in higher education, and decision 
making largely detached from academic considerations 
(e.g., the efforts to recentralize resource control, 
weakening the power of deans and directors, launching 
new initiatives from the central administration rather 
than harvesting them from faculty and students, and 
imposing upon faculty and academic programs a 
corporate bureaucracy
Missions
One of the greatest challenges to the modern research 
university is balancing its various complex roles, even as 
these roles are rapidly changing. How does one achieve 
an optimum balance between teaching and research? 
Public service versus our role as an independent 
critic of society? The liberal arts and the professions? 
The tensions among these various roles occur in part 
because of the incompatibility in the needs, values, and 
expectations of the various constituencies served by 
higher education.
The basic functions of the university continue to be 
its core academic activities. Other major activities of the 
university gain legitimacy only to the degree that they 
are linked with education and scholarship. In this sense, 
public service that is based on teaching and research is 
not a function but one of a number of principles that 
animate and guide the basic work of a university.
Efforts to respond to unrealistic public aspirations 
and expectations by attempting to be all things to all 
people, higher education has whetted an insatiable 
public appetite for a host of service activities of 
marginal relevance to its academic mission. A quick 
glance around any community with a local university 
provides numerous examples of this, from extension 
offices for continuing education to medical clinics to 
incubation centers for high-tech business formation to 
athletic camps for K-12 students.
Yet such responsiveness to the needs—indeed, 
even the whims—of society by higher education may, 
in the long run, be counterproductive. Not only has it 
fueled an inaccurate public perception of the primary 
mission of a university and an unrealistic expectation 
of its role in public service, but it has also stimulated an 
increasingly narrow public attitude toward the support 
of higher education. A “What-have-you-done-for-me-
lately?”attitude now permeates federal, state, and local 
government. This fuels powerful forces of parochialism 
that force institutions to spread themselves ever more 
thinly as they scramble to justify themselves to their 
elected public officials. 
Perhaps the most extreme example of such 
misguided “public service” is the entertainment 
most large universities like Michigan are expected to 
provide through intercollegiate athletics. While many 
of the University’s athletic programs provide valuable 
and appropriate learning experiences for student, 
its football and basketball programs have clearly 
become commercial entertainment businesses. They 
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have evolved to the point where they no longer have 
relevance to the academic mission of the university. 
Furthermore, they are based on a culture, a set of values 
that, while perhaps appropriate for show business, are 
viewed as highly corrupt by the academy and deemed 
corrosive to our academic mission. It is increasing 
clear that “big-time” college sports exploit not only the 
health but also the educational opportunity of young 
students primarily to generate the revenues necessary 
to make a very small number of people fabulously 
wealthy, namely coaches, athletic directors, conference 
commissioners, and NCAA executives. Put another 
way, there is growing evidence that big-time college 
sports do far more damage to the university, to its 
students and faculty, its leadership, its reputation and 
credibility, that most realize--or at least are willing to 
admit. The evidence seems overwhelming:
Far too many of our athletics programs exploit 
young people, recruiting them with the promise of a 
college education—or a lucrative professional career—
only to have the majority of Division 1-A football 
and basketball players achieve neither. Furthermore, 
particularly in violent sports such as football and 
hockey, student-athletes are subjected to unacceptable 
health risks through injuries that could cripple them 
for life, without adequate protection or lifelong health 
security.
Scandals in intercollegiate athletics have damaged 
the reputations of many of our colleges and universities. 
Big time college football and basketball have put 
inappropriate pressure on university governance, as 
boosters, politicians, and the media attempt to influence 
governing boards and university leadership. The 
impact of intercollegiate athletics on university culture 
and values has been damaging, with inappropriate 
behavior of both athletes and coaches, all too frequently 
tolerated and excused. 
In summary, today at Michigan the commercial 
culture of the entertainment industry that characterizes 
college football and basketball is not only orthogonal 
to academic values, but it is corrosive and corruptive 
to the academic enterprise. It is clearly damaging to the 
institution, its students, its reputation, and its integrity. 
Community
We have noted earlier the increasing degree to which 
the University of Michigan has become “an engine of 
inequality” as it enrolled an increasing number of high 
income out-of-state students while the enrollment of 
students from low-income backgrounds dropped to 
among the lowest level of any public university. But 
this is only one of many signs of the degree to which 
the University is not only increasingly dependent upon 
but also shifting its focus to serving the wealthy. As bit 
by bit the University has been selling its resources to 
the highest bidder (e.g., student enrollments, the names 
of programs and places, access to athletic and cultural 
events, etc). Faculty, staff, and indeed many students are 
beginning to feel no longer welcome or even tolerated 
by the armies of new staff now determined to redefine 
and market the “brand” of the university. 
This bias increasingly toward serving the wealthy 
has also influenced University staff policies. As 
noted earlier there has been an extraordinary growth 
in both staffing of the central administration and 
compensation provided to senior administrators at 
a time when faculty and staff compensation has been 
relatively stagnant. Through the use of hidden devices 
such as one-time bonuses, deferred compensation, 
or incentive awards, the compensation of executives 
in the central administration and selected deans and 
directors is now considerably above that of most 
other public universities and challenging some of the 
leading private universities. While such executive 
compensation is usually argued as driven by market 
considerations both by leadership and compensation 
consultants, it m,ust be kept in mind that nonprofit 
organizations such as universities should not be 
driven by corporate models. Furthermore, unlike the 
compensation of corporate executives, which require a 
rigorous incentive compensation policy consistent with 
accounting practices and public disclosure, university 
compensation is all too often determined by ad hoc 
decisions made by senior administrators rather than 
adhering to rigorous, public salary structures.
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Political Challenges
Yet today universities are trapped by a converging 
political agenda at every level with multiple, not 
always compatible goals: to limit educational costs, 
even at the expense of quality; to make education ever 
more widely available; to draw back from the national 
commitment to research support, at least in the forms 
and amounts we have depended on since World War II; 
and to accelerate institutional transformation through 
application of information technology.
Running counter to these goals are a few troublesome 
trends already affecting our universities. Public funding 
for higher education has been declining in a climate 
where education is seen increasingly as a personal 
economic benefit rather than as a public good in and of 
itself. Long-standing policies such as affirmative action, 
which represented earlier commitments to equity and 
social justice, are now being challenged by governing 
bodies, in the courts, and through public referenda. 
The allocation of research funding is increasingly 
driven by those with great skepticism (or fear) of 
scientific reasoning, particularly in areas such as the 
social sciences. Our curriculum is deformed by the 
competitiveness and vocational demands of students 
whose debt load impels them toward excessive 
careerism, even as other voices call for a return to an 
idealized “classical” curriculum based on the great 
works of Western civilization.
Of particular concern is the intrusion of political 
forces in nearly every aspect of university governance 
and mission. State and federal government seek 
to regulate admissions decisions and financial aid. 
There are egregious examples of political or judicial 
intrusion in the research process itself, for example, 
Star Chamber hearings before government bodies 
investigating scholarly research integrity or the 
expenditure of research funds. We are only beginning 
to feel the crippling effects of open-meetings 
requirements on the conduct of business and on hiring. 
Today higher education is over regulated, and the 
costs of accountability are excessive both in dollars 
and in administrative burden. Governance of public 
institutions is too often in the hands of people selected 
for partisan political reasons rather than for their 
understanding and support of higher education. Most 
distressing, there is an increasing tendency by ambitious 
politicians to use the university as a whipping boy for 
personal political gain. These trends, symptomatic of 
the erosion of public confidence in universities, parallel 
the loss of trust in our institutions across the board.
Not that we in universities are blameless. We 
too often have been reactive rather than proactive 
in responding to demands from students, faculty, 
government, politicians, patrons, ideologues, 
and demagogues who distort or undermine our 
fundamental values and purposes. Academic structures 
are too rigid to accommodate the realities of our rapidly 
expanding and interconnected base of knowledge and 
practice. Higher education as a whole has been divided 
and competitive at times when we need to speak with 
a single unequivocal voice. Our entrenched interests 
University faculty, staff, and students are being priced out of community events.
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block the path to innovation and creativity. Perhaps, 
most dismaying, we have yet to come forth with a 
convincing case for ourselves, a vision for our future, 
and an effective strategy for achieving it.
Hence the University of Michigan should be 
challenged to should be to re-engage with its many 
publics–the people of Michigan, the nation, indeed, 
the world–to convince them of the importance of 
investing in higher education to provide its two great 
services, education and scholarship, “light and truth” 
or lux et veritas, to all who need and seek them. This 
must become a primary responsibility of not only the 
leadership of the University, but its Regents, faculty, 
students, staff, alumni, and those citizens who depend 
so heavily on the services provided by one of the great 
universities of the world.
Lingering Questions
During the past half century the University has 
continued to demonstrate significant pathfinding 
leadership, e.g., building the nation’s leading 
programs in the quantitative social sciences, building 
and managing the Internet, pioneering the early 
development of genetic medicine, creating the world’s 
largest digital libraries (JSTOR and the HathiTrust) 
and becoming a leader in the peaceful appplications of 
atomic energy.  The challenge today is how to sustain 
such pathfinding efforts in the century ahead.
From this brief review of the current status and the 
challenges facing the University of Michigan, a number 
of more general questions have arisen that should be 
considered by both the University’s leadership and 
governance: 
Question l: What is the fundamental role of the 
university in modern society? What are its core values 
to society? If the issue is to get back to fundamentals, to 
reorganize the institution according to our basic values, 
then how and where do we begin?
Question 2: How does one preserve the public 
character of an increasingly privately financed 
university? How does a “state-related” or “hybrid 
state-national-global” university adequately represent 
the varied interests of its majority shareholders (e.g., 
students, parents, patients, federal agencies, private 
donors)? Can one sustain an institution the size and 
breadth of the University of Michigan on self-generated 
revenues (e.g., tuition, federal grants and contracts, 
private gifts, auxiliary revenues) alone?
Question 3: Should our balance of missions shift 
among teaching, research, and service? Among 
undergraduate, graduate, and professional education? 
Among service to state, nation, and world?
Question 4: What is the proper balance between 
disciplinary and interdisciplinary activity? How can 
we encourage more people to work in truly innovative 
areas without unduly jeopardizing their academic 
careers? How can we stimulate a greater risk-taking 
intellectual culture in which people are encouraged to 
take bold initiatives? 
Question 5: We have an unparalleled opportunity 
to shape the academy for the future through this 
generation of graduate students. How should we meet 
this responsibility? Is the Ph.D. degree the appropriate 
training for the broadly educated, change-tolerant 
faculty needed by today’s universities? 
Question 6: As Michigan enters its third century, it 
will be facing a major number of faculty retirements, 
thereby providing the opportunity to attract bright 
young faculty to the University. How should we select 
new faculty for brilliance and creativity? Do our present 
traditions and practices in faculty selection allow us to 
select genius? How do we assess and enhance teaching 
ability? How do we evaluate and reward service 
activities? Indeed, what is the appropriate form of 
service in the research university?
Question 7: How do we enable the University to 
flourish during a period of very rapid change?
Question 8: How do we best protect the University’s 
capacity to control its own destiny? 
Provocative questions, indeed. And both challenging 
and appropriate for today if we are to prepare for 
tomorrow.
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Yesterday
UM Values
 Excellence
 Leadership
 Critical Inquiry
 Liberal Learning
 Diversity
 Innovation
 Excitement
 Spirit
Characteristics
 Leaders and Best
 Control of its destiny (constitutional autonomy)
 Freedom and responsibility
 Broad and Liberal Spirit
 Critical inquiry and learning
 Diverse in character, united in spirit
 Uncommon education for the common man
 Critic and servant of society
 Relish for innovation and excitement
 Pathnder, Trailblazer, Pioneer
Today
Publically committed?
Privately supported?
State governed (lay, politically governed)
Nationally supported
Decentralized, distributed leadership
Misunderstood (from within, from without)
Ponderous, risk adverse
Distracted (lost in forest for the trees)
Trapped in sinking state
Large, larger, largest in the land
 Campus
 Budget
 Michigan Stadium 
 Medical Center
Trajectories
 UG up
 Out-of-state up
 Rich students up
 Research volume up
 Graduate education down
 Tenure-track faculty declining
 Part-time faculty up
Priorities
 Academic programs benign neglect
 Quantity up
 Quality down
 Auxiliaries up
  Medical Center up
  Housing up
  Athletics way up
 Resources
  State ignored
  Federal leveraged
  Donors up (but inadequate)
  Investments stable
A summary of assessments of the University of Michigan expressed in faculty workshops held in 2011-2012.
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Appendices to Chapter 21
A Summary of UM Concerns
UM Appears to be doing just fine…
UM appears to be enjoying a period of relative 
peace, prosperity, and growth. 
Lots of new buildings North Quad, Law School, 
Ross School, Munger Hall, Pediatrics Hospital, 
Athletics
Completed a $3.2 B campaign and launching a $4 
B effort
Leading the nation with $1.32 B in research funding
New revenue plus cost control plus AAa ratings
(Not all good news: lost to Ohio State 12 out of 
last 14 games and Michigan State 6 out of last 7 
games…)
But is UM whistling through graveyard?
Unsustainability of its traditional sources of finan-
cial support 
Increasing competition for the best students and 
faculty
Mission creep in auxiliaries that dilutes the priority 
given to the academic core of the university
Are we ignoring serious issues and concerns that 
could threaten our most fundamental goals of 
quality, public purpose, leadership, and even our 
institutional saga as a pathfinder for American 
higher education? 
Cracks are beginning to appear in our façade of con-
fidence. 
Threats to student quality
Common Application Online process creates a false 
sense of student demand
Student selectivity: Instate: 60%; Outstate: 40%
Student yield: Instate: 70%; Outstate: 25%
It is clear that Michigan is still a “safety” school for 
out-of-state students.
Many out-of-state students come from very affluent 
families and are “paying for the party” rather 
than a rigorous education
Sharp drop in low-income and underrepresented 
minority students
Threats to faculty quality
Heavy instructional loads and weaker salaries have 
caused both attrition and hiring problems.
Michigan is winning only 50% of the battles to keep 
key faculty from being raided
Losses over past 7 years: 55 to Harvard, 54 to 
UCBerkeley, 46 to Stanford, 46 to Chicago, 37 to 
UTexas, 25 to Columbia…AND 23 to Ohio State!
Of particular concern is the loss of over 600 junior 
faculty over the past decade, many just after 
achieving tenure at Michigan.
Threats to public purpose
Founded to provide “an uncommon education for 
the common man”, many flagship universities 
have drifted away from their historic mission 
(Haycock’s Engines of Inequality)
Pell Grant percentage: 11% (22% pub U average)
First generation college students: 6% (down from 
14%)
Underrepresented minorities: 10% (pub U 25% av-
erage)
African American enrollments: 4.3% (down from 
9.4% in 1996)
Problems of scale
Enrollments are up 10,000 students (25%) over the 
past two decades! 
Good news: tuition revenue up by $400 M/y, rough-
ly comparable to state support. 
Bad News: so are teaching loads, student misbehav-
ior, and student high-rise slums (e.g., wealthy 
students “Paying for the Party”)
Fund raising is up! Well…kind of…since annual 
giving, campaign yields, and endowment are 
really just extrapolations of activity during the 
1990s, but with five times the number of staff 
(500 in development, 600 in communications)
UM is also being pressured to accept and partially 
fund projects of low priority, e.g., Munger Hall, 
“The Walk of Champions”
And the deans and chairs are now spending much 
of their time on the road begging for dollars rath-
er than providing academic leadership
Research is up!
Michigan is still the leader in research dollars.
However we are also the leaders in how much we 
are spending from institutional funds (e.g., $380 
M out of $1.32 B, or 30% of our research activity, 
compared to 20% for most universities).
Note that much of this subsidy comes from student 
tuition and patient fees.
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Other problems with scale
Increasing concerns that we may not have the man-
agement talent to handle such a gigantic en-
terprise… (e.g., shared services, IT rationaliza-
tion…)
We may also not understand the risk of launching 
larger and larger projects (e.g., Mott Pediatrics 
Hospital ($760 M) , Michigan Wolverines, Inc. 
($152 M/y),
Remember, we have a dramatic nearby examples of 
the dangers of scale: General Motors and Chrys-
ler…
Past decade of campus evolution
New academic buildings: Weill Hall, Ross Hall, 
Law School, LS&A Bioscience Building.
New/Renovated auxiliary buildings: Pediatrics 
Hospital, Cardiovascular Hospital, Hill Dorms, 
North Quad, East Quad, South Quad, West 
Quad, Munger Hall, Michigan Stadium, Crisler 
Arena, …
NOTE: Most capital expansion has been in auxil-
iaries (hospitals, housing, athletics). Relatively 
little has been invested in academic facilities.
Culture
What has happened to Michigan’s “public pur-
pose”, its “uncommon education for the com-
mon man”?
The University has been selling it to the highest bid-
der!!!
Students who can afford $60,000 per year…
Spectators who can pay on the average $230 per 
game to sit in Michigan Stadium, and students 
who can afford $50 per game
Donors who can buy almost anything they desire 
(including a monstrous dormitory with 7-stu-
dent “suites”, few windows, and no parking)
And perhaps a reputation that took two centuries 
to build!
A summary of the past two decades
Collapse of state with little change of near-term re-
covery
Unconstrained UM growth threatening academic 
mission
Driven by auxiliary activities and whims
Inability to focus on academic priorities
Possible erosion of quality and public purpose
Managing and reacting rather than visioning and 
leading
The University of Michigan Today
Publicly committed, yet privately supported
State governed, yet nationally supported
Priorities: UG up, Grad down; sponsored research 
up (albeit with University subsidy way up)
Academic reputation (and faculty quality) up? 
down?
Big, bigger, biggest: budget, campus, stadium
Leadership: decentralized, reactive, or strategic
Who is shaping UM’s future? Faculty? EOs? Re-
gents? Donors?
Is UM climbing, cruising in level flight, or on a 
downward glide path?
Major faculty concerns 1
Lack of priority for academic core
Imbalance in priorities (academics vs. auxiliaries)
Erosion of quality (preoccupation with growth, mis-
sion creep)
UM’s public purpose in jeopardy
“Common man” has been replaced by “uncommon-
ly rich man”
Diversity is dropping rapidly
Unsustainable financial models
Trapped in a sinking state (for at least a generation)
Major faculty concerns 2
Campus culture: complacent, detached, malaise?
Where is the excitement? The creativity? The inno-
vation?
Where is the vision? The strategy? The strategic in-
tent?
Are we drifting away from our heritage?
 Uncommon education for the common man?
 Leaders and best?
 Broad and liberal spirit?
 Pathfinder and trailblazer?
 UM’s ability to change the world?
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Vulnerabilities
Financial sustainability
Out-of-state tuition is approaching a ceiling (e.g., at 
Ivy League levels); instate tuition is still limited 
by Regents
States continue to be under pressure for health care, 
corrections, retirement, and tax relief
Federal research support has been eroding (and the 
costs of research increasing)
Endowments track with equity markets…up AND 
down
Competition for gifts is becoming more aggressive
Health care revenues will be affected by Obamacare
Intensifying competitive forces
An intensely Darwinian winner-take-all ecosystem 
in which the strongest and wealthiest institutions 
become predators, raiding the best faculty and 
students of the less generously supported and 
more constrained public universities and manip-
ulating federal research and financial policies to 
sustain a system in which the rich get richer and 
the poor get devoured.
Over the next decade, Harvard’s endowment will 
grow to almost $100 B and Stanford to $50 B. 
(Michigan’s will be at $20 B)
Cultural changes with scale
UM --> MSU, OSU, UT,…???
Auxiliaries increasingly dominate academics
Management increasingly dominates faculty
Leadership (EOs, Deans, Chairs) increasingly dis-
tracted by fund-raising
Technology increasingly dominates campuses 
(MOOCs, connected learning, cognitive tutors, 
fiber to the forehead)
Intercollegiate athletics increasing dominates both 
university values and academic integrity (as well 
as common sense…)
Public Purpose
The current size, financial model, leadership, and 
governance of the University is incompatible 
with its public purpose.
Without the restoration of some level of public sup-
port and the commitment of governance and 
leadership, there is simply no way that the Uni-
versity can achieve an acceptable level of par-
ticipation by low-income and underrepresented 
minority students.
We will become increasingly a university for the 
rich…
Academic priorities
The past decade has seen an increasing dominance 
by auxiliary activities over academic programs, 
driven both by the revenues available to these 
enterprises and by exceptionally aggressive 
leadership.
The voice of the faculty has been weak, particularly 
at the level of University governance.
The concept of a dean-driven institution has largely 
been weakened by both inadequate authority 
and the distraction of deans by fund-raising de-
mands.
Disconnection with UM’s saga
From time to time the University of Michigan has 
become disconnected from its history as “leader 
and best”, a pathfinder for higher education.
During the 1960s, activism and protest destroyed 
much of the awareness, leading to a “lost de-
cade” of the 1970s, when little of note happened, 
other than keeping the campus stable.
Fortunately, the 1980s and 190s administration was 
populated with long-time Michigan faculty and 
staff who not only understood the importance of 
Michigan’s historical roles but were determined 
to restore it.
In recent years this tradition of continuity has been 
seriously weakened.
The recent effort to replace much of the University 
leadership team (EOs, Deans, key administra-
tors) with the recruiting of an increasing number 
of outsiders into key university positions threat-
ens the University once again with the loss of 
connection to its history.
In a very real sense, this could well become another 
lost decade, as we abandon our heritage as both 
a pathfinder and leader.
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University of Michigan SWOT Analysis
As a final consideration, we have reassembled the 
various challenges, responsibilities, and opportuni-
ties facing the University of Michigan today into a 
Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats 
analysis contained in an appendix to this chapter.
Strengths
Quality
Intellectual breadth and comprehensiveness
Scale
Spirit
Risk-tolerance
Loosely coupled, adaptive, entrepreneurial system
Constitutional autonomy
Decentralization
Pathfinder saga
Weaknesses
Public support
Public governance
Faculty governance (U wide)
Obsolete (unsustainable) financial models
Obsolete public policies (state, federal)
Mission creep
Unconstrained growth of auxiliaries threatening 
 academic priorities
Erosion of
 Public Purpose (“common man”)
 Public Character (enrollment, athletics, etc.)
 Community activities
 Student activism
 Academic effort, “paying for the party”
 Racial diversity
 First generation college students
Inadequate capacity for strategic change and 
 transformation
Opportunities
Need for UM’s leadership as pathfinder
Rebalance competition and cooperation
Redefine core mission
Explore new paradigms
Leadership in key areas of vision
 Open Learning 
 Connectivity
 Open Knowledge
 Renaissance Campus
Threats
Warning Signs
 Quality
 Erosion of public purpose
 Unbridled (non-strategic) growth
 Financial challenges
 Priorities 
   Cloud > core 
   Auxiliary > academic;
 Campus evolution
Trapped in a sinking state next to a sinking city
Political hostility, intrusion, manipulation
Public perception 
Aggressiveness of auxiliaries (particularly 
 Athletics, UMMC, Housing)
Loss of influence of the deans
Opportunistic rather than strategic growth
Disruptive technologies
Public/political awareness
Taken over by PR and marketing; promoting
 myth over reality
What does the SWOT analysis suggest? 
Smaller but better?
Restructuring governance, management, leadership
Moving to a federalist model
 Regents --> senate
 Faculty --> house
 EOs --> executive branch
 Deans --> governors
Note: This would require a new constitution!
A summary of the past two decades
Collapse of state with little change of near-term 
 recovery
Unconstrained UM growth threatening 
 academic mission
Driven by auxiliary activities and whims
Inability to focus on academic priorities
Possible erosion of quality and public purpose
Managing and reacting rather than visioning 
 and leading
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Chapter 22
The Road Ahead
In considering how the University of Michigan 
has evolved over the past half-century, the events that 
have occurred, the actions that have been taken, and 
the challenges that remain today, a number of possible 
options for the future have become apparent. In this 
chapter we pull these ideas together for each of the 
topics considered earlier to suggest a possible roadmap 
to the University of Michigan’s future.
Growth
It is critical that the University develop a more 
strategic approach to growth. One of the problems with 
a loosely coupled adaptive ecosystem is how to control 
growth, e.g., to prevent explosive growth in some 
components at the expense of others or even the entire 
organism. A key is communication among components 
and across the institution. When such communication 
is artificially limited or distorted (whether intentional 
or not), instabilities can set in.
Hence it is important to use a multiplicity of 
networks both to monitor growth and subject it to 
assessments of its relationship to University priorities 
such as quality, financial sustainability, and impact. 
Bigger is not always better!
Here an excellent example is enrollment growth. 
Although this allows the University to serve more 
students, the dramatic growth over the past two 
decades (over 10,000 students) was clearly driven 
not by a desire to broaden the University’s impact 
but rather to increase tuition revenue to compensate, 
in part, for the loss of state support. However in the 
process enrollment growth has clearly overloaded 
both faculty and facilities resources, shifting much of 
instruction to the use of part-time or non-tenure-track 
faculty and driving the priorities for capital facilities. 
It has also driven a major private construction boom 
of high-cost apartment complexes designed for the 
expanding student population. 
Hence any strategy for enrollment growth must 
take into account the impact on faculty, staff, facilities, 
campus infrastructucture, and the city of Ann Arbor, 
itself, in addition to priorities such as quality and 
mission. The desire for additional tuition revenue 
through enrollment growth should also consider other 
options such as year-round operation, distance learning, 
and other forms of Internet-based academic services 
such as collaboratories and virtual organizations.
Quality
The quality of the University of Michigan academic 
programs is the most fundamental determinant of its 
ability to develop and maintain leadership. However, 
a comprehensive and diverse array of intellectual, 
social, and cultural experiences is also important for 
its leadership role in higher education. The scale of 
our programs not only contributes to the richness and 
quality of the University (e.g., the size and quality of 
central resources such as libraries, computing networks, 
and athletic facilities), but it also determines its potential 
The importance of controlling growth
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impact on society. Rather than viewing the quality, 
breadth, and scale of the University as competing 
objectives–or possibly even as constraints on what it can 
accomplish within a world of limited resources–instead 
these characteristics, when linked together creatively, 
can provide an unusual opportunity. 
Michigan’s character as leader through its 
pathfinding and trailblazing requires it to build “spires 
of excellence” in key fields, rather than trying to settle 
for a uniform level of simply good quality across all 
of its activities. Only by attempting to be the very best 
in these fields can we develop in our students, faculty, 
and staff the necessary intensity and commitment to 
excellence. Furthermore, only by competing with the 
best can it establish appropriate levels of expectation 
and achievement.
The theme of pathfinding leadership influences 
the focus of emphasis within Michigan’s traditional 
endeavors of education, scholarship, and service. On 
the one hand, the strength of its professional schools 
and the strong research and scholarly orientation of our 
faculties should not be compromised. On the other hand, 
the University needs to generate a fresh commitment 
to cultivating a spirit of liberal learning among its 
undergraduates and its faculties, to encourage major 
efforts to improve the quality of teaching and learning.
In order to develop leaders among its faculties, at 
least some fraction of its scholarship needs to be shifted 
to venturesome intellectual activities at the cutting edge 
of inquiry. Faculty members should also be encouraged 
to work in seminal, cross-disciplinary areas where 
extraordinary insight and intellectual breadth can lead 
to the creation of entirely new fields of knowledge.
The development of leaders among students 
demands challenging intellectual experiences, both 
in formal instruction and in the extracurricular 
environment. Key in these endeavors is the importance 
of a liberal education. Today’s students will enter 
an increasingly complex, changing, and fragmented 
world. Too many undergraduates channel their 
energies into pre-professional and more narrowly 
vocational directions. The challenge is to cultivate 
among undergraduates a greater willingness to explore 
and to discover–to assist undergraduates to develop 
critical, disciplined, and inquiring minds.
Finally we must again stress the importance of 
understanding the history of the University, the nature 
of our past achievements of academic quality and 
leadership, and our unique institutional culture. The 
University’s unusual combination of quality, breadth, 
scale, and spirit not only allow it, but actually compel it 
to provide leadership for higher education through risk 
taking, path finding, and trail blazing. To this leadership 
character, one must add the importance of recognizing 
that the true source of Michigan’s excellence and 
leadership rests with the quality, spirit, and innovation 
of its people–its faculty, students, and staff–and 
decidedly not with its administrative leadership or 
governance. It thrives as a loosely coupled, adaptive 
organization, drawing its strength, innovation, and 
vision from the grass roots, from the faculty, students, 
and staff who embrace deep commitments to academic 
priorities.
One of UM’s true spires of excellence for 50 years!
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While ingrained in the culture of the institution 
and shaping the perspective and achievements of 
its people, such a high degree of decentralization of 
authority can be a threatening characteristic to those 
new to the University–particularly to those recruited 
into leadership positions as deans or executive officers 
or elected to serve on the University’s Board of Regents. 
Hence the challenge is both to make certain that the 
selection of University leadership at all levels is balanced 
among insiders both knowledgeable and committed to 
the unique history and culture of the University, and 
those recruited from outside into leadership positions 
adequately informed and committed to sustaining this 
culture and its academic priorities.
Balance (Academics vs. Auxiliaries)
Careful consideration should be given to strategic 
issues of institutional balance and priorities. While the 
relative scale of different academic programs such as 
schools and colleges is an important issue for University 
leadership and governance, perhaps even more so is 
the balance among academic and auxiliary activities. 
For example, auxiliary activities such as clinical 
services, student housing, and intercollegiate athletics 
have increased in scale (by any measure–financial, 
personnel, visibility) at a rate considerably faster than 
that characterizing the core academic activities of the 
University. While such auxiliary activities certainly are 
responding to demand, they also have been benefiting 
from lucrative markets that are relatively price 
insensitive, thereby fueling substantial growth.
To this end, the University needs to address in a 
more strategic fashion whether it is appropriate for 
an academic institution to be responsible for a health 
system that has already become comparable in size to 
the academic institution itself (e.g., $3.0 billion/year 
compared to $3.4 billion/year) or an intercollegiate 
athletic program that has clearly evolved into a $150 
million/year commercial enterprise rather than a 
student activity. Perhaps the time is approaching 
for a serious consideration of exploring a different 
organizational structures (e.g., a holding company 
of relatively autonomous financial and management 
units) to govern and manage such rapidly growing 
auxiliary enterprises so different in character from the 
academic core of the University. 
More generally, how does one sustain the quality 
and leadership of academic programs in an unusually 
large and complex institution such as the University 
of Michigan that is continually challenged to balance 
rapidly changing challenges, responsibilities, and 
opportunities? For example, highly selective private 
institutions sometimes sacrifice breadth and size in 
an effort to achieve absolute excellence in a small 
number of fields. This results in institutions highly 
focused in an intellectual sense, which while certainly 
capable of conducting very distinguished academic 
programs, are nevertheless unable to provide the 
rich array of opportunities and diverse experiences 
of “multiversities” such as Michigan. At the other 
end of the spectrum, the University can also set itself 
apart from many other large, comprehensive public 
universities by the degree to which it chooses to focus 
its resources on academic quality. 
Students
It is important to achieve the proper balance among 
undergraduate, graduate, and professional student 
The University as a fragile organization balanced between the university hospital and football stadium
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enrollments that characterizes the world’s leading 
research universities. Over the past 15 years enrollments 
have grown 25% to almost 44,000. However essentially 
all of this growth has been at the undergraduate 
level, while graduate and professional enrollment has 
stayed relatively constant. This major shift in student 
composition deserves serious strategic attention, since 
it has strained the faculty and facilities resources that 
support our graduate and professional programs.
The emphasis on attracting more out-of-state 
students capable of paying $60,000 for tuition, room and 
board has generated very substantial new resources, it 
has also shifted somewhat the student culture, away 
from the historic mission of “providing an uncommon 
education for the common man” and, instead, attracting 
more students from wealthy backgrounds, many of 
whom selected Michigan as a “safety school” backup 
to Ivy League applications or have chosen Michigan for 
its extracurricular life (i.e., have come “paying for the 
party”). 
It is important to emphasize here the concern about 
the low enrollments of students from low-income 
backgrounds. Much of Michigan’s impact in the past 
came from students from working class families from 
the state’s farms and factories who saw attending the 
University as a great opportunity to do something 
important with their lives, provided they worked 
hard enough. To serve more of these students, once 
the backbone of its student body, the University must 
restructure its admissions policies, financial aid, and 
outreach.
The University also needs to throttle back its 
reputation as a party school and instead rebrand it 
as an institution determined to demand the student 
academic effort required for leadership roles later in 
life. Although in loco parentis disappeared decades ago, 
the University has learned that it simply cannot ignore 
the behavior of students beyond the classroom. While 
most communities of young people experience the 
challenges of excessive alcohol consumption, drugs, 
and sexual misconduct and assault, large university 
communities are particularly vulnerable to these, 
as evidenced by Michigan’s “leadership” in various 
national polls attempting to rate institutions as “party 
schools” or tragically, “sexual assault and misconduct”. 
While the University has taken major steps toward 
addressing these concerns, the very scale and diversity 
of its many student communities will likely require 
new approaches.
Here particular attention must be given to “Greek 
life” on campus, since the unusually large number of 
students belonging to unregulated fraternities leads to 
a serious issue of adequate controls, as evidenced by the 
frequent instances of serious misbehavior and, indeed, 
even criminal conduct by fraternity members. While 
there is always a danger to the University in exposing 
itself to liability in becoming too engaged with these 
organizations, their damage to the University has been 
and remains today simply too great to ignore. While 
it is unrealistic to ban fraternities entirely as some 
Achieving a better balance between “paying for the party” against student service activities
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institutions have done, the University must reinforce 
demands for appropriate behavior with strong 
penalties for misconduct, both for students as well as 
for the fraternities as organizations.
Furthermore, the University should urge faculty to 
challenge, in turn, our students through demanding 
academic programs. Here a goal might be set of 
demanding that through course assignments, students 
spend a minimum of two hours of effort for every one 
hour of class time, a metric used at leading universities 
through much of the last century. We also need to 
provide more opportunities for student engagement 
with faculty in research, service, and professional 
activities. Here technology might help, since social 
networking has largely decoupled such engagement 
and interactions from space and time constraints.
Finally, on a more positive note, Michigan’s 
long history of student activism, while occasionally 
challenging to the University’s leadership and 
governance, is an activity of great importance because 
of its social impact. Michigan must not only tolerate 
such student activities, including occasional disruption 
of University activities, but actually encourage it and 
remain attentive and responsive to student issues. Here, 
particular concern should be given to maintaining the 
University’s long tradition of “truth and light”, by 
throttling back efforts to manage information flow 
throughout the institution so that bad news is disguised 
and good news is marketed heavily. Students deserve 
the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth 
from the institution responsible for their education.
The role and experiences of graduate and 
professional students also deserves attention. In 
particular, the various concerns of graduate teaching 
assistants and postdoctoral scholars, raised both by 
oncampus organizations and national studies such as 
those conducted by the National Academies, requires 
attention both at Michigan and at the national level. 
The fundamental principle is that these members 
of the University community must be regarded as 
students and future scholars first, and not just simply 
as a cost-effective way to conduct instruction and 
research. Similarly, the nature of professional education 
is changing rapidly in many fields such as the health 
sciences, law, education, and business, and once again, 
Michigan must continue to not only provide leadership 
as these instructional paradigms shift, but also be 
attentive to the demands they place among students.
Faculty
Department chairs and deans spend much of their 
time recruiting new faculty (and persuading their 
best faculty not to leave). However this amount of 
faculty retention and recruiting effort is difficult to 
assess at the University level. To be sure, a provost is 
usually sensitive to the “wins” and “losses” of a school 
or college when evaluating deans, but the broader 
University and its faculty are usually not aware of how 
the institution is doing in this competition for faculty. 
To this end, it might be useful to adopt a practice of 
the 1990s by creating each spring an “Ebb and Flows” 
Respecting student activism and protest against injustice
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chart identifying new faculty hires and losses at the 
department level, including where the gains came from 
and where the losses went. This would be analogous to 
a “business dashboard” exercise in the corporate world.
While the overall strength of the faculty in 
departments and schools is of great importance to the 
University, determining the strength of its teaching and 
research, the visibility of the institution is frequently 
determined by truly exceptional individuals, so-
called “essential singularities”, whose intellectual 
impact is immense. At a large pubic university such as 
Michigan, these exceptional faculty members usually 
are first discovered as young hires, before their work 
has reached the attention of competing institutions. 
However once their work becomes visible, they are 
aggressively recruited by many other institutions, 
particularly leading private institutions such as the Ivy 
League, MIT, or Stanford, who can focus great resources 
to recruit them away from Michigan. 
The University should think very strategically 
about how to provide a supportive environment for 
their unusual brilliance (not the easiest challenge 
in a community of outstanding scholars) and move 
them rapidly through the ranks in an effort to hold 
them to Michigan. At the highest level, the University 
might consider the creation of professorial chairs with 
institution-wide appointments, such as the University 
Professors at the University of California or the Institute 
Professors at MIT. These provide exceptional faculty 
members with appointments in all academic units (and 
campuses in the case of Michigan), funded centrally by 
the institution, so that they have maximum flexibility 
for their research and teaching interests.
The disappearance of mandatory retirement 
age and the vulnerability of defined contribution 
retirement plans in a fluctuating economy have had 
a major impact on faculty retirement planning. While 
financial security certainly influences the retirement 
plans of faculty members, surveys have indicated 
many senior faculty also seek some level of continued 
engagement with their University following retirement, 
since their intellectual, cultural, and social lives have 
been shaped by these institutions. Today faculty 
retirement considerations require more flexibility 
through options such as phased retirement or part-
time appointments. Many universities have developed 
specific policies to encourage the engagement of senior 
faculty in productive roles, such as emeritus-in-service 
appointments providing them with the opportunity 
to continue teaching, research, and service at reduced 
appoint levels.
While the desire to recapture faculty positions for 
new younger faculty from retiring faculty members 
within the current environment of limited funding 
remains a priority for most deans, it is important to 
recognize that many emeritus faculty members remain 
among the University’s most distinguished, dedicated, 
and capable teachers and scholars. Hence the emeritus 
faculty cadre should be viewed as an important asset of 
the University from a strategic viewpoint.
Finally, it is important to understand that the 
national leadership of the University of Michigan is 
due primarily to the national leadership and influence 
achieved by members of its faculty in several areas:
Intellectual Leadership: e.g., stimulating, defining, 
and leading a particular field
Teaching Leadership: e.g., developing new 
pedagogy or reshaping a field through textbooks
Leadership in practice or application of knowledge: 
e.g., leading in a field of practice such as law 
or medicine or building a company through 
technology transfer
Academic leadership: e.g., achieving recognition as 
a department chair, dean, or university president
There are many paths to such leadership 
achievements, e.g., through research and scholarship, 
entrepreneurial activities, pedagogical development 
(e.g., award winning textbooks that dominate a field, 
intellectual leadership (e.g., election to a National 
Academy), and broader academic leadership (as chairs, 
deans, executive officers, and university presidents). 
However all of these paths to consequential leadership 
require not only talent, effort, and persistence, but they 
also require a supportive environment in the University 
and influence beyond its campus. Hence the University 
not only needs to better encourage and recognize the 
national leadership of its faculty members, but it also 
needs to create an environment that supports such 
efforts, identifies and promotes opportunities, and 
remove barriers to such activities beyond the campus. 
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Staff
Throughout the university, whether at the level 
of secretaries, custodians, or groundskeepers or the 
rarified heights of senior administrators for finance, 
hospital operations, or facilities construction and 
management, the quality of the university’s staff, 
coupled with their commitment and dedication, was 
actually just as important as the faculty in making 
Michigan the remarkable institution it has become. In 
some ways, it has been even more so, since unlike many 
faculty members, who view their first responsibilities 
as to their discipline or perhaps their careers, most staff 
members are true professionals, deeply committed to 
the welfare of the university as their highest priority, 
many dedicating their entire careers to the institution. 
Most staff members serve the university far longer 
than the faculty, who tend to be lured away by the 
marketplace.
It is important that the University implement 
employee development programs comparable in scale 
and quality. While it is certainly true that many staff 
members develop unique skills of great value to the 
University, this should not be used as an excuse to 
lock them in place. Instead, they should be provided 
with the opportunity to develop new skills and explore 
new employment roles. The current University policy 
of allowing staff to take courses while employed is 
important to such career advancement.
Although the unique roles of staff throughout such 
a large, diverse, and highly decentralized organization 
should be respected, there needs to be a thorough 
review of salary practices to achieve equity across the 
institution. There have been too many examples of 
inexperienced management providing inappropriate 
compensation through the undisclosed use of bonuses 
and other forms of one-time compensation, particularly 
at the central administration level. While making the 
total compensation of all employees of the University 
openly available for comparison, it is also appropriate 
to implement an ongoing compensation review to 
ascertain inequities that may arise across the university 
for similar staff roles. Furthermore, the University 
should move away from the ad-hoc approaches 
relying on individual management decisions (or higher 
education compensation consultants) and instead adopt 
the more rigorous approach to compensation policies 
demanded by the SEC of Fortune 500 companies by 
developing, in advance, formula-based compensation 
policies and then disclosing.
Financials
Clearly, because of the impact of aging populations 
and the global financial crisis on state and federal 
budgets and hence on support for higher education, the 
nation’s colleges and universities must intensify their 
efforts to increase efficiency and productivity in all of 
their activities. In particular, they should set bold goals 
for reducing the costs of their ongoing activities. While 
universities have many differences from business 
corporations–for example, cost reductions do not 
Giving higher priority to faculty leadership at the national level
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drop to the bottom line of profits–there is likely a very 
considerable opportunity for process restructuring in 
both administrative and academic activities. 
Of course, in the face of deep cuts in state 
appropriations, most public research universities have 
already been engaged in intense cost-cutting efforts, 
particularly in non-academic areas such as financial 
management, procurement, energy conservation, 
competitive bidding of services, and eliminating 
unnecessary regulation and duplication.  But many 
have also chosen to limit employee compensation 
and throttle back staff benefits as a tempting target, 
although this has put at risk their capacity to attract and 
retain outstanding faculty and staff. 
Furthermore, many universities have chosen to 
implement actions recommended by consultants and 
adopted from the corporate world without due regard 
to the unique character of the university environment, 
thereby disrupting the academic mission and damaging 
employee morale.  Rather than distracting Michigan 
with such penny-wise and pound-foolish actions such as 
“shared services” (that will undercut the staff support of 
our teaching and research) or IT “rationalization” (that 
will stifle the innovation and creativity in our academic 
units), while achieving only marginal savings (less than 
1% on the average), we should consider “pound-wise 
and penny-foolish” approaches that would have very 
major impact on the University. 
1. Re-establish the control of the Provost over 
budgets, expenditures, and financial discipline by 
recreating the Committee on Budget Administration 
and the Budget Priorities Committee, both chaired or 
reporting to the Provost.
From 1970 to 2000, the authority as chief budget 
officer of the Provost was sustained by the Executive 
Officers convened as the Committee on Budget 
Administration and chaired by the Provost and by 
the Budget Priorities Committee, a blue-ribbon body 
comprised of faculty, staff, deans, and executive officers 
reporting to the Provost. Note the Provost maintained 
control over all operating and capital expenditures 
through these mechanisms, a control and discipline 
authority that is clearly missing today.
2. Build a network of experienced financial managers 
throughout the University with dotted line reporting 
relationships to the EVPCFO to maintain both reliability 
and consistency in financial controls.
The role of experienced financial managers in 
each of the many academic units is critical since most 
deans and chairs come from the ranks of faculty rather 
inexperienced in such management and financial roles. 
The EVPCFO should not only maintain a network of 
contacts with these managers at the unit level, capable 
of providing assistance or warnings when necessary, 
but should also be involved to some degree in both the 
appointment and evaluation of these staff. As noted, it 
is this informal network of experienced management 
staff in the units linking to the EVPCFO that is the key 
The University must always remember the critical importance of its staff!!!
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to the financial integrity of such a massive and highly 
decentralized institution.
3. The Provost and EVPCFO should implement a 
series of actions to establish greater discipline and cost 
containment.
All capital projects that are either not fully funded 
(for BOTH capital expenditures and operating costs) 
or central to the academic programs of the University 
should be carefully re-evaluated. Similarly, private 
gifts that either do not address significant University 
priorities or entail significant additional expenditures 
should be declined. It is absolutely essential that the 
Executive Officers constrain those activities that convey 
a false impression of the University’s prosperity or 
compete with the academic core for resources. Any 
auxiliary or University-related activities that compete 
directly with academic units for private giving or 
University subsidy should be constrained. Finally, 
the salaries of senior administrators, including the 
President, should be clearly linked to faculty and staff 
salaries rather than simply market-driven (which is 
largely a fictitious rationale for compensating what 
are “public callings” similar to many government 
positions).
4. Moving to year-round operation
It is time that the University seriously considered 
moving to year-round operation at full capacity. One 
can no longer justify the idle use of expensive fixed-
cost capital facilities for instruction or student residence 
during the spring-summer months, particularly since 
these have now been renovated to handle year-round 
operation. Furthermore, since today state support 
provides for only 8% of instructional activities, it is 
no longer necessary for expanding the instructional 
calendar to subsidize the spring-summer months. 
Indeed, with over 50,000 applications for admission 
to the University, there is ample demand capable of 
generating adequate student tuition and fees to support 
year round activity. 
Moving to a three-term year-round calendar would 
provide students additional flexibility in how they 
schedule their instructional program. In fact, students 
entering with advanced placement credits could 
conceivably earn a bachelor’s degree in two years by 
enrolling year-round, thereby providing as well very 
considerable savings in the cost of their education 
(particularly through both living costs and additional 
employment opportunities).
While it is true that many faculty members use the 
spring-summer term for research, the University could 
rely on senior and/or emeritus faculty as the major 
teaching staff for the summer (perhaps negotiating a 
reduced salary). 
5. Tax auxiliary units to support the academic core
The auxiliary units of the University, i.e., hospitals, 
Moving to year-round operation including summersBuilding stronger relations between EOs and Regents
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student housing, intercollegiate athletics, depend 
heavily on the reputation and capacity of the academic 
core of the institution. Furthermore the auxiliaries 
currently operate in a less price sensitive market and 
are less constrained by political issues than tuition (e.g., 
Regents).
Hence it seems perfectly appropriate (albeit 
controversial) to “tax” the expenditures of the auxiliary 
units to help support the academic core. Indeed, such a 
tax on expenditures might provide an additional brake 
on unnecessary spending, such as capital facilities 
expansion.
6. Implement a statewide effort to restore state 
higher education appropriations
During the 1980s and 1990s the University 
successfully led a statewide coalition of public 
universities and their most influential alumni to make 
the case for state support (the so-called “treetops” 
strategy). During the past decade there has been little 
effort to build such a unified approach. It is clearly time 
to repeat the “treetops” strategy of the 1990s to restore 
state appropriations to earlier inflation-adjusted levels. 
(A detailed plan is suggested later in this chapter.)
Facilities
While capital facilities (or bricks and mortar) 
are necessary and important assets for the teaching, 
research, and service activities of a university, they 
also have other characteristics that can pose risks. 
For example, they sometimes have a monumental 
character, symbolizing the history and tradition of an 
institution. Hence they provide an important objective 
for university leaders, from deans to presidents to 
trustees, to build something designed by a “big name 
architect” to symbolize the impact of their leadership. 
In a similar way, many donors have an edifice complex, 
designing to mark the campus with a major facility 
bearing their name. It is perhaps not surprising that 
these other objectives sometimes conflict with the actual 
need for the building or the serious consideration of its 
construction and long-term operating costs.
Here the recommendation is that the University 
should think very carefully about the financial burden it 
is assuming by building an edifice for a donor. It should 
at least demand a gift in excess of 50% of the actual 
construction costs in constant dollars. It might even 
consider seeking an additional endowment to provide 
further support for the operations of the facility.
Name-brand architects are another problem, since 
they are interested in making a statement just as a dean 
or president or governing board is. And the result can be 
an expensive facility that will haunt further leadership 
and governance of the institution for years to come. 
Such commissions should be seriously considered 
and balanced against the costs of using local architect-
engineering services.
Take care to avoid the “edifice complex” and demand full funding of donor-initiated facilities
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Technology
The University of Michigan has been able to 
respond to rapid technological change in the past–and, 
indeed, achieved leadership–because it has functioned 
as a loosely coupled adaptive system with many of 
our academic units given not only the freedom, but 
also the encouragement, to experiment and to try new 
things.  We have intentionally avoided the dangers of 
centralizing these activities.
 To be sure, the tension between centralization 
(commodity technology and “rationalization”) and 
decentralization (where cacophony leads to innovation) 
can be very threatening, particularly to those parts of 
the University that need to make the trains run on time 
(e.g., financial services, hospitals, etc.)  Fortunately, in 
the past, the wisdom of maintaining a loosely coupled 
adaptive system at the academic level finally bubbles 
up to the leadership of the institution, and the IT efforts 
academic units are set free once again.  
It is important not to attempt to standardize 
the campus cyberinfrastructure environment. The 
university in general–and Michigan in particular–is 
one of the most intellectual diverse organizations in the 
world.  In fact, its great strength and contribution to 
society arises from this very unusual diversity in ideas, 
experiences, and people.  Again, this argues for a much 
more organic plan, essentially a diverse ecosystem that 
will continue to mutate and evolve in ways that we 
cannot anticipate. While dependence on commodity 
services, particularly those provided through the 
cloud, can be cost-effective, it can also become highly 
constraining for the creative enterprise characterizing 
research universities. Overdependence on commodity 
products can become debilitating to the academic 
process, particularly to the degree we constrain the 
cyber environments of academic units through policies 
such as purchasing and shared services, that can harm 
the loosely coupled adaptive culture of the university 
that is one of our greatest strengths.  
To be sure, the University has important 
responsibilities that require mission critical computing. 
But it is at the level of academic units rather than the 
enterprise level where innovation and leadership must 
occur.  Why?  Because they are driven by learning and 
discovery, by experimentation, by tolerance for failure, 
and by extraordinarily talented faculty, students, and 
particularly, staff. 
Leadership
The role of leaders in a major public research 
university such as Michigan is complicated by its scale 
and diversity, comparable to that of global corporations 
or government agencies. Today’s university conducts 
many activities, some nonprofit, some publicly 
regulated, and some operating in intensely competitive 
marketplaces. Universities teach students, conduct 
research for various clients, provide health care, engage 
in economic development, stimulate social change, and 
provide mass entertainment (e.g., college sports). Of 
course the university also has higher purposes such as 
preserving our cultural heritage, challenging the norms 
and beliefs of our society, and preparing the educated 
citizens necessary to sustain our democracy. 
Few university leaders are powerful enough to 
change the culture of their institution much less 
its historical saga, since both have evolved over 
generations of students, faculty, staff, and leaders. 
Indeed, institutions such as Michigan tend to shape its 
leadership rather than vice versa, and if leaders fail to 
adjust to its culture, they are usually repelled or at least 
sequestered so they can do little harm.
To be sure, it is important to seek a balance in 
leadership, bringing in leaders from outside for 
new ideas and energy while relying on internal 
appointments to sustain important traditions and 
values. When this balance is distorted, perhaps due to 
complacency with the status quo, or more serious, an 
effort by newcomers, frustrated with the Universilyty’s 
resistance to change, to bring in too many outsiders in 
key roles as deans or executive officers in an effort to 
change the culture of the institutions. Fortunately, the 
decentralized organization of the University is not only 
capable of responding to a changing environment but 
also repelling invasive species that attempt dramatic 
change.
So what balance should be sought? Certainly the 
majority of deans should be chosen from inside, perhaps 
in a ratio of two to one over outsiders. To be sure this is 
difficult in an era in which universities are increasingly 
dependent upon executive search consultants, tempted 
to push their existing stable of external candidates 
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and motivated by compensation indexed to the 
compensation negotiated by selected candidates. At 
the executive officer level, perhaps a balance closer to 
50%-50% seems best, balancing internal and external 
experiences.
It is important in these days of increasing public 
concerns about the costs of higher education, that the 
role of the university president be clearly defined as 
one of public service rather than corporate leadership 
and compensated accordingly. Leading an academic 
institution should be characterized as a duty similar to 
those of other public leadership roles such as mayors, 
governors, and, indeed, United States presidents. It is a 
high calling to service, and to allow aggressive search 
consultants, ambitious candidates, or inexperienced 
boards to suggest otherwise in determining excessive 
compensation puts American higher education at 
considerable risk. Instead presidential and executive 
compensation should be closely linked to faculty 
salaries. (And, of coursre, the same can be recommended 
for coaches and athletic directors...)
Finally it is very important to view leadership 
development as a strategic issue for the University. 
Every effort should be made to encourage and support 
such activities, providing opportunities for further 
leadership experiences, albeit with strong evaluation 
of leadership ability. Interestingly enough, since such 
leadership usually requires not only time and effort, but 
also sacrificing one’s scholarly activity, such willingness 
to participate in faculty service should be recognized as 
a sign of possible leadership interest.
Governance
The contemporary university has many activities, 
many responsibilities, many constituencies, and 
many overlapping lines of authority, and from this 
perspective, shared governance models still have much 
to recommend them: a tradition of public oversight 
and trusteeship, shared collegial internal governance 
of academic matters, and, experienced administrative 
leadership. But it also seems clear that the university 
of the twenty-first century will require new forms of 
governance and leadership capable of responding to 
the changing needs and emerging challenges of our 
society and its educational institutions. Governing 
board members should be selected for their expertise 
and commitment and then held accountable for their 
performance and the welfare of their institutions. 
Faculty governance should focus on those issues of 
most direct concern to academic programs, and faculty 
members should be held accountable for their decisions. 
Our institutions must not only develop a tolerance for 
strong presidential leadership; they should demand it.
As the contemporary university becomes more 
complex and accountable, it may even be time to set 
aside the quaint American practice of governing 
universities with boards comprised of lay citizens, 
with their limited expertise and all too frequently 
political character, and instead shift to true boards of 
directors similar to those used in the private sector. 
Although it may sound strange in these times of 
scandal and corruption in corporate management, 
The importance of building a close relationship between Deans and Regents
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there is increasing evidence today that university 
governing boards should function with a structure and 
a process that reflects the best practices of corporate 
boards. Corporate board members are selected for their 
particular expertise in areas such as business practices, 
finance, or legal matters. They are held accountable to 
the shareholders for the performance of the corporation. 
Their performance is reviewed at regular intervals, 
both within the board itself and through more external 
measures such as company financial performance. 
Clearly, directors can be removed either through action 
of the board or shareholder vote. Furthermore, they can 
be held legally and financially liable for the quality of 
their decisions–a far cry from the limited accountability 
of the members of most governing boards for public 
universities.
The key to effective faculty governance is to provide 
faculty bodies with true executive powers rather 
than merely advisory authority, thereby earning the 
active participation of the university’s leading faculty 
members. Advisory bodies, paid only lip service by the 
administration or the board of trustees, rarely attract 
the attention or the participation of those faculty most 
actively engaged in scholarship and teaching. The 
faculty should become a true participant in the academic 
decision process rather than simply a watchdog on the 
administration or defenders of the status quo. Faculty 
governance should focus on those issues of most direct 
concern to academic programs, and faculty members 
should be held accountable for their decisions. Faculties 
also need to accept and acknowledge that strong 
leadership, whether from chairs, deans, or presidents, is 
important if their institution is to flourish, particularly 
during a time of rapid social change.
Because of the unusual nature of faculty governance 
at Michigan, vested in both university-wide structures 
such as the Senate Assembly and school and department 
level executive committees, some specific suggestions 
are appropriate for our University. First it is essential 
that the voice of the faculty on both academic and 
institutional matters be strengthened by restoring 
the executive powers of school and college executive 
committees.To this end, it is important that newly 
appointed deans understand both the bylaws and 
past practices that have granted and recognized the 
executive powers characterizing these bodies.
Consideration should also be given to strengthening 
the Senate Assembly and the Senate Advisory 
Committee on University Affairs, both by providing 
some degree of executive authority and perhaps a new 
structure capable of attracting the engagement of the 
University’s most distinguished faculty members into 
service on these bodies. One possiblity would be to 
move to a bicameral organization comprised of both 
elected faculty members from general ranks (“the 
house”) and a “senate” of appointed senior faculty with 
endowed or honorific chairs.
More generally, it is appropriate to question 
whether the key participants in shared governance–
the lay governing board, elected faculty governance, 
and academic administrators–have the expertise, 
the discipline, and the authority, not to mention the 
accountability, necessary to cope with the powerful 
social, economic, and technological forces driving 
change in our society and its institutions. More 
specifically, is it realistic to expect that the shared 
governance mechanisms developed decades (or, 
in some cases, centuries) ago can serve well the 
contemporary university or the society dependent upon 
its activities? Can boards comprised of lay citizens, 
with little knowledge either of academic matters or the 
complex financial, management, and legal affairs of the 
university be expected to provide competent oversight 
for the large, complex institutions characterizing 
American higher education? What is the appropriate 
role for the faculty in university governance, and is this 
adequately addressed by the current determination 
and conduct of faculty governing bodies? Can 
academics with limited experience in management 
serve as competent administrators (deans, provosts, 
presidents)? And, finally (and most speculatively), 
what works, what does not, and what to do about it?
The complexity of the contemporary university and 
the forces acting upon it have outstripped the ability 
of the current shared governance system of lay boards, 
elected faculty bodies, and academic administrators 
to govern, lead, and manage. It is simply unrealistic 
to expect that the governance mechanisms developed 
decades or even centuries ago are appropriate for the 
contemporary university. To blind ourselves to these 
realities is to perpetuate a disservice to those whom we 
serve, both present and future generations.
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Organization and Management
While the decentralization of authority and 
accountability throughout the University was radical 
when introduced in the 1980s and 1990s in response to 
the decline in centrally obtained resources such as state 
support, it aligned well with the increasing complexity 
and scale of the University that evolved beyond 
centralized control. The trail-blazer character of the 
Michigan saga demands a risk-tolerant environment 
in which initiatives are encouraged at all levels among 
students, faculty, and staff. For example, the university 
intentionally distributes resources among a number of 
pots, so that entrepreneurial faculty with good ideas 
rarely have to accept “no” as an answer but instead can 
simply turn to another potential source of support.
Hence, the message that today should be provided 
to all new leadership recruited from outside is that 
“Michigan exists today and must remain highly 
decentralized in authority, and its evolution must be 
driven by the talent, achievements, and goals of faculty, 
students, and staff at the grass-roots level. Don’t attempt 
to challenge this. Learn how to live with it!”
From this discussion, it should be apparent that a 
top-down leadership style is quite incompatible with 
the Michigan culture. Those presidents who have 
chosen to ignore this reality or attempted to reign in 
this distributed power, to tame the Michigan anarchy, 
have inevitably failed, suffering a short tenure with 
inconsequential impact. Not to suggest that Michigan 
will tolerate a weak president. Presidents unable 
to adapt to the Michigan trailblazing saga, who are 
hesitant to push all the chips into the center of the 
table on a major initiative or incapable of keeping pace 
with the high energy level of the campus, will soon be 
rejected–or at least ignored–by the faculty. Michigan 
embraces bold visions, and without these, effective 
leadership is simply impossible.
Yet, as the influence of powerful forces such as 
the changing needs of society, globalization, and 
technology reshape the activities of the university, one 
can expect its organization and structure to continue 
to evolve, albeit while preserving its decentralized 
character. Many research universities are already 
evolving into so-called “core in cloud” organizations 
in which academic departments or schools conducting 
elite education and basic research, are surrounded 
by a constellation of quasi-academic organizations—
research institutes, think tanks, corporate R&D 
centers—that draw intellectual strength from the core 
university and provide important financial, human, and 
physical resources in return. Such a structure reflects 
the blurring of basic and applied research, education 
and training, the university and broader society. 
Missions
Education
  Today the university is caught between the 
contradictory forces of responding to more pragmatic 
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goals of students and employers while providing the 
liberal education that provides a student with the 
broader skills important for good citizenship and 
a meaningful life. Furthermore, in a world of ever-
changing needs, one objective of an undergraduate 
education certainly must be to prepare a student for a 
lifetime of learning. The old saying that the purpose of 
a college education is not to prepare a student for their 
first job but rather their last job still has a ring of truth.
     Today’s college graduates will face a future in which 
perpetual education will become a lifetime necessity 
since they are likely to change jobs, even careers, many 
times during their lives. To prepare for such a future, 
students need to acquire the ability and the desire to 
continue to learn, to become comfortable with change 
and diversity, and to appreciate both the values and 
wisdom of the past while creating and adapting to the 
new ideas and forms of the future. These objectives are, 
of course, those that one generally associates with a 
liberal education.
   There is a certain irony here. The contemporary 
university provides one of the most remarkable learning 
environments in our society—an extraordinary array 
of diverse people with diverse ideas supported by an 
exceptionally rich array of intellectual and cultural 
resources. Yet we tend to focus most of our efforts 
to improve undergraduate education on traditional 
academic programs, on the classroom and the 
curriculum. In the process, we may have overlooked the 
most important learning experiences in the university.
   There seems little doubt that the undergraduate 
experience needs to be reconsidered from a far broader 
perspective. Better alignment with the multiple 
missions of the university—providing undergraduates 
with education through teaching, research, and 
service—would seem an appropriate goal for most 
universities. All too frequently each of the missions 
of the university is associated with a different 
component—a liberal education and teaching with the 
undergraduate program, research with the graduate 
school, and practical service with professional schools. 
However, in reality, all components of the university 
should be involved in all of its missions—particularly 
undergraduate education.
Research
A decade into the 21st century, a resurgent America 
must stimulate its economy, address new threats, and 
position itself in a competitive world transformed by 
technology, global competitiveness, and geopolitical 
change. Educated people, the knowledge they produce, 
and the innovation and entrepreneurial skills they 
possess, particularly in the fields of science and 
engineering, have become key to America’s future.
Restoring the nation’s research capacity will require 
a balanced set of commitments by each of the partners–
federal government, state governments, research 
universities, and business and industry–to provide 
leadership for the nation in a knowledge-intensive 
The University’s primary activities must remain learning and scholarship, e.g., lux et veritas
(shown here with Governor Rick Snyder and Professor Gary Was in his laboratory).
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world and to develop and implement enlightened 
policies, efficient operating practices, and necessary 
investments.
The federal government must re-establish campus 
based research as a national priority, honoring earlier 
commitments such as the America COMPETES Act and 
doubling the support of NIH, reducing unnecessary 
regulations that increase administrative costs, 
impede research productivity, and deflect creativity 
energy without substantially improving the research 
environment.
Over the past two decades, in the face of shifting 
public priorities and weak economies, states have 
decimated the support of their public research 
universities, cutting appropriations per enrolled 
student by an average of 35 percent, totaling more 
than $15 billion each year nationally. As the leader of 
one prominent private university put it, “The states 
are methodically dismantling their public universities 
where the majority of the nation’s campus research is 
conducted and two-thirds of its scientists, engineers, 
physicians, teachers, and other knowledge professionals 
are produced.” 
Hence, the nation must challenge the states to 
recognize that the devastating cuts and meddlesome 
regulations imposed on their public research 
universities is not only harming their own future, but 
also putting at great risk the nation’s prosperity, health, 
and security. While strongly encouraging the states to 
begin to restore adequate support of these institutions 
as the economy improves, they should also be urged 
to move rapidly to provide their public research 
universities with sufficient autonomy and agility to 
navigate an extended period with limited state support. 
It is important that the relationship between 
business and higher education should shift from that 
of a customer-supplier—of graduates and intellectual 
property—to a peer-to-peer partnership nature, 
stressing collaboration in areas of joint interest and 
requiring joint commitment of resources. 
Although universities seek high efficiency in 
their teaching and research–particularly public 
universities in the face of eroding state support, it is 
essential that the nation’s research universities strive 
even harder to address the concerns of the American 
public that their costs are out of control. To this end, 
universities should set and achieve bold goals in cost-
containment, efficiency, and productivity. They should 
strive to constrain the cost escalation of all continuing 
activities—academic and auxiliary—to the national 
inflation rate or less through improved efficiency and 
productivity. This will require the development of more 
powerful, strategic tools for financial management and 
cost accounting, tools that better enable universities to 
determine the most effective methods for containing 
costs and increasing productivity and efficiency. It is 
essential that universities, working together with key 
constituencies, intensify efforts to educate people about 
the distinct character of American research universities 
and cease promoting activities that create a public sense 
of unbridled excess on campuses.
Service
Our institutions need a continually refreshed vision 
of their role that responds to the ever-changing needs of 
the society we serve. As we evolve along with broader 
society, the linkages between us become more varied, 
complex, and interrelated. Within this context of change, 
it is clear that public service must continue to be an 
important responsibility of the American university. Yet 
it is important to always remember that education and 
scholarship are the primary functions of a university, 
its primary contributions to society, and hence the 
most significant roles of the faculty. When universities 
become overly distracted by other activities, they not 
only compromise this core mission but they also erode 
their priorities within our society.
Community
So, how might the University begin to rebuild some 
of the communities and resources that have disappeared 
over the past two decades? Put another way, how might 
they glue back together broken communities? First, 
it is important to counter those practices that tend to 
compete with academic communities, such as:
Stressing once again that the primary role of chairs 
and deans is not fund-raising but rather academic 
leadership, and the constituencies they serve are 
students and faculty, not wealthy donors.
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Seeking a better balance between external and internal 
appointments for key leadership positions (e.g., 
chairs, deans, executive officers, and president), 
perhaps by countering the external bias of search 
consultants.
Achieving a better balance between the attention given 
to the priorities of academic and auxiliary units. To 
be sure, units such as the University Medical Center, 
University Housing, and the Athletics Department 
do have access to vast resources. But the heart and 
purpose of a university are learning and scholarship, 
and whether prosperous or not, these activities and 
their associated communities involing faculty and 
students must be given the priority.
Placing a much higher priority on creating and 
sustaining places where communities of students, 
faculty, staff, and leaders can regularly meet and 
discuss key issues, e.g., the Inglis House estate, the 
Michigan Union, and perhaps an emeritus faculty 
club.
Neighborhood
Many of the most powerful forces driving change in 
higher education come from the marketplace, driven by 
new societal needs, the limited availability of resources, 
rapidly evolving technologies, and the emergence of 
new competitors such as for-profit ventures. Clearly, 
in such a rapidly changing environment, agility and 
adaptability become important attributes of successful 
institutions.
In looking back over the past five decades, the 
University has been most effective in stimulating new 
state investments when the times are the toughest. In 
the early 1980s, after Michigan had lost roughly one-
third of its state support, Harold Shapiro was able to 
leverage his “smaller but better” philosophy into a 
strategic effort to restore state funding of operations 
and capital facilities along with unusual programs such 
as the Research Excellence Fund, which gave highest 
priority to the state’s research universities. Then again, 
at the bottom of a similar trough in the state’s economy 
in 1990, Michigan was able to unite the state’s public 
universities (and particularly UM, MSU, and WSU) 
in a “treetops” alumni strategy, activating key alumni 
leadership across the state, protecting institutional 
autonomy (meaning tuition control), triggering capital 
outlay support, and electing a new governor more 
supportive of higher education.
The University of Michigan needs to develop and 
then provide strong leadership for a full-court press 
effort aimed at public education that will likely take 
several years to have the desired effect. While the 
president of the University will play the key role as 
public spokesperson for this effort, it is important to 
leverage leadership with a carefully designed and 
highly strategic communications effort. Put most 
simply, the University’s communications operation 
must become much more of the type of a marketing 
effort one would find in a political campaign, complete 
with sophisticated polling, market segmentation, 
and a highly strategic media plan. Our state relations 
operation should operate more like a development 
campaign, identifying and cultivating key alumni in 
each legislative district focused on political influence–
akin to the NRA. In fact, the similarity of the effort 
to a development campaign suggests that our own 
development staff might well be a third member of this 
team.
Public Purpose
We must always keep in mind that the University of 
Michigan is a public university, created as the first such 
institution in a young nation, evolving in size, breadth, 
and quality, but always committed to a truly public 
purpose of “providing an uncommon education for 
the common man”. Today there is an even more urgent 
reason why the University must once again elevate 
diversity to a higher priority as it looks toward the 
future: the rapidly changing demographics of America
The increasing diversity of the American population 
with respect to culture, race, ethnicity, and nationality 
is both one of our greatest strengths and most serious 
challenges as a nation. A diverse population gives us 
great vitality. However, the challenge of increasing 
diversity is complicated by social and economic factors. 
Today, far from evolving toward one America, our 
society continues to be hindered by the segregation and 
non-assimilation of minority and immigrant cultures. 
If we do not create a nation that mobilizes the talents 
of all of our citizens, we are destined for a diminished 
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role in the global community and increased social 
turbulence. Higher education plays an important role 
both in identifying and developing this talent. And 
the University of Michigan faces once again a major 
challenge in reclaiming its leadership in building a 
diverse campus. 
 The most immediate challenge is to restore a 
significant need-based financial aid program at the state 
level capable of augmenting the modest Pell Grants 
received by low income students to enable them to attend 
college. Next, there needs to be serious effort to better 
define the mission of the state’s community colleges 
in preparing students for further university education 
and developing appropriate articulation agreements to 
support this transition. Finally, it is absolutely essential 
to the future of the State of Michigan and the welfare 
of its people that it begin to restore adequate support 
for higher education. Michigan’s ranking in the bottom 
10% in its ranking of state support for higher education 
is not only embarrassing but also indicative of why the 
state’s economic performance today and in the future 
will similarly lag the rest of the nation. 
Restoring the University’s diversity will require 
not only a serious restructuring of Michigan’s financial 
strategies, but even more important, a renewed 
commitment to the fundamental public purpose that 
has guided the University for almost two centuries. 
While the University of Michigan’s concerted effort 
to generate support from other patrons, particularly 
through private giving and sponsored research, it 
simply must realize that these will never be sufficient 
to support a world-class university of this size, breadth, 
or impact. Without substantial public support, it is 
unrealistic to expect that public universities can fulfill 
their public purpose.
Hence the highest priority should be to re-engage 
with the people of Michigan to convince them of the 
importance of investing in public higher education 
and unleashing the constraints that prevent higher 
education from serving all of the people of this state. 
This must become a primary responsibility of not only 
the leadership of the University, but its Regents, faculty, 
students, staff, alumni, and those Michigan citizens 
who depend so heavily on the services provided by one 
of the great universities of the world.
Of particular interest are several new approaches: 
Learn Grants: To provide strong incentives, the 
idea would be to provide EVERY student with a “529 
college savings account”, a “Learn-Grant”, when they 
begin kindergarten. An initial contribution of, say, 
$10,000 (say, a $5,000 federal grant with a state $5,000 
match) would accumulate over their K-12 education to 
an amount that when coupled with other financial aid 
would likely be sufficient for their college education at 
a public college or university. The Learn Grants would 
in themselves provide a critical incentive for succeeding 
in K-12 and preparing for a college education.
An interesting contrast between the car of one of our “paying for the party” students
and a reception for the new HAIL program aimed at recruiting low-income students!
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A National Commitment to Livelong Learning: The 
nation would commit itself to the goal of providing 
universal access to lifelong learning opportunities to 
all its citizens, thereby enabling participation in the 
world’s most advanced knowledge and learning society. 
While the ability to take advantage of educational 
opportunity always depends on the need, aptitude, 
aspirations, and motivation of the student, it should 
not depend on one’s socioeconomic status. Access to 
lifelong learning opportunities should be a civil right 
for all rather than a privilege for the few if the nation 
is to achieve prosperity, security, and social well being 
in the global, knowledge-and value-based economy of 
the 21st century.
A Call for Generational Responsibility: It should be 
the baby-boomers generation legacy to ensure that our 
nation accepts a responsibility as a democratic society 
to provide all of its citizens with the educational, 
learning, and training opportunities they need and 
deserve, throughout their lives, thereby enabling both 
individuals and the nation itself to prosper in an ever 
more competitive global economy. While the ability 
to take advantage of educational opportunity will 
always depend on the need, aptitude, aspirations, and 
motivation of the student, it should not depend on 
one’s socioeconomic status. 
345
Throughout this book we have drawn on an array 
of personal experiences, memories, perceptions, and 
perhaps a few misunderstandings from our years at 
University of Michigan. This effort was motivated in 
part by the fact that as the University celebrates its 
Bicentennial in 2017, the Duderstadts will reach their 
50th year of service to the institution. Hence it seemed 
like an interesting exercise to chart the course of the 
University over this period in an effort to develop a few 
ideas about the road ahead. In this final chapter we turn 
from the past to the future, to possible themes for the 
University of Michigan’s third century. 
Of course, developing a vision for the future of the 
University of Michigan is a challenging exercise, even 
for the two of us who have personally experienced 
a quarter of its history. The unusual size, breadth, 
and complexity of the institution and the important 
leadership role it has played in American higher 
education make any such visioning effort complex 
indeed.
 Yet today we believe the University of Michigan 
faces a pivotal moment in its history, a fork in the road. 
Taking one path can, with dedication and commitment, 
preserve the University as a distinguished–indeed, 
a great–university, but only one among many such 
institutions. We believe, however, there is another path, 
a path that will require a bold vision, courage, and 
creativity in addition to dedication and commitment. 
By taking this second path, the University can seek not 
only to sustain its quality and distinction, but it would 
seek to embrace its long history as a leader–indeed, a 
pathfinder–for not simply higher education but for the 
nation and the world at large.
The Foundations of a Vision for 
the University of Michigan’s Future
To develop a suitable vision for this planning effort 
we have begun with the most important values of the 
institution, for example, quality, academic priority, 
leadership, liberal learning, diversity, critical and 
rational inquiry, caring, commitment, and community. 
We have also kept in mind the key characteristics of the 
University over its history, as framed by descriptors 
such as “the leaders and best”, “an uncommon 
education for the common man”, “a broad and liberal 
spirit”, “diverse, yet united in a commitment to 
academic excellence and public service”, “a center of 
critical inquiry and learning”, “an independent critic 
and servant of society”, “a relish for innovation and 
excitement”, “control of our own destiny comparable to 
private universities”, and “freedom with responsibility 
for students and faculty”. Finally we have extensively 
surveyed the powerful forces driving change in our 
world and higher education and evaluated the position 
of the University of Michigan within this framework 
for the decades ahead.
And, like Michigan’s earlier visions, a vision for 
Chapter 23
The Third Century
The forces driving change in higher education
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the University’s third century should flow up from the 
imagination and inspiration of the faculty, students, 
and staff who are deeply engaged in the University’s 
academic mission.
The Theme for the Near Term: Reflection
For the near term, from now until the Bicentennial 
Year 2017-2018, we suggest the University of Michigan 
would benefit from a period of reflection upon 
its remarkable history and accomplishments. The 
University community should not simply prepare 
to celebrate two centuries of leadership in higher 
education, but it first should strive to understand and 
secure those values and characteristics that have played 
such an important role throughout its history:
Academic quality: The reputation of Michigan as 
one of the world’s great universities has been based 
primarily on the quality of its academic programs. 
While there are many sources of superficial rankings 
(e.g., US News & World Report, the London Times, 
Shanghai Jaio Tong, and the QS World Rankings), it 
would seem appropriate for the University to attempt 
a more rigorous and sustained assessment of its 
quality,  analogous to the important resource provided 
by the Michigan Almanac or perhaps even similar to 
a “business dashboard”. Of course, key in this effort 
would be not only an ongoing assessment of the quality 
of students, faculty, and academic programs, but also 
major contributions of the University.
Establishing and sustaining the academic core of 
the University as its highest priority: Sometimes in the 
face of the substantial assets and growth characterizing 
auxiliary activities of the University (e.g., hospitals, 
housing, athletics), it is all to easy to forget that 
Michigan’s impact on the state, nation, and world is 
determined primarily by the quality of its academic 
programs and the achievements of its faculties. This 
must always be clearly established and understood 
as the University’s highest priority. The University 
of Michigan is not primarily a hospital, a hotel, or a 
football team. It is one of the great learning institutions 
of the world.
Diversity: The University has long been 
distinguished by its strong and sustained commitment 
to providing educational and faculty opportunities to 
underrepresented racial and ethnic populations. From 
its earliest efforts to enroll minority students in the 
19th century to the BAM activism of the 1960s, to the 
Michigan Mandate of the 1990s, the University has long 
been viewed as, and must remain a national leader in 
the achievement of diversity. Despite the challenges it 
faces, the University simply must renew its commitment 
to regain this leadership. Failure is not an option.
Public Purpose: So too, the University’s long-
standing commitment to providing “an uncommon 
education for the common man” demands that it 
provide educational opportunities for students from 
all economic circumstances. While this has become 
increasingly difficult in the face of eroding state support, 
it nevertheless is both a core value of the University and 
a critical element of its public purpose. It simply must 
take those actions necessary to restore a more equitable 
socioeconomic balance in its student body.
Spirit: Michigan’s “broad and liberal spirit” has been 
an important characteristic of our students, faculty, and 
staff. While this may at times annoy or antagonize the 
politics that swirl about the institution, such activism 
is not only an important element of our heritage but 
at times represents the conscience of the nation on 
controversial issues. This spirit must always be not only 
respected and tolerated but furthermore encouraged on 
the part of the University community.
Developing a vision for a hazy future
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Leadership: The University of Michigan has long 
taken pride in its “leaders and best” heritage, seeking 
both leadership and excellence in its achievements. 
Key in establishing and sustaining this element of our 
character is setting bold goals where the University not 
only aspires to excellence but can have great impact on 
society, where it can change the world!
The Michigan Saga: Finally, the role of the University 
in serving as both a pathfinder and trailblazer for all 
of higher education remains one of its most important 
roles. To sustain this role requires attracting to the 
University students, faculty, staff, and leadership of 
unusual initiative, creativity, and determination.
While renewing the effort (or restoring our 
commitment) to achieve these characteristics seems 
obvious, particularly as we prepare for the University’s 
bicentennial by reviewing its history and honoring its 
heritage and saga, it is nevertheless in the spirit of the 
near term vision that we suggest the University should 
set out to challenge itself.
The Theme for the Next Generation: Renaissance
The world is changing rapidly, driven by the 
role played by educated people, new knowledge, 
innovation, and entrepreneurial skill. While these 
forces challenge us and our social institutions, they also 
contain the elements of what could become a renaissance 
of creativity and innovation in the 21st century. Since 
universities will play a critical role as the source of these 
assets of the age of knowledge, our vision for the early 
21st century involves stressing similar characteristics 
among our people and our programs, e.g., creativity, 
innovation, ingenuity, invention, and entrepreneurial 
zeal. Put another way, the future university must add 
to its traditional motto of lux et veritas, the scholarly to 
discover truth and the learning to enlighten society, the 
mission of genius itself, of the creativity demanded by 
an ever changing world.
Of course while learning and scholarship have 
long been viewed as missions of the university, so 
too has been the creation of new knowledge across all 
intellectual and professional disciplines. Developing 
new approaches to scholarship, great works in literature 
and the arts, ingenious approaches to investigating 
physical and social phenomenon, these have long been 
the goal of most scholars. Not just to preserve and 
transmit knowledge, but to actually create it.
In fact, Ralph Waldo Emerson suggested the 
importance of creativity to the university’s mission 
almost two centuries ago in his 1837 Address to Phi Beta 
Kappa that to the traditional missions of veritas (the 
search for truth) and lux (the enlightenment provided 
by learning), one should add genius, the power of 
creativity:
“Colleges have their indispensable office, to teach 
elements. But they can only serve us when they aim not 
to drill but to create; when they gather from far every 
ray of various genius to their hospitable halls, and by the 
concentrated fires, set the hearts of their youth aflame..”.
The professions that have dominated the late 20th 
Century—and to some degree, the late 20th Century 
university—have been those which manipulate and 
rearrange knowledge and wealth rather than create 
it; professions such as law, business, accounting, and 
politics. Yet it is becoming increasingly clear that the 
driving intellectual activity of the 21st Century will be 
the act of creation itself, as suggested by Jacques Attali 
in his provocative forecasts for the 21st century at the 
turn of the Millennium:
“The winners of this new era will be creators, and it 
is to them that power and wealth will flow. The need 
to shape, to invent, and to create will blur the border 
between production and consumption. Creation 
will not be a form of consumption anymore, but 
will become work itself, work that will be rewarded 
handsomely. The creator who turns dreams into 
reality will be considered as workers who deserve 
prestige and society’s gratitude and remuneration.”
(Jacques Attali, 2000)
But today the new tools of creativity are appearing 
characterized by extraordinary power. We have the 
capacity to create new objects literally atom by atom. 
With new methods in molecular biology such as CRISPR 
and gene drive, we can not only precisely modify the 
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DNA code for a living organism, but actually cause 
it to propagate through a species to change future 
generations (a frightening thought when human gene 
editiing is considered). The dramatic pace of evolution 
of information technology shows no sign of slowing, 
continuing to advance in power from 100 to 1000 fold 
a decade, enabling not only new forms of analysis such 
augmenting the traditional tools of experiment and 
theory with the sophisticated tools of data analysis 
(big data). Indeed, the tools of artificial intelligence 
not only are rapidly progress but have stimulate fears 
of eventual sentient behavior of machines. These 
tools also have changed the opportunities available 
in literature, performace, and art, with powerful tools 
of investigation and display (e.g., the CGI  techniques 
increasingly dominating the film industry.) 
 Already we are seeing the spontaneous emergence 
of new forms of creative activities, e.g., the “maker” 
fairs providing opportunities to showcase forms of 
artistic, recreational, and commercial activity; the use 
of “additive manufacturing” to build new products 
and processes atomic layer by atomic layer; and the 
growing use of the “app” culture to empower an 
immense marketplace of small software development 
companies. In fact, some suggest that our civilization 
may experience a renaissance-like awakening of 
creative activities in the 21st century similar to that 
occurring in 16th century Europe.
Since universities will play such a critical role as the 
source of these assets of the age of knowledge, perhaps 
the university of the 21st century will also shift its 
intellectual focus and priority from the preservation or 
transmission of knowledge to the process of creation 
itself. A determining characteristic of the university of 
the 21st Century may be a shift in intellectual focus, from 
the preservation or transmission of knowledge, to the 
process of creation itself. Thus, our vision for the early 
21st century should stress the following characteristics 
among our people and our programs:
Creativity
Innovation
Ingenuity and Invention
Entrepreneurial Zeal
But here lies a great challenge. As noted earlier, 
creativity and innovation are key not only to problem 
solving but more generally to achieving economic 
prosperity, social well being, and national security 
in a global, knowledge-driven economy. Yet, while 
universities are experienced in teaching the skills 
of analysis, we have far less understanding of the 
intellectual activities associated with creativity. In 
fact, the current disciplinary culture of our campuses 
sometimes discriminates against those who are truly 
creative, those who do not fit well into our stereotypes 
of students and faculty.
The university may need to reorganize itself 
quite differently, stressing forms of pedagogy and 
extracurricular experiences to nurture and teach the 
art and skill of creation and innovation. This would 
probably imply a shift away from highly specialized 
disciplines and degree programs to programs placing 
more emphasis on integrating knowledge. There 
is clearly a need to better integrate the educational 
mission of the university with the research and service 
activities of the faculty by ripping instruction out of 
the classroom–or at least the lecture hall–and placing it 
instead in the discovery and tinkering environment of 
studios or workshops or “hacker havens”.
Actually, as John Seely Brown points out, today’s 
students are already using technology to function much 
like artists – disciplined, focused, pushing boundaries, 
challenging assumptions and creating meaning. 
(Brown, 2009) They are willing to engage with multiple 
viewpoints before synthesizing their own. But beyond 
that, they look for meaning not just in what they create 
or own but in addition through what they contribute 
back to society-at-large. They are engaged, first and 
foremost, in fostering what might be called the creative 
class. Not only do they want to create for themselves, 
but they also want others to build on their creations. 
The platforms they use are mostly digital: instant 
messaging to keep in constant contact with one’s own 
intimate community; blogging to let one experiment 
by exposing their ideas to others and getting rapid 
feedback; by participating in the rapidly expanding 
worlds of open source, open content (e.g., Wikipedia), 
and remixing the work of others; rich media capable 
of expressing complex ideas; and a vast network 
characterizing cyberinfrastructure that lets one access 
communities, instruments, and databases all over the 
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world (an infrastructure that the University of Michigan 
has played a key role in creating). These are the power 
tools of the Net Generation.
Here, the University of Michigan provides an 
interesting example of how academic programs 
characterized by technology-driven creative activities 
might evolve. On the University’s North Campus, 
we already are fortunate to have several schools–
music, dance, and the performing arts; art and 
design; architecture; and engineering–that focus on 
the creative activities that increasingly require new 
tools, . The Media Union (aka Duderstadt Center) and 
Walgreen Center on the North Campus provide unique 
“commons” facilities, gathering places that support 
interdisciplinary activities in “making things”–3-D 
objects, virtual reality simulations, new art forms, CGI-
based performances, responding to a growing need 
for both student learning and faculty participation in 
such activities. It is important to recapture the original 
vision of the Media Union as an innovation commons 
or creation space where students, faculty, and staff from 
multiple disciplines gather to create, invent, design, and 
even make things (whether objects of art, performances, 
buildings, or new technologies). In fact, the four deans 
of these schools who created the concepts for the Media 
Union and Walgreen Center used to refer to the North 
Campus as the University’s “Renaissance Campus”.
Drawing together aspects of hardware and software, 
inquiry and discovery, tinkering and invention, 
and creativity and innovation, experimentation and 
performance, the Duderstadt Center and Walgreen 
Center provide tremendous interactive playground for 
imaginative scholars and students. The tools in these 
facilities are so easy to use that ideally they become 
natural extensions to everyday activity. For example, an 
artist , an engineer, and a choreographer should be able 
to think up a new staging for a performance together, 
sketch it out in three dimensions on a computer, then 
show it off and discuss it in real time with colleagues 
both here and across the world, all without noticing the 
complex technology that allows them to collaborate. 
This model of “creativity and innovation” commons 
facilities that enable faculty members and students 
from diverse schools to work together  is now being 
propagaged to other parts of the University, including 
the arts and humanities and social sciences of the 
Central Campus and the natural science and biomedical 
programs.
This vision of renaissance aligns well with several 
other aspects of the University’s institutional saga such 
as its commitment to excellence and leadership and 
its belief that this rests upon building diverse learning 
communities. But achieving such a vision will also 
likely require a culture change that encourages risk 
taking and tolerates occasional failure as the price one 
must frequently pay for setting and accomplishing 
challenging goals.
To adapt its pedagogy to the challenge of a 
The Renaissance Campus: Music, Art, Architecture, and Engineering
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Duderstadt Center. Walgreen Center
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“renaissance” education, universities may form 
strategic alliances with other groups, organizations, 
or institutions in our society whose activities are 
characterized by great creativity, for example, the art 
world, the performing arts, and high-tech industry.
Particularly key in this effort is the earlier goal of 
diversity. As Tom Friedman noted in a New York Times 
column, “The sheer creative energy that comes when 
you mix all our diverse people and cultures together. 
We live in an age when the most valuable asset any 
economy can have is the ability to be creative–to spark 
and imagine new ideas, be they Broadway tunes, great 
books, iPads, or new cancer drugs. And where does 
creativity come from?” As Newsweek described it, ‘To 
be creative requires divergent thinking (generating 
many unique ideas) and then convergent thinking 
(combining those ideas into the best result).” And 
where does divergent thinking come from? It comes 
from being exposed to divergent ideas and cultures and 
people and intellectual disciplines. (Friedman, 2011) 
Just what a world-class research university 
characterized by great socioeconomic diversity such as 
the University of Michigan can offer!
The Theme for the Third Century: Enlightenment
Any vision proposed for the University of Michigan’s 
third century must consider the extraordinary changes 
and uncertainties of a future driven by exponentially 
evolving information and communications technology. 
The extraordinary connectivity provided by the 
Internet already links together the majority of the 
world’s population. To this, one can add the emerging 
capacity to capture and distribute the accumulated 
knowledge of our civilization in digital form and 
provide opportunities for learning through new 
paradigms such as MOOCS and cognitive tutors. This 
suggests the possible emergence of a new global society 
no longer constrained by space, time, monopoly, or 
archaic laws and instead even more dependent upon 
the generation of new knowledge and the education of 
world citizens. In such an era of rapid change, it has 
become the responsibility of democratic societies to 
provide their citizens with the learning opportunities 
they need throughout their lives, at costs they can 
afford, as a right rather than a privilege.
More generally, what the nation (and also the 
world) needs today is a 21st century version of the 
Enlightenment movement of the 17th and 18th century 
that swept aside the divine authority of kings by 
educating and empowering the public, stimulating 
revolution, and creating the liberal democracies that 
now characterize most developed nations. Our nation 
and our world needs once again the “illumination” 
provided by distributing “the light of learning and 
knowledge” to counter the ignorance (e.g., today’s 
“denier” culture) and address the challenges of our 
times. 
More specifically, the goals of the Enlightenment 
were to provide for a rational distribution of freedom, 
universal access to knowledge, and the formation of 
learning communities. Rational and critical thought 
was regarded as central to freedom and democracy. 
Knowledge and learning were regarded as public 
goods, to be made available through communities such 
as salons, seminars, and academies. These dreams of 
the universal and the collective, Liberte, Egalite, and 
Fraternite for the French Revolution–or perhaps better 
articulated by Jefferson’s opening words from our 
Declaration of Independence: “We hold these truths to 
be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they 
are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable 
Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the 
pursuit of Happiness.”–remain as important today as 
they were three centuries ago.
Today, the educational institution most capable 
of launching a new “age of Enlightenment” is the 
“university”, with its dual missions of creating “unions” 
of scholars and learners and providing “universal” 
access to knowledge. In a sense, the word “university” 
itself conveys the elements of this vision: both the sense 
of a “union” or community of learners (i.e., universitas 
magistrorum et scholarium) and the “universality” or 
totality of knowledge and learning as the key to social 
well-being in an age of knowledge. Furthermore, 
since these have been regarded as public goods, one 
might even suggest that the public universities have a 
particular responsibility in providing these.
Our proposition is that the Enlightenment theme 
would be a particularly compelling and appropriate 
goal for the University of Michigan’s third century. 
After all, our future will continue to be one in which 
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freedom and prosperity depend upon widespread 
distribution of “the light of learning and knowledge”, 
and hence this should become a key component of our 
extended public purpose. 
Actually, this theme traces its origin to the earliest 
days of the University of Michigan, since its original 
incarnation as “the Catholepistemiad or University of 
Michigania” was a utopian vision stimulated by the 
principles of the Enlightenment that undergirded the 
Northwest Ordinance of 1787, e.g., “religion, morality, 
and knowledge being necessary to good government 
and the happiness of mankind, schools and the 
means of education shall forever be encouraged”. 
Michigan’s early evolution was heavily influenced 
by Henry Tappan’s efforts to build a true university, 
based not simply on learning but on scholarship laid 
the foundation for the research university in America. 
And, perhaps most important, its public character was 
shaped by the Jeffersonian ideal of education for all to 
the extent of the individual’s capacity, i.e., “providing 
an uncommon education for the common man”. 
These fundamental principles, along with its unusual 
secular character, established Michigan as one of the 
nation’s first and most prominent “public” “research” 
universities and continues to define its public purpose 
today in terms of both creating and distributing learning 
and knowledge to society. Hence, it is most appropriate 
that any vision for the University’s future embrace and 
extend its character as a truly “public university” to 
address the nature of our changing world.
But while the Enlightenment of the 18th century 
was concerned with “celebrating the luminosity of 
knowledge shining through the written word”, today 
knowledge comes in many forms–words, images, 
immersive environments, “sim-stim”. And learning 
communities are no longer constrained by space and 
time but rather propagated instantaneously by rapidly 
evolving technologies (e.g., cyberinfrastrucure) and 
practices (e.g., open source, open knowledge). The 
ancient vision of the Library of Alexandria to collect 
all of the books of the world in one place is rapidly 
becoming true–except the “place” has now become a 
cloud in cyberspace. Learning communities are evolving 
into knowledge generating communities–wikis, crowd 
sourcing, hive cultures that span the globe. 
William Germano suggests yet another argument for 
such a theme as the possible next stage in speculating 
about the evolution of the “book”, from the invention 
of writing to the codex to the printed volume to the 
digital revolution. As he explains: 
“Right now we are walking through two great 
dreams that are shaping the future of scholarship, even 
the very idea of scholarship and the role “the book” 
EnlightenmentRenaissanceReection
Now! Soon! Eventually!
(Embracing the Michigan Saga) (Aligning with the Age of Knowledge) (Redening UM’s Public Purpose)
Excellence
Academic Priority
Diversity
Public Purpose
Spirit
Leadership
Pathnder
Creativity
Innovation
Ingenuity
Invention
Entrepreneurism
Passion
Risk-Taking
Building Learning
   Communities
Propagating Learning
   and Knowledge
Becoming a
   Knowledge Commons
A Global University
Timescale
Theme
Purpose
Values
A Vision for the Third Century of the University of Michigan
353
should play within it. Great Dream No. 1 is universal 
access to knowledge. This dream means many things to 
many people, but for knowledge workers it means that 
scholarly books and journals can, and therefore should, 
be made available to all users. New technologies make 
that possible for the first time in human history, and as 
the argument goes, the existence of such possibilities 
obligates us to use them. Great Dream No. 2 is the ideal 
of knowledge building as a self-correcting, collective 
exercise. Twenty years ago, nobody had Wikipedia, 
but when it arrived it took over the hearts and laptops 
for undergraduates and then of everyone else in the 
education business. Professional academic life would 
be poorer, or at least much slower, without it. The 
central premise of Wikipedia isn’t speed but infinite 
self-correction, perpetually fine-tuning what we know. 
In our second dream, we expand our aggregated 
knowledge quantitatively and qualitatively”. 
(Germano, 2010)
Germano continues on to suggest that “these two 
dreams–the universal and the collective–should sound 
very familiar since they are fundamentally the latest 
entries in Western culture’s utopian tradition.”
In a sense, then, the concept of a 21st century analog 
to the Enlightenment combines several themes that we 
suggested earlier might characterize the university of 
the future: 
The emergence of a Universitas Magistrorum et 
Scholarium in cyberspace.
The power of network architectures in distributing 
knowledge and learning
The increasing access to knowledge and learning 
resources through the massive digitization and access 
to printed materials and other sources of information
The perspective of learning organizations as 
ecologies that evolve and mutate into new forms
The university as the prototype of an emergent 
global civilization
Today, the University of Michigan is already playing 
a leadership role in achieving just such a vision. Its 
efforts during the 1980s (together with IBM and MCI) to 
build and manage the backbone of the Internet, its role 
in creating Internet2, and most recently the early effort 
to create a “national learning, research, and innovation 
network” linking together the nation’s research 
universities, national laboratories, federal agencies, and 
industry with advanced cyberinfrastructure all provide 
strong evidence of the leadership role it plays in linking 
together people and institutions around the world.
The University of Michigan has also played a 
leadership role in redefining the nature of the “library” 
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for a digitally connected world, first with the NSF 
digital library project in the 1990s–a consortium of 
universities that stimulated the development of the 
Page Rank search algorithm and the creation of Google, 
and helping to build the JSTOR project, the first major 
effort to digitize a massive collection of scholarly 
publications in disciplines such as economics and 
history. Today, Michigan serves as the lead partner in 
the Google Books project, to provide search access to the 
printed knowledge of the world, and the HathiTrust, 
a collection of 60 leading libraries with the futher goal 
of providing full-text access to large inventories of 
scholarly materials. Furthermore, as a participant in the 
OpenCourseWare and MOOC movements to provide 
global access to learning resources, the University 
has firmly established its leadership role in providing 
both knowledge and learning on an unprecedented 
global scale. Its leadership in promoting open access 
to research data and intellectual property through 
efforts such as the Creative Commons has potential 
for redefining the public university as a “knowledge 
commons” serving the world.
Hence, it is appropriate and perhaps provocative) 
to suggest that the University is well-positioned 
to participate in a contemporary version of the 
Enlightenment, spreading knowledge and learning 
throughout the world. We suggest that this might even 
become the primary mission of the University for its 
Third Century!
Achieving the Vision
We have suggested three visions for the future of the 
University of Michigan: 
A vision for today of Reflection upon the past 
accomplishments, values, and key characteristics of the 
University’s institutional saga;
A near-term vision of a Renaissance as the University 
aligns itself to better engage with a world dependent 
upon learning, knowledge, creativity, and innovation, 
a world by spanning the broad range of learning from 
simply “to know”, “to do”, “to create” and “to become; 
and 
A longer term vision of Enlightenment as it commits 
itself to expand its public purpose to provide “the light 
of learning and knowledge” to the world in the new 
forms enabled by rapidly evolving information and 
communications technologies. 
Although bold, we believe these visions to be 
consistent both with the University’s heritage and 
challenges and opportunities it will face as it begins its 
third century.
Of course there are always those who believe that 
Michigan should settle for achieving excellence and 
leadership within the confines of the current American 
research university paradigm. The University of 
Michigan, they argue, should take the necessary steps 
to preserve its options, to create flexibility, to develop 
the capacity to adapt to and control change, and to 
open up opportunities during the decades. They prefer 
more modest strategies to clearly identify the goals that 
would enable the University of Michigan to adapt to 
a changing world in a far more organic, evolutionary 
manner. 
But such a laissez-faire approach to the future is not 
the Michigan style. The University tends to flourish 
when it has been enlivened and emboldened by 
challenging visions of the future. While acknowledging 
the difficulties and the risks inherent in long-range 
planning exercises, the University’s heritage as a leader 
in higher education demands the development and 
articulation of a bold vision for the third century. It is 
a fitting exercise for an institution aspiring to become 
“the leader and best.”
We contend that as the University approaches 
its third century, it should embrace once again its 
heritage as a pathfinder for higher education, a saga 
established two centuries ago in the 19th century when 
the University of Michigan became a primary source 
for much of the innovation and leadership for higher 
education. Once again Michigan has the opportunity to 
influence the emergence of a new paradigm of what the 
university must become in our 21st Century world to 
respond to the changing needs of our society. 
This, then, is the particular challenge and 
opportunity for the University of Michigan. As it has 
so many times in its past, the University of Michigan 
must embrace yet again its historic role of leadership 
for a future characterized by great challenges, immense 
responsibilities, and exciting opportunities. 
370
References
Adelman, Clifford.  The Bologna Process for U.S. Eyes: Re-
learning Higher Education in the Age of Convergence. 
San Jose, CA: Institute for Higher Education Policy, 
2009.
America COMPETES Act.  America Creating Opportu-
nities to Meaningfully Promote Excellence in Tech-
nology, Education, and Science Act, Public Law No. 
110-69 (reauthorized 2010).
Armstrong, Elizabeth and Laura Hamilton, Paying for 
the Party: How College Maintains Inequality, Harvard 
University Press, 2013.
Atkins, Daniel E. (chair).  Revolutionizing Science and 
Engineering Through Cyberinfrastructure.  Report of 
the National Science Foundation Blue-Ribbon Ad-
visory Panel on Cyberinfrastructure. Washington, 
DC: National Science Foundation, 2003. 
Atkins, Daniel E., John Seely Brown and Allen L Ham-
mond. External Review of the Hewlett Foundation’s 
Open Educational Resources (OER) Program: Achieve-
ments, Challenges, and Opportunities.  Menlo Park, 
CA: Hewlett Foundation, February, 2007.
Augustine, Norman (chair). Rising Above the Gathering 
Storm: Energizing and Employing America for a Bright-
er Economic Future.  National Academies Commit-
tee on Prospering in the Global Economy of the 21st 
Century. Washington, DC: National Academies 
Press, 2005.
Bement, Arden L. “Cyberinfrastructure: The Second 
Revolution”, The Chronicle of Higher Education, Jan-
uary, 2007.
Berdahl, Robert. “Maintaining America’s Competitive 
Edge: Revitalizing the Nation’s Research Univer-
sity”. Testimony to the National Academies Com-
mittee on Research Universities.  Washington, DC: 
Association of American Universities, 2010.
Bok, Derek.  Our Underachieving Colleges. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2006.
Bok, Derek. “The Ambiguous Role of Money in Higher 
Education”, Commentary, Chronicle of Higher Ed-
ucation, August 12, 2013.
Borgman, Christine L. (chair).  Fostering Learning in 
the Networked World: The Cyberlearning Oppor-
tunity and Challenge.  Report of the NSF Task Force 
on Cyberlearning.  Washington, D.C.: National Sci-
ence Foundation, 2008.
Boulos, Michael. “Bill Gates and a Prescription for 
Breneman, David. “Peering Around the Bend: The 
Leadership Challenges of Privatization, Account-
ability, and Market-Based State Policy”.  Association 
of Governing Boards, Washington, DC, 2005.
Bowen, William G.  “Walk Deliberately, Don’t Run, To-
ward Online Education”. Chronicle of Higher Edu-
cation. March 25, 2013; See also William G. Bowen, 
Higher Education in the Digital Age. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2013.
Bowen, William G., Matthew M. Chingos, Kelly A. 
Lack, and Thomas I. Nygren. Interactive Learning 
Online at Public Universities: Evidence from Ran-
domized Trials. Ithaka, May 22, 2012, available on 
the ITHAKA website: http://www.sr.ithaka.org
Breneman, David. Are the States and Public Higher Ed-
ucation Striking a New Bargain? Public Policy Paper 
Series.  Washington, DC: Association of Governing 
Boards and Colleges, 2005.
Brown, John Seely. “Minds on Fire”, Educause, Janu-
ary/February 2009.
Brown, John Seely and Paul Duguid.  The Social Life of 
Information.  Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business 
School Press, 2000.
Brownstein, Ronald. “The Generational Mismatch”, 
National Journal, July, 2010.
Carnegie Higher Education Reporter, The Big Picture: 
Assessing the Future of Higher Education, Winter, 
2014.
371
Christensen, Clayton M. The Innovator’s Dilemma. Cam-
bridge, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1997.
Chronicle of Higher Education. “State Appropriations 
for Higher Education”.  Chronicle of Higher Educa-
tion, January 11, 2008.
Clark, Burton R. The Distinctive College: Antioch, Reed, 
and Swarthmore. Chicago: Aldine, 1970. 
Clark, William. Academic Chrisma and the Origins of the 
Research University. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2006.
Cole, Jonathan R. The Great American University. New 
York, NY: Public Affairs, 2009.
Council for Aid to Education, “College Fund Raising 
Rankings in 2013”, February 24, 2014.
Delta Project, Academic Spending vs Athletic Spending: 
Who Wins, January, 2013.
Delta Project, Labor Intensive or Labor Expensive: Chang-
ing Staffing and Compensation Patterns in Higher Edu-
cation, February, 2014.
Detesiewicz, William, “The Miseducation of America”, 
Chronical Review, July 4, 2014.
Drucker, Peter. “A Better Way to Pay for College”.  Wall 
Street Journal, A14, May 9, 1991.
Drucker, Peter. “Beyond the Information Revolution”. 
Atlantic Monthly, 284:4, October, 1999.
Duderstadt, James J., Daniel E. Atkins and Douglas Van 
Houweling. Higher Education Faces the Digital Age: 
Technology Issues and Strategies for American Colleges 
and Universities. Washington, DC: American Coun-
cil on Education, 2002.
Duderstadt, James J. (chair). Preparing for the Revolution: 
Information Technology and the Future of the Univer-
sity. Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 
2003. 
 http://www.nap.edu 
Duderstadt, James J., William A. Wulf, and Robert Zem-
sky. “Envisioning a Transformed University”, Issues 
in Science and Technology, 22(1), 35-41, Washington, 
DC: National Academy Press, 2005.
Duderstadt, James J. A Case Study in University Transfor-
mation: Positioning the University of Michigan for the 
New Millennium (Ann Arbor: University of Michi-
gan, Millennium Project, 1999), http://milproj.
dc.umich.edu/publications/strategy. 
Duderstadt, James J. A University for the 21st Century. 
Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2001.
Duderstadt, James J. and Farris W. Womack. The Future 
of the Public University in America: Beyond the Cross-
roads. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 2002.
Duderstadt, James J. The View from the Helm: Leading the 
American University During an Era of Change. Ann 
Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2007.
Duderstadt,  James J., Aligning American Higher Edu-
cation with a Twenty-first-century Public Agenda”. 
Higher Education in Europe, Vol 34, No. 3-4, 2009.
The Economist.  “The Brains Business: A Survey of High-
er Education”. The Economist, September 10, 2005.
The Economist. “The Search for Talent: The World’s Most 
Valuable Commodity Is Getting Harder to Find”. 
The Economist, October 2006.
The Economist. “Now for the Reckoning—Corporate 
America’s Legacy Costs”. The Economist, October 
15, 2005.
The Economist. “Special Report: Blacks in America”.  The 
Economist, August 6, 2005.
The Economist. “Detroitosaurus Wrecks: The lessons for 
America and the car industry from the biggest in-
dustrial collapse ever”.  The Economist, June 4, 2009.
The Economist. “A Ponzi scheme that works”.  The Econ-
omist, December 19, 2009.
Editorial, “Fat-Cat Administrators at the Top 25”, New 
York Times, May 23, 2014
Finley, Nolan. “Attitude May Make Michigan the New 
Mississippi”. Detroit News, May 1, 2005.
 See also Finley, Nolan. Detroit News, December 9, 
2007.
Flexner, Abraham. Medical Education in the United States 
and Canada. New York: Carnegie Foundation for the 
Advancement of Teaching, 2010.
Frey, William H, “Five Myths about the 2010 Census 
and the U.S. Population”, Brookings Institute Re-
port, 2010.
Friedman, Thomas. The World Is Flat: A Brief History of 
the 21st Century. New York, NY: Farrar, Strauss, and 
Giroux, 2005.
Garcia, M.L. and O.H. Bray. Fundamentals of Technology 
Roadmapping. Albuquerque, NM: Sandia National 
Laboratory, 1997.
Germano, William. “What Are Books Good For?”  The 
Key Reporter, Phi Beta Kappa Society, Winter, 2010, 
p. 8.
372
Gibson, William. Neuromancer. New York: Ace Books, 
1984.
Glazer, Louis.  A New Agenda for Michigan. Ann Arbor, 
MI: Michigan Future, 2007.
 http://www.michiganfuture.org
Glazer, Louis and Donald Grimes. Michigan’s Transi-
tion to a Knowledge-Based Economy, Annual Progress 
Reports, 2008, 2009, 2010. Ann Arbor, MI: Michigan 
Future, Inc., 2010.
Google Books, http://books.google.com/, 2011
Gratz v. Bollinger, Docket 02–516, 539 U.S. 244 (2003), 
Decision: June 23, 2003; Grutter v. Bollinger, Docket 
02–241, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), Decision: June 23, 2003
Harpers Magazine, 1887.
HathiTrust, http://www.hathitrust.org/, 2011
Haycock, Kati and Danette Gerald. Engines of Inequality. 
Washington, DC: Education Trust, 2008.
Haycock, Kati. Opportunity Adrift. Washington, DC: 
Education Trust, 2010.
Holliday, Chad, chair. National Academies Commit-
tee on Research Universities. Research Universities 
and the Future of America: Ten Breakthrough Ac-
tions Vital to Our Nation’s Prosperity and Security. 
Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 2012. 
(The complete report, summary, and videos of the 
press conference can be found on the National 
Academies website: http://sites.nationalacade-
mies.org/PGA/bhew/researchuniversities/index.
htm
Hollinger, David. “Academic Culture at Michigan”. 
50th Anniversary of Rackham School of Graduate 
Studies. Ann Arbor: Rackam School Publications, 
1988. 
Ito, M., Hanging Out, Messing Around, and Geeking Out: 
Kids Living and Learning With New Media. Cam-
bridge: MIT Press, 2009.
ITS. “Trends in College Spending (ITS) On-Line”. Delta 
Project on Postsecondary Education Costs, Produc-
tivity, and Accountatility, 2010.
Kane, Thomas J. and Peter R. Orzag. “Funding Restric-
tions at Public Universities: Effects and Policy Im-
plications” (working paper, Brookings Institution, 
Washington, DC, September 2003).
Kelly, Kevin. “Scan This Book!”.  New York Times Sunday 
Magazine, May 14, 2006.
Kerr, Clark. The Uses of the University. Cambridge: Har-
vard University Press, 1963.
Kerr, Clark. The Gold and the Blue: A Personal Memoir of 
the University of California, 1949-1967.  Volume One: 
Academic Triumphs. Berkeley, CA: University of 
California Press, pp. 172-190, 2001.
Kirkpatrick, David. The Facebook Effect: The Inside 
Story of the Company That Is Connecting the 
World. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2011.
Krug, Edward A., ed., Charles W. Eliot and Popular Ed-
ucation, Classics in Education, vol. 8 (New York: 
Teachers College, Columbia University, 1961).
Kuhn, Thomas S. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. 
Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1963.
Kurashige, Scott, “The Diversity Gap at Michigan Flag-
ship, Signs of a Lost Public Mission”, Chronicle of 
Higher Education, March 3, 2014.
Kurzweil, Ray. The Age of Spiritual Machines: When Com-
puters Exceed Human Intelligence. New York, NY: Vi-
king, 1999.
Kurzweil, Ray. The Singularity Is Near: When Humans 
Transcend Biology. New York, NY: Viking Penguin, 
2005.
Levy, Stephen. In the Plex: How Google Thinks, Works, 
and Shapes Our Lives. New York: Simon & Schuster, 
2011.
Leonhardt, David, “If Affirmative Action is Doomed, 
What Is Next?”, New York Times, June 17, 2014.
Lingenfelter, Paul E. “The Firing of Henry Philip Tap-
pan, University Builder” (master’s thesis, Univer-
sity of Michigan, 1970) 
Longworth, Richard C. Caught in the Middle: America’s 
Heartland in the Age of Globalization. New York, NY: 
Bloomsbury, 2008.
Lohmann, Susanne. Meeting of the National Acade-
mies IT Forum with the Provosts of the Association 
of American Universities, Beckman Center, Irvine, 
CA, September 9, 2003. 
McPherson, Peter. Assuring That Public Research Univer-
sities Remain Vital. Washington: Association of Pub-
lic and Land-Grant Universities, 2010.
McPherson, P., Shulenburger, D., Gobstein, H., and 
Keller, C.  Competitiveness of Public Research 
Universities and Consequences for the Country: 
Recommendations for Change. Washington, D.C.: 
Association of Public and Land-Grant Universities, 
2009.
373
Miller, Charles (chair). A Test of Leadership: Charting the 
Future of U.S. Higher Education. National Commis-
sion on the Future of Higher Education in America 
(“The Spellings Commission”).  Washington, DC: 
Department of Education, 2006.
Mueller, Benjamin, “Officials’ Pay at Public Colleges 
Rise Faster than at Private Ones”, Chronicle of 
Higher Education, March 3, 2014
Moe, Michael. The Knowledge Web: People Power– Fuel 
for the New Economy. New York, NY: Merrill-Lynch, 
2000.
National Intelligence Council.  Mapping the Global Fu-
ture, Project 2020.  Washington, DC: Government 
Printing Office, 2004.
New York Times Editorial, “Keeping the Public Col-
leges Afloat”.  New York Times, 2004.
Newman, John Henry. The Idea of a University (New Ha-
ven, CT: Yale University Press, 1996; 1st ed., New 
York: Longman, Green, 1899) 
Northwest Ordinance, Article 3., printed in F. N. Thor-
pe, ed. The Federal and State Constitutions, Colonial 
Charters, and Other Organic Laws. Washington, DC: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, pp. 957, 1909.
NRC, Committee on Developments in the Science of 
Learning. How People Learn: Brain, Mind, Experience, 
and School.  National Research Council.  Washing-
ton, DC: National Academy Press, 2000.
NRC.  The Impact of Academic Research on Industrial 
Performance.  National Research Council.  Wash-
ington, D.C.:  National Academies Press, 2003.
Obama, President Barack. State of the Union Address 
before the United States Congress, January 25, 2011.
Palmisano, Samuel J. “The Globally Integrated Enter-
prise”.  Foreign Affairs, May/June 2006.
Pancake, Cherry. Presentation to the Advisory Commit-
tee on Cyberinfrastructure, National Science Foun-
dation, 2003
Peckham, Howard H. The Making of the University of 
Michigan 1817–1992, ed. and updated by Margaret 
L. Steneck and Nicholas H. Steneck (Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Bentley Historical Library, 
1994) 
Pensky, Marc. “Digital Natives, Digital Immigrants”. 
NCB University Press, 9 (5), 2001.
Prahalad, C.K. and Gary Hamel. Competing for the Fu-
ture. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School 
Press, 1994.
Price, Richard Rees. “The University of Michigan: Its 
Origin and Development,” Harvard Bulletin in Edu-
cation 3 (January 1923) 
Raschke, Carl A. The Digital Revolution and the Coming 
of the Postmodern University. New York, NY: Rout-
ledge Falmer, 2003.
Reed, Dan. “Computing for the Future: Release 2016”. 
Chapel Hill, NC: Renaissance Computing Institute, 
2006.
Rhodes, Frank H. T.  The Creation of the Future: The Role 
of the American University. Ithaca, NY: Cornell Uni-
versity Press, pp. 137-39, 2001.  
 Rhodes is the former president of the first of the na-
tion’s truly public-private hybrids, Cornell Univer-
sity.
Rudolph, Frederick. The American College and Univer-
sity: A History (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 
1962)
Ruegg, Walter. A History of the University in Europe, Vol. 
I, Universities in the Middle Ages. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1992. 
Ruegg, Walter. A History of the University in Europe, 
Vol. II, Universities in Early Modern Europe. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. 
Ruegg, Walter. A History of the University in Europe, Vol. 
III, Universities in the 19th and Early 20th Centu-
ries. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. 
Schmidt, Peter, “Supreme Court Upholds Bans on Ra-
cial Preference in College Admissions”, Chronicle 
of Higher Education, April 22, 2014.
SHEEO. State Higher Education Finance. Washington, 
DC: State Higher Education Executive Officers, 
2010.
Supiano, Beckie, “The Solution to the Student-Load 
‘Crisis’? Depends on  How You Define it”, Chroni-
cle of Higher Education, June 24, 2014.
Tappan, Henry Philip. University Education (New York: 
George P. Putnam, 1851) 
Thelin, John R. A History of American Higher Educa-
tion. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
2004.
Thomas, Douglas and John S. Brown, A New Culture 
of Learning. San Francisco: Douglas-Brown, 2010.
Thompson, Derek, “How America’s Top Colleges Re-
flect (and Massively Distort) the Country’s Racial 
374
Evolution”, The Atlantic, 2013.
Turner, James and Paul Bernard. “The Prussian Road to 
University”, 50th Anniversary of Rackham School 
of Graduate Studies. Ann Arbor: Rackam School 
Publications, 1988.
UM Accreditation Report. An Institution of Global Learn-
ing, Knowledge, and Engagement. Ann Arbor: Uni-
versity of Michgan Regents, 2010.
UM Financial Reports, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013
University of California, A National Model for Providing 
Quality Educational Opportunity to Low-Income Stu-
dents, April, 2014.
Vest, Charles M.  “Why MIT Decided to Give Away All 
Its Course Materials via the Internet”.  Chronicle of 
Higher Education, January 30, 2004.
Vest, Charles M.  Clark Kerr Lectures, The University of 
California, Berkeley.  Berkeley, CA: University of Cal-
ifornia Press, 2005. 
Veysey, Lawrence R. The Emergence of the American Uni-
versity. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965.
Waldrop, M. Mitchell. “Campus 2.0”. Nature Vol. 495, 
March 14, 2013
Weber, Luc and James J. Duderstadt, eds. The Globaliza-
tion of Higher Education, VI Glion Colloquium. Par-
is: Economica, 2007.
Weber, Luc and James J. Duderstadt, eds. Innovation and 
University Research, VII Glion Colloquium. Paris: 
Economica, 2009. 
Wendler, C., Bridgeman, B., Cline, F., Millett, C., Rock, 
J., Bell, N., and McAllister, P.  The Path Forward: 
The Future of Graduate Education in the United 
States.  Princeton, NJ: Educational Testing Service, 
2010.
Wiley, John. Forward Thinking: The University and Wis-
consin’s Economic Recovery. Chancellor’s Report. 
Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin, 2003.
Wulf, William A. “Warning: Information Technology 
Will Tranform the University”, Issues in Science and 
Technology, pp. 46-52, Summer, 1995.
Zarkaria, Fareed, “America’s Higher Education Fail-
ings”, New York Times, May 1, 2014.
Zemsky, Robert, William Massey and Gregory Wegner. 
Remaking the American University: Market-Smart and 
Mission Centered.  New York, NY: 2005.
Zemsky, Robert.  Making Reform Work: The Case for 
Transforming American Higher Education. Rutgers, 
NJ: University of Rutgers Press, 2009.  
 See also Robert Zemsky, “Will Higher Education 
Ever Change as it Should?”. Chronicle of Higher Edu-
cation Commentary, August 3, 2009.
355
Universities are based on long-standing traditions 
and continuity, evolving over many generations (in 
some cases, even centuries), with very particular sets 
of values, traditions, and practices. Historians of higher 
education usually focus on the broader forms of uni-
versities over the centuries, such as the emergence of 
the Universitas Magistrorum et Scholarium or “union of 
masters and scholars” in medieval times to the voca-
tional Ecoles that augmented more traditional universi-
ties in France in the late 18th century to the emergence 
of wissenschaft, lernfreiheit, and lehrfreiheit (scholar-
ship coupled with the freedom to learn and freedom to 
teach) characterizing the German universities based on 
the principles of von Humboldt in the early 19th cen-
tury. The early American colleges were based on the ob-
jectives of character building and elitism of the British 
universities such as Oxford and Cambridge, but would 
later evolve into a more unique merger of several Euro-
pean forms in the mid-19th century that combined the 
instruction of young students, graduate students in the 
learned professions, and faculty scholarship.
But there are other characteristics that have shaped, 
distinguished, and sustained the universities of our 
times. Burton R. Clark, a noted sociologist and scholar 
of higher education, introduced the concept of “orga-
nizational legend ” or “institutional saga,” to refer to 
those long-standing characteristics that determine the 
distinctiveness of a college or university. (Clark, 1970) 
Clark’s view is that “an organizational legend (or saga), 
located between ideology and religion, partakes of an 
appealing logic on one hand and sentiments similar to 
the spiritual on the other”; that universities “develop 
over time such an intentionality about institutional life, 
a saga, which then results in unifying the institution 
and shaping its purpose.” Clark notes: “An institution-
al saga may be found in many forms, through mottoes, 
traditions, and ethos. It might consist of long-standing 
practices or unique roles played by an institution, or 
even in the images held in the minds (and hearts) of 
students, faculty, and alumni. Sagas can provide a sense 
of romance and even mystery that turn a cold organiza-
tion into a beloved social institution, capturing the al-
legiance of its members and even defining the identity 
of its communities.”
All colleges and universities have a social purpose, 
but for some, these responsibilities and roles have actu-
ally shaped their evolution and determined their char-
acter. The appearance of a distinct institutional saga 
involves many elements—visionary leadership; strong 
faculty and student cultures; unique programs; ideolo-
gies; and, of course, the time to accumulate the events, 
achievements, legends, and mythology that character-
ize long-standing institutions. For example, the saga of 
my alma mater, Yale University, was shaped over the 
centuries by old-boy traditions, such as secret societies 
(e.g., Skull and Bones); literature (from dime-novel he-
roes, such as Frank Merriwell and Dink Stover, to Buck-
ley’s God and Man at Yale); and national leadership 
(William H. Taft, George H. Bush, Bill Clinton, George 
W. Bush, and Gerald R. Ford—although the latter was 
first and foremost a Michigan man). Harvard’s saga 
is perhaps best captured by the response of a former 
Harvard president who, when asked what it takes to 
build a great institution like Harvard, responded sim-
ply, “Three hundred years!” Notre Dame draws its saga 
from the legends of the gridiron, that is, Knute Rockne, 
the Four Horsemen, and the Subway Alumni. Big Ten 
universities also have their symbols: fraternity and so-
rority life, campus protests, and gigantic football stadi-
ums.
While institutional sagas are easy to identify for 
older universities (e.g., North Carolina, Virginia, and 
Appendix 
The Michigan Saga
356
Michigan among the publics; Harvard, Yale, and Princ-
eton among the privates), they can sometimes be prob-
lematic to institutions rising rapidly to prominence. 
During the controversy over inappropriate use of gov-
ernment research funds at Stanford during the 1990s, 
the late Roger Heyns—former Michigan dean; chancel-
lor at the University of California, Berkeley; and then 
president of the Hewlett Foundation, adjacent to the 
Stanford campus—once observed to me that Stanford 
faced a particular challenge in becoming too good too 
fast.4 Prior to World War II, its reputation as “the farm” 
was well deserved. Stanford was peaceful, pastoral, and 
conservative. The extraordinary reputation it achieved 
first in the sciences and then across all the disciplines 
in the latter half of the twentieth century came on so 
abruptly that the institution sometimes found it diffi-
cult to live with its newfound prestige and visibility, as 
its inquisition by a congressional inquiry into misuse of 
research funds in the 1990s demonstrated.
Again to quote Burton Clark: “The institutional saga 
is a historically based, somewhat embellished under-
standing of a unique organization development. Col-
leges are prone to a remembrance of things past and 
a symbolism of uniqueness. The more special the his-
John Harvard’s statue (350 years old?) Yale’s Skull and Bones
Virginia’s Academical Village The “farm” at Stanford
Notre Dame’s “Touchdown Jesus” Michigan’s Powerplant Smokestack
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tory or the more forceful the claim to a place in history, 
the more intensively cultivated are the ways of sharing 
memory and symbolizing the institution.”5 A visit to 
the campuses of one of our distinguished private uni-
versities conveys just such an impression of history and 
tradition. Their ancient ivy-covered buildings and their 
statues, plaques, and monuments attesting to impor-
tant people and events of the past convey a sense that 
these institutions have evolved slowly over the centu-
ries—in careful and methodical ways—to achieve their 
present forms and define their institutional saga. 
In contrast, a visit to the campus of one of our great 
state universities conveys more of a sense of dyna-
mism and impermanence. Most of the buildings look 
new, even hastily constructed to accommodate rapid 
growth. The icons of the public university tend to be 
their football stadiums or the smokestacks of their 
central power plants, rather than ivy-covered build-
ings or monuments. In talking with campus leaders at 
public universities, one gets little sense that the history 
of these institutions is valued or recognized. Perhaps 
this is due to their egalitarian nature or, conversely, to 
the political (and politicized) process that structures 
their governance and all too frequently informs their 
Michigan Images (clockwise): Hill Auditorium, MLK Day March, Jonas Salk, 
University Hospital, Apollo 15 (all Michigan crew), Go Blue, Angell Hall (center)
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choice of leadership. The consequence is that the pub-
lic university evolves through geological layers, each 
generation paving over or obliterating the artifacts and 
achievements of its predecessors with a new layer of 
structures, programs, and practices. Hence, the first 
task of a new president of such an institution is that 
of unearthing and understanding its institutional saga.
Continuing in this spirit, then, what are the first im-
ages that come to mind when one mentions the Univer-
sity of Michigan? Academic activities such as students 
listening attentively to brilliant faculty in the lecture 
hall or studying in the library? Scientists toiling away 
late in the evenings in the laboratory, striving to under-
stand the universe; or scholars pouring over ancient 
manuscripts, rediscovering our human heritage? Not 
likely.
The University of Michigan is many things to many 
people, but its images are rarely stimulated by its core 
missions of teaching and scholarship. To some, the uni-
versity’s image is its football team, the Michigan Wol-
verines, decked out in those ferocious winged helmets 
as it stampedes into Michigan Stadium before a crowd 
of 110,000, rising to sing the Michigan fight song, Hail 
to the Victors. Others think first of a Michigan of the 
arts, where the world’s leading orchestras and artists 
come to perform in Hill Auditorium, one of the great 
concert halls of the world.
For some, Michigan represents the youthful con-
science of a nation—the birthplace of the teach-in pro-
tests against an unpopular war in Vietnam, site of the 
first Earth Day, and home of the century-old Michigan 
Daily, with student engagement in so many of the criti-
cal issues of the day. There is also the caring Michigan, 
as experienced by millions of patients who have been 
treated by the University of Michigan Medical Center, 
one of the nation’s great centers of medical research, 
teaching, and clinical care.
Then there is the Michigan of the cutting-edge re-
search that so improves the quality of our lives. For 
example, it was at Michigan, in 1952, that the clinical 
trials were conducted for the Salk polio vaccine. It was 
at Michigan that the gene responsible for cystic fibrosis 
was identified and cloned in the 1990s. And although 
others may have “invented” the Internet, it was Michi-
gan (together with another “big blue” partner, IBM) 
that built and managed the Internet backbone for the 
nation during the 1980s and early 1990s.
Michigan can also be seen as a university of the 
world, long renowned as a truly international center of 
learning. If you walk down the streets of any capital 
city in the world, you will encounter Michigan gradu-
ates, often in positions of leadership. Indeed, Michigan 
is even a university of the universe, with the establish-
ment of the first lunar chapter of the UM Alumni Asso-
ciation by the all-Michigan crew of Apollo 15.
These activities may serve as images of the universi-
ty for many. I would suggest, however, that they are less 
a conveyance of the nature of Michigan’s institutional 
saga than a consequence of its more fundamental tra-
ditions and character. To truly understand Michigan’s 
saga, one must go back in time almost two centuries 
ago, to the university’s founding in frontier America.
A University on the Frontier
It can be argued that it was in the Midwest, in fron-
tier towns such as Ann Arbor and Madison, that true 
universities first appeared in America. By augmenting 
the traditional mission of educating the young with 
faculty scholarship and public service to society, the 
emerging public state universities created a uniquely 
American university capable of responding to the 
needs of a rapidly changing nation in the 19th Century 
and that still dominates higher education today. 
The University of Michigan was established in 1817 
in the village of Detroit by an act of the Northwest Ter-
ritorial government and financed through the sale of 
Indian lands granted by the United States Congress. 
(Price, 2003) Since it benefited from this territorial land 
grant, the new university was subject to the Enlighten-
ment themes of the Northwest Ordinance guaranteeing 
civil rights and religious freedom. But equally signifi-
cant for our purposes was the Northwest Ordinance’s 
statement of the importance of education in the new 
territories: “Religion, morality, and knowledge being 
necessary to good government and the happiness of 
mankind, schools and the means of education shall for-
ever be encouraged.” (Northwest Ordinance, 1909)
The University of Michigan traces its earliest heri-
tage to two quite different models of higher education 
in 19th century Europe. Actually, the first incarnation 
of the University of Michigan proposed by Augus-
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tus Woodward, Secretary and later Governor of the 
Michigan Territory, was not a university but rather a 
centralized system of schools, libraries, and other cul-
tural institutions borrowing its model from the Univer-
site Imperiale de France founded by Napoleon a decade 
earlier. (Ruegg, 1996) Named “the Catholepistemiad or 
University of Michigania” by Woodward, this was ac-
tually an extraordinary vision for the times. It proposed 
an intellectual breadth far beyond the classical curricu-
lum of the colonial colleges that would be run by the 
professors rather than boards of churchman and de-
nominations like other American colleges of the early 
19th century. Woodward also proposed that it would be 
supported by taxation so that its primary schools were 
free and its higher education programs would require 
only a modest tuition from students. 
It was only after the State of Michigan entered the 
Union in 1837 that a new plan was adopted to focus 
the University on higher education, establishing it as 
a “state” university after the Prussian system, with 
programs in literature, science and arts; medicine; and 
law–the first three academic departments of the new 
university. The new Michigan State Legislature autho-
rized funds to purchase a campus for the University, 
and an enterprising group of citizens from Ann Arbor 
offered a 40 acre site in their community. (Actually, the 
group first wanted to attract the state capital, but that 
went to Lansing. Then they considered going after the 
state prison before finally offering the site for a univer-
sity.)
Because the University had already been in existence 
for two decades before the State of Michigan entered 
the Union in 1837, and because of the frontier society’s 
deep distrust of politics and politicians, the new state’s 
early constitution (1851) granted the University an un-
usual degree of autonomy as a “coordinate branch of 
state government,” with full powers over all Univer-
sity matters granted to its governing board of regents, 
although surprisingly enough it did not state the pur-
pose of the University. This constitutional autonomy, 
together with the fact that the University traces its ori-
gins to an act of Congress rather than a state legislature, 
has shaped an important feature of the University’s 
character. In financial terms, the University of Michi-
gan was actually a United States land grant university 
supported entirely by the sale of its federal lands and 
student fees rather than state resources until after the 
Civil War. Hence throughout its history the University 
has regarded itself as much as a national university as a 
state university, albeit with some discretion when deal-
ing with the Michigan State Legislature. 
Implicit in the new constitution was also a provision 
that the University’s regents be determined by state-
wide popular election, again reflecting public dissatis-
faction with both the selection and performance of the 
early-appointed regents. (The last appointed board re-
taliated by firing the professors at the University.) The 
constitution also provided for the University to be led 
by a president, who would preside over the meetings of 
the regents (without vote). Hence the first assignment 
The original building of the Catholepistemiad
or University of Michigania in Detroit, 1817
The words of the Northwest Ordinance 
in the auditorium of old University Hall
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of the newly elected board was to select a president for 
the University (after inviting back the fired professors). 
After an extensive search, they elected Henry Philip 
Tappan, a broadly educated professor of philosophy 
from New York, as the first president of the reconfig-
ured University.
Under Tappan’s leadership, the University rapidly 
began to evolve into yet a third European form with 
the appointment of its first president. In fact, one can 
make a strong case that with Tappan’s arrival, the Uni-
versity of Michigan became the first attempt in America 
to build a true university. At a time when the colonial 
colleges were teaching young boys the classical cur-
riculum of Greek, Latin, and rhetoric using the scho-
lastic methods to “transform savages into gentlemen”, 
much as the British public school, Tappan brought to 
Ann Arbor a vision of building a true university in the 
European sense, one which would not only conduct in-
struction and advanced scholarship, but also respond 
to popular needs. He was strongly influenced by Euro-
pean leaders such as Wilhelm von Humboldt, Prussian 
minister of education and founder of the University of 
Berlin, who stressed the importance of combining spe-
cialized research with humanistic teaching to define the 
intellectual structure of the university. (Ruegg, 2004; 
Clark, 2006) 
Tappan articulated a vision of the university as a 
capstone of civilization, a repository for the accumu-
lated knowledge of mankind, and a home for scholars 
dedicated to the expansion of human understanding. In 
his words, “a university is the highest possible form of 
an institution of learning. It embraces every branch of 
knowledge and all possible means of making new in-
vestigations and thus advancing knowledge.”(Tappan, 
1851) He aimed to develop “an institution that would 
cultivate the originality and genius of those seeking 
knowledge beyond the traditional curriculum, with a 
graduate school in which diligent and responsible stu-
dents could pursue their studies and research under the 
eye of learned scholars in an environment of enormous 
resources in books, laboratories, and museums”. (Peck-
ham, 1963) 
Henry Tappan’s concept for the University wove 
together the classical curriculum and mental disci-
pline of the collegiate model, the utilitarian emphasis 
of the newly emerging state universities, and the Ger-
man university emphasis on pure scholarship. (Thelin, 
2004) During his tenure, the University of Michigan 
broadened the classical curriculum to include the sci-
ences, planted the early seeds for a graduate school 
to distinguish postgraduate professional studies from 
undergraduate education, and introduced the seminar 
model of instruction for graduate education. (Peckham, 
1963) Furthermore Michigan faculty members carried 
this broader concept of the university with them as they 
moved on to leadership roles at other institutions (e.g., 
Andrew Dixon White at Cornell, Charles Kendall Ad-
ams at Cornell and Wisconsin, and Erastus Haven at 
Northwestern). (Rudolph, 1962)
Although premature for a frontier state, Tappan’s 
vision for the University of Michigan in the 1850s and 
1860s provided the first American model of a modern 
university. Hence from its founding, the University of 
Michigan has been identified with the most progressive 
forces in American higher education. The early colo-
nial colleges served the aristocracy of colonial society, 
stressing moral development over a liberal education, 
much as the English public schools, and based on a 
classical curriculum in subjects such as Greek, Latin, 
and rhetoric. In contrast, Michigan blended the classi-
cal curriculum with the European model that stressed 
faculty involvement in research and dedication to the 
preparation of future scholars. Michigan hired as its 
first professors not classicists but a zoologist and a ge-
ologist. Unlike other institutions of the time, Michigan 
added instruction in the sciences to the humanistic cur-
riculum, creating a hybrid that drew on the best of both 
a “liberal” and a “utilitarian” education. (Turner, 1988)
President Henry Tappan
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The University of Michigan can also claim to be one 
of the first truly public universities in America, creat-
ed by the Northwest Territorial government in a non-
sectarian spirit 20 years before Michigan was admitted 
to the Union. (Technically, the Universities of Georgia 
and North Carolina were the first state universities, but 
since they were highly influenced by the church–think 
“Chapel Hill”–they could not strictly be regarded as 
“public” in character.) (Thelin, 2004) 
One might also consider the University of Michigan 
as one of the earliest examples of the American research 
university, with its construction of one of the three larg-
est telescopes in the world, the first teaching laboratory 
building for chemistry, and the first courses in new 
disciplines such as bacteriology, forestry, meteorology, 
sociology, modern history, journalism, and American 
literature. In fact, almost every American intellectual 
movement from the mid-19th century onward must in-
clude some mention of Michigan. Beyond its impact on 
the traditional literature, arts, and science, the Univer-
sity led in the creation of many new disciplines such as 
the quantitative social sciences, biomedical disciplines, 
engineering sciences, and policy disciplines. (Turner, 
1988)
The influence of the University on the professions 
has also been immense. Michigan was the first univer-
sity in the West to pursue professional education, estab-
lishing its medical school in 1850, engineering courses 
in 1854, and a law school in 1859. Michigan joined with 
Columbia and Penn in creating the paradigm for medi-
cal practice and education by defining the M.D. as a 
graduate degree, introducing laboratory science in the 
curriculum, and opening the first university hospital 
for clinical training. Decades later, this model would 
be adopted to transform the rest of medicine through 
the Flexner Report of 1910. (Flexner, 1910) Moreover 
through the efforts of Henry Frieze, Michigan stimu-
lated the development of secondary education (high 
schools) throughout the Midwest. 
An Uncommon Education for the Common Man
By the late 19th Century, Michigan was recognized, 
to quote Harper’s Weekly, as “an institution in whose 
progress not a single State alone, but the whole country 
as well, may claim an interest”. (Harper’s Weekly, 1887) 
The magazine went on to note: “The most striking fea-
ture of the University is the broad and liberal spirit in 
which it does its work. Students are allowed the widest 
freedom consistent with sound scholarship in pursuing 
the studies of their choice. Women are admitted to all 
departments on equal terms with men; the doors of the 
University are open to all applicants who are properly 
qualified, from whatever part of the world they may 
come.”
Particularly notable here was the role of Michigan 
President James Angell in articulating the importance 
of Michigan’s commitment to provide “an uncommon 
education for the common man” while challenging the 
aristocratic notion of leaders of the colonial colleges 
such as Charles Eliot of Harvard. (Rudolph, 1962) An-
gell argued that Americans should be given opportuni-
ties to develop talent and character to the fullest. He 
portrayed the state university as the bulwark against 
The University of Michigan’s campus in 1852 (Cropsey Painting)
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The University of Michigan in 1887, as depicted in the famous article in Harper’s Weekly
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the aristocracy of wealth. This commitment continues 
today, when even in an era of severe fiscal constraints, 
the University still meets the full financial need of every 
Michigan student enrolling in its programs. 
The University has long placed high value on the 
diversity of its student body, both because of its com-
mitment to serve all of society, and because of its per-
ception that such diversity enhanced the quality of its 
educational programs. From its earliest years, Michigan 
sought to attract students from a broad range of ethnic 
and geographic backgrounds. In 1860, the regents re-
ferred “with partiality” to the “list of foreign students 
drawn thither from every section of our country.” For-
ty-six percent of the University’s students then came 
from other states and foreign countries. Although the 
Michigan legislature occasionally objected to this high 
out-of-state enrollment, the Regents reminded state 
government that the University had not been founded 
by state action or money but by a grant of land from 
the United States Congress, which support rendered its 
obligations at the national level. President Haven noted 
that the larger fees from out-of-state students provided 
much of the University’s income that subsidized in part 
the education of Michigan residents (a situation that 
continues today). 
The first African American students arrived on cam-
pus in 1868. Michigan was one of the first large uni-
versities in America to admit women in 1870. At the 
time, the rest of the nation looked on with a critical eye, 
certain that the experiment of co-education would fail. 
Although the first women students were true pioneers, 
the objects of intense scrutiny and some resentment, 
by 1898 the enrollment of women had increased to the 
point where they received 53 percent of Michigan’s un-
dergraduate degrees. The University’s constitutional 
autonomy enabled it to defend this commitment to di-
versity in the face of considerable political resistance to 
challenging the status quo, eventually taking the battle 
for diversity and equality of opportunity all the way to 
the United States Supreme Court in the landmark cases 
of 2003. In more contemporary terms, it seems clear that 
an important facet of the institutional saga of the Uni-
versity of Michigan would be its achievement of excel-
lence through diversity.
Michigan’s international presence in both students 
and activities has also been unusual for public univer-
sities. The University awarded the first doctorate to a 
Japanese citizen who later was instrumental in found-
ing the University of Tokyo. President Angell’s service 
in 1880-82 as United States Envoy to China established 
further the university’s great influence in Asia, includ-
ing providing the resources to establish Tsinghua Uni-
versity from the reparations from the Boxer Rebellion.
Hence in many ways, it was at the University of 
Michigan that Thomas Jefferson’s embrace of the prin-
ciples of the Enlightenment in his proposition for na-
tion, “We hold these truths to be self-evident: That all 
men are created equal”, was most fully embraced and 
realized. Whether characterized by gender, race, reli-
gion, socioeconomic background, ethnicity, or national-
ity–not to mention academic interests or political per-
suasion–the University has always taken great pride in 
the diversity of its students, faculty, and programs. 
The Biggest in the Land
Throughout its history, the University of Michigan 
has also been one of the nation’s largest universities, 
vying with the largest private universities such as Har-
vard and Columbia during the 19th and early 20th 
centuries, and then holding this position of national 
leadership until the emergence of the statewide pub-
lic university systems (e.g., the University of California 
and the University of Texas) in the post-WWII years. 
Perhaps this addiction to growth is best explained by 
Michigan’s president during the 1920s, Marion Bur-
ton, when he concluded that, “A state university must 
Spring Commencement on the Diag
gives a sense of Michigan’s massive scale
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accept happily the conclusion that it is destined to be 
large. If its state grows and prospers, it will naturally 
reflect those conditions.” (Peckham, 1963)
Although growth stabilized during the Depression 
years of the 1930s, enrollments exploded once again 
following World War II, growing to 20,000 in 1947, of 
whom 11,000 were returning veterans. To accommodate 
the growth of the campus, the Regents first purchased 
300 acres north of the Huron River as a North Campus, 
then later agreed to attach upper division senior col-
leges to the junior colleges in Flint and Dearborn to ac-
commodate the post-war baby boom population explo-
sion. In 1971, these senior colleges were separated off 
and given full four-year academic programs as regional 
campuses of the University. Growth of the Ann Arbor 
campus began to slow during the 1970s and 1980s, 
stabilizing at 35,000 students in the mid-1990s. But as 
state support continued to deteriorate, the University 
launched yet another major expansion over the first de-
cade of the new century, expanding to 44,000 students 
in an effort to capture the higher tuition revenue pro-
vided by major growth in out-of-state and international 
students, while maintaining its commitment to serve 
Michigan resident students regardless of need.
Today the Ann Arbor campus is the largest in the na-
tion–indeed, in the world–in facilities (34 million gsf), 
budget ($7 billion/year), and research activity ($1.3 
billion/year). The University continues to benefit from 
one of the largest alumni bodies in higher education, 
with over 500,000 living alumni. Michigan sends more 
of its graduates into professional study in fields such as 
law, medicine, engineering, and business than any oth-
er university in the nation. Michigan graduates are well 
represented in leadership roles in both the public and 
private sector and in most of the learned professions. 
The University’s influence on the nation and the world 
has been immense, both through the achievements of 
the faculty and staff on its campus and of its graduates 
as they continue on to roles in commerce, service, and 
leadership. 
Michigan Does Big Things!
Michigan students have often stimulated change in 
our society through their social activism and academic 
achievements. From the teach-ins against the Vietnam 
War in the 1960s to Earth Day in the 1970s, to the Michi-
gan Mandate in the 1980s, Michigan student activism 
has often been the catalyst for national movements. In 
a similar fashion, Michigan played a leadership role in 
public service, from John Kennedy’s announcement of 
the Peace Corps on the steps of the Michigan Union in 
1960 to the AmeriCorps in 1994. Its classrooms have of-
ten been battlegrounds over what colleges will teach, 
from challenges to the Great Books canon to more re-
cent confrontations over diversity and social inclu-
sion. This spirit of democracy and tolerance for diverse 
views among its students and faculty continues today.
Nothing could be more natural to the University 
of Michigan than challenging the status quo. Change 
has always been an important part of the University’s 
tradition. Michigan has long defined the model of the 
large, comprehensive, public research university, with 
a serious commitment to scholarship and progress. It 
has been distinguished by unusual breadth, a rich di-
versity of academic disciplines, professional schools, 
social and cultural activities, and intellectual pluralism. 
The late Clark Kerr, the president of the University of 
California, once referred to the University of Michigan 
as “the mother of state universities,” noting it was the 
first to prove that a high-quality education could be de-
livered at a publicly funded institution of higher learn-
ing. (Kerr, 1963)
This unrelenting commitment to academic excel-
lence, broad student access, and public service contin-
ues today. In virtually all national and international 
surveys, the University’s programs rank among the 
very best, with most of its schools, colleges, and depart-
ments ranking in quality among the top ten nationally 
and with several regarded as the leading programs in 
the nation. Other state universities have had far more 
generous state support than the University of Michigan. 
Others have had a more favorable geographical loca-
tion than “good, gray Michigan.” But it was Michigan’s 
unusual commitment to provide a college education of 
the highest possible quality to an increasingly diverse 
society–regardless of state support, policy, or politics–
that might be viewed as one of the University’s most 
important characteristics. The rapid expansion and 
growth of the nation during the late 19th and early 20th 
centuries demanded colleges and universities capable 
of serving all of its population rather than simply the 
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One of the world’s largest telescopes The nation’s first instructional chemistry laboratory
The nation’s first university hospital The world’s first academic programs in atomic energy
Apollo 15, the All-Michigan mission to the moon Michigan’s leadership in developing the Internet
Michigan is one of the few universities capable of changing the world.
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elite as the key to a democratic society. Here Michigan 
led the way in both its commitment to wide access and 
equality and in the leadership it provided for higher 
education in America.
A list of many of the ways that the University of 
Michigan has contributed to society–on occasion even 
changing the world, is provided at the end of this chap-
ter.
The Key to Michigan’s Leadership
Interestingly enough, both the University’s growth 
and success in building an unusually broad array of 
world-class programs had little to do with the generos-
ity of state support. For the first half-century following 
its founding in 1817, the University was supported en-
tirely from its federal land grant endowment and the 
fees derived from students. During these early years, 
state government both mismanaged and then mis-
appropriated the funds from the Congressional land 
grants intended to support the University. (Peckham, 
1963) The University did not receive direct state ap-
propriations until 1867, and for most of its history, state 
support has actually been quite modest relative to many 
other states. Although there were periods during which 
state support matched those for other public universi-
ties, such as the 1920s and 1960s when both adequate 
appropriations and support for facilities became avail-
able, these were followed by long periods of deteriorat-
ing state support (e.g. the Depression years of the 1930s 
and then the recessions of the 1970s , 1980s, and 2000s). 
More specifically, the strong support of both operat-
ing appropriations and capital facilities enabling strong 
growth of the Ann Arbor campus during the post-WWII 
years began to slow in the 1960s. The efforts of state 
government to take over direct control of all campus 
construction in direct conflict with Regental authority 
led to a moratorium in state-funded campus construc-
tion during the late 1960s and much of the 1970s. The 
impact of the OPEC oil embargo and the emergence of 
strong competition from the Japanese auto industry 
weakened state tax revenues. Although the University 
and the state shared in the support of the Replacement 
Hospital Project in the early 1980s, the drain of this 
mammoth project on the state funds once again severe-
ly limited state support for capital facilities.
President Harold Shapiro understood well the 
longer-term implications of weakening state support 
(dropping from 65% to less than 30% of the academic 
budget during his tenure). He moved in the 1980s to 
put in place a series of major financial measures to sus-
tain the quality and capacity of the University. First a 
more conservative financial management and invest-
ment strategy was implemented, making tough de-
cisions to set priorities, focusing resources to achieve 
excellence, and beginning a major decentralization of 
authority and responsibility for resource decisions that 
was better aligned with both revenue generation and 
cost containment. As the state subsidy of the costs of 
educational programs declined, it was necessary to 
compensate with major increases in tuition, highly dif-
ferentiated between Michigan resident and out-of-state 
students. Finally, aggressive fund-raising efforts were 
launched with campaigns raising over $300 million 
during the 1980s and $1.4 billion in the 1990s. More ag-
gressive efforts were taken to actively manage the Uni-
versity’s endowment, increasing it from a modest $250 
million during the 1980s to over $3 billion by the late 
1990s. 
As a consequence of these actions, the financial 
strength of the University rose dramatically even as 
state support declined to less than 10% of its total op-
erating budget. In fact by 1997 the University of Michi-
gan earned Wall Street’s highest AAa credit rating, join-
ing the University of Texas (with its rich oil assets) as 
the only public universities to achieve this. It would 
be this unusually high credit rating that would allow 
President Harold Shapiro
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the University to borrow at minimum interest rates the 
resources to sustain further campus facility expansion 
and renovation despite the fact that the state support 
would continue to decline to one of the lowest levels in 
the nation (dropping to 47th among the states by 2010). 
Yet even as the University became predominantly sup-
ported by private resources (tuition and gifts) and fed-
eral grants (for research and student financial aid), it 
was able to sustain its strong commitment to serve the 
needs of the state. As Frank Rhodes, a former Michigan 
dean and provost before becoming president of Cornell 
put it, Michigan had become the prototype of a “pri-
vately financed but publicly committed” university, 
a description that characterizes many of the nation’s 
leading public research universities today.
The real key to the University’s quality and impact 
over its two centuries of history has certainly not been 
support by the State of Michigan, but rather the very 
unusual autonomy granted the institution by the state 
constitution of 1851 as a “coordinate branch of state 
government”. This unusual characteristic of consti-
tutional autonomy for the young university not only 
arose from the concerns of a frontier state about the role 
of government but also reflected the importance of free-
dom as a key Enlightenment theme embraced by Jef-
ferson and his colleagues in defining the early structure 
of the republic and later became an important founding 
principle of the Northwest Ordinance that led to the 
creation of the University. 
This constitutional autonomy, together with the fact 
that the University traces its origins to an act of Con-
gress rather than a state legislature, has shaped an im-
portant feature of the University’s character. Through-
out its history the University has regarded itself as 
much as a national university as a state university, as 
exemplified by the declaration of its early Regents:
“The University of Michigan is indebted for its ex-
istence of the munificence of Congress, in the redemp-
tion of its solemn pledge given to the whole Northwest 
that ‘schools and the means of education should for-
ever be encouraged’, and to keep up the mutual good 
feeling between our State and the General Government 
in which the endowment of the University originated. 
The doors of all its Departments are open to students 
from every State in the Union, upon the same terms as 
to those of our own State; so that it may, in some sense, 
with propriety, be styled a National Institution, and ev-
ery State in the Union has an interest in its prosperity.” 
(Regents Minutes, 1859) 
Furthermore, Michigan’s constitutional autonomy, 
periodically reaffirmed through court tests and con-
stitutional conventions, has enabled the University to 
have much more control over its own destiny than most 
other public universities. (Peckham, 1963) 
The University has always been able to set its own 
goals for the quality of its programs rather than al-
lowing these to be dictated by the vicissitudes of state 
policy, support, or public opinion. Put another way, al-
though the University is legally “owned” by the people 
of the state, it has never been obligated to adhere to the 
priorities or whims of a particular generation of Michi-
gan citizens. Rather, it has been viewed as an enduring 
social institution with a duty of stewardship to com-
mitments made by generations past and a compelling 
obligation to take whatever actions were necessary to 
build and protect its capacity to serve future genera-
tions. Even though these actions might conflict from 
time to time with public opinion or the prevailing po-
litical winds of state government, the University’s con-
stitutional autonomy clearly gave it the ability to set its 
own course. When it came to objectives such as pro-
gram quality or access to educational opportunity, the 
University of Michigan has always viewed this as an 
institutional decision rather than succumbing to public 
or political pressures.
The Michigan Saga
What might be suggested for the University of 
Michigan institutional saga in view of the University’s 
history, its traditions and roles, and its leadership over 
the years? Among the possible candidates from Michi-
gan’s history are the following characteristics:
The Catholepistemiad or University of Michigania 
(the capstone of a system of public education)
The flagship of public universities or “mother of 
state universities”
A commitment to providing “an uncommon educa-
tion for the common man”
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The “broad and liberal spirit” of its students and 
faculty
The University’s control of its own destiny, due to 
its constitutional autonomy providing political 
independence as a state university and to an un-
usually well-balanced portfolio of assets provid-
ing independence from the usual financial con-
straints on a public university
An institution diverse in character yet unified in 
values 
A relish for innovation and excitement 
A center of critical inquiry and learning
A tradition of student and faculty activism
A heritage of leadership
The leaders and best” (to borrow a phrase from 
Michigan’s fight song, The Victors)
But one more element of the Michigan saga seems 
particularly appropriate during these times of chal-
lenge and change in higher education. It is certainly 
true that the vast wealth of several of the nation’s elite 
private universities–e.g., Harvard, Yale, Princeton, and 
Stanford–can focus investments in particular academic 
areas far beyond anything that Michigan or almost any 
other university in the nation can achieve. They are 
capable of attracting faculty and students of extraordi-
nary quality and supporting them with vast resources. 
Yet, Michigan has one asset that these universities 
will never be able to match: its unique combination of 
quality, breadth, scale, and spirit. This enables Michi-
gan to take risks far beyond anything that could be 
matched by a private university. Because of their rela-
tively modest size, most elite private universities tend 
to take a rather conservative approach to academic pro-
grams and appointments, since a mistake could seri-
ously damage a small academic unit. Michigan’s vast 
size and breadth allows it to experiment and innovate 
on a scale far beyond that tolerated by most institu-
tions, as evidenced by its long history of leadership in 
higher education. It can easily recover from any fail-
ures it encounters on its journeys along high-risk paths. 
This ability to take risks, to experiment and innovate, 
to explore various new directions in teaching, research, 
and service, enables Michigan’s unique role in Ameri-
can higher education. During a time of great change in 
society, Michigan’s most important institutional saga is 
that of a pathfinder and a trailblazer, building on its tra-
dition of leadership and relying on its unusual combi-
nation of quality, capacity, and breadth, to reinvent the 
university, again and again, for new times, new needs, 
and new worlds.
Here, perhaps we should be more precise in our 
choice of descriptors: pathfinders are those who identify 
new directions; trailblazers explore the new pathways; 
pioneers build the roads along the new paths that others 
can follow; and settlers occupy the new territory. (Cheri 
Pancake, 2003) Hence we suggest that Michigan should 
be viewed first and foremost both as a pathfinder and a 
trail-blazer, identifying possible paths into new territo-
ry and blazing a trail for others to follow. Michigan has 
also been at times a pioneer, building roads that others 
could follow (e.g., the Internet). 
Whether in academic innovation (e.g., the quantita-
tive social sciences), social responsiveness (e.g., its ear-
ly admission of women, minorities, and international 
students), or its willingness to challenge the status quo 
(e.g., teach-ins, Earth Day, and the Michigan Mandate), 
Michigan’s history reveals this pathfinding and trail-
blazing character time and time again. Recently, when 
Michigan won the 2003 Supreme Court case concerning 
the use of race in college admissions, the general reac-
tion of other colleges and universities was “Well, that’s 
what we expect of Michigan. They carry the water for 
us on these issues.” When Michigan, together with IBM 
and MCI, built NSFnet during the 1980s and expanded 
it into the Internet, this again was the type of leadership 
the nation expected from the University.
Continuing with the frontier analogy, while Michi-
gan has a long history of success as a pathfinder, trail-
blazer, and occasional pioneer, it has usually stumbled 
as a settler, that is, in attempting to follow the paths 
blazed by others. All too often this leads to complacen-
cy and even stagnation at an institution like Michigan. 
The University almost never makes progress by simply 
trying to catch up with others.
Michigan travelers in Europe and Asia usually en-
counter great interest in what is happening in Ann Ar-
bor, in part because universities around the world see 
the University of Michigan as a possible model for their 
own future. Certainly they respect—indeed, envy—
distinguished private universities, such as Harvard 
and Stanford. But as public institutions themselves, 
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they realize that they will never be able to amass the 
wealth of these elite private institutions. Instead, they 
see Michigan as the model of an innovative university, 
straddling the characteristics of leading public and pri-
vate universities.
Time and time again colleagues mention the “Mich-
igan model” or the “Michigan mystique.” Of course, 
people mean many different things by these phrases: 
the University’s unusually strong and successful com-
mitment to diversity; its hybrid funding model com-
bining the best of both public and private universities; 
its strong autonomy from government interference; or 
perhaps the unusual combination of quality, breadth, 
and capacity that gives Michigan the capacity to be in-
novative, to take risks. Of course, all these multiple per-
spectives illustrate particular facets of what it means to 
be “the leaders and best.”
The institutional saga of the University of Michigan 
involves a combination of quality, size, breadth, inno-
vation, and pioneering spirit. The University has never 
aspired to be Harvard or the University of California, 
although it greatly admires these institutions. Rather, 
Michigan possesses a unique combination of character-
istics, particularly well suited to exploring and charting 
the course for higher education as it evolves to serve a 
changing world.
And it is this unique character as a pathfinder, trail-
blazer, and pioneer that should shape the University’s 
mission, vision, and goals for the future. Such bold ef-
forts both capture and enliven the institutional saga 
of the University of Michigan. And these are the traits 
that must be recognized, honored, and preserved as the 
University enters its third century.
